Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 3:21-cv-03496-

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., holding that the district court erred by instructing the jury that Plaintiff Surgical Instrument Service Company, Inc. (SIS) was required to prove the “Kodak/Epic factors” to establish a valid antitrust aftermarket market. The court clarified that these four factors—regarding information costs, switching costs, and the general knowledge of restrictions—are applicable only in “Kodak-style” claims where a plaintiff alleges market power in a single-brand downstream aftermarket despite the defendant’s lack of market power in the competitive foremarket. In this case, SIS presented evidence demonstrating that Intuitive possessed over 99% market share in the foremarket for minimally invasive soft-tissue surgical robots and leveraged that dominance to maintain 100% market share in the aftermarket for robot attachment instruments. Because SIS brought a standard foremarket/aftermarket tying claim based on proven foremarket monopoly power, rather than a Kodak-style claim relying on aftermarket lock-in alone, the court ruled that proof of the Kodak/Epic factors was not required under the Rule of Reason. Additionally, the panel rejected Intuitive’s alternative argument for judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence. The court found that Intuitive waived its challenge regarding the sufficiency of evidence proving market power prior to SIS’s entry in 2019 because it failed to raise this specific ground in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motions. Furthermore, even assuming the argument was preserved, the court determined the evidence at trial was legally sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Intuitive possessed market power prior to 2019 and that its process for approving third-party products and services was illusory. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the judgment entered in favor of Intuitive is vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, allowing the antitrust claims to be re-evaluated without the erroneous jury instruction regarding the Kodak/Epic factors.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 2:21-cv-01676-APG-MDC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The court applied a de novo standard of review to determine whether the defendants had waived their right to arbitrate. Under the applicable legal test, waiver requires two elements: knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and intentional acts inconsistent with that right. The court found that the defendants satisfied both elements because they were aware of their arbitration agreements as a condition of employment yet actively sought merits determinations by answering the complaint and filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim without asserting their right to arbitrate. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that they could not move to compel arbitration due to the plaintiff’s anonymity, noting that seeking judgment on the merits evinced partiality for judicial resolution. Consequently, the defendants are deemed to have waived their right to arbitration, and the case proceeds in district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 3:24-cv-02008-IM

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the plaintiffs’ motion to remand and dismissing their claims against the Oregon citizen defendants, Peter and Bette Richards. The court held that the non-diverse defendants were fraudulently joined because the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against them under settled Oregon law, thereby satisfying the exception to the complete diversity requirement for removal jurisdiction. The court applied the standard for fraudulent joinder, which requires the removing party to show that the plaintiff “fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.” The panel analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims under Oregon’s Employer Liability Law (ELL) and the Oregon Safe Employment Act (OSEA), concluding that the Richards were not liable as “employers,” “owners,” or “indirect employers” because the work was performed at a private home by nonsubject workers. Regarding the negligence claim, the court noted that Oregon law generally limits liability for dangerous work to the extent of ELL liability, which did not exist here. Finally, the premises liability claim failed because the injury resulted from defective equipment owned by an independent contractor rather than a condition of the premises. As a practical consequence, the federal court retains subject matter jurisdiction over the case based on diversity between the remaining parties, and the dismissal of the claims against the Richards defendants stands, leaving the case to proceed solely against the non-diverse defendant, Vermeer Manufacturing Company.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 3:23-cv-06691-VC

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Optum Services, Inc., dismissing Maria Ledezma’s religious accommodation claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The court held that Ledezma failed to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because her objection to the employer’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement was not based on a sincere religious belief. Applying the standard set forth in *Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.* and its recent precedent in *Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center*, the court ruled that a plaintiff must plead a sufficient nexus between their religion and the specific belief conflicting with a work requirement, noting that invocations of broad religious tenets cannot convert secular preferences into religious convictions. The court found Ledezma’s objection materially identical to the one rejected in *Detwiler*: while she invoked the biblical principle that her body is a “temple of the Holy Spirit,” her specific refusal of the vaccine was grounded in personal medical judgments regarding potential harm and a longstanding preference for holistic healthcare over allopathic treatments. The court determined that Ledezma’s reliance on Scripture to support her personal health choices did not transform those secular preferences into religious mandates, as doing so would require courts to evaluate the validity or authenticity of different religious sources or pathways to conviction. Consequently, because her belief was deemed secular in nature, she could not establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, and the summary judgment in favor of the employer stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a prisoner civil rights complaint brought under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the plaintiff, who alleged violations of his constitutional rights regarding conditions of confinement and the actions of prison officials, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Specifically, the plaintiff did not properly appeal a grievance decision within the timeframe mandated by the Illinois Department of Corrections’ rules or failed to provide sufficient detail in his administrative filings to put the prison officials on notice of the specific claims he now asserts. The court applied the standard that exhaustion must be completed before filing suit and noted that while courts may allow for equitable tolling, the plaintiff offered no valid reason for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements. Consequently, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, though the dismissal is subject to the possibility of the plaintiff re-filing if he can demonstrate proper exhaustion or a valid excuse for non-exhaustion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 4:23-cr-00021-RRB-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed David Malyk’s conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), rejecting his challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found during a search of Unit 3A in an Alaska apartment complex. Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings, the panel held that the search was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court determined that probation officers possessed probable cause to believe Malyk resided in Unit 3A based on the totality of the circumstances. This included prior observations of Malyk entering the unit, evidence found during a search of his girlfriend’s apartment (Unit 2A) linking him to the complex—such as his Department of Corrections wristband, mail, and a registered vehicle—and subsequent findings that Unit 1A was used for storage containing a key to Unit 3A and a cat previously seen at Unit 2A. The court further rejected Malyk’s argument that law enforcement officers acted as a “stalking horse” by directing the search; it found no evidence that police initiated or directed the action, noting instead that probation officers requested assistance for protection and investigation purposes while performing their official duties. As a result of the affirmation, the conviction stands, and the judgment of the District Court for the District of Alaska is final.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order denying Salvador Cabrera Arvizo’s motion to reopen proceedings regarding his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the BIA’s denial, noting that motions to reopen are disfavored and agencies possess broad discretion. To warrant reopening, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood” that new evidence, combined with the existing record, establishes prima facie eligibility for relief. The court found substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard. Although the Petitioner submitted new evidence including threatening text messages, police reports, and declarations regarding threats from a Mexican cartel, the court held these materials were insufficient to establish that he would be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the Mexican government. The court reasoned that the Petitioner’s general assertions about cartel power and police corruption amounted to “speculative conclusions or vague assertions” unsupported by the specific evidence submitted. Consequently, the BIA did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in concluding the motion failed to establish a prima facie case for CAT relief. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied, and the stay of removal remains in effect only until the mandate issues; the Petitioner’s separate motion to stay removal is otherwise denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Ninth Circuit denied Miguel Angel Gonzalez-Argueta’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The court held that Gonzalez-Argueta failed to demonstrate the requisite nexus between the claimed harm and his status as a former Salvadoran police officer, rendering him ineligible for relief. The panel applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the agency’s factual findings regarding eligibility. In determining whether a nexus existed for a petitioner claiming persecution based on membership in the particular social group of “former police officers,” the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent (specifically *Sanjaa v. Sessions* and *Ayala v. Holder*) which limits the analysis to evidence of persecution experienced after the petitioner exited the police force. The court found that all threats Gonzalez-Argueta received occurred while he was an active officer, and because he and his family had not been threatened since he left the force, the agency’s conclusion that there was no nexus was supported by substantial evidence. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied, and the order of removal to El Salvador remains in effect. The court noted that a temporary stay of removal remains in place only until the mandate issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Salome Johnson’s amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the *Feres* doctrine established in *Feres v. United States*, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The court determined that the record contained no reversible error regarding the application of this rule, which generally bars service members from suing the government for injuries incident to service. Consequently, the judgment dismissing the case is upheld, and oral argument was dispensed with as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the written materials.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Sindi Paz Pineda and her daughter regarding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court affirmed the agency’s determinations, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the petitioners failed to establish an objective basis for a fear of religious persecution and that the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to control private actors who would inflict harm. Under the standard of review, administrative factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise, and because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum, ineligibility for asylum necessitates ineligibility for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Additionally, the court declined to review claims regarding the petitioners’ credibility and the failure to develop the record because these issues were not raised before the BIA, thereby failing to satisfy the exhaustion requirement mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Consequently, the petition is denied, and no relief is granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.