Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Marcus Alexander Waldo, Jr.’s third motion for compassionate release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, specifically finding no error in the district court’s failure to provide an adequate explanation for its decision. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the standard of review and explanation requirements for compassionate release motions established in *United States v. Jenkins*, 22 F.4th 162 (4th Cir. 2021). As a result of the affirmation, the district court’s denial of Waldo’s motion remains in effect, and no further relief is granted on this appeal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Ronald Dickey Mason’s conviction for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), rejecting his arguments regarding insufficient evidence and improper character testimony. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied a de novo standard of review, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. The court held that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mason knew of the loaded firearm located in the driver’s side center console of his vehicle and that he carried it during drug trafficking offenses. This conclusion was supported by testimony establishing the car as his primary transportation, the firearm’s accessible position near drugs found in the same vehicle, and expert testimony regarding the common use of firearms for self-protection and asset security in the illegal drug trade. Regarding the admission of character evidence, the court applied the plain error standard because Mason failed to object to the testimony at trial. The government witness, Agent Ward, referred to drug traffickers generally as “bad guys” or “bad persons.” The court determined that no plain error occurred because the comments did not affect Mason’s substantial rights. The court noted that the remarks referred to drug traffickers in general rather than Mason specifically, the jury was already aware of Mason’s guilty plea to two other drug offenses, and the evidence against Mason was strong given the undisputed facts of him driving a loaded firearm with methamphetamine. Consequently, the district court’s judgment of conviction stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw after finding that the appellant’s claims were barred by a valid appeal waiver included in his plea agreement. The court applied de novo review, enforcing the waiver because the defendant’s sworn statements at the change-of-plea hearing contradicted any claim that he entered the agreement unknowingly or involuntarily, and because his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriately raised through collateral review rather than direct appeal. Additionally, the court determined that challenges to sentencing calculations and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct fell within the scope of the waiver or were waived by the guilty plea itself. The court further concluded that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver and, after an independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio*, found no non-frivolous issues for appeal outside the waiver’s scope. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and appellate counsel is permitted to withdraw.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order certifying a class of third-party payors in a RICO pharmaceutical fraud action against GlaxoSmithKline LLC and remanded the case for further proceedings. While the appellate court affirmed that the proposed class was ascertainable, it held that the District Court erred in concluding that common issues predominated over individual ones regarding causation. The court established that while third-party payors in pharmaceutical fraud RICO cases may use class-wide statistical evidence to prove but-for causation, such evidence must demonstrate actual causation rather than mere correlation. Specifically, the court ruled that statistical methods like multiple regression analysis are required to isolate the causal effect of the defendant’s fraudulent marketing from other variables and to justify the rejection of competing explanations. The court found that the plaintiffs’ proposed evidence—including internal GSK marketing studies that did not isolate fraudulent messaging, an excluded regression report, and a “natural experiment” relying solely on the correlation between the public disclosure of risks and a subsequent drop in prescriptions—failed to meet this rigorous standard. Consequently, the District Court’s certification was vacated because it failed to resolve disputes regarding the adequacy of the statistical evidence and applied an incorrect legal standard by inferring reliance from a common scheme without sufficient proof that the fraud specifically caused the injury. On remand, the District Court must re-evaluate the predominance requirement under this clarified standard, potentially allowing for additional discovery if necessary.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that neither the jail nurse nor the sheriff’s deputy acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs, and therefore were entitled to qualified immunity. The court applied the two-prong test for deliberate-indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause: (1) whether the detainee had an objectively serious medical need, and (2) whether the defendant acted with subjective recklessness in the face of a known or obvious risk of harm. The court determined that while the plaintiff suffered a stroke, his symptoms prior to hospitalization—including mumbling, elevated blood pressure, increased sleep, and decreased appetite—were not so obvious that a reasonable official would have recognized them as indicative of a stroke requiring emergency intervention. Specifically, the nurse observed that the plaintiff was alert, followed commands, had no mobility issues, and denied pain; thus, her decision to monitor rather than immediately transport him was not reckless. The deputy, lacking medical training, reasonably deferred to the nurse’s judgment and subsequently recommended hospitalization once the plaintiff reported feeling ill on the twelfth day. Because the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendants’ conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights, their qualified immunity defense succeeded. Furthermore, the court ruled that the Monell claims against the county and sheriff failed as a matter of law because there can be no municipal liability without an underlying constitutional violation by an individual official. As a result of this decision, the judgment in favor of the defendants stands, and the plaintiff’s claims for damages regarding the stroke and permanent brain damage are dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Jason Demyers’s 324-month prison sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the reasonableness of the sentence, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Regarding procedural reasonableness, the court held that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the drug quantity attributable to Demyers, relying on co-conspirator testimony, FedEx records, cell phone logs, and flight records; furthermore, any potential error was harmless because the admitted drug quantities alone triggered the same base offense level of 38. The court also found no reversible error regarding the district court’s rejection of Demyers’s policy argument to apply methamphetamine-mixture Guidelines rather than pure-methamphetamine Guidelines, noting the court explicitly considered and rejected the request while imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. Additionally, the court affirmed the application of a four-level enhancement for being an organizer or leader under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) based on Demyers’s supervisory control over co-conspirators, and a two-level enhancement for engaging in criminal conduct as a livelihood under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(E), supported by evidence of his income exceeding the statutory threshold and his lack of legitimate employment. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court rejected Demyers’s claim that the sentence was unreasonable due to an improper weight placed on avoiding unwarranted disparities among co-defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The court clarified that while courts may consider a co-defendant’s sentence, they are not required to impose strict proportionality and must focus on the individual defendant’s circumstances. The practical consequence is that Demyers’s conviction and sentence remain in effect, and he must serve the 324-month term imposed by the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 3:24-cv-00614-MMC

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Roger Greer’s First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court applied the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard, reviewing the dismissal de novo and accepting factual allegations as true while disregarding conclusory legal assertions. Regarding the Title VII discrimination claim, the court held that Greer failed to allege membership in a protected class because he asserted discrimination based on disability, which is not a protected category under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). For the Rehabilitation Act discrimination claim, the court found the complaint insufficient because it did not describe the nature of Greer’s impairment with particularity, relying instead on conclusory language that merely recited statutory elements. Additionally, the court dismissed the retaliation claims under both statutes due to a lack of a plausible causal link between Greer’s 2014 EEO complaint and his subsequent termination, noting an over-year gap between the protected activity and the adverse action, alongside the intervening positive drug test. Finally, the court determined that the district court acted within its broad authority to deny leave to amend given that the First Amended Complaint failed to cure the deficiencies of the original filing. Consequently, Greer’s claims are dismissed without further opportunity to amend.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of two law enforcement officers against photojournalists who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment excessive force claims arising from injuries sustained during the 2020 Kenosha protests. Regarding the First Amendment claim, the court applied the burden-shifting framework established in *Nieves v. Bartlett*. The plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory animus because the record lacked evidence that the officers intentionally targeted them rather than violent protestors nearby. The court held that the mere fact that journalists were struck while standing near legitimate targets, combined with discrepancies in police use-of-force reports, was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding intent to retaliate for protected activity. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the court addressed whether an officer’s intentional deployment of force that accidentally strikes an unintended target constitutes a “seizure.” While noting a circuit split and unsettled law on this specific question following *Torres v. Madrid*, the court determined that it was not necessary to resolve the underlying constitutional issue because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that, given the uncertainty in the case law as of 2020, it was not “clearly established” that such conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. The practical consequence is that the summary judgment for the officers stands, and the plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed without further litigation on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Decatur and its officers, holding that the officers possessed probable cause to arrest Charles Friend for domestic battery and that their warrantless entry into his mother’s home was lawful due to consent. The court applied the objective “totality of the circumstances” standard to determine probable cause, concluding that a reasonable officer could believe a crime had been committed based on Hathaway’s statements regarding her injuries, her history of altercations with Friend, and corroborating accounts from her daughter and colleague. The court ruled that inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony or potential intoxication did not negate probable cause, as weighing witness credibility is a function for the jury, not the police officer at the time of arrest. Furthermore, the court determined that the officers’ conditional statement to Friend that they would “hash this out” rather than arrest him if he was innocent did not constitute an outright or material lie sufficient to vitiate the knowing and voluntary consent given by Friend and his mother to enter the home. Consequently, because the arrest was supported by probable cause and the entry was consensual, there was no Fourth Amendment violation, which also defeated the plaintiff’s derivative claim against the City under *Monell*. The practical consequence is that the officers are shielded from liability for false arrest and unlawful search, and the plaintiff’s civil rights lawsuit is dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The dc-circuit denied the petitions for review of the Federal Aviation Administration’s approval of a runway extension and terminal construction project at Tweed New Haven Airport. The court held that the FAA’s environmental assessment complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court applied the standard of deferential review established by *Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County*, 605 U.S. 168 (2025), which mandates that judicial review in NEPA cases be limited to ensuring the agency adequately considered and disclosed environmental impacts within a “broad range of reasonableness.” The court rejected four specific challenges: first, it found the FAA reasonably segmented the project by excluding future taxiway upgrades that were temporally remote and not required for safety; second, it held the agency was not required to consider cumulative effects of inchoate projects or quantify specific effects from existing airline service where the baseline was adequately detailed; third, it deferred to the FAA’s predictive technical judgments regarding enplanement projections and air pollution reductions based on available data; and fourth, it concluded the agency sufficiently addressed flooding, runoff, and wetland impacts through detailed mitigation plans and reasonable explanations of indirect effects. The practical consequence is that the FAA’s approval of the construction project stands, allowing the airport to proceed with the runway extension and terminal expansion without further judicial intervention or a requirement to prepare a more extensive environmental impact statement.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.