Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Jean Rony Fleurinord, a Haitian national seeking asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that substantial evidence supports the Board of Immigration Appeals’ adverse credibility determination regarding Fleurinord’s testimony. This determination was based on inconsistent statements concerning the source of his fear in Haiti, material omissions in his sworn statement and application for relief, and the Immigration Judge’s observations of his demeanor during the hearing. Because the credibility finding is dispositive of his eligibility for relief, the court did not address alternative agency findings or Fleurinord’s claims for protection under the Convention Against Tortures (CAT), due process, adjustment of status, or equal protection, which were deemed forfeited or unexhausted. As a result, the petition was denied and any temporary stay of removal entered by the court was lifted effective immediately.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Edward Williams’ 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, ruling that Williams procedurally defaulted his claim and failed to demonstrate either cause for the default or actual innocence. The court applied the standard from *Bousley v. United States*, requiring a prisoner to show “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence” to overcome procedural default on collateral review. To establish prejudice regarding his guilty plea, Williams needed to prove a reasonable probability that, had he been properly advised of the *Rehaif* mens rea element (knowledge of his felon status), he would not have pleaded guilty. The court held that Williams could not meet this burden because the record conclusively demonstrated he knew his predicate drug conviction was punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Specifically, Williams served 26 months in prison for a three-year sentence, was prosecuted as an adult rather than in juvenile court, signed a plea agreement explicitly labeling the offense a “felony,” and acknowledged during his federal plea colloquy that the prior conviction carried a term exceeding one year. The court rejected Williams’ argument that the D.C. Youth Rehabilitation Act expunged his conviction or reclassified the sentence, noting he was still on parole at the time of the firearm possession and that the statute defined such terms as imprisonment. Additionally, the court found no basis to grant an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), as the existing record conclusively showed Williams was not entitled to relief and the district judge who presided over his original plea colloquy was intimately familiar with the case facts. Consequently, Williams’ request for relief was denied, and his conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The ninth-circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying a motion to reopen proceedings, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by concluding that Rolando Alberto Calderon failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the “reasonable likelihood” standard required for a motion to reopen, which mandates only a threshold showing that the petitioner would likely prevail on the merits if the record were further developed. The court determined that the BIA erred in its analysis of three specific legal points: first, the legitimacy of the underlying imprisonment does not preclude a finding of torture; second, the agency failed to give reasoned consideration to evidence of systematic torture and cruel treatment by Salvadoran authorities and gang members under the “State of Exception,” including beatings, denial of food and water, and intentional infliction of pain; and third, the BIA improperly considered countervailing evidence regarding the possibility of release upon proving non-affiliation with MS-13, which is impermissible at the prima facie stage. The court found that Calderon’s evidence, including reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State regarding prison conditions in El Salvador, established a reasonable likelihood that he would be tortured by government officials or with their acquiescence if returned to his home country. As a practical consequence, the BIA must reconsider Calderon’s motion to reopen proceedings to assert his CAT claim without the legal errors identified by the court. Additionally, the court granted the petitioner’s pending motions to stay removal from the United States pending the outcome of the remanded proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:22-cv-07939-ODW-AGR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a class action securities fraud complaint brought by shareholders against FIGS, Inc., its executives, and related entities under Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because their allegations did not meet the heightened pleading standards required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court applied the standard that claims sounding in fraud must allege with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of falsity and scienter. Regarding the Securities Act claims, the court found the plaintiffs failed to plead specific false or misleading statements concerning FIGS’s data analytics capabilities or inventory risk, noting that the company’s offering documents contained sufficient hedging language and that the allegations lacked objective verification. The court further determined that the confidential witness testimony relied upon by the plaintiffs was insufficient because the witnesses lacked personal knowledge of the alleged issues, were not employed during the relevant period, or offered only hearsay and speculation. Regarding the Exchange Act claims, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter with the requisite particularity. The executives’ general statements regarding their involvement in company operations did not create a strong inference of fraudulent intent, nor did the plaintiffs provide specific facts showing access to internal reports contradicting public statements. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against individual defendants under Sections 15 and 20(a) because no primary violations were established, and dismissed claims against Tulco, LLC, for failure to plead a primary violation of securities fraud. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ complaint remains dismissed, and the judgment in favor of the defendants stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:02-cr-00106-PA-1

The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s denial of Anthony J. Sutton’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court committed significant procedural error by issuing a form order denying the motion without providing any explanation. The court applied the standard requiring district judges to explain their sentencing decisions sufficiently to demonstrate they have considered the parties’ arguments and possess a reasoned basis for their legal decisionmaking, particularly when a defendant raises nonfrivolous arguments for reduction. The court rejected the government’s reliance on *Chavez-Meza v. United States*, which permits brief explanations in certain circumstances, because Sutton’s case involved significant variances from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines ranges and presented new mitigating factors not considered during his 2020 resentencing. Specifically, Sutton had disaffiliated from a gang, completed drug treatment, and avoided prison infractions between 2020 and 2025. Because these arguments were distinct from those before the court in 2020 and the sentence remained an upward variance of over 100% even after the Guidelines amendment, the district court was obligated to provide a specific justification for rejecting Sutton’s motion rather than relying on its prior sentencing rationale. The practical consequence is that the case is sent back to the United States District Court for the Central District of California to conduct new proceedings where the judge must provide a reasoned explanation for either granting or denying the sentence reduction request, addressing Sutton’s specific arguments regarding his rehabilitation and current status.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:22-cv-04814-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of HAMOC’s promissory estoppel claim but reversed the dismissal of its negligent misrepresentation claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that ERISA does not preempt the state law negligent misrepresentation claim because it does not “relate to” an ERISA plan under either the “connection with” or “reference to” tests. Applying the relationship test, the panel determined the claim did not bear upon an ERISA-regulated relationship (such as between a plan and its participant) but rather concerned representations made by an administrator to a third-party provider outside the scope of ERISA’s comprehensive regulatory scheme. Furthermore, under the “reference to” test, the court found the claim was not premised on the existence of an ERISA plan or essential to its survival; instead, it arose from Aetna’s independent tortious conduct in making false representations about reimbursement rates during verification calls, which induced La Peer to provide services. The panel distinguished its prior decision in *Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co.*, noting that *Bristol* preempted promissory estoppel claims because they sought to supplant the terms of an ERISA plan with a new oral agreement, whereas the negligent misrepresentation claim here seeks damages for an independent injury unrelated to the administration of plan benefits. Consequently, HAMOC may proceed with its state law negligent misrepresentation claim while its promissory estoppel claim remains dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, holding that the insurer was not liable under its Employment Practices Liability (“EPL”) endorsement to pay a default judgment entered against Mammoth Tech, Inc. for pregnancy-related discrimination claims. The court determined that the “Related Claims” provision within the policy’s overarching Liability Coverage Terms and Conditions (“LCTC”) applied to the EPL endorsement, thereby deeming the January 2021 lawsuit filed by Juliana Rodriguez Morel a “Related Claim” to her March 2019 administrative complaint. Because the earlier administrative complaint was made before the EPL policy period began in December 2020, the related claims provision backdated the “first made” date for the subsequent lawsuit to that prior time, excluding it from coverage. The court applied New Hampshire substantive law and reviewed the interpretation of the insurance policy de novo. It rejected the appellants’ argument that the EPL endorsement superseded the LCTC’s Related Claims provision, clarifying that an endorsement controls over the base policy only when the provisions are in direct conflict. The court found no such conflict because the LCTC’s related claims mechanism and the EPL endorsement’s “Prior and Pending Proceeding” exclusions operate independently to address different scenarios: the former defines when a claim is “first made,” while the latter excludes liability for losses arising from wrongful acts underlying proceedings filed before a specific prior date (December 4, 2015). The court further dismissed reliance on out-of-state precedent and arguments regarding policy ambiguity, concluding that the provisions functioned harmoniously to exclude coverage. As a result of this affirmation, the judgment on the pleadings in favor of Travelers stands, meaning the insurer has no obligation to pay the $303,592.20 judgment or associated costs awarded against Mammoth Tech, Inc. The administrators of the estate are left without recovery from the insurance policy for these specific claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The Eleventh Circuit denied consolidated petitions for review filed by various railroads and industry associations challenging the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) 2024 Crew Size Rule. The court held that the FRA acted within its statutory authority under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which grants the Secretary of Transportation power to issue safety regulations “as necessary,” interpreting this phrase as conferring broad discretion rather than imposing a strict evidentiary bar requiring quantitative proof of necessity. Applying the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard, the court found the FRA reasonably exercised its discretion by relying on qualitative evidence, including public comments regarding close calls and safety research on cognitive demands, to justify the rule as a precautionary measure against potential accidents involving human error or incapacitation. The court rejected arguments that the FRA violated the change-in-position doctrine by reversing its 2019 decision not to regulate crew size, ruling that the vacated 2019 Withdrawal Order had no legal effect and thus did not constitute a prior policy requiring heightened justification for reversal. Additionally, the court found the FRA’s explanation for regulating despite the lack of specific statistical data linking one-person crews to accidents was sufficient under the APA, as agencies need not wait for catastrophic events to enact prophylactic safety rules. The court also dismissed challenges regarding the rule’s cost analysis, noting that *Michigan v. EPA* did not compel a formal cost-benefit analysis for this statute and that the FRA’s consideration of costs was reasonable. Finally, the court held that the FRA’s failure to meet a 12-month statutory deadline for rulemaking did not mandate vacatur, as the statute contained no specified consequence for noncompliance, citing *Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.* and *McIntosh v. United States*. As a practical consequence, the petitions for review are denied, leaving the FRA’s Crew Size Rule in effect. The rule remains enforceable, requiring freight trains to operate with a minimum of two crewmembers unless specific exemptions apply or special approval is granted based on a finding that one-person operations are “as safe or safer” than two-person operations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

The eighth-circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal because enforcing his plea agreement’s waiver of appellate rights did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The court applied the standard that an appeal waiver is enforceable unless its enforcement would constitute a miscarriage of justice, reviewing the validity and applicability of the waiver de novo. Although the defendant argued that the district court misinterpreted the plea agreement as imposing a mandatory 144-month minimum sentence when the agreement only prohibited him from arguing for a sentence below 12 years, the appellate court found no such misinterpretation. The court held that the district judge’s statement regarding the 144-month floor reflected an assessment of the appropriate sentence based on the statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the defendant’s sentencing history, rather than a belief that the court lacked discretion to impose a lower sentence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as barred by the valid waiver.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-11

Docket: 2:23-CV-02324-JWB-RES)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s final judgment for the defendant, Installtec, Inc., on all of plaintiff Lee Andrew Mitchell-Pennington’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. The appellate court confined its review to the retaliation claims because Mitchell-Pennington waived any challenge to the dismissal of his Title VII and ADA discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims by failing to address them in his opening brief. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the summary judgment decision, determining that no genuine dispute existed regarding material facts and that Installtec was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Regarding the retaliation claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the court held that while Mitchell-Pennington engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse employment action by being terminated, he failed to provide sufficient evidence establishing a causal connection between his complaints and his termination. The court found the district court correctly relied on uncontroverted facts showing Installtec fired Mitchell-Pennington for legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons, including refusing to perform duties, failing to follow instructions, aggression toward coworkers, missing work, and recording others instead of working. Additionally, the court rejected Mitchell-Pennington’s arguments regarding the lack of a summary judgment hearing and the dismissal of his affidavit as conclusory and self-serving, noting that unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment proceedings. As a practical consequence, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Installtec on the retaliation claims remains in effect, resulting in final judgment for the defendant. The court also granted Mitchell-Pennington’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, requiring him to continue making partial payments until his entire fee is paid.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.