Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:21-cv-02428-SPG-SK

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jane Doe’s claims against WebGroup Czech Republic, a.s., and related entities for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act immunizes the defendants from liability because treating them as publishers or speakers of third-party content would impose a monitoring obligation. Specifically, the court reasoned that Doe’s theory of liability required WebGroup to monitor and remove child pornography to avoid profiting from it, which constitutes a quintessential publishing activity protected by Section 230. Furthermore, the court found that WebGroup’s use of neutral tools—such as tags, search functions, recommendation algorithms, and revenue-sharing schemes—did not materially contribute to the development or creation of the unlawful content, meaning the defendants did not qualify as “information content providers” under the *Roommates.com* exception. Regarding the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) claim, the court determined that the FOSTA exception to Section 230 immunity did not apply because Doe failed to adequately plead that WebGroup knowingly benefited from and knowingly assisted sex trafficking activities as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The court noted that mere association with traffickers or turning a blind eye to revenue sources is insufficient; instead, the plaintiff must allege actual knowledge of the trafficking venture and a causal relationship between affirmative conduct furthering the venture and the receipt of a benefit. The court concluded that Doe’s allegations regarding WebGroup’s profit-sharing relationships did not sufficiently establish that the channel partners recruited or solicited her as defined by statute, nor did they adequately plead that WebGroup had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking circumstances until after the videos were removed following a 2020 cease and desist letter. Consequently, Section 230 bars all claims, including those under federal child pornography statutes and California privacy law, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:25-cv-09814-FMO-PVC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Jaime Melendez’s lawsuit challenging the rescission of a job offer as an ICE transportation officer. The appellate court held that the district court erred in dismissing Melendez’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) does not preclude judicial review for individuals who are applicants for employment with private contractors rather than federal employees. Consequently, the sua sponte dismissal of the APA claim was deemed premature because it was not frivolous to argue that the CSRA’s preclusive scheme did not apply to this class of persons. Regarding the Title VII claim, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend. The court applied the standard that Title VII governs relations between employers and employees, not third parties, and found Melendez’s theory—that a private contractor ratified ICE’s suitability determination—fell outside recognized circumstances for imputing third-party liability, such as principal-agent relationships or an employer’s failure to take corrective action. Furthermore, the complaint lacked allegations that ICE’s decision constituted actionable discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The court also affirmed the denial of a motion to reconsider, noting that such motions cannot be used to raise new procedural due process arguments for the first time when they could have been raised earlier via a motion to amend. On remand, the district court is required to proceed with Melendez’s APA claim while maintaining the dismissal of the Title VII claim. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:22-cv-00633-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Ali Yousif Ahmed Al-Nouri’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, thereby upholding the certification of his extradition to Iraq to face charges of premeditated murder. The court applied the standard of review for habeas challenges to extradition orders, which limits judicial inquiry to whether the magistrate judge had jurisdiction, the treaty was in force, and there was competent evidence supporting the probable cause determination. Regarding probable cause, the panel held that the record contained sufficient competent evidence to support the finding that Al-Nouri conspired with and participated in the murders of two Iraqi police officers in 2006. The court rejected Al-Nouri’s argument that discrepancies in witness statements or contradictory declarations obtained from One World Research invalidated the probable cause finding, noting that such contradictory evidence is inadmissible in extradition proceedings unless it completely obliterates the government’s evidence, which these declarations failed to do. On the merits of the political offense exception under Article III of the U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, the court applied the “incidence test” from *Quinn v. Robinson*, requiring a showing that (1) an uprising existed at the time of the offense and (2) the charged offense was incidental to that uprising. While acknowledging the existence of a Sunni domestic insurgency in Iraq in 2006, the panel held that Al-Nouri failed to meet his burden of proving that the murders were incidental to that specific domestic struggle. The court found no clear error in the lower court’s factual determination that Al-Nouri acted on behalf of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an international terrorist group with a global agenda distinct from the indigenous insurgency, rather than as part of the local Sunni uprising. Consequently, the court ruled that acts of international terrorism do not qualify for the political offense exception. The panel also rejected Al-Nouri’s arguments regarding humanitarian conditions and the adequacy of the Iraqi judicial system, citing the “rule of non-inquiry,” which bars courts from inquiring into the fairness of foreign judicial proceedings or considering humanitarian exceptions to extradition. Finally, the court dismissed Al-Nouri’s claim that Iraq intended to prosecute him for additional charges as speculative and outside the scope of habeas review. The practical consequence is that Al-Nouri remains subject to extradition to Iraq.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:23-cr-00174-RSM-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Volodimyr Pigida’s convictions for conspiracy, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and other felonies related to his operation of a Ponzi scheme known as Trend Sound Promoter. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a specific unanimity instruction because the evidence supported a single overall conspiracy involving overlapping periods of wire, mail, and bankruptcy fraud, rendering any potential error harmless given Pigida’s conviction on all counts. Regarding evidentiary challenges, the court ruled that admitting victim testimony regarding prior dealings was harmless error due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the brevity of the testimony, and determined that an FBI agent’s reference to an SEC referral was not inadmissible hearsay as it was offered to explain the investigation’s origin rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. The court further found no error in denying Pigida’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal, concluding that his omission of a $1.45 million withdrawal from bankruptcy records constituted a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) rather than merely a misleading one. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of an acceptance of responsibility sentencing adjustment because Pigida denied essential factual elements of guilt at trial, attempted to flee after conviction, and only admitted guilt after being apprehended following a months-long search, continuing to shift blame even after his capture. As a result of this decision, the district court’s judgment and sentence remain in full force.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiff Brian Pfalzgraf’s claim that Deputy Ben Reisner’s protective frisk was unlawful but reversed summary judgment on his claim that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally extended. The court held that while the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion that Pfalzgraf was armed and dangerous to justify the initial pat-down, there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether specific observations—such as Pfalzgraf’s driving patterns, agitation, dilated pupils, dry mouth, inconsistent explanations, avoidance of police vehicles, and prior sightings of his truck at a known drug-trafficking residence—collectively provided reasonable suspicion of a separate drug offense. Under the standard established in *Rodriguez v. United States*, an officer may extend a traffic stop beyond the time required to address the initial violation only if they possess reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity; because the video footage did not clearly contradict the deputy’s assertions, this factual question must be resolved by a jury rather than decided as a matter of law at summary judgment. Regarding the frisk claim, the court affirmed that no individualized facts suggested Pfalzgraf posed a threat, noting that suspicion of drug impairment alone does not create a reasonable inference of weapon possession and that general contextual factors like time of day or location do not satisfy the *Terry* requirement for specific, articulable facts. Additionally, the court found that the deputy’s conduct violated clearly established law, denying qualified immunity on the frisk claim. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Because the jury previously awarded damages without specifying which portion was attributable to the unlawful frisk versus the extended stop, and because the appellate court reversed liability on one of those two claims, the court vacated the $4,000 total damages award. The district court must now determine whether to conduct a new trial or apportion damages based on the remaining valid claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 2:18-cv-01360-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment confirming an international arbitral award against Antrix Corp. Ltd., a wholly owned corporation of India, while reversing and vacating in part regarding the standing of shareholder intervenors to register the judgment and remanding for the district court to address the effect of a subsequent Indian court set-aside of the award. The panel held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception supplies subject matter jurisdiction because the action seeks to confirm an award governed by the New York Convention, a treaty in force for the United States, and the statute does not require a commercial nexus between the underlying dispute and the United States. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court ruled that even assuming Antrix is a “person” entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process protections, exercising jurisdiction was reasonable under the standard set forth in *Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization*, weighing the United States’ interest in enforcing treaty obligations, the manageable burden on the sophisticated foreign state defendant, and the plaintiff’s lack of an alternative forum capable of attaching Antrix’s U.S. assets. The court further held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply to actions confirming awards under the New York Convention because the Convention mandates recognition and enforcement absent specific enumerated defenses, and no adequate alternative forum exists since only U.S. courts can attach a foreign sovereign’s commercial assets located within the United States. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed as to jurisdictional issues, while the portion regarding shareholder intervenors’ standing and the impact of the Indian set-aside is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Honduran nationals Elzi Marquez-Cortez and her daughter A.V.M., upholding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision to deny their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court affirmed that the BIA correctly found the petitioners failed to establish eligibility for relief on multiple grounds. Regarding the “witnesses to crime” particular social groups, the court held that the BIA did not err by finding these groups were not socially distinct. The court clarified that the BIA did not impose an “ocular visibility” requirement but properly considered whether Honduran society perceives individuals who report crimes without public opposition as a distinct group. The record supported the conclusion that while the gang may have perceived the petitioners as witnesses, there was no evidence that the general public in Honduras recognized such individuals as a distinct social group. On the nexus issue for asylum and withholding of removal, the court applied the standard requiring a protected ground to be “at least one central reason” for the persecution. The court found substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that neither sex nor imputed anti-gang political opinion was a central reason for the harm suffered. The petitioners were targeted primarily for financial gain during an initial robbery and subsequently for personal retribution regarding the police report, rather than because of their membership in a particular social group or political opinion. For CAT relief, the court affirmed that the petitioners failed to demonstrate it was “more likely than not” they would be tortured upon return due to governmental acquiescence. The court noted that while there was general evidence of violence against women and corruption in Honduras, the record lacked specific evidence showing government officials had actual knowledge or willful blindness regarding the threats and breached their legal responsibility to intervene. The petitioners’ speculation that police collaborated with gang members was insufficient to meet this burden. Additionally, the court exercised its discretion to enforce administrative exhaustion, declining to consider the petitioners’ argument challenging the BIA’s interpretation of *In re C-T-L-* because they failed to raise this specific legal issue before the BIA. As a result of the denial, the petitioners remain subject to removal to Honduras.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-12

Docket: 4:23-cv-05047-SAB

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Washington Department of Corrections on Kevin Duden’s failure-to-accommodate claims brought under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The court held that the employer successfully demonstrated that accommodating Duden’s religious objection to a COVID-19 vaccine mandate would impose an undue hardship. Applying the standard from *Groff v. DeJoy*, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), the panel determined that the burden on DOC was substantial in the overall context of its business, citing undisputed evidence that thirty percent of Duden’s duties required in-person instruction of inmates in a high-security prison where internet access is prohibited, and that alternative protocols like masking or social distancing failed to prevent significant infection rates and staff deaths. The court further clarified that undue hardship analysis under Title VII is not limited to exclusively monetary costs but includes health, safety, and operational burdens, noting that DOC’s failure to provide specific financial cost data did not preclude a finding of undue hardship given the reliance on these non-monetary factors. Additionally, the court declined to consider Duden’s new argument regarding inmate vaccination policies raised for the first time in his reply brief. Consequently, the judgment remains in favor of the defendants, and no further relief is granted to the appellant.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 1:22-cv-23091-KMM

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on three independent grounds. First, the court found the case moot because the underlying state-court action had been settled and dismissed, eliminating any “actual controversy” required under Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). The court held that a live controversy does not exist when the dispute over a present defense obligation has been resolved, noting that parties cannot stipulate to federal jurisdiction even if they argue potential recovery of costs or fees. Second, the court determined the appeal was improperly brought on an interlocutory basis because the district court’s summary judgment order lacked “injunctive qualities” necessary for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The order did not contain mandatory language enforceable by contempt, nor did it involve a request for injunctive relief or a counterclaim seeking such relief. Third, the court noted that the district court had since entered a final judgment after dismissing the remaining duty-to-indemnify claim as moot; consequently, any appeal must be taken from that final judgment rather than an interlocutory order. The practical consequence is that the appeal is terminated, and Mt. Hawley Insurance Company must wait to challenge the summary judgment ruling on the duty to defend by appealing the final judgment entered in the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:23-CV-02324-JWB-RES)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s final judgment for the defendant, Installtec, Inc., on all of plaintiff Lee Andrew Mitchell-Pennington’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The appellate court confined its review to the retaliation claims because Mitchell-Pennington waived any challenge to the dismissal of his Title VII and ADA discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims by failing to address them in his opening brief. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the summary judgment decision, determining that no genuine dispute existed regarding material facts and that Installtec was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the retaliation claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the court held that while Mitchell-Pennington engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action by being terminated, he failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing a causal connection between his complaints and his termination. The court found the district court correctly relied on uncontroverted facts showing Installtec fired Mitchell-Pennington for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, including refusing to perform duties, failing to follow instructions, aggression toward coworkers, missing work, and recording others instead of working. Additionally, the court rejected Mitchell-Pennington’s arguments regarding the lack of a summary judgment hearing and the dismissal of his affidavit as conclusory and self-serving, noting that unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings. As a practical consequence, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Installtec on the retaliation claims remains in effect, resulting in final judgment for the defendant. The court also granted Mitchell-Pennington’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, requiring him to continue making partial payments until his entire fee is paid.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.