Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The eleventh-circuit denied the Center for Biological Diversity’s petition for review of the Environmental Protection Agency’s approval of Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC’s application to use phosphogypsum in a road construction pilot project on private land. The court held that the EPA did not violate the Clean Air Act regulations found at 40 C.F.R. § 61.206 (Subpart R) and that its decision was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court first established that it had jurisdiction, finding that the Center possessed associational standing because a member living near the facility demonstrated concrete and particularized injuries to his health and property use from radioactive emissions, which were traceable to the EPA’s approval and redressable by vacatur or remand. The court also rejected Mosaic Fertilizer’s argument that the case was moot due to the completion of construction, noting that a favorable decision could still alter the agency’s ongoing monitoring obligations or require reconsideration of the project’s conditions. On the merits, the court ruled that the regulatory text of Subpart R does not categorically prohibit road construction as an “other purpose” use of phosphogypsum; rather, the regulation permits such uses upon EPA approval if they are at least as protective of public health as disposal in a stack or mine. The court further determined that even if the EPA applied an incorrect risk threshold (3 in 10,000 instead of the Center’s preferred 9 in 100,000), any such error was harmless because the calculated risks for all exposure scenarios were orders of magnitude lower than either threshold. Finally, the court found the EPA’s risk assessment methodology well-supported and not arbitrary or capricious, as the Agency reasonably limited its analysis to the specific parameters of the pilot project, excluded the “reclaimer” scenario as implausible given the site’s existing industrial nature, and properly accepted older radium sampling data while conditioning approval on future sampling. Consequently, the petition was denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court imposing a sentence on Jacqueline Brewster following her guilty plea to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(2). The court determined there was no reversible error in the record after reviewing the case materials. Consequently, the sentence remains in effect, and oral argument was dispensed with as the facts and legal contentions were deemed adequately presented in the written briefs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:20-cv-00697-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of student borrowers who brought a civil RICO claim against ITT Technical Institute loan servicers Vervent, Inc., Activate Financial, LLC, and their executives. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the plaintiffs neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before filing suit in April 2020, meaning the claims were not time-barred by RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. Applying the “injury discovery” rule, the panel determined that the clock began to run only when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the fraudulent nature of their loan payments, which occurred after ITT’s high-profile collapse and bankruptcy in September 2016. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that public regulatory investigations into ITT or irregularities in loan documents placed borrowers on inquiry notice earlier, reasoning that ordinary student borrowers are not held to the same level of financial sophistication as industry insiders or sophisticated investors and could not reasonably be expected to infer hidden fraud from complex regulatory filings or routine payment obligations. Additionally, the court ruled that the defendants failed to preserve their challenge regarding proximate causation for appellate review because the district court’s denial of summary judgment on that issue turned on disputed factual matters, and the defendants did not renew the specific challenge in a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Consequently, the twelve-million-dollar jury verdict stands, and the case is remanded to enforce the district court’s judgment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:23-cr-00174-RSM-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Volodimyr Pigida’s convictions for conspiracy, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and related felonies arising from his operation of a Ponzi scheme known as Trend Sound Promoter. The court rejected Pigida’s challenges to the district court’s rulings on four specific grounds. First, regarding the jury unanimity instruction, the court held that no abuse of discretion occurred because the evidence supported a single overall conspiracy involving overlapping wire, mail, and bankruptcy fraud; furthermore, any error was harmless given the convictions on all counts. Second, concerning the admission of prior act testimony from a victim-witness, the court determined that even if erroneous, the admission did not materially affect the verdict in light of the overwhelming evidence presented during the eleven-day trial. Third, the court found no reversible error in admitting an FBI agent’s testimony regarding the Securities and Exchange Commission’s initial referral to explain the investigation’s origin rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, noting any error was also harmless. Fourth, the district court correctly denied Pigida’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal because his omission of a $1.45 million withdrawal from bankruptcy records constituted a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3), distinguishing it from the Supreme Court’s holding in *Thompson v. United States* regarding misleading but true statements. Finally, the court upheld the denial of an acceptance of responsibility sentencing adjustment because Pigida only admitted guilt after a jury verdict and a months-long flight from justice, having previously shifted blame to “hackers” and his own inexperience. The practical consequence is that Pigida’s convictions stand, and he remains subject to sentencing by the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:20-cv-00427-ART-CSD

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Richard Granados’ federal habeas corpus petition challenging his state convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and attempted murder. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court’s rejection of Granados’ claims was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence claim, the court applied the standard from *Jackson v. Virginia*, which requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel found that the Nevada Supreme Court reasonably concluded that trial testimony regarding Granados’ feud with the victims, his search for them, and his actions immediately before the shooting supported a finding of specific intent to commit murder and negated a claim of self-defense under Nevada law. On the ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning plea negotiations, the court applied the *Strickland v. Washington* standard, requiring proof that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability the result would have been different had counsel performed adequately. The panel determined that the state court’s application of this test was reasonable given Granados’ admission that his counsel conveyed all plea offers and urged him to accept one, undermining his assertion that he would have accepted a plea but for ineffective assistance. Finally, the court rejected the cumulative error claim, finding no multiple instances of trial error that rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair under *Parle v. Runnels*. As a result, Granados’ request for relief was denied, and the state convictions remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:23-cv-05786-BHS

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Aaron Stewart and Tierra Harvest, LLC’s Fourth Amendment, procedural due process, and state-law claims against the City of Tacoma. The court held that Stewart failed to establish municipal liability under *Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs.* because he could not prove the unconstitutional conduct resulted from an official policy, a longstanding custom, or the actions of a final policymaker. Regarding the “final policymaker” theory, the court ruled that Sergeant Smith was not a final policymaker and that Stewart failed to provide evidence or legal argument establishing that Deputy City Attorney Michelle Yotter possessed final policy-making authority under Washington state law. Under the “custom” theory, the court found that testimony regarding case-by-case assessments of contraband did not demonstrate a persistent and widespread custom sufficient to constitute city policy. Finally, the court determined that Stewart’s failure-to-train claim was insufficient because he offered only an expert opinion on officer unreasonableness without proving the City had actual or constructive notice that its training omissions would cause constitutional violations. The court also noted that Stewart waived his state-law negligence and conversion claims by failing to adequately brief them, and dismissed arguments regarding Extra Space Storage as inapposite since that entity was no longer a defendant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:20-cv-00697-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs following a jury trial on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against student loan servicers. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the plaintiff borrowers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before filing suit in April 2020, thereby satisfying RICO’s four-year statute of limitations under the “injury discovery” rule. The court reasoned that ordinary student borrowers were not placed on inquiry notice by prior government investigations into ITT Educational Services or irregularities in loan documents, as these did not reveal the concealed fraudulent nature of the loans to unsophisticated consumers; rather, the clock began to run only after ITT’s high-profile collapse and bankruptcy in September 2016. Additionally, the court ruled that defendants failed to preserve their challenge regarding proximate causation for appellate review because the district court’s denial of summary judgment on that ground turned on disputed factual issues, and the defendants did not renew the specific challenge in their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. As a result, the twelve-million-dollar jury verdict stands, and the case is remanded to enforce the judgment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:18-cv-01360-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming an international arbitral award against Antrix Corp. Ltd., a corporation wholly owned by India, while reversing and vacating in part regarding the standing of shareholder intervenors to register the judgment. The panel held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception supplies subject matter jurisdiction for actions to confirm awards governed by the New York Convention, rejecting Antrix’s argument that a commercial nexus to the United States is required because the statute’s text does not impose such a limitation. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court held that even assuming Antrix is a “person” entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process protections, the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable under the standard set forth in *Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization*, weighing the United States’ interest in enforcing treaty obligations, the manageable burden on the sophisticated foreign state defendant, and the plaintiff’s lack of an alternative forum capable of attaching Antrix’s U.S. assets. The court further held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to actions confirming awards under the New York Convention because the treaty mandates enforcement absent specific enumerated defenses and no adequate alternative forum exists, as only U.S. courts can attach a foreign sovereign’s commercial property located within the United States. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the court remanded for the district court to address in the first instance the effect of subsequent Indian court proceedings that set aside the arbitral award.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:18-cv-01360-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming an international arbitral award against Antrix Corp. Ltd., a wholly-owned instrumentality of India, while reversing and vacating in part regarding the standing of shareholder intervenors to register the judgment. The panel held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception supplies subject matter jurisdiction because the underlying agreement concerns a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under U.S. law, as mandated by the New York Convention, and does not require a separate commercial nexus with the United States. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court held that even assuming Antrix is a “person” entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process protections, exercising jurisdiction over Antrix was reasonable because the United States has a strong interest in enforcing treaty obligations, the burden on the sophisticated foreign state is manageable, and the plaintiff has no alternative forum capable of attaching Antrix’s commercial assets located in the United States. The court further held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to actions confirming awards under the New York Convention because the treaty mandates recognition and enforcement absent specific enumerated defenses, and a foreign court cannot serve as an adequate alternative forum for attaching U.S.-based assets. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the panel affirmed the confirmation of the award and registration of the judgment against Devas Multimedia America, Inc., but reversed regarding the shareholder intervenors’ standing to register the judgment and remanded for the district court to address the effect of subsequent Indian court proceedings that set aside the award.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Sindi Paz Pineda and her daughter regarding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court affirmed the agency’s determinations, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that the petitioners failed to establish an objective basis for a fear of religious persecution and that the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to control private actors who would inflict harm. Under the standard of review, administrative factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise, and because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum, ineligibility for asylum necessitates ineligibility for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Additionally, the court declined to review claims regarding the petitioners’ credibility and the failure to develop the record because these issues were not raised before the BIA, thereby failing to satisfy the exhaustion requirement mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Consequently, the petition is denied, and no relief is granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.