Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The ninth-circuit granted panel rehearing, withdrew its earlier June 26, 2026 memorandum by issuing a superseding amended memorandum, and barred any further rehearing petitions in the case. In the amended decision, the court granted in part and denied in part the petition for review of the BIA’s removal order. It held that the agency legally erred in treating the petitioner’s 18 U.S.C. § 545 conviction as a particularly serious crime for asylum and INA withholding purposes because, at step one of the particularly-serious-crime analysis, the agency must look to the elements of the offense, and it instead relied on the statute’s maximum sentence and on a prior moral-turpitude ruling—considerations that are not elements of the offense. The court also held that the agency legally erred in denying cancellation of removal because it failed to consider relevant evidence that the petitioner had accepted responsibility for her criminal conduct, including her plea agreement, presentence report, and below-guidelines sentence. The court denied relief under the Convention Against Torture, including both CAT withholding and CAT deferral. It applied the rule that CAT relief requires proof that torture is more likely than not, and when the claim depends on a chain of events, each link in that chain must itself be more likely than not. The court said the agency did not have to separately discuss the State Department’s Mexico human-rights report because it was cumulative and not potentially dispositive, and substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings that the petitioner had not shown the necessary chain of events was more likely than not. Because CAT relief failed on that ground, remand on CAT withholding would be futile even though the agency’s particularly-serious-crime analysis was erroneous. The practical result is that the case goes back to the BIA for further proceedings on asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, and cancellation of removal, while the denial of CAT protection remains in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 3:24-cv-00834-H-VET

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of long-term disability benefits in an ERISA action. Reviewing for clear error regarding factual findings and de novo regarding legal conclusions, the court held that the claimant bears the burden of proving disability by a preponderance of the evidence under the plan terms. The panel rejected arguments that examining physicians warrant special deference over non-examining ones, that prior short-term disability payments create a legal presumption of long-term disability, or that the district court clearly erred by adopting subsidiary rationales regarding malingering and witness credibility consistent with the insurer’s original denial rationale. The judgment stands, leaving the insurance company’s denial of benefits in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The ninth-circuit held that a conviction under California Penal Code § 288.2(b) for distributing harmful matter to a minor with the purpose of seducing the minor is categorically a “crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Because that conviction made the petitioner removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the BIA’s affirmance of the immigration judge’s denial of cancellation. The court reviewed the issue de novo and applied the categorical approach, looking to the elements of the state offense rather than the petitioner’s actual conduct. Relying on Leon-Briviesca v. Blanche, the court said the generic federal definition of child abuse requires at least criminal negligence and conduct that places a minor in a situation likely to produce harm; actual injury is not required. The court concluded § 288.2(b) fits that definition because it requires knowing and intentional conduct directed at a minor and the transmission of “harmful matter” for sexual purposes. The court rejected arguments that the statute was overbroad because it supposedly covers conduct without actual injury, consensual sexual communications between older minors, communications with someone only believed to be a minor, or communications the minor never receives. On those points, the court emphasized both California law recognizing the harm inherent in such conduct and the lack of any realistic probability that California would apply the statute in the broader ways the petitioner proposed. The practical result is that the petition for review was denied, the BIA’s order stands, and the denial of cancellation of removal remains in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The eleventh-circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Guerlancie Felix’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order affirming the denial of her applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court held that Felix failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding two specific claims: first, her argument that the immigration judge erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the government after finding past persecution on account of political opinion; and second, her claim that the BIA erred in not considering her eligibility for humanitarian asylum. The court applied the exhaustion requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), ruling that unadorned, conclusory statements or passing references do not satisfy the requirement to raise the “core issue” and provide sufficient information for the BIA to review errors. Because Felix did not raise these specific arguments in her notice of appeal or briefing before the BIA, the court could not consider them. Regarding her challenge that the BIA failed to show reasoned consideration of the humanitarian asylum claim, the court denied this argument on the merits, applying a de novo standard of review. The court reasoned that the BIA is only required to provide reasoned consideration for claims actually raised by the petitioner; therefore, it cannot be faulted for failing to consider an unexhausted claim that was not properly before it. As a result, the petition is dismissed as to the exhaustion issues and denied as to the reasoned consideration issue.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court denying Derby Clerfe’s motion to dismiss his indictment for conspiring to violate federal laws prohibiting the export of firearms without filing an export information sheet. The court rejected Clerfe’s two primary constitutional challenges: a Second Amendment claim and a non-delegation doctrine claim. Regarding the Second Amendment challenge, the court applied the standard established in *New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen*, which requires determining whether the challenged conduct is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and, if so, whether the regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court held that the plain text of “keep and bear Arms” does not cover Clerfe’s conduct of exporting firearms abroad to Haiti because “keeping” arms entails physical possession or control, whereas export involves dispossessing oneself of the weapons. Consequently, the conduct was not presumptively protected. Even assuming the conduct fell within the Amendment’s scope, the court found the export restrictions consistent with historical tradition, citing founding-era statutes from 1794, 1806, and 1807 that prohibited or restricted the export of arms for foreign policy reasons. Regarding the non-delegation challenge, the court applied the “intelligible principle” test to determine if Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the President under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The court concluded that the statute provided an intelligible principle by directing the President to designate defense articles in furtherance of “world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States,” a goal clarified by other provisions of the AECA aimed at reducing international arms trade. The court noted that this delegation is similar to those upheld in *Touby v. United States* and *United States v. Amirnazmi*, particularly given the procedural requirements and the President’s exclusive authority over foreign affairs. The practical consequence is that Clerfe’s conviction stands, and the appeal is dismissed with the judgment of the District Court affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 5:23-cv-00232-MTT

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Shannon Waller, Jr.’s breach of contract, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) claims against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia. Regarding the contract claim, the court applied Georgia sovereign immunity law under Ga. Const. Art. 1, § 2, ¶ IX(c) and O.C.G.A. § 50-21-1(a), holding that a valid written contract waiving immunity must contain all essential terms in writing; the plaintiff’s admission letter and Student Handbook failed to meet this standard because they lacked express consideration or obligations moving to the contract. For the discrimination claims, the court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, ruling that the complaint failed to allege sufficient factual content to support an inference that adverse actions were taken by reason of the plaintiff’s disabilities rather than patient safety concerns, constituting merely threadbare recitals of legal elements. The district court’s dismissal orders remain in effect, terminating the federal litigation against the university system and its employees.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to reconsider while dismissing the appeal regarding the underlying denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. The court dismissed the appeal as untimely because the appellant’s notice of appeal, filed in April 2025, failed to meet the 60-day deadline required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) for appealing a final order where the United States is a party; the court noted that no timely post-judgment motion under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) had been filed to extend this period. Regarding the motion to reconsider, the court applied a standard of review finding no reversible error in the district court’s decision, citing *Bonnie v. Dunbar*, 157 F.4th 610 (4th Cir. 2025). Consequently, the appeal is dismissed as to the § 2241 petition, leaving that denial intact, and the denial of reconsideration is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Ernest Owusu’s emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and dismissing his complaint. The court held that the district court correctly lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Owusu’s requests to declare his removal proceedings unlawful, enjoin those proceedings, and stay his removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Applying the standard of review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and relying on *Mapoy v. Carroll*, the court found no reversible error in the lower court’s determination that the statute precluded judicial review of these specific immigration-related claims. Consequently, Owusu’s appeal was dismissed, his motion for injunctive relief pending appeal was denied, and oral argument was dispensed with as unnecessary.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 4:22-md-03047-YGR

The ninth-circuit dismissed Meta Platforms, Inc., TikTok entities, and plaintiffs’ conditional cross-appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court held that section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provides a defense to liability rather than immunity from suit, meaning denials of such defenses do not qualify for immediate interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. Applying the three stringent requirements derived from *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.*, the court found the district court’s ruling failed to conclusively determine the disputed question, was not completely separate from the merits of the action, and could be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. As a result, the appeals are dismissed and the litigation must proceed in the district court until final judgment is entered.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 1:23-cv-00265-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s preliminary injunction regarding Hawaii’s Act 52, which restricts firearm carry in sensitive places and on private property. On remand from the United States Supreme Court, which had previously reversed the panel’s prior determination that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success regarding the private-property rule, the Ninth Circuit now affirmed the injunction as it applies to Hawaii Revised Statutes section 134-9.5. This statute prohibits carrying firearms onto private property unless the owner allows it. The court also affirmed the injunction regarding sections prohibiting carry in certain parking areas and section 134-9.1(a)(12). Conversely, the court reversed the injunction as it applied to Hawaii Revised Statutes sections 134-9.1(a)(4) and 134-9.1(a)(9), which prohibit carrying firearms in specific other locations. The panel’s analysis concerning all other aspects of Hawaii’s law remains unaffected by this remand decision.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.