Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 4:23-cr-00003-SLG-KFR-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s jury conviction for distribution of a controlled substance resulting in death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The court rejected the defendant’s argument that Supreme Court decisions in *Burrage v. United States*, *Rehaif v. United States*, and *Ruan v. United States* clearly irreconcilably undercut the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in *United States v. Houston*, which holds that a defendant need not intend or foresee death for liability under this statute. The panel determined that *Burrage* addressed but-for causation rather than intent, while *Rehaif* and *Ruan* applied mental state requirements to separate wrongful from innocent acts, a distinction the court found inapplicable here because knowingly distributing controlled substances is inherently wrongful regardless of foreseeability. Regarding sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the *Jackson v. Virginia* standard, concluding that viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the fentanyl pills sold by the defendant were the but-for cause of the victim’s death based on testimony and text messages tracing the drugs from the defendant to the victim. As a result, the judgment of conviction is upheld.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:19-cv-01534-JCM-DJA

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Bank of America, N.A., holding that the bank was entitled to the excused-tender doctrine under Nevada law. The court applied a de novo standard of review and determined that the two requirements for excusing tender were satisfied without genuine dispute: first, the homeowners association (HOA) agent had a policy of rejecting any tender less than the full lien amount, and second, the bank knew of this policy. The record established that the HOA’s authorized agent, Assessment Management Services, maintained an across-the-board policy to reject conditional tenders covering only the superpriority portion of the lien, and Bank of America was aware of this policy through repeated rejections of tenders made on its behalf between 2012 and 2014. The court clarified that Bank of America, not its servicer Carrington Mortgage Services, bore the obligation to tender under Nevada law. Consequently, because a conditional tender would have been rejected, the bank was excused from making the full payment to preserve its deed of trust priority. The judgment is affirmed, leaving the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Bank of America in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:24-cv-00177-RFB-NJK

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Golden Creek Holdings, Inc.’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Applying de novo review and the plausibility standard established in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, the panel held that the district court correctly determined that sending a March 2011 written acceleration notice did not trigger Nevada’s ancient-lien statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 106.240. Relying on the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision in *LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon*, the court explained that a debt becomes “wholly due” only pursuant to the terms of the mortgage or deed of trust or a recorded written extension thereof; a notice of intent to accelerate is not included in this statutory list because the borrower retains at least 30 days to cure the default after receiving such notice. Consequently, the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and the dismissal stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 5:23-cv-00683-SSS-DTB

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Vasu Vijayraghavan’s state law claims against Katherine Cohan. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing Vijayraghavan’s wrongful arrest claim with prejudice because her operative complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to raise a plausible inference that Cohan’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing her arrest without probable cause, citing *Cox v. Griffin* and *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*. Furthermore, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying Vijayraghavan’s motions to amend, for reconsideration, or to assert additional claims, noting that she failed to comply with local civil rules by not attaching a proposed amended complaint and failing to articulate good cause for untimely filings. Regarding the dismissal of other state-law claims without prejudice, the court determined that any potential error in declining supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) was harmless because the district court permissibly declined to exercise such jurisdiction once all federal claims had been dismissed. Consequently, the judgment of the district court stands, and Vijayraghavan’s appeal is denied with no further relief granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 3:24-cv-05114-DGE

The ninth-circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment for American Strategic Insurance Corp. (ASI) regarding a dispute over an insurance policy lapse following nonpayment, which resulted in a home fire loss. The court applied de novo review to legal conclusions and abuse of discretion review to evidentiary rulings. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims related to notice and consent, renewal notice requirements, the admissibility of an employee declaration, the method of insurance registration, and electronic clickwrap consent. Regarding notice and consent, the court held that Washington law allows one spouse to impliedly consent to transactions conducted by the other, rendering separate notices unnecessary when the husband acted with authority for both spouses; furthermore, email delivery was deemed equivalent to postal mail under Wash. Rev. Code § 48.185.005(3). The court found the renewal notice statutorily sufficient despite misidentifying the payor, as it clearly communicated the willingness to renew and the premium amount required. The court also upheld the district court’s admission of the O’Nuallain declaration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2), rejecting the argument that “belief” negated personal knowledge for business records authentication. Regarding registration and consent, the court ruled that ASI’s business records rebutted Mr. Hughes’s conclusory assertion that he applied solely by phone, establishing a computer completion as undisputed fact. The court further determined the clickwrap agreement was enforceable under Washington law because the terms were reasonably conspicuous, required affirmative action (clicking a box), and adequately specified the types of documents and hardware/software requirements for electronic access. The court reversed the summary judgment on the claim brought under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA). The court reasoned that the WCPA must be liberally construed to serve its beneficial purposes and found that ASI’s agent, Progressive, sent a cover email regarding policy renewal that used boilerplate language suggesting coverage was active, while the attached document alone notified the insured of the lapse. The court held that this discrepancy created a potential issue of material fact regarding whether the communication was misleading under the WCPA and whether it proximately caused harm. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum disposition to allow for a proper analysis of the WCPA claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to a Peruvian national and her minor daughter. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish past persecution because she did not provide evidence linking the abuse by her aunt and cousin to a protected ground, such as membership in a particular social group, rather than indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, the court found substantial evidence supporting the determination that the petitioner lacked an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, noting the decades-long passage of time since the abuse and the continued safety of family members remaining in Peru. The court declined to address challenges regarding withholding of removal and CAT protection because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to raise those specific issues before the BIA. Consequently, the petition is denied, leaving the immigration judge’s order denying relief in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:20-cv-09194-DMG-AS

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Patricia Klawonn’s ERISA claim alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring underperformance to be “both substantial and consistent” to support a claim of imprudence, failing to apply the prospective methodology clarified in *Anderson v. Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm.*, 137 F.4th 1015 (9th Cir. 2025), which mandates evaluating prudence based on the methods fiduciaries employed at the time of their decisions rather than hindsight-based results. Additionally, the court noted that the district court erred by implying a requirement for “substantial loss” when ERISA statute 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) imposes liability for “any loss.” Regarding the class certification, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the initial ruling but determined that Klawonn’s individual claim for prospective relief became moot by the time of summary judgment due to her continued unemployment and decision to cash out of the plan, rendering her prospects of returning to work speculative. However, because the class was properly certified before her claim became moot, the class action itself remains viable. On remand, the district court is instructed to analyze the breach of fiduciary duty based on the *Anderson* standard and to determine whether a substitute class representative is available to continue the litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:20-cv-09194-DMG-AS

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Klawonn’s ERISA claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of prudence and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring underperformance to be “both substantial and consistent” to support a claim of imprudence, failing to apply the prospective evaluation of methods employed by fiduciaries clarified in *Anderson v. Intel Corp. Inv. Pol’y Comm.*, 137 F.4th 1015 (9th Cir. 2025). Additionally, the district court erred in its definition of recoverable loss; under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), fiduciaries are liable for “any loss” to the plan resulting from a breach, not merely “substantial loss.” Regarding the class certification and standing issues, the court affirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion in initially certifying the class when Klawonn had sufficient intent to return to work. However, the court found that Klawonn’s individual claim for prospective relief became moot by the time of summary judgment due to her continued unemployment and decision to cash out of the plan. Despite this individual mootness, the class action remains viable because the class was properly certified before the claim became moot. Consequently, on remand, the district court must determine whether a substitute class representative is available to continue the litigation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 3:24-cv-08167-AMO

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Target Corporation’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that a genuine dispute of material fact remains regarding whether the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate, specifically concerning which version of Target’s checkout screen the plaintiff encountered and whether he logged into his account while the arbitration agreement was in effect. Applying de novo review to the denial of the motion to compel and clear error review to underlying factual findings, the court determined that the district court erred by failing to resolve these factual disputes before ruling on the motion. The panel noted that under the summary judgment standard applicable to arbitrability motions, if genuine disputes exist as to whether an arbitration agreement was formed, the district court must hold the motion in abeyance and proceed to a trial on arbitrability. The court found that conflicting evidence regarding the checkout screen version (a $3.99 fee versus a $6.49 fee) and the plaintiff’s equivocal testimony about signing in created unresolved factual issues that precluded summary judgment on the arbitration question. On remand, the district court is instructed to determine whether these factual disputes can be resolved without a trial or if a trial on arbitrability is necessary. The court must then apply the traditional inquiry regarding the visuals involved with notice and the context of the transaction to decide if a valid contract to arbitrate was formed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 1:23-cv-00905-SCR

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits. The court applied a de novo standard of review to the district court’s decision, determining that it would only reverse if the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) findings were not supported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. The court held that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to reject Armes’ subjective symptom testimony regarding her heart problems, knee pain, and hand limitations. The ALJ identified inconsistencies between Armes’ claimed disabling limitations and the objective medical record, noting that her cardiac condition had improved following procedures, her knee pain was stable with medication, and she lacked treatment for her alleged hand pain despite claiming it was severe. Furthermore, the court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s rejection of the treating physician’s opinion as an outlier because it was brief, conclusory, and inconsistent with the broader medical record showing normal examination findings. Regarding the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) determination, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Armes could perform light work with specific postural and environmental limitations. The ALJ considered all medically determinable impairments, including non-severe ones, and relied on three consistent medical opinions. Finally, the court determined that the ALJ properly found Armes capable of performing her past relevant work, as she did not challenge the persuasiveness of the medical opinions supporting this conclusion. Consequently, the denial of benefits is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.