Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Ninth Circuit denied Jose Luis Sanchez Olivares’s petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s denial of cancellation of removal and voluntary departure, as well as a motion to remand. The court held that substantial evidence supports the Agency’s determination that Sanchez is statutorily ineligible for these forms of relief because he failed to establish “good moral character” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1) and 1229c(b)(1). Specifically, the court applied the statutory bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7), which precludes a petitioner from demonstrating good moral character if they have been confined as a result of conviction to a penal institution for an aggregate period of 180 days or more. The record confirmed Sanchez was sentenced to 364 days for a DUI conviction and actually served 201 days in custody, satisfying the statutory threshold. The court rejected Sanchez’s argument that his incarceration was not “as a result of conviction” because it was a condition of probation, noting this issue was not exhausted before the BIA. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the Immigration Judge’s denial of a continuance request, as the dates of incarceration were undisputed and counsel failed to articulate good cause for additional time to investigate; consequently, Sanchez’s due process claim also failed. The petition is denied, though the temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Tevon O’Shea Vanhorn’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The court applied the “plain error” standard of review because Vanhorn failed to move to withdraw his guilty plea or challenge the factual basis in the district court, requiring him to demonstrate an error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. Regarding the guilty plea, the court held that the district court did not err in finding a sufficient factual basis under Rule 11(b)(3), as the record supported Vanhorn’s knowing participation in the conspiracy through his admissions, intercepted communications, and evidence of drug seizures. Concerning the sentencing, the court reviewed the application of the two-level “premises enhancement” under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) for clear error and legal conclusions de novo, concluding that the district court’s finding that Vanhorn stored narcotics and directed transactions at a mobile home was supported by sufficient evidence from the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, surveillance, and intercepted calls. Consequently, the appellate court rejected all of Vanhorn’s claims and affirmed the judgment without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The fourth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction allowing PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC to access private property for field surveys required to complete its Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) application. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that PSEG likely possessed the power of eminent domain under Section 12-111(a) of the Maryland Code’s Real Property Article, satisfied the irreparable harm factor, and demonstrated that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court applied a deferential abuse of discretion standard to review the preliminary injunction, applying Maryland substantive law to determine likelihood of success on the merits while using federal standards for the remaining *Winter* factors. Regarding the power of eminent domain, the court utilized Maryland’s canon of statutory interpretation requiring that statutes be read as a consistent and harmonious body of law to avoid rendering a statutory scheme unworkable. The court reasoned that Section 7-207(b)(3)(v) of the Public Utility Article delegates the power of eminent domain to transmission line applicants, but conditions its *exercise* on the issuance of a CPCN. Because field surveys are a prerequisite for obtaining a CPCN, requiring the certificate before allowing access would create an impossible loop where an applicant could never complete the application. Consequently, the court concluded that PSEG “has” the power of eminent domain for the limited purpose of accessing land to conduct surveys under Section 12-111(a) prior to receiving the CPCN. The court further found that irreparable harm existed because lost revenues from construction delays were unrecoverable, and the balance of equities favored PSEG as the access was temporary, non-invasive, and did not constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment or Maryland Constitution. The practical consequence is that PSEG may proceed onto the appellants’ properties to conduct the necessary environmental and socioeconomic surveys immediately, subject to the narrow scope of the injunction, while the underlying CPCN application proceeds through state regulatory review. The property owners retain the right to seek damages for any actual harm caused by the survey access under Section 12-111(c) and may raise opposition to the project’s construction during the subsequent CPCN approval process.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The eighth-circuit affirmed the defendant’s 300-month sentence for producing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e). Relying on an *Anders* brief filed by appellate counsel, the court reviewed the record to determine if the sentence was substantively unreasonable and whether any non-frivolous issues existed. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the court held that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) without relying on improper factors or committing clear errors of judgment. The court further concluded after an independent review that no other non-frivolous issues were present. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed and appellate counsel is granted permission to withdraw from representation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 2:23-cr-00219-SB-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Vincent Glynn Bennett, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence, holding that a 270-day delay between the government’s lawful seizure of suspected narcotics and its application for a search warrant was constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Applying the totality of the circumstances test established in *United States v. Place* and *United States v. Sullivan*, the court balanced the nature of the intrusion against the government’s interests, concluding that the delay did not violate Bennett’s rights. The court reasoned that Bennett possessed only a reduced possessory interest in the contraband, which he never sought to recover, while the government maintained a substantial interest in preventing the distribution of narcotics. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the delay resulted from dilatory tactics by law enforcement; rather, the time lapse was attributable to the judicial process surrounding Bennett’s prior motion to suppress warrantless testing results. Consequently, the conviction stands and the suppressed evidence remains admissible.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The eighth-circuit reversed the district court’s denial of immunity motions for the Missouri Department of Corrections (MODOC) and three correctional officers (Billy Loflin, Pierce Yount, and Stephanie Noisworthy), remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court held that MODOC was entitled to sovereign immunity under Missouri law because the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a “dangerous condition” of property as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.1(2). The court reasoned that the alleged defects—a defective video monitoring system and an obstructed cell window—did not constitute dangerous conditions under Missouri precedent because they amounted to a failure to provide preventative measures or supervision rather than a physical defect in the property itself. Additionally, the court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint failed to plausibly allege that the officers had actual knowledge of the inmate’s suicide risk; conclusory allegations that they “should have known” or inferred the risk from general behavioral signs were insufficient to meet the subjective component of the deliberate indifference standard. Finally, the court ruled that the officers were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law on the state law wrongful death claim because their duty to conduct periodic cell checks was discretionary, not ministerial, as departmental policies allowed for variation in how and when the checks were performed.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The eleventh-circuit denied the petition for review filed by Lourdes Villanueva-Quiroz and her derivative family members challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing their appeals of an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection. The court applied the “reasoned consideration” standard, reviewing de novo whether the BIA afforded the petitioner’s claims adequate consideration rather than merely reacting to them. Under this standard, the agency must demonstrate it heard and thought about the case, though it is not required to address every piece of evidence or make findings on issues unnecessary to its decision. The court found that the BIA expressly considered and rejected the petitioner’s argument regarding the Honduran government’s inability or unwillingness to control the gang “Los Guatos,” specifically addressing her claim that police inaction constituted such inability. Because the BIA provided sufficient justification for its dispositive ruling on this prong of the asylum claim, the court concluded the agency satisfied its obligation to provide reasoned consideration. Consequently, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order affirming the Immigration Judge’s decision remains in effect.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Tyree May’s sentence, rejecting his challenge to two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements on the grounds that they did not violate *Apprendi v. New Jersey*. The court applied the standard of review for clearly erroneous factual findings and held that under *United States v. Benkahla*, sentencing judges may find facts relevant to determining an advisory Guidelines range by a preponderance of the evidence, provided the sentence remains within the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict. The court reasoned that May failed to explain how *Erlinger v. United States* undermined this precedent, as *Apprendi* concerns facts increasing penalties beyond statutory limits rather than those affecting only advisory guidelines. Furthermore, the court found the district court’s factual determination plausible based on the record in its entirety, specifically noting that officer testimony regarding victim statements adequately supported the finding even if other evidence was ambiguous. Consequently, May’s conviction and sentence stand without oral argument.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 1:24-cr-00036-LAG-ALS-2

The eleventh-circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation of the appellant pursuant to *Anders v. California*, after conducting an independent review of the entire record and finding no arguable issues of merit. Consequently, the court affirmed Randle’s conviction and sentence without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s final written decision holding claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,354,015 unpatentable as anticipated by prior art. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the Board’s claim construction, determining that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “mounted to” is “connected to, either directly or indirectly.” The court rejected Ravin Crossbows’ proposed construction, which limited the term to connections allowing “only rotation about a fixed axis,” reasoning that such an interpretation would render the claim’s separate “rotatable around a first/second axis” limitations superfluous. The court further held that the Board properly declined to adopt the district court’s claim construction from related litigation, noting that while the district court agreed on the plain and ordinary meaning standard, the parties disputed the specific definition, allowing the Board to determine the correct construction based on intrinsic evidence. Consequently, the patent claims remain invalid.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.