Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit denied Maria Susana Navarrete-Melgar’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming an immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The court held that the statutory requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) for a Notice to Appear to specify the time and place of a hearing is not a jurisdictional defect that deprives an immigration judge of authority, but rather a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to waiver if not raised timely. Relying on binding precedent in *United States v. Cortez*, 930 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2019), the court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the failure to include a date and time in the Notice to Appear rendered the proceedings void, noting that Supreme Court decisions in *Pereira v. Sessions* and *Niz-Chavez v. Garland* addressed the “stop-time rule” for continuous presence eligibility rather than jurisdictional authority. Furthermore, the court found the petitioner forfeited her objection to the defective Notice because she failed to raise it before the immigration judge during the proceedings, despite having notice of the defect following the 2018 *Pereira* decision, and instead raised it for the first time on appeal to the BIA. Regarding the merits of the relief request, the court applied a substantial evidence standard of review and affirmed the adverse credibility determination made by the immigration judge, which was based on inconsistencies between the petitioner’s testimony and other evidence in the record. Because the petitioner provided no independent corroborating evidence sufficient to support her claims absent credible testimony, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of relief. Consequently, the petition for review is denied, leaving the removal order in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit affirmed William Kevin Glover’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, distribution of fentanyl and methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine, and maintaining a drug-involved premises, as well as his 327-month prison sentence. The court applied the *Anders v. California* standard, finding no meritorious issues for appeal after reviewing the record. Regarding the motion to suppress, the court held that Glover forfeited his right to challenge the district court’s denial of the motion because he failed to file timely specific objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation despite being warned of the waiver consequences under *Thomas v. Arn* and *Wright v. Collins*. On the jury instruction issue, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and concluded that the district court did not err in refusing a “government-agent” instruction because, unlike in *United States v. Lewis*, substantial evidence supported Glover’s conspiracy with co-conspirators rather than solely government agents, meaning the failure to give the instruction did not seriously impair his defense. Regarding the motion for a new trial based on juror comments, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and found no error because defense counsel failed to object during voir dire when given the opportunity, and the prospective juror’s dismissal was immediate and curative instructions were provided, negating any prejudice under the Sixth Amendment. Finally, reviewing the sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard, the court found no procedural or substantive errors, noting the sentence was within the Guidelines range and properly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judgment is affirmed, and counsel is directed to inform Glover of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 4:21-CV-00363-JDR-MTS)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Walgreens Specialty Pharmacy in a negligence action brought by the Scholls under Oklahoma law. The court held that Walgreens owed no legal duty to fill J.J.S.’s prescription for Lupron Depot prior to July 13, 2020, and therefore could not be liable for negligence based on its failure to do so during that period. The court applied the standard of review de novo for summary judgment and interpreted Oklahoma state law regarding the existence of a duty in negligence cases. The appellate panel concluded that under the Oklahoma Pharmacy Act and relevant administrative regulations, pharmacists have no general statutory or regulatory duty to fill prescriptions. The court relied on *Pharmcare Okla., Inc. v. State Health Care Auth.* and noted that Oklahoma regulations explicitly clarify a pharmacist’s right not to fill a valid prescription. Furthermore, the court found that Walgreens’ conduct did not create a common-law duty because there was no evidence in the record of an affirmative promise or undertaking by Walgreens to fill the specific prescription before July 13. The Scholls failed to point to any additional evidence that could have created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the existence of such a duty. As a result of this decision, the judgment in favor of Walgreens stands, and the negligence claim against the pharmacy is dismissed without further proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The eighth-circuit granted the petition for review regarding the denial of Rustico Lacsina’s statutory motion to reopen removal proceedings, denied the petition regarding the denial of his motion for sua sponte reopening, and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for further proceedings. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by denying the statutory motion to reopen based on the “departure bar” regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which prohibits aliens who have departed the United States from filing such motions. The court’s decision rests on the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which grants an alien the right to file one motion to reopen proceedings. The court reasoned that the statutory text imposes specific numeric, evidentiary, and timing limitations but contains no geographic restriction requiring the alien to remain in the United States at the time of filing. While Congress explicitly required physical presence for domestic violence victims seeking out-of-time motions, the omission of such a requirement for general motions indicated a clear congressional intent not to impose a departure bar. Consequently, the court found that the regulation conflicts with the statute and lacks authority, noting that all other circuit courts to address this issue have reached the same conclusion. The court further rejected the BIA’s claim that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion due to the alien’s removal, stating that Congress alone controls the BIA’s jurisdiction under the statute and did not include such a limitation. Regarding the request for sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the court denied review because this specific agency decision is committed to agency discretion by law and is therefore unreviewable by the court. On remand, the BIA must reconsider Lacsina’s motion to reopen based on the vacatur of his California convictions without applying the invalid departure bar regulation. The court explicitly stated that its ruling is limited to the procedural validity of the departure bar and does not address the substantive merits of Lacsina’s claim for relief from removal.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Damond K. Wiley Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence and his subsequent motion for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Illinois State Police troopers had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on the visible dark tinting of the BMW’s windows, which violated the Illinois Vehicle Code, regardless of whether the dash camera footage captured other alleged infractions like speeding or failure to signal. Applying the objective standard from *Whren v. United States* and *Kansas v. Glover*, the court ruled that the constitutional reasonableness of the stop depended on the facts known to the officers at the time, specifically the illegal tinting, rather than inconsistencies between the officers’ verbal statements, police reports, or video evidence regarding other violations. Regarding the warrantless search of the vehicle, the court affirmed the denial of suppression based on the protective search exception established in *Terry v. Ohio* and *Maryland v. Buie*. The court found that Trooper Renner had reasonable suspicion that Wiley was engaged in criminal activity after he fled upon being ordered to return to his car. Furthermore, the trooper possessed specific and articulable facts justifying a protective sweep for safety: the vehicle’s dark tinting obscured whether anyone else remained inside, it was unknown if Wiley would return to the car, and the officer could not determine if weapons were present. Opening the driver’s door to confirm there were no other occupants or immediate threats was deemed a permissible cursory inspection that revealed a firearm in plain view. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing because Wiley failed to present any evidence contradicting the government’s video and photographic records, meaning no disputed issues of material fact existed that would alter the outcome of the suppression motion. Consequently, the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) stands, and Wiley remains subject to his sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 96-month prison sentence imposed on Tiarra Jones for conspiracy to commit bank fraud, rejecting her claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court held that the district court did not err in weighing the relevant sentencing factors. The record demonstrated that the district court explicitly considered Jones’s mitigating circumstances, including her history of childhood trauma, an abusive relationship, mental health challenges, and her acceptance of responsibility which warranted a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. However, the district court also properly weighed significant aggravating factors, noting the sophisticated nature of the scheme, its duration spanning multiple years and 22 states, Jones’s leadership role in creating fictitious entities, and the substantial financial loss involved. The appellate court found that while the sentence was nearly two years below the advisory Guidelines range, the district court acted within its wide latitude to determine that a lesser term would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense or the defendant’s role. Consequently, the judgment of the district court stands, and Jones remains subject to the 96-month imprisonment, five-year supervised release, and $187,962.63 restitution order.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order revoking Robert Boyd’s conditional discharge from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (18 U.S.C. § 4248). The court held that decisions to revoke conditional discharge must be reviewed for clear error regarding factual findings and de novo regarding legal conclusions, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine if revocation requirements are met. The court concluded that the Government satisfied its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 4248(f) by proving three elements: (1) Boyd failed to comply with his prescribed regimen of care or treatment; (2) he suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3) in light of his failure to comply and his mental illness, he would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. The court deferred to the district court’s credibility determinations that Boyd knowingly possessed an SD card containing images of pubescent males in violation of Condition 37 of his release, rejecting Boyd’s claim that he was unaware of the contents despite a polygraph test. Furthermore, the court upheld the district court’s finding that Boyd posed a future risk of harm based on his pattern of deceptive behavior, interactions with underage employees, and expert testimony utilizing actuarial risk assessments which outweighed contrary expert opinion. As a consequence of this ruling, Boyd’s conditional release was revoked, and he was remanded to the custody of the Attorney General for continued civil commitment at FCI Butner.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 6:25-cv-00132-ACA

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dalton Banks’s § 1983 complaint against Alabama Probate Court Judge Tammy Brown and the Cullman County Sheriff’s Department. The court held that judicial immunity absolutely bars claims against a judge for acts taken in her judicial capacity unless she acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Applying the standard from *Sibley v. Lando*, the court determined that issuing an involuntary commitment order is a normal judicial function, occurred in open court regarding a pending case, and thus qualified as a judicial activity protected by immunity. The court rejected Banks’s argument that the judge lacked jurisdiction because the order allegedly violated Alabama law or was void ab initio, clarifying that judicial immunity applies even when a judge acts in error, maliciously, or in excess of jurisdiction, provided she possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the commitment proceeding. Additionally, the court noted that claims against the Sheriff’s Department were properly dismissed because it is not a legal entity subject to suit under Alabama law, and the district court correctly denied leave to amend the complaint as any amendment would be futile due to sovereign immunity and res judicata. The practical consequence is that the dismissal of the complaint stands, ending the federal civil rights action against the judge and the department.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The eighth-circuit granted counsel’s motion to withdraw under *Anders v. California* and dismissed the appeal because the defendant’s valid and enforceable plea agreement contained an appeal waiver that barred the challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Applying the standard for reviewing such waivers as set forth in *United States v. Scott* and *United States v. Andis*, the court conducted an independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio* and determined that no non-frivolous issues existed outside the scope of the waiver. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without reaching the merits of the sentencing claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that a bankruptcy trustee could avoid a transfer of real property from debtor Jason Wylie to his mother, Kathleen Sullivan, under the constructive fraud provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i). The court held that Wylie did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” for the transfer because the release of mortgage debt he received was less than the value of the property conveyed, and Sullivan failed to prove that a separate $200,000 business loan or a $33,000 conversion claim were satisfied by the transaction. Applying Michigan contract law, the court reviewed de novo the interpretation of the 2014 loan agreement and found no personal guaranty by Wylie for his company’s debt. Under Michigan law, absent two distinct signature blocks or explicit language creating a personal obligation, an officer signing as “President” and “individually” does not automatically create a personal guaranty; the contract text identified only the company as the obligor. Furthermore, the court found that the 2019 “Mutual Release in Full” extinguished claims related to specific mortgages and promissory notes but did not cover the separate conversion claim or the business loan, as the release’s language was limited to those listed instruments and Sullivan’s extrinsic evidence regarding intent lacked credibility. Regarding the remedy, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion under 11 U.S.C. § 550 to order the return of the specific property rather than its value, noting that Congress grants courts broad authority to choose between recovering the property or its value and that Sullivan failed to preserve arguments contesting this specific remedy below. As a result, the transfer remains avoided, and Kathleen Sullivan must return the paid-off real property to Wylie’s bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors. The court declined to address Sullivan’s claim regarding the district court’s adoption of the trustee’s proposed order, finding no reversible error in that procedural matter.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.