Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 4:21-cr-00163-

The Ninth Circuit vacated Attila Colar’s convictions on 44 federal counts involving alleged Paycheck Protection Program fraud and obstruction of justice, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate a colorable claim of actual juror bias raised by an alternate juror who expressed strong negative reactions to Colar’s defense theory regarding racial and religious targeting before hearing any evidence. The panel applied the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury, establishing that once a colorable issue of juror bias arises, the district court must conduct a suitable investigation before the juror continues to serve; this duty cannot be deferred simply because the juror is an alternate. The court found that the district court’s failure to investigate immediately and its subsequent belated inquiry—which occurred only after the juror had heard evidence and failed to unequivocally confirm the juror could set aside his expressed bias—constituted structural error. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, any doubt regarding a juror’s impartiality must be resolved against the juror, and the participation of even a single biased juror in rendering a guilty verdict requires reversal without regard to harmless error analysis. As a practical consequence, Colar’s convictions are set aside, and the case is returned to the district court for a new trial with an impartial jury. While the panel affirmed the denial of Colar’s motion for acquittal regarding sufficiency of the evidence in a separate memorandum disposition, the structural error regarding juror bias necessitates a retrial rather than a dismissal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:24-cv-00184-TL

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Travis M. Glenn’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend and its denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the claim regarding the failure to send tax documents because Glenn alleged only potential financial harm, which is conjectural and insufficient to establish Article III standing under *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*. Regarding the COVID-19 guidelines claim, the court found the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief under the standards set in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly* and *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, as Glenn offered vague and conclusory allegations without explaining how specific financial losses were caused by the alleged disregard of guidelines. The court further affirmed the dismissal of claims for unlawful termination, malicious business practices, breach of contract, and whistleblower violations because Glenn failed to cite applicable statutes or legal theories supporting his entitlement to notice, appeal rights, or reimbursement, and failed to allege that he performed contractual obligations or made protected complaints prior to termination. The appellate court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, concluding that further amendment would be futile given Glenn’s prior opportunities to cure deficiencies. Additionally, the court deemed Glenn’s objection to the denial of a preliminary injunction waived because it was not raised in his opening brief; even if considered, the motion was properly denied as Glenn could not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits following the dismissal of his underlying claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 3:21-cv-01669-JO-MSB

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment order and the remedies imposed against Choice Advisors, LLC and Matthias O’Meara for violating MSRB Rule G-42(e)(1)(D) and breaching fiduciary duties in municipal advisory services. The court held that the appellants’ agreement with BB&T constituted an illegal fee-splitting arrangement under the plain language of the rule, which broadly prohibits any division of fees between a municipal advisor and a bank underwriter to prevent conflicts of interest, regardless of how the payment is structured. Regarding remedies, the court applied the abuse of discretion standard and affirmed the permanent injunction based on the *Murphy* factors, finding a reasonable likelihood of future violations due to the appellants’ knowing misconduct and failure to police themselves. The court further upheld the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and civil penalties, ruling that proof of investor pecuniary harm is not required for disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) or (d)(7) and that penalties were warranted to deter knowing violations despite the appellants’ unsupported claims regarding their ability to pay. As a result, the permanent injunction, disgorgement order, and civil penalties remain in effect against the appellants.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:22-cv-00091-JLS-GJS

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Officer Kyle Clifton’s motion to dismiss Ahmad Price’s civil rights claims. The court held that the district court correctly applied the *Younger* abstention doctrine to bar Price’s request for a permanent injunction because state criminal proceedings regarding the evidence obtained from the search were ongoing, implicated important state interests, and provided an adequate forum for federal challenges without extraordinary circumstances warranting intervention. Regarding the damages claims, the court ruled that issue preclusion applied because the California state trial court and Court of Appeals had already adjudicated the identical issues of whether Clifton lawfully detained Price and searched his vehicle, as well as the credibility of Clifton’s supplemental report. The court further affirmed the denial of leave to amend the complaint, finding that additional amendments could not cure the deficiencies in Price’s claims. Consequently, Price’s civil rights action is dismissed, and his motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 4:25-cv-04966-HSG

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to intervene as of right filed by the Western States Trucking Association, Construction Industry Air Quality Coalition, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute, National Association of Convenience Stores, and various Corn Grower Associations, but reversed the denial of motions to intervene as of right filed by the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, National Automobile Dealers Association, and American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, while also reversing the denial of permissive intervention for the former group. The court applied the four-part test under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) for intervention as of right: (1) timeliness; (2) a significantly protectable interest; (3) a practical impairment of that interest by the action’s disposition; and (4) inadequate representation by existing parties. The court held that automakers and dealers possess a “significantly protectable” legal interest in federal preemption under Section 209 of the Clean Air Act, as the outcome of the underlying litigation regarding EPA waivers directly affects their ability to invoke this defense. Furthermore, the court found these entities demonstrated inadequate representation because the Federal Defendants have not raised specific arguments regarding the applicability of the Congressional Review Act and the Administrative Procedure Act to the EPA waivers. Conversely, the court determined that the economic interests asserted by trucking associations, fuel manufacturers, and corn growers were too attenuated from the core legal issues to constitute a significantly protectable interest under Rule 24(a)(2). Regarding permissive intervention, the court found the district court abused its discretion by relying on an erroneous view of adequate representation; because the Federal Defendants do not adequately represent the interests of the fuel and agricultural groups, those motions were remanded for reconsideration. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to grant intervention as of right to the Alliance for Automotive Innovation, National Automobile Dealers Association, and American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, and to determine whether to grant permissive intervention to the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute, National Association of Convenience Stores, and Corn Grower Associations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment enforcing an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral award against Argentina, holding that the petition to enforce was timely. The court determined that because 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, the federal statute implementing the Washington Convention, lacks a specific statute of limitations, the court must borrow the most analogous state or local limitations period. Applying the standard rule that courts should look to the law of the District of Columbia for the closest analogue, the court concluded that D.C. Code § 15-101, which provides a twelve-year limitations period for the enforcement of money judgments issued by courts within the District, is the appropriate statute to apply. The court reasoned that this provision aligns with the statutory mandate in § 1650a requiring awards to be enforced with the same “full faith and credit” as final state court judgments. The court rejected Argentina’s arguments for a three-year limitations period under the Federal Arbitration Act, noting that Congress explicitly excluded the FAA from applying to Washington Convention awards, and also rejected the D.C. Arbitration Act or a general catchall provision as inapposite due to differences in judicial review standards and the impracticality of shorter timeframes given the mandatory internal annulment process under the Washington Convention. Consequently, Titan Consortium 1, LLC’s enforcement action filed four years after the award was issued is deemed timely, and the district court’s judgment enforcing the award remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The D.C. Circuit granted the Hospital’s petition for review and denied the National Labor Relations Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, ruling that the Board’s “successor bar” rule is inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). On remand from the Supreme Court following *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, the court determined it must independently interpret the statute rather than defer to the Board’s legal conclusions. The court held that the successor bar, which compels a new business owner to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union for up to one year regardless of whether the union retains majority employee support, violates Sections 7 and 9 of the Act. Specifically, the rule suspends employees’ statutory right to choose their own bargaining representatives and the requirement that exclusive representation be based on majority support. The court rejected the Board’s arguments that it possessed policymaking authority to create this irrebuttable presumption or that industrial stability justified overriding these specific statutory guarantees. Consequently, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, allowing the Hospital to present evidence regarding whether the union actually lacks majority support.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:23-cv-08152-PA-RAO

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of a regulatory takings claim brought by a mobile home park owner against the City of Santa Barbara, holding that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim under the *Penn Central* test. The court applied de novo review to the dismissal and evaluated the three factors required for a regulatory taking: (1) economic impact, (2) interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action. While the court assumed without deciding that the plaintiff’s allegation of a 92.5% diminution in property value satisfied the first factor, it ruled that the second and third factors weighed decisively against the claim. Regarding the second factor, the court determined that the park owner could not reasonably expect its property to be free from rent control regulations, noting that mobile home parks are heavily regulated fields and that vacancy control was a foreseeable supplement to the City’s long-standing rent stabilization framework rather than an unforeseeable departure. The court further held that statements by a former mayor regarding the legality of such controls did not create reasonable investment-backed expectations because elected officials’ views change over time and do not bind future policy. Regarding the third factor, the court characterized the ordinance as an adjustment of economic benefits and burdens to promote the common good rather than a physical appropriation. Consequently, the court concluded that substantial economic impact alone cannot sustain a takings claim at the motion-to-dismiss stage when the other *Penn Central* factors are not plausibly alleged. The practical consequence is that the plaintiff’s lawsuit is terminated without proceeding to discovery or trial.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 2024 revision to its Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS), which classified environmental impacts from severe nuclear accidents as “small” for the purpose of license renewals. The court held that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in failing to separately quantify the effects of aging components and climate change on accident risks within its generic analysis. The court applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, emphasizing that NEPA is a procedural statute requiring agencies to take a “hard look” at environmental consequences but not mandating specific results or micromanaging agency choices regarding the depth and breadth of inquiry. The court reasoned that the NRC’s determination was reasonable because: (1) the agency extensively analyzed severe accidents by assessing their likelihood and consequences, finding the probability-weighted impacts to be more than 10,000 percent lower than its conservative 1996 bounding estimates; (2) the NRC relied on a “full suite of regulatory programs” designed to manage aging and ensure plants withstand natural phenomena like storms and floods, which supported its judgment that these factors would not meaningfully alter the risk assessment; and (3) the large margin of error in the agency’s data provided sufficient buffer to account for uncertainties regarding aging and climate change. The court distinguished this case from *New York v. NRC* (“New York I”), noting that the NRC did not rely on regulatory compliance as a substitute for environmental analysis but rather used it to support its predictive judgments within a broader, forward-looking risk model. As a practical consequence, the petition is dismissed, leaving the NRC’s 2024 GEIS Revision 2 in effect. The generic “small” classification remains applicable to severe accidents during license renewals, meaning plants that have already completed Severe-Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) analysis are not required to repeat it generically. However, the court clarified that this does not preclude site-specific scrutiny; interested parties may still petition for waivers or intervene in individual license-renewal proceedings to raise plant-specific evidence of new or significant environmental impacts that might alter the generic determination for a particular facility.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 4:25-cv-04966-HSG

The ninth-circuit affirmed the denial of motions to intervene as of right filed by the Western States Trucking Association, Construction Industry Air Quality Coalition, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute, National Association of Convenience Stores, and various Corn Grower Associations, while reversing the district court’s denial of permissive intervention motions for the latter four groups and remanding for further proceedings. The court applied the four-part test under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) to determine intervention as of right, requiring a timely motion, a significantly protectable interest, a showing that the disposition may impair the ability to protect that interest, and a demonstration that the interest is inadequately represented by existing parties. The court held that Auto Innovators, NADA, and AmFree satisfied this test because they possess a legally protectable right under section 209 of the Clean Air Act to sell federally approved vehicles, an interest that would be impaired if the Plaintiff States succeeded in their challenge to the Congressional Review Act resolutions disapproving EPA waivers. Furthermore, these groups demonstrated inadequate representation by Federal Defendants, who had not yet raised arguments regarding whether EPA waivers constitute “rules” under the Administrative Procedure Act and the CRA. Conversely, the court found that the economic interests asserted by WSTA, CIAQC, AFPM, API, NACS, and the Corn Grower Associations were too attenuated from the litigation’s core issues to constitute a significantly protectable interest. Regarding permissive intervention, the court determined the district court abused its discretion by denying motions for AFPM, API, NACS, and the Corn Grower Associations based on an erroneous view that Federal Defendants adequately represented their interests; because Federal Defendants may not advance all arguments these organizations wish to make, the district court must re-evaluate whether permissive intervention is appropriate. The practical consequence is that Auto Innovators, NADA, and AmFree are granted leave to intervene as of right in the underlying litigation concerning California’s zero-emission vehicle regulations. The motions to intervene as of right by WSTA, CIAQC, AFPM, API, NACS, and the Corn Grower Associations remain denied, but AFPM, API, NACS, and the Corn Grower Associations are remanded to seek permissive intervention in the district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.