Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The eighth-circuit denied the petition for review filed by Honduran citizens Mario Enriquez Paz-Guevara, Ana Yessenia Ponce-Lopez, and their minor child regarding an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying them asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the agency’s factual findings. It held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the petitioners failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of their proposed particular social group, noting that persecution involves extreme concepts such as death, torture, or injury and excludes low-level intimidation. The court further ruled that because the petitioners did not meet the well-founded fear standard for asylum, they could not satisfy the higher “clear probability” standard required for withholding of removal, and separate analysis for CAT claims was unnecessary absent evidence of torture unrelated to the asylum grounds. Consequently, the petition is denied and the BIA’s order denying all forms of relief remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the town supervisors and Ronald Wolff, dismissing James March’s First Amendment retaliation claim and Wolff’s counterclaim. The court held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity regarding March’s termination. Although March conceded he was a “policymaking official” subject to the *Elrod-Branti* exception for political firings, the court found that the legal standard governing whether a policymaker can be fired for speech critical of superiors or their policies is not clearly established in Seventh Circuit precedent. The court noted significant ambiguity regarding how “political” speech must be to trigger the “policymaker corollary” and whether an employer’s reasonable belief that speech was unprotected suffices when they lack actual knowledge of the speech’s content. Consequently, a reasonable official could have believed firing March under these circumstances did not violate the Constitution. Regarding Wolff’s counterclaim against March, the court ruled it failed because March did not exercise state power to initiate criminal charges and thus could not be liable for retaliatory prosecution, and Wolff failed to identify a similarly situated comparator required for his class-of-one equal protection claim. The practical consequence is that the town supervisors and Wolff face no civil liability, and the district court’s dismissal of both lawsuits stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

Docket: 3:23-cv-06155-

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of PacifiCorp’s complaint alleging that Washington State’s Climate Commitment Act (CCA) and Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA) violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce through the allocation of no-cost carbon allowances. The court held that PacifiCorp failed to plausibly allege a cognizable claim because the electricity generated for in-state sale and the electricity exported out-of-state are not “similarly situated” entities under the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The panel applied the standard that discrimination under the Dormant Commerce Clause requires differential treatment of similarly situated economic interests. The court reasoned that the regulatory distinctions between the two categories of emissions render them dissimilar: electricity sold to Washington customers is subject to the comprehensive decarbonization mandates of CETA, whereas exported electricity is not covered by CETA’s requirements. Consequently, the legislature’s decision to provide no-cost allowances only to utilities subject to CETA’s preexisting regulatory regime does not constitute unconstitutional discrimination against out-of-state commerce. The court further rejected PacifiCorp’s reliance on compensatory tax precedents, noting that the state was not imposing a discriminatory tax but rather regulating different entities under different statutory schemes. Because the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the district court properly dismissed it without leave to amend, and the motion for a preliminary injunction was correctly denied as moot. As a practical consequence, PacifiCorp’s challenge to Washington’s carbon allowance program is terminated, and the state’s regulatory scheme remains in effect. The utility must continue to purchase allowances for emissions associated with exported electricity while receiving no-cost allowances only for emissions tied to in-state sales, subject to the existing CETA compliance obligations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The eighth-circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Trevion Dickson following his guilty plea to firearm and drug offenses, rejecting his claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, under which a sentence is deemed reasonable if the district court did not fail to consider relevant factors, give significant weight to improper or irrelevant factors, or commit a clear error of judgment in weighing appropriate factors. Applying this deferential standard, the appellate court concluded that the district court’s individualized assessment based on the facts presented was reasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the district court’s sentence remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ class action suit against Samsung for violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), holding that the complaint failed to plausibly allege that Samsung “possessed,” “collected,” “captured,” or “obtained” biometric data as required by 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 15(a) and (b). Applying Illinois statutory construction rules, the court determined that the terms “possession,” “collect,” “capture,” and “obtain” in BIPA require a private entity to have actual control over the biometric identifiers or information. The court reasoned that while Samsung manufactured the devices and preinstalled the Gallery App which creates face templates from user photos, the plaintiffs failed to allege that Samsung controlled the resulting data because the templates were stored locally on the users’ devices, not on Samsung’s servers, and the users retained the ability to delete the data or disable the feature. Distinguishing cases where manufacturers were found to have control due to exclusive access or inability of users to modify data, the court concluded that providing a tool (the smartphone and app) that allows users to voluntarily capture their own biometric information does not equate to the manufacturer possessing or collecting that information under BIPA. Consequently, the judgment for Samsung stands, and the plaintiffs are barred from proceeding with their claims based on the current allegations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a First Amendment retaliation lawsuit brought by James March, the former Town Administrator of Grand Chute, Wisconsin, and dismissed the counterclaim filed by Ronald Wolff. The court held that the town supervisors are entitled to qualified immunity regarding March’s claim that they fired him for speaking to state investigators about corruption allegations against Wolff. The court applied the *Elrod-Branti* doctrine, which permits government employers to fire “policymaking” employees for political reasons without violating the First Amendment. The court recognized a “policymaker corollary” extending this exception to firings based on politically disloyal speech. However, the court found that the law governing this corollary was not clearly established at the time of March’s termination in May 2023 due to significant ambiguities in Seventh Circuit precedent regarding how “political” speech must be to trigger the exception and whether an employer’s reasonable belief about the nature of a policymaker’s speech is sufficient for liability. Specifically, the court noted that it was unclear if an employer must know the specific content of a policymaker’s speech before firing them or if a reasonable mistake regarding the speech’s political nature could shield the employer. Because a reasonable official could have believed that terminating March for his interactions with law enforcement did not offend the Constitution, qualified immunity applied. Regarding Wolff’s counterclaim against March, the court affirmed summary judgment because Wolff failed to state viable claims. His retaliatory prosecution claim failed because March did not exercise “state action” or collude with prosecutors to bring charges. His class-of-one equal protection claim failed because he failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated differently. As a practical consequence, the district court’s dismissal of both the retaliation lawsuit and the counterclaim stands, leaving the defendants immune from civil liability for March’s termination and Wolff without relief on his counterclaims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The eighth-circuit dismissed MOSenecaManufacturer, LLC’s petition for review of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission’s orders. The court held that the petition was procedurally defective because it failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a)(2)(C), which requires a petitioner to specify the order or part thereof to be reviewed. Although the petitioner attached the Commission’s orders dismissing the proceeding for failure to comply with prior directives and denying reconsideration, its briefing exclusively advanced constitutional arguments regarding the merits of an Administrative Law Judge’s decision that it had not designated in the petition. The court found that no intent to seek review of the ALJ’s merits decision could be fairly inferred from the petition or contemporaneous filings, as the document contained no reference to those substantive issues and only challenged the procedural dismissal orders. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition without addressing the underlying constitutional claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-07

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s preliminary injunction blocking federal agencies from categorically freezing billions of dollars in funds appropriated under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The court held that the nonprofit plaintiffs possessed Article III standing to challenge the agency actions, finding that direct grantees and subgrantees suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to the agencies’ decisions to freeze funds. While the National Council of Nonprofits established organizational standing based on its members’ injuries regarding most agencies, the court found it lacked standing specifically to bring claims against the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) because it failed to identify any members receiving HUD grants under these acts. Regarding the merits, the court applied the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) standard, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on their claim that the agency actions were arbitrary and capricious. The court reasoned that the OMB Defendants and Agency Defendants adopted a “freeze first, ask questions later” approach by mandating an immediate, categorical pause on disbursements without adequately considering the significant reliance interests of grant recipients or explaining how they would reconcile the pause with legal requirements for payment. The court rejected arguments that these actions were committed to agency discretion or constituted impermissible programmatic attacks, determining instead that the across-the-board freezes were discrete final agency actions subject to review. The practical consequence of the decision is that the preliminary injunction remains in effect regarding the prohibition on the agencies from implementing, giving effect to, or reinstating the directive to unilaterally freeze awarded funding. However, the court vacated the specific portion of the district court’s order that affirmatively directed the Agency Defendants to “resume the processing, disbursement, and payment” of funds. The appellate court held this affirmative payment order exceeded the district court’s authority under the APA because it effectively enforced a contractual obligation to pay money, which is barred by sovereign immunity and reserved for the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act. The case is remanded with instructions to modify the injunction to remove the mandatory payment directive while preserving the prohibition on the unlawful freeze.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The sixth-circuit affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of Mulama’s application for cancellation of removal but granted his petition in part by remanding the case for reconsideration of voluntary departure eligibility. Regarding cancellation of removal, the court held that the Board correctly applied the statutory standard requiring “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to U.S. citizen children under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The court found no error in the Board’s determination that the financial and emotional hardships Mulama’s three children would face upon his removal to Kenya were not sufficiently rare or severe, noting that their mothers possess substantial income and can provide adequate care. The court also rejected Mulama’s due process claim regarding alleged agency bias because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies by raising the issue before the immigration judge or the Board. Additionally, the court affirmed the denial of a motion to remand based on new evidence regarding his daughter’s autism diagnosis, concluding that this evidence was not material enough to likely change the hardship outcome. However, the court granted the petition regarding voluntary departure and ordered a remand without reaching the merits of whether Mulama properly posted the required bond. Although the Board denied reinstatement of voluntary departure due to a lack of proof that the $500 bond was posted, and the Attorney General requested this specific relief, the court noted that jurisdiction over purely factual findings regarding the bond is limited. Instead, relying on the Attorney General’s voluntary request for remand to allow the agency to reassess eligibility, the court directed the Board to reconsider whether Mulama qualifies for voluntary departure consistent with the record evidence of his bond receipt.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-06

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s final written decision holding claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,354,015 unpatentable as anticipated by prior art. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the Board’s claim construction, determining that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “mounted to” is “connected to, either directly or indirectly.” The court rejected Ravin Crossbows’ proposed construction, which limited the term to connections allowing “only rotation about a fixed axis,” reasoning that such an interpretation would render the claim’s separate “rotatable around a first/second axis” limitations superfluous. The court further held that the Board properly declined to adopt the district court’s claim construction from related litigation, noting that while the district court agreed on the plain and ordinary meaning standard, the parties disputed the specific definition, allowing the Board to determine the correct construction based on intrinsic evidence. Consequently, the patent claims remain invalid.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.