Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Carol D. Moore’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the dismissal was proper under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases that are essentially appeals of state court judgments. Applying this standard, the appellate court reviewed the record and found no reversible error in the lower court’s application of the doctrine to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against the attorneys and law firm. Consequently, the dismissal stands, and the case remains closed without prejudice, meaning the plaintiff is barred from relitigating these specific claims in federal court under the current jurisdictional constraints but may potentially refile if the underlying state proceedings are resolved differently or if a new cause of action arises.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The fourth-circuit denied Said Abdi Fooley a certificate of appealability and dismissed his appeal from the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as successive and unauthorized. The court applied the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and *Gonzalez v. Thaler*, which requires a prisoner to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right to obtain such a certificate. Specifically, because the district court denied relief on procedural grounds, Fooley was required to demonstrate that both the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that his motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. After independently reviewing the record, the court concluded that Fooley failed to make this requisite showing. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without oral argument, leaving the district court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Qinbin Chen’s convictions for unauthorized access device fraud, conspiracy to commit unauthorized access device fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit international money laundering, but reversed his two substantive convictions for international promotion money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A). The court applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard, viewing facts in the light most favorable to the government, and found ample evidence that Chen knowingly trafficked Walmart gift cards with specific intent to defraud victims by facilitating their rapid redemption before they could be cancelled. Regarding aggravated identity theft, the court held that while the district court failed to instruct the jury on the Supreme Court’s *Dubin* “crux” standard, no plain error occurred because the use of the stolen debit card was central to Chen’s fraud scheme, not merely ancillary, and Chen had invited any potential instructional error. Conversely, the court reversed the substantive money laundering convictions because direct evidence from bank statements showed the specific funds transferred from overseas buyers sat in Chen’s accounts without being used to reinvest in or promote his unlawful gift card scheme, failing to meet the statutory “intent to promote” requirement established in *United States v. Heaps*. The conspiracy conviction for money laundering was affirmed based on circumstantial evidence that Chen’s illicit expenditures exceeded his legitimate income, supporting an inference of intent to plow back proceeds into the scheme generally. Because the vacatur of the substantive money laundering convictions voided the entire sentence under the sentencing package doctrine, the court vacated Chen’s 84-month prison term and remanded for resentencing, declining to address procedural challenges regarding the forfeiture order as they would be cured on remand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 6:20-CV-01293-TC)

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the tractor manufacturer had no legal duty to warn the operator that dismounting a moving tractor was dangerous. Applying Kansas substantive law under diversity jurisdiction, the court determined that the open and obvious danger exception under K.S.A. § 60-3305(c) absolved the defendant of its obligation to warn or instruct consumers about hazards that are patent and should be realized by a reasonable user. The court reasoned that exiting a vehicle while it is in motion constitutes an “open and obvious” hazard where the risk speaks for itself, noting that even the plaintiff’s own witnesses admitted that stepping off a moving tractor is dangerous and that one would have to be “suicidal” to do so. Consequently, the manufacturer was not required to provide specific warnings regarding this universally recognized risk, nor did the manual’s description of the automatic parking brake undermine the commonsense understanding that operators should not dismount while the vehicle is moving. Because the danger was sufficiently obvious as a matter of law, the issue was properly resolved by the court rather than the jury. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the plaintiff’s verdict and the associated liability apportionment against the defendant are vacated. The case will be remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant as a matter of law, effectively dismissing the failure-to-warn claim without further trial or reconsideration.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 260-month sentence of Jorge Luis Perez for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the denial of Perez’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, determining that substantial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution supported the verdict; specifically, law enforcement recovered over 50 grams of methamphetamine packaged for distribution from Perez’s vehicles, and a firearm was found within arms reach of Perez near drugs and cash. Regarding the sentence, the court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard to assess procedural and substantive reasonableness, concluding that the district court correctly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range which is presumptively reasonable. The court also conducted an *Anders v. California* review of the record and found no meritorious issues for appeal, ordering counsel to inform Perez of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 4:21-cr-00163-

The Ninth Circuit vacated Attila Colar’s convictions on 44 federal counts related to alleged Paycheck Protection Program fraud and obstruction of justice, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate a colorable claim of actual juror bias raised by an alternate juror who expressed strong negative reactions to Colar’s defense theory regarding racial and religious targeting before hearing any evidence. The court applied the Sixth Amendment standard requiring an impartial jury, noting that the participation of even one biased juror constitutes structural error. The panel established that once a colorable claim of actual bias arises, a district court must conduct a suitable investigation before the juror continues to serve; this duty applies equally to alternate jurors and cannot be deferred until a seat opens on the regular panel. The court found the district court’s belated inquiry inadequate because it occurred only after the juror had heard evidence and failed to unequivocally confirm that the juror could set aside his expressed bias or withstand the recurrence of the defense theory throughout the trial. Because the record remained unclear regarding the juror’s impartiality, any doubt was required to be resolved against him. As a practical consequence, Colar is entitled to a new trial because the presence of a potentially biased juror deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. While the court affirmed the denial of Colar’s motion for acquittal in a separate memorandum disposition, the conviction was vacated due to the structural error regarding juror bias.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Rebecca Barker’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during a search of her home, holding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. The court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test established in *Illinois v. Gates*, requiring only a “fair probability” that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place, and reviewed the magistrate judge’s determination with great deference to see if there was a substantial basis for the finding. The court concluded that the affidavit provided sufficient nexus between the suspected drug trafficking activity and Barker’s residence. The affidavit detailed that law enforcement was surveilling the home for drug activity, observed Barker in possession of a controlled substance and a firearm, and witnessed Gill—a known drug trafficker—leave Barker’s residence immediately before being apprehended with over 60 grams of methamphetamine and cash. The court reasoned that these facts, combined with the affiant’s training and experience regarding where drug dealers typically store evidence, created a fair probability that evidence would be found in the home, even without direct observation of Gill entering the house or explicit statements linking specific items to the residence. As a practical consequence, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, meaning the evidence seized from Barker’s home remains admissible for her federal trial and conviction. The court also rejected Barker’s alternative arguments that the search violated North Carolina state law or that her counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, noting that state law does not alter Fourth Amendment standards and that no reasonable probability existed that a timely objection would have resulted in suppression given the probable cause finding.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Luke D. Patterson’s motion for reconsideration of his denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s decision, concluding that the lower court did not err in denying the motion. Although the district court treated the filing as a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, the appellate court noted in a footnote that the filing was untimely under Rule 59(e) and should have been treated as a Rule 60(b) motion; however, this procedural classification did not alter the outcome. Under controlling precedent, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not permit review of the underlying judgment. Consequently, Patterson’s request for habeas relief remains denied, and the district court’s original order stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The seventh-circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Angelica Mendoza Rubio for conspiracy to commit money laundering, rejecting her arguments that the district court erred by applying a role enhancement and failing to consider sentencing disparities among coconspirators. The court held that the record supported the application of a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) because Mendoza Rubio acted as a manager or supervisor; she exercised sufficient control and authority by orchestrating and coordinating the activities of her coconspirators, including directing cash pickups, monitoring deposits, and instructing others on Bitcoin purchases, which satisfied the requirement that she played a critical managerial role despite not being an organizer or leader. Regarding the claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), the court found no procedural error because the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence within the binding plea agreement range, which necessarily constitutes meaningful consideration of disparity factors, and further determined that the substantive sentence was reasonable given Mendoza Rubio’s unique role as the sole client contact and her critical accounting skills that legitimized the fraud. Consequently, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin is affirmed, and Mendoza Rubio must serve the 60-month prison term followed by a three-year term of supervised release.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The D.C. Circuit affirmed Peter K. Navarro’s conviction for two counts of contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192. The court held that executive privilege was not validly invoked in this case because the power to assert the privilege rests exclusively with the President or a designee, and neither former President Trump nor an authorized agent affirmatively claimed the privilege regarding the Select Committee’s subpoena. The court found no clear error in the district court’s factual determination that Navarro unilaterally asserted privilege without direction from the President, noting that the sitting President explicitly declined to assert privilege and that no formal invocation occurred. Furthermore, the court ruled that even if privilege had been invoked, it would not have excused Navarro’s default because the subpoena sought information regarding his public statements and private publications, which fall outside the scope of presidential communications privilege. Regarding the jury instructions, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that a defendant’s good-faith mistaken belief that executive privilege applied is not a defense to a willful failure to comply with a congressional subpoena, citing binding precedent under *Sinclair v. United States* and *Licavoli v. United States*. Consequently, Navarro’s separation-of-powers defense failed, and his conviction stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.