Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The seventh-circuit affirmed the denial of Terry Ferguson’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence based on an alleged conflict of interest with his counsel, and dismissed his appeal challenging the denial of motions to dismiss the indictment for selective or vindictive prosecution as waived by his plea agreement. Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court applied the standard requiring a defendant to show an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance. The court held that no such conflict existed because there was no evidence that an investigation into the attorney was ongoing at the time of Ferguson’s 2023 plea and sentencing, nor did Ferguson demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his lawyer would have acted differently had no conflict existed. Specifically, the court found Ferguson’s speculation regarding a potential cooperation deal insufficient to establish an adverse effect, as he had previously declined to cooperate, and his attorney reasonably believed no investigation was underway. Regarding the prosecution claims, the court applied the standard for enforcing appellate waivers in plea agreements, reviewing whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary and within its scope. The court found the waiver enforceable because Ferguson’s plea agreement explicitly waived all issues other than the validity of the plea and sentence, and the district court conducted a thorough colloquy ensuring Ferguson understood that pretrial motions were not appealable. Consequently, Ferguson’s challenges to the denial of his motions to dismiss fell outside the scope of the waiver’s exceptions and were barred. The practical consequence is that the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is affirmed in part and the remaining appeal is dismissed, leaving the conviction and sentence intact.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The fourth-circuit affirmed the defendant’s criminal judgment, rejecting his claim that the district court committed error under *United States v. Rogers* by including a warrantless search condition “at any time” in the written judgment when he contends the oral order was limited to daytime searches. The court applied the standard of review for consistency between an oral sentence and a written judgment de novo, determining whether a material discrepancy exists that constitutes a *Rogers* error or requires resentencing under *United States v. Mathis*. The court held that because the district court’s oral pronouncement imposed a search condition without any temporal restriction, the inclusion of “at any time” in the written judgment did not outline an additional obligation but merely clarified or explained the details of the orally pronounced condition. Consequently, there was no material discrepancy between the oral and written orders, and the defendant’s sentence stands as imposed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The First Circuit denied Lesvi Lucia Monzon Guzman’s petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and humanitarian asylum. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that there was no nexus between the persecution Monzon alleged and a statutorily protected ground, rendering her claims legally insufficient. The court applied the “one central reason” standard under the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires an applicant to prove that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was at least one central reason for the persecution. Reviewing the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard, the court found that Monzon failed to establish this nexus regarding her claims of gender-based harm, familial ties, or political opinion. Specifically, the court determined that the gang robberies were motivated by financial gain rather than protected characteristics, and the threats from Juan Carlos Campos Jurado were motivated by revenge for reporting his crimes rather than her family membership or political views. The court further ruled that because Monzon failed to demonstrate persecution on account of a protected ground, she was ineligible for humanitarian asylum, which requires a prerequisite showing of past persecution linked to a protected ground. As a practical consequence, the petition is denied, and the BIA’s order dismissing Monzon’s appeal remains in effect, leaving her without the requested relief from removal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Arnel Hategekimana’s conviction on six counts stemming from a controlled purchase of narcotics following a bench trial. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hategekimana’s motion to suppress evidence without an evidentiary hearing and in admitting certain testimony at trial. Applying a review for reversible error, the court found no such error in the lower court’s rulings and therefore affirmed the judgment, dispensing with oral argument as the record and legal contentions were adequately presented.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

Docket: 3:23-cv-00846-CRK-PDB

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to St. Johns County regarding the breach of contract claims against Southeast Development Partners, LLC, and rejected the developer’s claim that the county’s enforcement of the agreement constituted an unconstitutional exaction under *Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District*. The court held that the Concurrency and Impact Fee Credit Agreement unambiguously required the developer to pay all costs for road improvements, including any amounts exceeding the initial $15 million estimate, based on the plain language of Section 4(e) which stated the developer would “pay all costs… in excess of the Escrow Funds.” The court further ruled that Florida’s statutory tolling provisions for states of emergency did not apply because the agreement was not a development order or permit listed under Fla. Stat. § 252.363(1)(a). Additionally, the court found that any failure by the county to update its Capital Improvements Element was not a material breach as it did not go to the essence of the contract. Regarding the unlawful exaction claim, the court determined that the nexus and rough proportionality requirements were satisfied because the developer voluntarily assumed the risk of variable construction costs in exchange for development approval and public benefit credits. However, the court vacated the portion of the summary judgment finding that Southeast Land Ventures, LLC breached the contract. Applying Florida law regarding assignments, the court concluded that while Southeast Development assigned its rights under the agreement to Southeast Land, it did not expressly assign its obligations or liabilities. Because an assignee cannot breach a contract for which it has assumed no responsibilities, the district court erred in holding Southeast Land liable for the breach. The case is remanded with instructions to modify the judgment to reflect that only Southeast Development breached the agreement and was obligated to pay the increased costs.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Marcus Hahn’s second-or-successive § 2255 habeas motion. While the court held that Hahn successfully satisfied the jurisdictional gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) by demonstrating that his claim relied on *Sessions v. Dimaya*—a new rule of constitutional law regarding the vagueness of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s residual clause that is retroactive to collateral review—the court ruled that the motion was barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The court applied the “miscarriage-of-justice” exception to the statute of limitations, which requires a credible showing of actual innocence. The court held that for a plea-bargaining defendant, this standard mandates proving actual innocence not only of the challenged convictions but also of any equally serious or more serious charges dismissed by the government as part of the plea deal. In this case, Hahn’s § 841 convictions were based on a crime of violence categorization invalidated by *Dimaya*, but his plea agreement involved the dismissal of two counts of sexual exploitation of minors under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The court determined that these dismissed charges were at least equally serious to the § 841 convictions, as both carried a maximum statutory penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment and minimum fines. Because Hahn failed to demonstrate actual innocence regarding the dismissed § 2251 charges, he was ineligible for the miscarriage-of-justice exception. The practical consequence is that Hahn’s habeas motion remains dismissed with prejudice, his convictions stand, and he must continue serving his sentence. The court did not reach the merits of whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause versus the elements clause, as the timeliness bar was dispositive.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Evan Galasso’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made during police questioning in a vehicle at his residence and later at an FBI office. The court held that even if Galasso was in custody during the initial car interrogation without Miranda warnings, any error was harmless because Galasso conceded on appeal that the admission of those unwarned statements did not materially affect his decision to plead guilty. Regarding the subsequent questioning at the FBI office, the court applied the *Missouri v. Seibert* objective test to determine if post-warning statements were tainted by pre-warning admissions. The court found the warnings effective because there was a significant break in time and location between interrogations, different agents conducted the sessions, and the second interrogation focused on distinct topics (hands-on offenses) rather than merely repeating the first round. Finally, the court rejected Galasso’s argument that he invoked his right to counsel during the car encounter, ruling under *Davis v. United States* that his request was not unambiguous because it was inaudible on the recording and the officer did not hear it, meaning the *Edwards v. Arizona* bar was not triggered. As a result, the conviction and 180-month sentence stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CSX Transportation, Inc.’s claims against Zayo Group, LLC regarding unauthorized fiber optic cable installations under Indiana railroad easements. The court held that under Indiana law, a railroad easement does not necessarily include the right to exclude third parties from installing infrastructure in the air above or ground below the tracks if such installations do not interfere with railroad operations, nor does it include the right to charge licensing fees for such installations. Applying the principle that an easement’s scope is defined by its specific purpose—transportation of goods via a rail line—the court reasoned that rights to the subsurface and airspace remain with the servient estate owner unless they impede the railroad’s operations. Additionally, the court ruled that Zayo’s cable installations did not constitute “continuing trespasses” under Indiana law; because the installations were permanent upon completion and any future maintenance was predictable, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of each initial installation rather than continuing until removal. Consequently, claims regarding installations occurring before November 2019 (for criminal trespass and licensing theft) and November 2015 (for civil trespass and rent) are time-barred. The practical consequence is that CSX cannot recover damages for these past unauthorized installations or assert a property right to exclude utilities from the airspace and subsurface of its easements absent operational interference, leaving such rights with the underlying landowners.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Lynsey Ann Porter’s complaint, which asserted claims for whistleblower retaliation under Virginia Code Annotated § 40.1-27.3 and wrongful termination under *Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville*. The court held that Porter failed to allege facts stating a claim upon which relief could be granted. While the district court had denied Porter’s motion for leave to amend, the appellate court modified the judgment to clarify that the dismissal of the statutory whistleblower retaliation claim is with prejudice. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court to enter an order reflecting this modification, effectively ending the litigation on these claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The dc-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment issuing a modified preliminary injunction that prohibits the above-ground physical construction of the proposed 90,000-square-foot ballroom on the former site of the White House East Wing, while expressly allowing below-ground construction of national security facilities and above-ground measures strictly necessary to cover, secure, and protect those facilities. The court held that the National Trust for Historic Preservation likely has associational standing because its member, Professor Alison Hoagland, demonstrated a concrete and imminent aesthetic injury to her professional and personal interests in viewing the White House and President’s Park, which is germane to the organization’s preservation mission. On the merits, the court found the National Trust likely to succeed on its claims that the construction violates 40 U.S.C. § 8106, which requires express congressional authority to erect buildings on federal grounds in the District of Columbia. The court ruled that neither the National Park Service Organic Act (54 U.S.C. § 100101(a)) nor the President’s funding authorization statute (3 U.S.C. § 105(d)) provided such express authority. Specifically, the Organic Act mandates the conservation of historic objects and leaving them unimpaired for future generations, a standard the demolition and replacement of the East Wing violates. Furthermore, Section 105(d) is an appropriation authorization that does not grant independent substantive authority to construct new buildings, particularly when funded by private donations rather than congressional appropriations, and the term “improvement” in that statute does not encompass the construction of a massive new structure replacing an existing wing. The court also rejected the government’s arguments under the Economy Act, noting that an agency cannot contract another agency to perform work it lacks authority to do itself. The practical consequence is that the above-ground construction of the ballroom must cease pending the resolution of the litigation, though security-related underground work and protective measures may proceed. The court vacated its prior administrative stay and stayed its own decision for fourteen days to allow the government to seek review by the Supreme Court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.