Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 2:24-CV-02604-JWB-BGS)

The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because the City of Edwardsville repealed and replaced the original ordinance that was the subject of the district court’s ruling while the appeal was pending. The court applied the standard that an appeal becomes moot when a live controversy no longer exists, noting that the repeal of the challenged law eliminates the specific injury the appellants sought to remedy in their request for a preliminary injunction. Although the new ordinance imposed some remaining restrictions on northbound trucks, the court found the change material because it softened the alleged harm by allowing southbound heavy trucks to access the properties, thereby altering the balance of equities required for an injunction that the district court never had the opportunity to evaluate under the new legal framework. The court rejected the voluntary cessation exception to mootness, finding no evidence that the city intended to reenact the original ordinance once litigation ended. Consequently, the court declined to vacate the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over other dismissed claims, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal and all outstanding motions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 4:23-cv-00352-RSB-CLR

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ denial of access to courts claim but reversed the dismissal of their Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against both named and unnamed defendants. Regarding the Eighth Amendment claims, the court applied the two-prong standard from *Farmer v. Brennan* and *Wade v. McDade*, requiring plaintiffs to plausibly allege that prison officials were subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk. The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an objectively substantial risk because it described specific conditions at Coastal State Prison—including chronic understaffing, failure to maintain lock security, and weapons entering through work crews—that mirrored facts found sufficient in *Lane v. Philbin*. Furthermore, the court found the subjective prong met because the complaint alleged the named defendants were actually aware of these dangerous conditions and the resulting high number of assaults, rather than merely inferring knowledge from their supervisory roles. Consequently, the case was remanded for further proceedings on the Eighth Amendment claims against the five named officials (Commissioner Timothy Ward, Warden Brooks Benton, and Deputy Wardens Michael Anderson, Carl Betterson, and Phillip Glenn) as well as the unnamed supervisors and correctional officers. The court affirmed the dismissal of the denial of access to courts claim because the plaintiffs failed to identify any specific official acts by the named defendants that frustrated their ability to litigate; while the complaint alleged that state entities blocked access to records via the Georgia Open Records Act, none of those entities were named as defendants, nor was there an allegation that the named prison officials participated in that blockage. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss, noting that facial challenges to legal sufficiency should generally be resolved before discovery begins and that the plaintiffs did not renew their request for discovery after the court ordered them to show cause regarding the unnamed defendants. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs may proceed with their Eighth Amendment claims against all defendants once they identify the specific officers involved through discovery, while the denial of access claim remains dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 8:16-cv-02549-TPB-CPT

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment finding the defendants liable for direct copyright infringement. The court held that DISH Network L.L.C. successfully established a prima facie case of infringement by proving valid ownership of the copyrighted Arabic-language works and demonstrating that the defendants’ use of encoders to “push” these works onto their content delivery networks constituted a public performance in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The court’s decision rested on three primary legal determinations. First, regarding ownership, the court applied UAE copyright law to determine that the registered works were “Collective Works” rather than “Joint Works,” vesting initial ownership in MBC LLC under Article 26 of UAE Federal Law No. (7) of 2002. The court further ruled that MBC’s U.S. copyright registrations created a statutory presumption of validity under 17 U.S.C. § 410(c), and the defendants waived any challenge to the “work made for hire” designation on those registrations by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. Second, regarding the transfer of rights, the court applied United States law, specifically 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d) and 204(a), holding that third-party infringers cannot challenge the sufficiency of written agreements transferring copyright between the original owner and the plaintiff when there is no dispute between those parties. Third, regarding infringement, the court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony and evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 803(6), and 901 to prove that the defendants operated encoders within the United States or transmitted works to U.S. users. The court concluded that the use of encoders was an independently sufficient basis for direct infringement liability, rendering it unnecessary to address whether the use of content delivery networks also constituted infringement. As a practical consequence, the district court’s judgment awarding DISH a permanent injunction and $600,000 in statutory damages, along with attorney fees and costs, remains in full force and effect. The defendants are permanently enjoined from distributing the protected programming, and they must pay the assessed monetary penalties.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 1:23-CV-02908-RMR-TPO)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial in a diversity action involving negligence and negligence per se claims arising from a vehicle accident. The court held that the jury verdict in favor of the defendant was not clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. Applying an abuse of discretion standard to review the denial of the new trial motion, the court evaluated the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. While acknowledging that a violation of Denver Revised Municipal Code § 54-234(1) constitutes negligence per se under Colorado law, the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the defendant was not negligent. Specifically, the court noted that although a passenger testified she did not see the driver check the lane before maneuvering, the passenger admitted she was looking for a parking garage at the time and was unfamiliar with Denver. This testimony, combined with other evidence regarding the driver’s cautious habits, plausibly supported the inference that the driver had ascertained the safety of her movement. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and the plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The First Circuit affirmed Sherriff Cooper’s convictions for sex trafficking of a minor (Count One) and transportation of a minor with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity (Count Two), but vacated his conviction for forced labor (Count Three) and remanded the case for further proceedings. Regarding Count One, the court rejected Cooper’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) is duplicitous because it lists ten alternative acts (“recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits”) as separate offenses rather than alternative means of committing a single crime. Applying a de novo standard of review, the court analyzed the statutory text, legislative history, and penalty structure, concluding that Congress intended these acts to be alternative means of the single offense of sex trafficking. Consequently, the indictment provided adequate notice, and no jury unanimity instruction was required regarding which specific act Cooper committed. The court also affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence for Counts One and Two, finding that a rational jury could conclude from J.C.’s testimony and text message records that the crimes affected interstate commerce and that Cooper intended to prostitute the victim during their travel to New York. Regarding Count Three, the court held that the district court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on venue. While the court agreed with Cooper’s arguments regarding pretrial motions and evidentiary sufficiency for venue were without merit, it applied the framework from *United States v. Perez* to determine that Cooper had properly placed venue “in issue” at trial. By testifying that the forced labor (J.C. working as a stripper) occurred entirely in New York, Cooper created a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the offense began in Massachusetts or New York. Under the majority view of federal courts, when a defendant creates such a factual dispute and timely requests a jury instruction on venue, the issue must be decided by the jury. The court determined this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury could have convicted Cooper on Count Three based solely on conduct occurring in New York, without ever considering whether the scheme to force labor began in Massachusetts.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 0:24-cv-60993-MD

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims against Lottery.com, Inc. and Matthew McGahan. The court held that the complaint failed to state a claim because it did not plead the circumstances constituting fraud with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court applied the standard of review de novo, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true but construing them in favor of the plaintiff. Under this standard, all theories asserted—fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud—required particularized pleading because they sounded in fraud. The court emphasized that Rule 9(b) demands plaintiffs identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud. Specifically, the court found the complaint deficient regarding the element of reliance. While the plaintiffs asserted they relied on a letter from the defendant CEO to transfer funds, the court ruled these were “threadbare assertions” that failed to explain the manner in which the representations misled them or how the specific terms of the letter (such as conditions regarding board approval) influenced their decision. The complaint lacked details on how the letter was presented, which entities transferred money, and the causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the transaction. As a practical consequence, the plaintiffs’ action remains dismissed with prejudice. The court noted that the dismissal was proper because the plaintiffs, represented by counsel, failed to request leave to amend their complaint or file an amended complaint in response to the motion to dismiss, despite having the opportunity to do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Alexander Alonso Galindo’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop and subsequent search. The court held that the district court committed no reversible error in finding that the officers had probable cause to initiate the stop based on a violation of West Virginia Code § 17C-3-4(a). Applying de novo review to legal conclusions and clear error review to factual findings, the court determined that Galindo’s failure to provide a timely response at two green lights, including an initial ten-second pause, constituted disobeying official traffic-control instructions. Relying on the standard established in *Whren v. United States* and *United States v. Bowman*, the court ruled that an officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where there is probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. Consequently, the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) stands, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

Docket: 8:21-cr-00187-KKM-NHA-1

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Aunyis Cherry’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and his 120-month sentence. Regarding the constitutional challenge to the conviction, the court applied plain error review because the argument was raised for the first time on appeal. Relying on binding precedent *United States v. Rozier*, which remains valid following Supreme Court decisions in *Bruen* and *Rahimi*, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment for individuals with felony convictions. Regarding sentencing enhancements, the court affirmed the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for possessing a stolen firearm. Citing *United States v. Richardson* and reaffirmed in *United States v. Dubois*, the court ruled that this guideline provision imposes no mens rea requirement and its application does not offend due process, even if the defendant lacked knowledge that the weapon was stolen. Regarding the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, the court addressed Cherry’s argument that it relied on acquitted conduct. The court applied the harmless error doctrine established in *United States v. Keene*. Because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the same 120-month sentence regardless of the enhancement ruling, the appellate court reviewed only whether the sentence was substantively reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Finding that the district court reasonably considered Cherry’s flight from law enforcement and significant criminal history to justify an upward variance to the statutory maximum, the court concluded any potential error in applying the enhancement was harmless. As a result of this decision, Cherry’s conviction and sentence stand as imposed by the district court, with no remand for resentencing required.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on all of the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims. The court applied the Title VII burden-shifting framework to Noel’s race and sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims. Regarding discrimination and retaliation, the court held that Noel failed to establish pretext because she lacked evidence that the employer’s neutral reasons for its actions—specifically her excessive absences, repeated tardiness, and failure to input required attendance points—were false or a cover for unlawful animus. The court rejected her arguments regarding timing, comparative treatment of a coworker, and sham investigations as insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the court affirmed on forfeiture grounds because Noel failed to challenge one of the district court’s two independent alternative grounds for dismissal, specifically the employer-liability element, in her appellate brief. Consequently, the judgment for Challenge Manufacturing Holdings, Inc. stands, and no further proceedings are required on these claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Thomas Duncan’s 84-month prison sentence for wire fraud, rejecting his challenges to two sentencing guideline enhancements: one for multiple bribes and another based on a loss calculation exceeding $1.5 million. The court applied de novo review to the district court’s legal interpretations of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and clear error review to its factual findings. Regarding the multiple bribe enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1), the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding the scheme involved more than one bribe rather than a single stream of benefits, noting the fraud occurred over six years with inconsistent amounts and terms negotiated over time. On the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2) and § 2B1.1, the court affirmed that the district court acted within its discretion to attribute $1.7 million in losses to Duncan based on a “reasonable estimate” derived from circumstantial evidence and the pattern of the scheme, even absent written documentation linking Duncan to every specific order. Finally, the court ruled that any potential error regarding these enhancements was harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would have imposed the same 84-month sentence regardless of the guideline calculations, citing the duration of the fraud and breach of trust as independent grounds for the sentence. Consequently, the judgment is affirmed, and Duncan’s conviction and sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.