Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:24-CV-00616-DAK)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Homie Technology’s antitrust claims against the National Association of Realtors and various real estate brokerages, ruling that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that under 15 U.S.C. § 15b and Utah Code Ann. § 76-16-503, Homie’s federal and state antitrust claims accrued between 2015 and 2019 when the challenged NAR rules were promulgated, meaning the four-year limitations period expired before Homie filed suit in 2024. The court applied the “continuing conspiracy” exception to the statute of limitations but found it inapplicable because Homie failed to plausibly allege that the NAR’s promulgation of the challenged rules and the subsequent boycotts by individual brokers were part of a single, unified conspiracy. The court reasoned that while the alleged boycott by unnamed brokers might constitute an antitrust violation, Homie did not sufficiently allege that the NAR rules themselves reflected a “conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective” of excluding new market entrants. The court noted that Homie’s own allegations showed it was initially successful in the market for years while the rules were in effect, undermining the claim that the rules were inherently exclusionary. Furthermore, the court determined that NAR’s annual reaffirmation and enforcement of the rules could not constitute a continuing conspiracy because they could not renew an agreement that Homie had not plausibly alleged existed in the first place. Because the claims are time-barred, the appellate court did not address Homie’s alternative arguments regarding antitrust injury or standing. The practical consequence is that Homie Technology’s lawsuit against the NAR and Brokerage Defendants is dismissed with prejudice, preventing the case from proceeding to discovery or trial on the merits of the antitrust allegations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 8:21-cv-01045-MSS-AAS

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Eric Bischoff is barred by the six-year statute of limitations under New York law from challenging the validity of the 2011 share transfer, rejecting his arguments that equitable estoppel applied or that the “void” language in the shareholder agreement rendered the transfer void ab initio regardless of the time bar. However, the court vacated the district court’s conclusion that the 2013 and 2016 transfers were valid and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that while the statute of limitations bars a legal remedy (a breach of contract claim), it does not validate the underlying contractual obligation or prove that the transfer complied with the shareholder agreement’s eligibility requirements. Consequently, the district court erred by treating the time-barred 2011 transfer as conclusively establishing Robert P. Martin (RPM) as a permissible Group B Shareholder for the subsequent transfers without independently analyzing whether RPM actually met the specific criteria under the Agreement—either being an immediate family member who is an active employee or a beneficiary of the Alvina Martin 1988 Trust. On remand, the district court must determine the validity of the 2013 and 2016 transfers based on whether RPM satisfied these substantive eligibility requirements, rather than relying on the procedural bar of the statute of limitations regarding the 2011 transfer.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a minor-role reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the imposition of a special condition of supervised release authorizing searches, while dismissing the remainder of the appeal and granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in declining the reduction because the record indicated Dyett participated in an illegal money laundering scheme by making fraudulent representations and moving large sums of money, noting that a defendant who is less culpable than co-defendants but “deeply involved” in criminal acts is not entitled to a minor-participant reduction. The court enforced Dyett’s limited appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement to bar challenges regarding the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the search condition. Additionally, conducting an independent review under *Penson v. Ohio*, the court found no non-frivolous issues outside the scope of the waiver. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, the appeal is dismissed as to waived arguments, and appointed counsel is permitted to withdraw.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The First Circuit vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision and remanded the case, holding that a conviction under New Hampshire Revised Statutes § 641:5(II) for retaliation against a witness does not constitute an “aggravated felony” defined as an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). Consequently, the petitioner is not deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on this conviction. The court applied the categorical approach to compare the elements of the state statute against the generic federal offense. The court determined that the generic federal offense of obstruction of justice requires a specific intent to interfere with the legal process, a mens rea requirement supported by Supreme Court precedent in *Pugin v. Garland* and First Circuit precedent in *Silva v. Garland*. In contrast, the New Hampshire statute criminalizes any unlawful act committed in retaliation against a witness or informant without requiring an intent to obstruct justice; it may be satisfied by acts motivated solely by revenge. Citing *State v. Baird*, where the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed a conviction based on a desire to “get even” rather than an intent to interfere with proceedings, the First Circuit concluded that the state statute covers conduct broader than the generic federal offense. Because the statute criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition allows, it cannot serve as a predicate for removability. The court declined to address the petitioner’s claim regarding deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture given this dispositive ruling on removability.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard to review the Agency’s findings, upholding them unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court held that substantial evidence supports the determination that the harm suffered by the Petitioners lacks the requisite nexus to a protected ground. The record indicated that intruders stole valuables from the family’s home without making demands or contacting the family again, suggesting the motive was economic theft rather than persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The court rejected the Petitioners’ argument that the shooting of their father and killing of a dog compelled an inference of non-economic motive, citing *INS v. Elias-Zacarias*. Additionally, the court found the Agency properly considered the CAT claim by weighing evidence of cartel involvement and police corruption against countervailing evidence, such as the offer of protection to the Petitioners’ father and the inability to identify the burglars, concluding the Petitioners were not more likely than not to be tortured. The court also noted that due process and equal protection claims raised in the opening brief were forfeited for failure to develop those contentions. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied, the temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) is lifted effective immediately, and the Petitioners’ motion to stay removal is denied, allowing for their removal from the United States.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Ninth Circuit denied Pamela Morocho-Morocho’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The court applied a substantial evidence standard to the Agency’s factual findings and de novo review to legal determinations. The panel held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm she suffered and a protected ground, as her own testimony conceded that her attacker targeted her for money rather than her membership in a particular social group. Furthermore, the court found no record evidence that “Ecuadorian women with family living in the United States” constitutes a cognizable particular social group because Ecuadorian society does not perceive them as socially distinct. The court also declined to consider new particular social group arguments raised for the first time in the petitioner’s opening brief because they were not exhausted before the administrative agencies. As a result, the petition is denied, though the temporary stay of removal remains in effect until the mandate issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit vacated the district court’s denial of summary judgment regarding the defendant’s claim of qualified immunity in a failure-to-promote case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. The court held that the district court failed to satisfy its threshold duty to make a thorough determination of the qualified immunity defense because its analysis consisted of only a single sentence concluding that the plaintiff’s right to equal opportunity was clearly established without addressing whether those rights were violated based on the specific facts. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, a district court must carefully review the record to identify genuinely disputed facts, view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and then determine if those facts demonstrate a constitutional violation that is clearly established; this reasoned analysis is required to permit meaningful appellate review. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court to reconsider the qualified immunity issue consistent with these standards.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Applying the substantial evidence standard of review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the court held that the Agency’s findings were supported by the record in three key areas. First, the court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the Lead Petitioner did not suffer past persecution, noting that while she was harassed and threatened by parents of special-needs children she transported, these incidents involved no physical harm and did not rise to the level of persecution. Second, the court affirmed that the Agency’s determination that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution was supported by substantial evidence, as there was no contact with the threatening parties after the employment ended in December 2022 and no indication of a continuing interest in harming the family. Additionally, the court upheld the finding that the petitioners could safely relocate within Colombia, as they failed to show targeted persecution beyond generalized violence. Third, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief because the petitioners failed to demonstrate a particularized likelihood of torture by or with the acquiescence of Colombian officials. Consequently, the petition is denied, and the temporary stay of removal entered pursuant to General Order 6.4(c) is lifted effective immediately.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The first-circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a diversity action concerning real property owned by Molly Cosel and her former husband as tenants by the entirety. The court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Cosel based on an unsettled question of Massachusetts law regarding whether a divorce decree extinguishes a creditor’s interest in a tenancy by the entirety when the non-debtor spouse is awarded the property. Because there remained genuine disputes of material fact regarding the validity of the promissory note underlying the creditor’s judgment lien—specifically whether the funds were a sham intended to encumber marital assets—the appellate court vacated that portion of the district court’s order and remanded for factual findings on the loan’s bona fides. The court further ruled that Cosel, as a non-party to the prior state court default judgment, was not precluded from challenging the validity of the debt under Massachusetts law or the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 76, as she was not in privity with the parties to that suit. Additionally, the court rejected the Trust’s argument that the property ceased to be Cosel’s principal residence during her temporary absence, affirming the district court’s conclusion that she intended to return. Regarding the Trust’s counterclaims, the court held that the domestic relations exception did not bar federal jurisdiction over claims by a third-party creditor against a non-debtor spouse. Finally, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the “necessaries” issue under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209, § 1, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the disputed funds were spent on necessaries based on the couple’s social station and means. On remand, the district court must first determine whether the loan is valid as to Cosel. If the loan is found invalid, Cosel prevails. If the loan is valid, the court must resolve factual disputes regarding whether the funds were spent on necessaries; if that issue does not resolve the Trust’s interest in the property, the court may then address or certify the unsettled legal question concerning the effect of the divorce on the creditor’s interest in the tenancy by the entirety.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:23-CV-02324-JWB-RES)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s final judgment for the defendant, Installtec, Inc., on all of plaintiff Lee Andrew Mitchell-Pennington’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The appellate court confined its review to the retaliation claims because Mitchell-Pennington waived any challenge to the dismissal of his Title VII and ADA discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims by failing to address them in his opening brief. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the summary judgment decision, determining that no genuine dispute existed regarding material facts and that Installtec was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the retaliation claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the court held that while Mitchell-Pennington engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action by being terminated, he failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing a causal connection between his complaints and his termination. The court found the district court correctly relied on uncontroverted facts showing Installtec fired Mitchell-Pennington for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, including refusing to perform duties, failing to follow instructions, aggression toward coworkers, missing work, and recording others instead of working. Additionally, the court rejected Mitchell-Pennington’s arguments regarding the lack of a summary judgment hearing and the dismissal of his affidavit as conclusory and self-serving, noting that unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings. As a practical consequence, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Installtec on the retaliation claims remains in effect, resulting in final judgment for the defendant. The court also granted Mitchell-Pennington’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, requiring him to continue making partial payments until his entire fee is paid.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.