Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The eighth-circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Relying on Supreme Court precedent in *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.* and Eighth Circuit decisions in *Parkhurst v. Tabor* and *Pratt v. Helms*, the court held that crime victims lack standing to assert equal protection or failure-to-investigate claims against law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even when alleging class-based discrimination based on sex. The court reasoned that private citizens have no constitutional right to an investigation of a crime committed against them and that police decisions concerning investigations are inherently discretionary and ill-suited to judicial second-guessing. Because the plaintiff lacked standing to assert her federal claims, the court declined to address the defendants’ immunity arguments. The court remanded the plaintiff’s state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to the district court to determine whether she has standing to assert that specific claim, as the parties did not address whether the federal standing analysis applies to state law causes of action.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 0:23-cv-62016-RS,

The eleventh-circuit reversed a bankruptcy court order denying a shareholder’s motion for relief from the automatic stay regarding the revocation or termination of a corporate debtor’s Subchapter S tax status. Reviewing de novo, the court held that a corporate debtor’s Subchapter S election does not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 because the election belongs to the shareholder rather than the corporate debtor. Relying on 26 U.S.C. § 1362, the court reasoned that shareholders exercise dominion and control over the creation and termination of Subchapter S status through consent requirements for election and revocation, distinguishing this tax classification from net operating loss carryforwards which are defined assets available to the estate. The court further rejected arguments that the appeal was moot under Article III or equitable mootness doctrines, finding that effective relief remained possible through potential IRS private letter rulings or share reinstatement without unduly disturbing third-party transactions. Additionally, the court determined the appeal was not barred by the law of the case doctrine as the underlying bankruptcy order was not final. Regarding the trustee’s laches defense concerning termination of status post-closing, the court remanded for the bankruptcy court to first consider prejudice and tax impact on creditors in the first instance.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The ninth-circuit dismissed the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of a third motion to reopen. While the court retains jurisdiction to review BIA decisions denying sua sponte reopening motions solely to check for legal or constitutional error, it found that the petitioner failed to identify any such error in the agency’s reasoning regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s lack of opposition or factors related to diligence. Additionally, the court noted that while it has jurisdiction over claims regarding equitable tolling of numerical limitations on motions to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the petitioner failed to exhaust this specific issue before the BIA. Consequently, the petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, though the temporary stay of removal remains in effect until the mandate issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The Ninth Circuit denied Hong Thanh Doan’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to dismiss his appeals regarding the denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings and vacate a final in absentia order, as well as a motion to reconsider that denial. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the Agency’s denials, reviewing legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Agency’s finding that Doan was personally served with the Notice to Appear (NTA) as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). Applying a presumption of regularity to the service of an NTA, the court ruled that Doan’s sworn statements refuting personal service were insufficient to overcome this presumption absent clear evidence to the contrary. The court found the Agency properly relied on marks in the signature box rather than speculation and correctly weighed Doan’s declarations against other record evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. The practical consequence is that the petition for review is denied, though a temporary stay of removal remains in effect until the mandate issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

Docket: 2:09-cr-00170-JCC-1

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a second petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking to vacate a 2010 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The court held that relief is unavailable because the petitioner failed to show valid reasons for not attacking the conviction earlier, particularly since his prior petition sought relief only for a separate firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the court prohibits piecemeal litigation. Additionally, the vacatur of the firearm conviction did not constitute an error of the most fundamental character sufficient to satisfy the coram nobis standard, as the factual basis for the marijuana count was separate from the firearm count.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-10

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Richard Kelly’s claims for denial of ERISA benefits and breach of fiduciary duty, but reversed and remanded the ruling on his claim for statutory penalties regarding document disclosure. Regarding the denial of benefits claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), the court applied the abuse of discretion standard because the plan granted the administrator discretionary authority. The court held that Altria did not abuse its discretion in denying Kelly’s claim, as the decision was supported by substantial evidence and resulted from a deliberate, principled reasoning process consistent with the *Booth* factors. The record showed that Fidelity completed the liquidation and distribution within the timeframes communicated to Kelly, and any conflicting statements regarding timing were outweighed by subsequent accurate estimates provided by other representatives. Regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), the court affirmed that Fidelity was not a functional fiduciary because it performed only ministerial recordkeeping and administrative functions rather than exercising discretionary authority over plan management or assets. Furthermore, even if Fidelity were deemed a fiduciary, the court found no breach of duty because its representations regarding transaction timelines were accurate and within the stated estimates, and it provided no investment advice or guarantees. Regarding the claim for penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) for failing to provide an Administrative Services Agreement (ASA), the court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the ASA was not a document “under which the plan is established or operated.” Applying statutory text and ordinary public meaning at the time of ERISA’s enactment, the court determined that because the ASA directed Fidelity to perform ministerial duties essential to the plan’s operation—such as answering participant inquiries and managing transactions—it qualified as a document under which the plan operated. Consequently, Kelly was entitled to receive the document. The practical consequence is that the district court’s judgment is affirmed in all respects except for the denial of penalties on the document disclosure claim. The case is remanded to the district court to evaluate in the first instance whether statutory penalties are appropriate for Altria’s failure to provide the ASA upon Kelly’s request. The court also affirmed the award of attorney’s fees to the defendants.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to U.S. Bank National Association on the plaintiffs’ Title VII hostile-work-environment claims and Pannek’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim, while reversing the summary judgment on their Title VII retaliation claims and remanding for further proceedings. Regarding the hostile-work-environment claims, the court applied the *Faragher/Ellerth* affirmative defense standard for vicarious liability where a supervisor creates a hostile environment but does not take a tangible employment action against the victim. The court held that U.S. Bank satisfied the first prong of this defense by exercising reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment through a robust policy, training, and an effective investigation that substantiated the allegations and disciplined the supervisor. The court found U.S. Bank satisfied the second prong because Pannek unreasonably failed to utilize corrective measures by waiting four months to report the sexual comments and providing only vague details in his initial complaint, while Strotman never reported the conduct at all. On the ADEA claim, the court applied the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework and found that Pannek failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court reasoned that under Sixth Circuit precedent, an employee is not “replaced” for ADEA purposes when their duties are redistributed among existing employees or assigned to another employee who retains their own duties. Because Pannek’s duties were absorbed by a younger colleague and other staff following a workforce reduction, and because Pannek provided no specific evidence that he was singled out for termination due to his age, his claim failed as a matter of law. Regarding the retaliation claims, the court applied the *McDonnell Douglas* framework under Title VII. The court determined that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether U.S. Bank’s proffered reason for termination—a reduction in force—was pretext for retaliation. The court noted evidence that the decisionmaker, Bryan Bolton, finalized his determination to terminate the plaintiffs after Pannek filed an ethics complaint and after Strotman participated in the investigation. Furthermore, the court found evidence suggesting the terminations were not anticipated as part of the reorganization by senior leadership and that Bolton failed to follow the bank’s required Peer Group Analysis (PGA) procedure before deciding to fire the employees. These factors created a factual question for a jury on whether the protected activity caused the adverse employment action.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ “class of one” equal protection claim against the United States Postal Service for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA), specifically 39 U.S.C. §§ 3662 and 403(c), the Postal Regulatory Commission possesses exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging that the Postal Service is not operating in conformance with statutory requirements, including claims of unreasonable discrimination among users. Applying the *Thunder Basin* framework to determine if Congress intended to preclude district court jurisdiction, the court found that: (1) the PAEA’s comprehensive review scheme does not foreclose meaningful judicial review because plaintiffs may file a complaint with the Commission and subsequently seek appellate review in the D.C. Circuit; (2) the constitutional claim is not “wholly collateral” to the statutory scheme because the equal protection challenge regarding discriminatory mail delivery mirrors the statutory prohibition on unreasonable discrimination under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c); and (3) the Commission has the requisite expertise to address the factual questions underlying the claim, such as whether a rational basis exists for the Postal Service’s refusal to deliver mail to specific addresses. Consequently, plaintiffs must pursue their claims through the administrative process before the Postal Regulatory Commission rather than in federal district court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

Docket: 1:20-cv-22318-KMW

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a housing discrimination case brought under the Fair Housing Act and state law. The court held that the plaintiff, Kanayo Derhem, failed to present sufficient evidence to support claims of disparate treatment or a hostile housing environment based on race and sex. Regarding the procedural history, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard to affirm the district court’s decision to strike new factual allegations from Derhem’s second amended complaint. The court reasoned that the district court acted within its inherent power to enforce orders and prevent undue prejudice, as the new allegations altered liability theories after discovery had closed and were known to the plaintiff at the time of the initial filing. On the merits of the Fair Housing Act claims, the court applied de novo review. For the disparate treatment claim, the court found that Derhem’s evidence did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination because the alleged discriminatory remarks by a board member were made by a non-decisionmaker and unrelated to the active decision-making process. Under the circumstantial evidence frameworks (McDonnell Douglas and “convincing mosaic”), the court determined that the defendants provided ample evidence that fines and amenity suspensions were imposed due to Derhem’s repeated, ongoing violations of condominium rules, rather than discriminatory animus. Additionally, the court held that a single racial epithet, even if true, was insufficient to establish a hostile housing environment claim as it did not rise to the level of being “severe or pervasive” enough to interfere with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her home. The court also rejected Derhem’s arguments regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) compliance, claims raised for the first time on appeal, and allegations of judicial bias based solely on the number of adverse rulings. The practical consequence is that the judgment in favor of the Bay House Miami Condominium Association and its individual defendants stands, and Derhem’s appeal is dismissed without reversal or remand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The dc-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment issuing a modified preliminary injunction that prohibits the above-ground physical construction of the proposed 90,000-square-foot ballroom on the former site of the White House East Wing, while expressly allowing below-ground construction of national security facilities and above-ground measures strictly necessary to cover, secure, and protect those facilities. The court held that the National Trust for Historic Preservation likely has associational standing because its member, Professor Alison Hoagland, demonstrated a concrete and imminent aesthetic injury to her professional and personal interests in viewing the White House and President’s Park, which is germane to the organization’s preservation mission. On the merits, the court found the National Trust likely to succeed on its claims that the construction violates 40 U.S.C. § 8106, which requires express congressional authority to erect buildings on federal grounds in the District of Columbia. The court ruled that neither the National Park Service Organic Act (54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)) nor the President’s funding authorization statute (3 U.S.C. § 105(d)) provided such express authority. Specifically, the Organic Act mandates the conservation of historic objects and leaving them unimpaired for future generations, a standard the demolition and replacement of the East Wing violates. Furthermore, Section 105(d) is an appropriation authorization that does not grant independent substantive authority to construct new buildings, particularly when funded by private donations rather than congressional appropriations, and the term “improvement” in that statute does not encompass the construction of a massive new structure replacing an existing wing. The court also rejected the government’s arguments under the Economy Act, noting that an agency cannot contract another agency to perform work it lacks authority to do itself. The practical consequence is that the above-ground construction of the ballroom must cease pending the resolution of the litigation, though security-related underground work and protective measures may proceed. The court vacated its prior administrative stay and stayed its own decision for fourteen days to allow the government to seek review by the Supreme Court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.