Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court’s June 30, 2026, opinion directing further proceedings consistent with that decision. The court entered this order at the direction of Judge Heytens, with the concurrence of Judges Agee and Harris, concluding the appellate review on remand without issuing a new substantive analysis or applying specific legal tests beyond adhering to the Supreme Court’s directive.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 3:25-cv-00120-MCR-ZCB

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of John Shung’s complaint seeking judicial review of a Medicare Advantage plan’s denial of reimbursement for laboratory tests. The court held that the district court correctly determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not meet the statutory threshold required for federal judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1395w-22(g)(5). The court applied the standard of de novo review for questions of subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation. Under Medicare regulations, a beneficiary must exhaust administrative appeals to obtain a final agency decision before seeking judicial review, which is contingent upon meeting an inflation-adjusted amount-in-controversy threshold. For requests filed on or after January 1, 2025, the applicable threshold was $1,900. The court found that Shung’s claim for $1,658.62 fell short of this requirement. The court rejected Shung’s arguments that the 2021 threshold should apply (noting even the 2021 threshold was $1,760), that interest and costs could be aggregated to meet the amount, or that he could aggregate claims from other years, as the latter argument was raised for the first time in a reply brief. Consequently, because Shung failed to establish an amount in controversy exceeding the necessary statutory threshold, judicial review was unavailable, and the dismissal of his complaint was upheld.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal from the district court’s order denying relief on Arthur Jones’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. The court applied the standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which requires a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” to issue a certificate of appealability. Specifically, the court determined that Jones failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Consequently, no relief was granted, and the appeal was terminated without oral argument.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s award of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether the employer’s proffered non-retaliatory reason for termination was pretextual. Applying the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework, the majority determined that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff revealed conflicting accounts concerning both the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct and the consistency of the employer’s justification. Specifically, the record contained a dispute as to whether the plaintiff engaged in “belligerent and insubordinate conduct” beyond the use of profanity, as the defendant claimed, versus the plaintiff’s account that his behavior was a non-threatening response to harassment. Furthermore, the court found a genuine issue regarding whether the employer’s reason for termination changed over time, noting a discrepancy between the initial notification to the plaintiff that he was fired for “the way you talked to [his supervisor]” (interpreted as profanity) and later declarations stating he was terminated for “belligerent and insubordinate conduct.” Because these inconsistencies could allow a reasonable jury to infer that retaliation was the but-for cause of the termination, summary judgment was improper. The case will proceed to trial on the retaliatory discharge claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff Derek Antol’s Fourth Amendment claim regarding the validity of the search warrant and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, but reversed the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Defendant Josephs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the search warrant affidavit contained sufficient probable cause to support a search for an illegal marijuana operation, even after excising alleged false statements or omissions regarding tax evasion and money laundering, thereby entitling the officers to qualified immunity on the unlawful search claim. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the court ruled it was duplicative of the Fourth Amendment claim because the conduct occurred during a seizure of a free citizen, meaning the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard governs rather than substantive due process. However, the court determined that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures when Defendant Josephs denied him access to his own restroom while detained, forcing him to urinate in his front yard. Applying the *Graham v. Connor* totality-of-the-circumstances test, the court found the seizure unreasonable because the severity of the crime did not justify such a restriction given Plaintiff’s compliance and lack of threat, and the denial was not necessary to prevent evidence destruction as officers had already allowed brief supervised access to the home. The court further concluded that this right was clearly established under an “obvious” standard, meaning any reasonable officer would have understood that denying a detained individual’s urgent request for restroom access while supervised violated constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a 165-month sentence for a new felony conviction and a consecutive 24-month revocation sentence for violating supervised release. Regarding Ireland’s argument that the district court erred in applying a specific Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference, the court held that any such error was harmless because the record demonstrated the district court would have reached the same result regardless of the calculation and because the resulting sentence was substantively reasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Furthermore, the court concluded there was no reversible error in ordering the sentences to run consecutively, noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines recommend consecutive terms for new convictions and supervision violations arising from the same conduct and that the district court’s discussion of the sentencing factors adequately supported this decision.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Terrance Moore on Cornelius Phelps’s excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that a reasonable jury could find Moore violated Phelps’s clearly established constitutional right to be free from excessive force by tasing him four times while Phelps was seated on the ground with his hands raised in a submissive posture and not actively resisting arrest. Applying the *Graham v. Connor* reasonableness standard, the court determined that the severity of the suspected crime (trespassing), the lack of an immediate threat to officer safety, and the absence of active resistance weighed heavily in Phelps’s favor. The court clarified that passive resistance, such as failing to immediately present arms for handcuffing or refusing verbal commands without physical struggle, does not justify the use of a taser. Furthermore, the court found that by July 2020, it was clearly established law in the Sixth Circuit that an officer may not use injurious physical force, including tasers, on a suspect who is compliant or has ceased resisting. Consequently, Moore was not entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct violated rights that were sufficiently clear at the time of the incident.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Fourth Circuit affirmed John Austin Perkins, III’s conviction and sentence for falsifying a document to impede a federal investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. The court applied the plain error standard of review because Perkins failed to raise objections regarding his guilty plea or sentencing procedures in the district court. Under this standard, the court required Perkins to demonstrate an error that was plain and affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different without the alleged error. Regarding the sentence’s reasonableness, the court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard, presuming a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable unless the defendant rebuts this presumption by showing it is unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Perkins failed to show plain error in the district court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and Rule 32, and found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable because the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors including Perkins’s criminal history and arguments for a variance, and adequately explained its decision to deny a downward variance despite Perkins’s age and health concerns. As a practical consequence, the judgment of the district court stands, and counsel is required to inform Perkins of his right to petition the Supreme Court for further review.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. The court held that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard when denying Yonan’s third motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on changed country conditions under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While the BIA correctly identified the governing rule requiring a comparison of country conditions at the time of the original merits hearing versus the time of the motion, it erroneously compared Yonan’s evidence of deteriorating conditions in Iraq to periods post-dating his 2008 merits hearing rather than to the baseline conditions existing in 2008. Specifically, the BIA evaluated the materiality of the PMF’s political ascendancy and the rescission of a decree recognizing the Chaldean Patriarch by comparing them to events in the mid-2010s or early 2020s, rather than determining if these factors represented a material escalation compared to the state of affairs in 2008. Because the BIA’s error prevented a proper assessment of whether conditions had materially changed since Yonan’s original hearing, and because the record suggests the PMF presents a distinct risk profile compared to militias active in 2008, the court found the error was not harmless. Consequently, the case is remanded to the BIA to reconsider the motion using the correct evidentiary comparator of country conditions as they existed at the time of the original merits hearing.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of institutional defendants and a supervisor in a § 1983 action brought by an inmate following an assault by a corrections officer. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish genuine disputes of material fact necessary to sustain claims for failure to train, custom of acquiescence, negligent hiring, or supervisory liability against the correctional facility, counties, and executive director. Regarding the failure-to-train claim, the court applied the *City of Canton* deliberate indifference standard, requiring proof that inadequate training was so obvious that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the need for it. The court found no evidence that MCCC’s formal training program, which included de-escalation techniques and response-to-resistance instruction, was constitutionally inadequate or that any alleged inadequacy caused the assault, noting the officer testified he knew entering the cell was prohibited. On the claim alleging a custom of acquiescence to constitutional violations, the court applied the standard requiring a clear and persistent pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct. The court determined the plaintiff failed to identify sufficient prior incidents, as most alleged examples did not involve use of force against inmates or were not raised in the district court. Furthermore, regarding negligent hiring, the court clarified that liability requires a strong connection between an applicant’s background and the specific injury, finding Duncan’s prior disciplinary history insufficient to provide notice of his likelihood to inflict this specific type of injury. Finally, the court rejected the supervisory liability claim against the director, finding no evidence that he knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct or failed to properly investigate the assault after it occurred. The practical consequence is that the claims against all defendants except the individual officer remain dismissed, and the inmate’s appeal regarding institutional liability was denied. The court also rejected a dissenting argument that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), holding that the trial on the remaining claim against the individual officer would not moot the issues regarding institutional policy and custom.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.