Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order releasing Kyle Wagner pending trial, holding that the government met its burden under the Bail Reform Act to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person. The court applied de novo review to the ultimate detention determination and found that Wagner posed a danger to the community based on his history of escalating online calls for violence against federal law enforcement, his solicitation of funds to evade detection, his private communications regarding the potential killing of a former government official, and his act of doxxing a pro-ICE individual. The court concluded that release conditions such as GPS monitoring, home confinement, and device restrictions were insufficient because they relied on Wagner’s voluntary compliance, which was undermined by his history of failing to appear in state proceedings, his arrest conduct (including spitting at agents), and the ease with which internet-based threats can be committed using unmonitored devices. Consequently, the court mandated Wagner’s pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The eighth-circuit affirmed David Rafael Walker’s conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of Walker’s justification defense, noting that while such a defense does not negate the element of knowing possession required by the statute, it may excuse criminal liability if the jury believes the defendant’s testimony. However, the court found no basis to overturn the jury’s credibility determinations, as Walker failed to establish all elements of the defense, including that he disposed of the firearm once a safe opportunity arose. Regarding the admission of hearsay statements by law enforcement officers and interview recordings, the court applied the plain error standard because Walker failed to object at trial. The court concluded that even assuming the statements were inadmissible, their admission did not affect Walker’s substantial rights given the overwhelming volume of other admissible evidence, including surveillance footage, DNA evidence, and live witness testimony, which supported the guilty verdict. Consequently, Walker’s judgment of conviction and 120-month sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Amir Mulamba’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phone, holding that law enforcement officers had probable cause and exigent circumstances to seize the device without a warrant and that the subsequent search warrant was valid. The court applied the Fourth Amendment standard for warrantless seizures, determining that officers reasonably believed Mulamba was attempting to solicit a minor for a commercial sex act in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594 based on the totality of circumstances, including eyewitness testimony from the victim’s mother and the victim herself, corroboration of vehicle details and social media identities, and Mulamba’s own furtive gestures and admission that he was deleting messages related to the victim. The court found these facts created an exigency because a reasonable officer would believe evidence was imminently being destroyed. Regarding the search warrant, the court applied the *Franks v. Delaware* standard, rejecting Mulamba’s challenge to the affidavit supporting the warrant. The court held that even if the alleged omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit were corrected—specifically regarding the timing of Mulamba’s consent, a statement about nude photos, and the duration of retrieving his phone—the remaining unchallenged facts still established probable cause to believe the phone contained evidence of attempted sex trafficking. As a result, the conviction for production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) stands, and the case is remanded with no further proceedings required regarding the suppression motion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The eighth-circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal because he failed to comply with the contemporaneous objection requirement specified in his plea agreement. The court held that the appeal waiver was enforceable because Murry knowingly and voluntarily entered the agreement, the substantive reasonableness challenge fell within the scope of the waiver, and enforcing the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Applying the standard established by *Hunter v. United States*, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026), the court determined that a sentence is only set aside due to a miscarriage of justice if it is marred by an egregious error so obvious that it would undermine public confidence in the judiciary. The court found no such error, noting the district court’s upward variance was based on the heinous nature of Murry’s prior criminal history involving violence against women. As a result, the appeal is dismissed and the 204-month sentence imposed by the district court stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Seventh Circuit denied Frank William Bonan II’s petition for review of an FDIC administrative order imposing a permanent prohibition from working at any federally insured institution and assessing a $105,000 civil money penalty. The court held that the FDIC’s enforcement action under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(e) and (i)(2)(B) did not violate Bonan’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because the statutory claims for “unsafe or unsound banking practices” and “breach of fiduciary duty” constitute public rights rather than private rights cognizable at common law. Applying the framework established in *SEC v. Jarkesy*, the court reasoned that these standards are regulatory terms of art with no direct analogue to common law actions existing at the Founding Era, thereby falling within the “public rights” exception to Article III jurisdiction as defined in *Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC*. The court further rejected Bonan’s Article II challenge regarding the removal protections for FDIC Board members and administrative law judges, ruling under *Collins v. Yellen* that he failed to demonstrate compensable harm resulting from those restrictions. Additionally, the court found no Fifth Amendment due process violations regarding allegations of agency bias, lack of pretrial discovery, or improper service of notice. Finally, applying a deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review, the court affirmed the FDIC Board’s factual findings that Bonan breached his fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by approving a loan to uncreditworthy borrowers, which caused financial loss to the bank and warranted the sanctions imposed. Consequently, the petition for review is denied, leaving the FDIC’s orders in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 5:23-CR-00409-JD-1)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed Joseph Tyler Reed’s convictions for receiving and possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (a)(5)(B), as well as his concurrent 210-month prison sentences. The court held that the police had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop to investigate whether a trailer Reed was towing had been stolen, based on evidence that the trailer was found with four other pieces of stolen farm equipment and that a GPS device attached to it had been removed. Regarding the search warrant for Reed’s cellphone, the court ruled that the warrant was not overbroad or lacking in particularity despite omitting a temporal limitation, because the crime of possessing stolen property was an ongoing scheme rather than a discrete event, making a specific time frame arbitrary given the uncertainty of when the possession began. On sentencing challenges, the court found no plain error in imposing multiplicitous punishments for receiving and possessing the same images, noting that the district court’s findings and the record indicated the convictions were based on different sets of images. Additionally, the court held it could not find plain error regarding the refusal to apply a two-level sentencing guideline reduction for lack of intent to distribute under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1), as Reed failed to raise the issue in district court and the record was silent on his intent, preventing factual development necessary to prove an obvious error.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:20-cv-00697-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of student borrowers who sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against loan servicers involved in a fraudulent scheme regarding ITT Technical Institute loans. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the plaintiffs neither knew nor reasonably should have known of their fraud-based injuries more than four years before filing suit in April 2020, meaning the claims fell within RICO’s four-year statute of limitations. Applying the “injury discovery” rule, the court determined that the clock did not start when borrowers made payments or when government investigations into ITT began, but rather when the fraudulent nature of the loans became reasonably discoverable to ordinary consumers following ITT’s public collapse and bankruptcy in September 2016. The court reasoned that complex regulatory filings and loan document irregularities did not place unsophisticated student borrowers on inquiry notice, as even sophisticated industry insiders failed to detect the fraud until the program unraveled. Additionally, the court ruled that defendants failed to preserve their challenge regarding RICO’s proximate causation requirement for appellate review because the district court’s denial of summary judgment on that issue turned on disputed factual matters and the defendants did not renew the specific challenge in a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. As a result, the twelve-million-dollar jury verdict stands, and the case is remanded to enforce the district court’s judgment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 3:25-cv-00048-KFR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The court applied a de novo standard of review, setting aside an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision only if it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence. The key legal issue addressed was whether the ALJ committed reversible error by relying on vocational expert testimony that appeared to conflict with the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred in finding she could perform “light work” despite limiting her to one hour of standing and walking per day, a restriction that seemingly conflicts with the requirements for the full range of light exertional level work. The court held that while the testimony conflicted with the maximum level of light work, it did not preclude the claimant from performing jobs within the light category that require less than the full range of such work. The court noted that the vocational expert explained this distinction and accounted for the plaintiff’s specific limitations by reducing the number of available jobs by 60%. Relying on the inherent reliability of vocational expert testimony and the principle that an ALJ may appropriately rely on such experts to determine if particular jobs are performable despite classification discrepancies, the court found substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. As a result of this affirmation, the denial of the plaintiff’s application for benefits remains in effect, and she is not entitled to disability insurance or supplemental security income under the Social Security Act.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 5:23-cv-01562-CBM-SHK

The ninth-circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity for three police officers facing claims of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from the fatal shooting of Daniel Luis Valdivia. The court applied de novo review to determine whether the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Regarding the excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, the court held that the officers were entitled to immunity because, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Valdivia’s retrieval of a gun from his pocket and movement of the weapon toward the officers constituted an immediate threat, rendering the use of force objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Regarding the substantive due process claim, the court found that the officers’ actions did not “shock the conscience” because their shooting of Valdivia was a response to an immediate threat rather than an act motivated by a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, while the appeal regarding the City of Covina is dismissed as the city was not a proper appellant.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The seventh-circuit vacated Christopher Lloyd’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing because his prior Indiana conspiracy conviction did not categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2. Applying the categorical approach, the court held that the term “conspiring” in the Guidelines must be interpreted based on the generic definition of conspiracy as it existed at the time the relevant Guideline provision was enacted in 1989. The court determined that, in 1989, the generic offense of conspiracy required a bilateral agreement between two or more genuine participants to commit a crime. Because Indiana’s conspiracy statute criminalizes unilateral conspiracies—where an individual agrees with an undercover agent who does not genuinely intend to commit the offense—the state statute sweeps broader than the generic federal definition. Consequently, no conviction under Indiana’s conspiracy statute can serve as a predicate “crime of violence” for sentencing enhancements under § 4B1.2, regardless of whether the defendant’s specific conduct involved multiple genuine conspirators. The court rejected the government’s argument that the 2023 reorganization of the Guidelines should reset the relevant date to 2023, ruling that the amendment was non-substantive and did not alter the meaning of “conspiring.”

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.