Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) final written decision holding that claims 4, 5, and 6 of U.S. Patent No. 11,470,243 were unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The court rejected Nielsen’s arguments that the PTAB erred in finding the prior-art reference “Tian” to be analogous art and in concluding that Tian rendered the challenged claims obvious when combined with other references. Regarding the analogous art determination, the court applied a two-prong test: whether the reference is from the same field of endeavor or, if not, whether it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem involved. The court reviewed the Board’s factual finding for substantial evidence. It held that the Board did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act by relying on the “reasonably pertinent” prong even though the petitioner primarily argued the “same field of endeavor” prong, noting that the theories overlap and the pertinence was implicit in the petition. Furthermore, the court clarified that the problem addressed by a patent is not limited to those expressly identified in the specification; rather, the Board properly identified the general problem of image processing and facial detection. The court found substantial evidence that Tian, which analyzed face resolution for expression analysis, logically would have commended itself to an inventor solving these problems. On the merits of obviousness, the court reviewed the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusion de novo. It rejected Nielsen’s contention that Tian failed to disclose the claim limitations regarding reducing image resolution and performing a two-step facial recognition process. The court determined that claim 4 does not require “binning” specifically, as it only requires reducing resolution, which Tian disclosed via down-sampling. Additionally, the claims do not limit the process to reducing only a first image or requiring full-resolution images for subsequent steps; thus, Tian’s teaching of detecting faces in a first frame and tracking them in subsequent frames satisfied the limitations of claims 4 through 6. Finally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination that there was a motivation to combine Tian with other references to save processing resources and time by performing face detection on reduced-resolution images. As a result of this affirmation, the PTAB’s decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable stands, meaning the patent rights for claims 4, 5, and 6 are invalidated, and Nielsen Company (US), LLC is precluded from enforcing these claims against TVision Insights, Inc.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Federal Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s denial of Jacki Easlick, LLC’s motions for a preliminary injunction and reconsideration regarding its design patent infringement claim against AccEncyc US. The court applied the abuse of discretion standard of review, evaluating the district court’s application of the four-factor preliminary injunction test: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of hardships, and public interest. Regarding the likelihood of success on the merits, the court held that the district court correctly applied the “ordinary observer” test under *Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.* by comparing the overall visual effect of the patented Tote Hanger design against the accused product rather than focusing on isolated details. The Federal Circuit found no error in the district court’s exclusion of functional elements from the scope of the design patent and its conclusion that significant differences in the ornamental features—specifically the center hook shape and finished ends—prevented an ordinary observer from being deceived into believing the designs were substantially the same. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court that a prior art analysis was not required because the designs were plainly dissimilar, and even if considered, would not have altered the outcome. On the issue of irreparable harm, the court affirmed that Jacki Easlick failed to meet its burden by providing only conclusory and theoretical statements regarding profits, brand value, and market loss without specific evidentiary support linking such harm to the alleged infringement. The court rejected the argument that the prior issuance of a temporary restraining order or the defendant’s failure to brief the issue compelled a finding of irreparable harm for the preliminary injunction stage. Finally, the court upheld the denial of the motion for reconsideration, determining that the proffered physical evidence and testimony were not newly discovered evidence that was previously unavailable, but rather evidence that could have been submitted earlier. As a result of this decision, the district court’s orders denying injunctive relief remain in effect, allowing AccEncyc US to continue selling the accused handbag hanger hooks without being enjoined by the preliminary injunction pending further proceedings or trial on the merits.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The federal-circuit dismissed the appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) based on the agreement of the parties. Each side shall bear its own costs.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The dc-circuit dismissed the Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO) interlocutory appeal from a district court order compelling jurisdictional discovery, holding that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The court determined that while immediate review is generally available for denials of motions to dismiss based on immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), this exception does not extend to orders compelling discovery aimed at resolving factual disputes regarding that immunity when specific procedural conditions are met. The court applied the three-prong test from *Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.* for collateral order review, focusing on whether the discovery order was “effectively unreviewable” on appeal from a final judgment. The opinion established that immediate appellate review is inappropriate where: (1) a judicial determination has already been made that the complaint adequately pleads an exception to immunity; (2) the defendant files a factual motion to dismiss disputing those specific allegations with its own evidence; and (3) the discovery order targets theories of immunity exceptions that the court has found adequately pleaded. In this instance, the district court had previously ruled that the plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts triggering the “commercial activity” exception to IOIA immunity. PAHO subsequently filed a factual motion contesting those specific allegations, prompting the district court to order discovery to resolve the resulting factual dispute. The court reasoned that in this context, the burden of responding to discovery is not comparable to the burden of litigating the merits of the suit, and deferring review until final judgment does not imperil PAHO’s immunity interests to a degree that justifies the institutional costs of piecemeal appeals. The practical consequence is that PAHO must comply with the district court’s discovery orders regarding the movement of funds and the commercial nature of its activities in the United States. The appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the pending factual motion to dismiss and the underlying litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The federal-circuit affirmed the dismissal of a class action brought by current and retired federal employees living in non-foreign areas (such as Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico) against the United States for underpayment of salary and retirement benefits. The court held that the United States Court of Federal Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over both the plaintiffs’ salary claims and their retirement benefits claims. Regarding the salary claims, which sought locality pay for the period 1994–2009 and continued cost-of-living allowances (COLA), the court applied the Tucker Act standard requiring a “money-mandating” source of law that creates an entitlement to “presently due money damages.” The court reasoned that even if the statutory provisions excluding non-foreign employees from locality pay or phasing out COLA were deemed unconstitutional and disregarded, the remaining statutes would not mandate specific monetary compensation. Instead, striking those provisions would leave a “vacuum” requiring new data collection by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and new determinations by the President’s agent to calculate pay amounts that did not exist at the time. Consequently, granting relief would require equitable remedies, such as injunctions directing future agency actions, which are outside the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction. Regarding the retirement benefits claims, the court held that challenges to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) calculations under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) fall under the exclusive review process established by the Civil Service Reform Act. This framework requires such claims to be adjudicated first by OPM and then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), with final appeals going to this court. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that it could review these claims in the first instance without an MSPB decision, noting that the statutory scheme designates the MSPB as the primary adjudicator rather than a “dress rehearsal.” The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed without reaching the merits of their constitutional arguments regarding due process, equal protection, or bills of attainder. The salary claims cannot proceed in the Court of Federal Claims because they seek equitable relief and lack a money-mandating source for present damages, while the retirement benefit claims must be pursued through the administrative channels of OPM and the MSPB before any judicial review is possible.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Tianna Barber’s conviction and sentence, rejecting her challenges regarding evidentiary rulings at trial and the calculation of her Sentencing Guidelines range. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in admitting a federal agent’s testimony interpreting coded drug slang in recorded jail calls under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as the agent possessed specialized knowledge of narcotics jargon distinct from common language. Furthermore, the court ruled that admitting a video recording of a controlled drug buy involving a confidential source did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the statements were either non-hearsay admissions by the defendant or her co-conspirator, or were offered for context rather than the truth of the matter asserted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Regarding sentencing, the court determined that the district court did not plainly err in calculating the Guidelines range using higher drug quantities than those found by the jury, noting that the Sentencing Guidelines permit consideration of conduct that establishes the instant offense of conviction even if the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated charges involving larger amounts. Consequently, Barber’s conviction and 150-month prison sentence remain in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The eighth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Charles Burgett’s employment discrimination action against the Commissioner of Social Security. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the summary judgment ruling, citing *Said v. Mayo Clinic*, and found the lower court’s decision proper based on its review of the record and arguments. Additionally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burgett’s motion for reconsideration, applying the standard outlined in *Ryan v. Ryan*. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and the appeal is dismissed with no further relief granted to the appellant.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 9:23-cr-80209-WPD-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed Henry Abdo’s sentence of 168 months’ imprisonment for two counts of wire fraud. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) for misrepresenting that he was acting on behalf of charitable organizations. The court applied the plain error standard of review because Abdo failed to raise an objection to the specific guideline application in the district court, despite objecting to the underlying factual allegations. To constitute plain error, an error must be clear under current law. The court determined that no such clear error existed because neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has resolved whether § 2B1.1(b)(9) applies when a defendant solicits investments in a for-profit company while falsely claiming the funds would benefit charitable causes. The court noted that while the Ninth Circuit interprets the guideline broadly to cover such misrepresentations, other circuits construe it more narrowly, creating a split in authority. Because the legal issue is not settled and circuits are divided, any potential error was not “plain or obvious.” As a result of this decision, Abdo’s 168-month sentence stands, and he remains imprisoned for his wire fraud convictions.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the U.S. Tax Court’s decision disallowing the taxpayers’ claimed charitable deduction for a conservation easement and upholding the IRS’s determination that the easement was worth $1,000,000 rather than the $14 million claimed. The court applied de novo review to legal questions regarding the interpretation of the tax code and the “clearly erroneous” standard to factual findings regarding fair market value. Under the “before-and-after” valuation method required by 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), the court held that the Tax Court did not err in rejecting the taxpayers’ expert valuations and accepting the IRS expert’s analysis, which relied on comparable distressed sales. The court reasoned that the taxpayers failed to meet their burden of proof because the Tax Court provided a sufficient explanation for crediting one expert over others, noting the taxpayers’ experts could not adequately explain their 30% reduction calculation. Furthermore, the court found no error in the Tax Court’s failure to explicitly state a “highest and best use” finding, as all parties’ experts agreed on the general use (development), and the dispute merely concerned the timing of that development, which the IRS expert deemed remote. The practical consequence is that the taxpayers’ appeals are dismissed, the Tax Court’s deficiency notices and penalties stand, and the taxpayers remain liable for the disallowed deduction amount plus associated taxes and penalties.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision disallowing the taxpayers’ charitable deduction for a conservation easement at the value they claimed. The court held that the Tax Court did not err in its valuation determination or its evidentiary rulings. Under the “before-and-after” valuation method required by 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), the easement’s value is the difference between the fair market value of the property before and after the restriction. The court applied a clearly erroneous standard to the Tax Court’s factual findings regarding expert testimony, noting that the burden of proof rests on the taxpayer to establish the deduction amount. The appellate court found no clear error in the Tax Court’s decision to credit the IRS expert’s valuation over the taxpayers’ experts, as the latter failed to provide a coherent explanation for their 30% reduction calculation and were deemed unreliable. Regarding the “highest and best use” of the property, the court ruled that because the parties’ experts agreed on the general use (development), the Tax Court was not required to conduct a separate formalistic analysis, and any argument that the timing of development differed was not raised properly below. Additionally, the court rejected the contention that reliance on distressed sales in the IRS expert’s report constituted an abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Tax Court’s finding that the easement was worth $1,000,000 rather than the claimed $14,175,000 stands, and the taxpayers’ deductions and associated penalties remain disallowed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.