Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 3:24-cv-05081-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 action brought by former Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families employees who were separated from employment after their requests for religious accommodations regarding a COVID-19 vaccination mandate were denied. The court held that the Employees failed to state a claim against the agency officials in their personal capacities because the First Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege personal involvement by any defendant in constitutional violations of free exercise, equal protection, or procedural due process rights. Applying the standard from *Johnson v. Duffy* and *Peck v. Montoya*, the court found that vicarious liability is unavailable under § 1983 and that the internal communications cited by the plaintiffs did not demonstrate religious animus or a policy known to cause constitutional injury. Regarding claims for prospective injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities, the court ruled these were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because there was no ongoing violation of federal law; the Governor’s vaccination proclamation had been rescinded months before the suit was filed, eliminating any threat of future enforcement necessary to invoke the *Ex parte Young* exception. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint, concluding that further amendment would have been futile as the Employees had already failed to cure the identified deficiencies in their First Amended Complaint. The practical consequence is that the federal claims against the officials are dismissed with prejudice and the case cannot proceed on these grounds.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:25-cv-02176-RGK-PVC

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action for failure to serve defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by requiring plaintiffs to respond to an order to show cause regarding service deficiencies on the same day it was issued, particularly given that counsel was out of the country and no specific explanation was provided for rejecting the plaintiffs’ reasons for delay. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), noting that the 90-day service provision is an “irreducible allowance” but that courts must extend time if a plaintiff shows “good cause.” The Ninth Circuit determined that mailing process to only one of four required addresses constituted incomplete service, yet this specific instance, combined with counsel’s family tragedy, could constitute good cause or excusable neglect under Rule 4(i)(4), which mandates that a court allow a party reasonable time to cure such deficiencies. The district court failed to explain why these potentially valid reasons for an extension were rejected and failed to afford the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate good cause before dismissal. On remand, the district court must afford the plaintiffs a reasonable amount of time to respond to the order to show cause and consider whether to extend the time to complete service based on the evidence of excusable neglect or good cause presented.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petitions filed by the Public Safety Spectrum Alliance and the Public Safety Broadband Technology Association for lack of Article III standing because they failed to submit individual affidavits or declarations from identified members proving specific injuries traceable to the FCC order, rendering their associational standing claims insufficient. The court denied the remaining petitions filed by the Coalition for Emergency Response and Critical Infrastructure and others on the merits and dismissed one claim as unripe. Regarding the merits, the court held that the Spectrum Act does not limit FirstNet’s authority to the 700 MHz band, allowing it to utilize spectrum in the 4.9 GHz band; the FCC properly invoked a rule of construction to exempt the selection of the Band Manager from competitive bidding requirements to avoid mutual exclusivity; and the FCC did not violate regulations governing federal use of the band because the proposed transfer involves a private Band Manager rather than direct inter-governmental sharing. The court further found the FCC’s order was not arbitrary, noting that broadcast licenses do not create property rights, the agency reasonably weighed reliance interests against public safety benefits, and it was permissible to defer specific procedural details regarding the Band Manager selection and contract terms until later stages. The claim regarding the FCC’s potential ultra vires authority over federal entities was dismissed as unripe because the order does not yet authorize FirstNet to use the spectrum; that issue will only be reviewable once the FCC selects a Band Manager and attempts to license FirstNet without NTIA approval. Consequently, the court affirmed the FCC’s Eighth Report and Order while dismissing the standing-deficient petitions and deferring review of the federal licensing authority question until the agency’s future actions clarify the specific legal conflicts.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:21-CV-00130-RJS)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Prime Insurance Company and Prime Holdings Insurance Services, Inc., holding that the insurer did not breach its duty of good faith under Utah law. The court applied de novo review to the summary judgment standard, requiring a showing that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Utah law, an insurer’s duty of good faith includes diligent investigation and settlement efforts, particularly after a third party has sued the insured. The court analyzed four specific allegations of bad faith: 1. **Duty to Explain Policy Terms:** The court predicted that the Utah Supreme Court would not impose a duty on insurers to explain policy terms absent ambiguity or fraud. Citing Utah precedent regarding the duty of insureds to read their policies and the majority view in other jurisdictions, the court found no ambiguity in the $50,000 coverage cap and noted that Prime Insurance had already provided written explanations of the limits and defense cost reductions. 2. **Failure to Offer Policy Limit:** The court found no evidence that the plaintiff’s attorney made a valid settlement offer for the policy limit; the email in question was merely an invitation to negotiate. Furthermore, the plaintiff conceded he would not have accepted $50,000, and the insurer acted reasonably by waiting for a medical examiner’s report before making a final determination on liability. 3. **Failure to Advise on Additional Funds:** The court ruled that Utah law does not require an insurer to advise an insured of the right to contribute its own funds to a settlement when the insurer has already tendered the full policy limit and informed the insured it could use those funds as it saw fit. 4. **Conditions on Tender:** The court determined that Prime Insurance’s request for a “full and final settlement” did not constitute bad faith because there was no evidence the plaintiff would have accepted the offer if it excluded claims against other potential defendants, such as a nurse who was not yet sued at the time of the tender. The practical consequence is that the summary judgment in favor of the insurers stands, dismissing the bad faith claim and leaving the plaintiffs without recovery on that specific cause of action.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fifth Circuit denied the respondents’ motion to refer the consolidated immigration cases to the en banc court as unnecessary and granted their motions for a stay of the district court judgments pending rehearing en banc. The court issued this per curiam order without addressing the merits of the underlying immigration relief sought by the petitioners, focusing solely on procedural management regarding the request for an en banc review and the preservation of the status quo while such review is considered. As a result, the district court’s judgments remain stayed, preventing their immediate enforcement or implementation until the en banc rehearing concludes.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:22-cr-00200-PA-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Brieshanay Quenise Ford’s conviction and 30-month sentence for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the district court correctly denied Ford’s motions to dismiss the indictment based on outrageous government conduct, inherent judicial authority, and selective enforcement. Regarding the outrageous government conduct claim, the court applied a de novo standard of review for legal conclusions and clear error for factual findings, determining that federal law enforcement did not create or participate in the alleged misconduct by LAPD Detective Vinton, and that even if Vinton’s actions were outrageous, they would not taint the separate federal prosecution. The court further ruled that the district court properly denied dismissal under inherent authority because the federal prosecution did not violate a statutory or constitutional right, rely on improper considerations, or involve illegal conduct imputable to federal officials. On the selective enforcement claim, the court found Ford failed to meet her burden of showing discriminatory effect by adducing evidence that similarly situated defendants were treated differently. Additionally, the court determined Ford’s constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by the en banc decision in *United States v. Duarte*, which held the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to non-violent felons. Finally, the court concluded the 30-month sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a), noting the district court properly weighed Ford’s mitigating evidence and did not plainly err by failing to disclose specific factual information regarding mass shootings prior to sentencing. As a result, the conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Mark Roote’s civil complaint. The court reviewed the record and determined there was no reversible error, relying on the district court’s acceptance of the magistrate judge’s recommendation. As an unpublished per curiam opinion, this decision does not establish binding precedent within the circuit. The court also granted Roote’s motion to file a supplemental informal brief but denied his request for disability accommodations as moot due to the dispensation of oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the American Association of Nurse Anesthesiology’s lawsuit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Department of Health and Human Services for lack of Article III standing. The court held that the Association failed to establish associational standing because its members could not demonstrate that their alleged injury—lower reimbursement rates from private insurers—was fairly traceable to the federal defendants’ conduct or likely redressable by a favorable judicial judgment. The court applied the three-prong standing test requiring an injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Regarding causation, the court reasoned that the injury was caused by the independent business decisions of private insurers, not by HHS’s failure to enforce the Affordable Care Act’s nondiscrimination provision (42 U.S.C. § 300gg). The court found the link between government inaction and the insurers’ specific policy changes too speculative, noting that insurers had discretion over their reimbursement practices and that state governments hold primary enforcement authority under the statute. Furthermore, the court ruled the injury was not redressable because the Secretary retains broad statutory discretion to decide whether to initiate enforcement proceedings, including determining if states have failed to enforce the law, investigating violations, and imposing penalties. Consequently, a court order compelling HHS to enforce the law would not guarantee that insurers would change their reimbursement rates or that any resulting penalties would remedy the members’ financial losses. The practical consequence is that the Association’s claims for a writ of mandamus and relief under the Administrative Procedure Act are dismissed without prejudice. The case returns to the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint, leaving the Association to seek remedies through political channels or administrative processes rather than federal litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

Docket: 2:22-cv-00667-SPL

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State of Arizona and its officials, holding that former employees Mark Hasz and Shaun Holland presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether their terminations were retaliatory for whistleblowing. The court applied the First Amendment retaliation standard established in *Eng v. Cooley* and *Burch v. City of Chubbuck*, which requires a plaintiff to show they spoke on a matter of public concern as a private citizen, and that such speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The court determined that the plaintiffs met their burden on the “motivating factor” element through three specific lines of circumstantial evidence: (1) temporal proximity, noting terminations occurred nine to eleven months after protected disclosures and investigations began shortly thereafter; (2) coordinated reassignments to a unit with no available lieutenant positions for Hasz immediately following the whistleblowing; and (3) evidence suggesting pretext, including allegations that use-of-force reports were altered to justify dismissal and that prior disciplinary histories were invoked only after the protected speech. The court noted that while the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the district court erred by failing to address the remaining burden-shifting steps—whether the defendants had adequate justification for the terminations or would have taken the same action absent the protected speech—as these are fact-bound questions requiring a jury’s determination. Additionally, the court found a triable issue regarding the state-law claim under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-532(A) and rejected the argument that individual defendant James Kimble was not a proper party, citing evidence of his involvement in personnel decisions and dismissal notices. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings where the trier of fact must evaluate the evidence regarding pretext and the defendants’ justification for the terminations under both federal First Amendment law and Arizona state whistleblower statutes.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-21

The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal filed by LeAnthony T. Winston regarding his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and subsequent denial of reconsideration. The court held that an appeal from such orders is not permissible without a certificate of appealability issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which requires a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Applying the standard set forth in *Buck v. Davis* and *Gonzalez v. Thaler*, the court determined that Winston failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong, nor did he show that the procedural ruling was debatable while stating a debatable claim of constitutional denial. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without oral argument, leaving the district court’s denial of relief in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.