Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The Ninth Circuit denied Satpal Singh’s petitions for review of Board of Immigration Appeals decisions dismissing his appeals from an Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, as well as denying his motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination, noting that under the REAL ID Act, inconsistencies bearing on credibility need not concern the heart of the claim. Specifically, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s false statements regarding his 2008 nonimmigrant visa application and travel history, which were contradicted by documentary evidence. Because this adverse credibility finding stands, the court affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal based on the lack of sufficient corroborating evidence. Additionally, the court found no reversible error in the BIA’s waiver of Singh’s challenges to the CAT denial. Regarding the motion to reopen, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and concluded the BIA did not err in finding Singh failed to comply with *Matter of Lozada* procedural requirements, failed to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel as strategic choices were made, and failed to establish prejudice since additional briefing would not have overcome the credibility determinations. Consequently, the petitions are denied, and Singh’s motion to stay removal is dismissed as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

Docket: 2:23-CR-00011-TL

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant Munir Walji’s motion for a new trial following his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor and abusive sexual contact in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. The court applied plain error review because Walji failed to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct during trial, despite having previously moved in limine to exclude testimony regarding personal beliefs about his guilt or veracity. The court held that the prosecution did not engage in improper vouching for the victim’s credibility. Regarding the forensic interviewer’s testimony, the court found the questioning concerned the witness’s methodology rather than assurances of truthfulness, and the witness expressly disclaimed any extra-record knowledge of the victim’s veracity. Furthermore, the court determined that the prosecutor’s closing arguments did not constitute vouching because they referenced only evidence already in the record, allowing the jury to independently assess credibility. Even assuming arguendo that the statements constituted vouching, the court concluded that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. This determination was based on the district court’s curative instructions directing the jury to decide the case solely on trial evidence and make careful credibility assessments, as well as the prosecution’s reminders that no evidence regarding the interview’s contents had been heard. Additionally, considering the strength of the government’s case, which included DNA evidence and testimony from other witnesses, the court found the challenged statements were not so crucial that their absence would have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, Walji is not entitled to a new trial.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

Docket: 1:23-cv-00059-WQH-REP

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim under Idaho law but reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment on their Fair Housing Act (FHA) retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Regarding the FHA claim, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting sua sponte summary judgment without providing Plaintiffs notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond regarding the issue of pretext. Although the district court assumed Plaintiffs met their prima facie burden for retaliation, it concluded they failed to show a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the Defendant’s reasons for terminating negotiations were pretexts for a retaliatory motive. The appellate court found that because the parties did not brief this specific pretext issue and the record contained no indication that Plaintiffs were notified the court would address it, the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) were violated. Additionally, the court clarified that a violation of § 3617 does not require the plaintiff to have capitulated to interference or for a discriminatory housing practice under § 3604 to have occurred; therefore, the district court must reconsider whether the Defendants violated § 3617 by refusing to continue negotiations after Plaintiffs engaged in protected activity. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court affirmed the summary judgment, applying Idaho law which requires conduct implying an agreement for an implied-in-fact contract to exist. The court found no such contract existed because neither party believed an agreement was reached at the time, and the record demonstrated that CMH’s conduct did not imply a promise to sell, while Plaintiffs understood their deposit was refundable pending a formal contract. Consequently, the case is remanded for further proceedings on the FHA retaliation claim while the dismissal of the state law breach of contract claim stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that refused to reopen removal proceedings based on a motion filed after the statutory deadline. The court held that the BIA correctly applied the 90-day time limit under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), which bars motions to reopen unless an exception applies for changed country conditions or changed personal circumstances accompanied by sufficient evidence of related country changes. The court found that the petitioners’ new evidence failed to qualify for the “changed country conditions” exception because it was not “qualitatively different” from evidence previously submitted. The new report describing ongoing discrimination and violence against religious minorities in India merely described a continuity of conditions similar to those detailed in a prior 2022 report, rather than a change in conditions. Additionally, the court determined that evidence regarding harassment of the petitioners’ family members by government officials constituted only a change in personal circumstances, which is insufficient on its own to bypass the time bar without proof of related changed country conditions. As a consequence, the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen stands, and the removal order remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review filed by Yuan Yaun Zhang and her minor daughter challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Specifically, the record contains nontrivial discrepancies between Zhang’s declaration and testimony, including differing accounts regarding when she formed the political opinion underlying her claim, an implausible statement in her declaration, and the omission of a material fact. The court noted that while Zhang did not challenge the basis for the credibility finding regarding her political opinion before the BIA, this unexhausted argument is not considered on review. Because the BIA dismissed the appeal solely based on this adverse credibility determination without addressing the merits of the asylum and withholding claims, the court declined to consider those merits. Additionally, the denial of CAT protection was not reviewed because Zhang failed to challenge the BIA’s finding that she waived review of the immigration judge’s denial of CAT relief. Consequently, the petition is denied, leaving the agency’s order denying all forms of relief in place.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

Docket: 2:20-cv-01284-DLR

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials, holding that the plaintiff, Shawn Goff, presented sufficient evidence to create genuine disputes of material fact regarding his claims under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find the confiscation of Goff’s Wiccan medallion and altar cloth constituted a substantial burden on his free exercise rights because the items held significant spiritual value for preventing negative energy and facilitating specific rituals, and their permanent deprivation exerted pressure inconsistent with his beliefs. Furthermore, the court determined there was sufficient evidence to dispute whether the named defendants, including the Complex Major and four correctional officers, personally participated in the deprivation of these items based on prison records identifying them and Goff’s testimony regarding orders given by the Complex Major. The court also ruled that Goff sufficiently pleaded his RLUIPA claim, which requires only notice pleading, as his complaint provided fair notice of the factual allegations supporting relief under the statute. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The lower court must now address the substantive claims regarding the First Amendment and RLUIPA violations, including any defenses such as qualified immunity or reasonableness related to penological interests, which were not fully adjudicated at the summary judgment stage.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying Betty Marleny Huaman Alamas’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Huaman Alamas failed to establish a “nexus” between the alleged incidents of harassment and a protected ground required for asylum eligibility. Specifically, the record indicated that the perpetrators were primarily motivated by material gain rather than race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, as Huaman Alamas herself testified she believed the attackers sought money and weapons. Because the lack of nexus precludes asylum eligibility, the court also affirmed the denial of humanitarian asylum and withholding of removal, which require a showing of past persecution on account of a protected ground. Furthermore, the court found substantial evidence supporting the denial of CAT relief, noting that the record did not compel a finding that it is more likely than not Huaman Alamas would be tortured upon return to Peru, particularly given her testimony that she and her family remained unharmed in Peru for months after the threats were made. Consequently, the petition for review is denied, and any pending motion to stay removal is also denied.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Luis Alberto Baez Perez, his wife, and their four minor children regarding the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that the petitioners failed to establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal because the record demonstrated only general violence and crime in Mexico without evidence of past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. Citing *Zetino v. Holder* and *Barajas-Romero v. Lynch*, the court found that the petitioners’ desire to avoid harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence lacked the necessary nexus to a protected ground. Regarding CAT relief, the court applied the “more likely than not” standard under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) and concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that the petitioners did not meet their burden. The court noted that the petitioners suffered no personal harm rising to the level of torture and that the Mexican government intervened to protect them, thereby negating any claim of government acquiescence or a particularized risk of future torture. Consequently, the petition is denied, leaving the agency’s order denying all forms of relief in place.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

The dc-circuit denied petitions for review challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s final rule designating Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as “hazardous substances” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The court held that EPA’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “may present substantial danger” was correct, finding that the plain text requires only a possibility of harm rather than scientific certainty. The court further ruled that EPA’s cost-benefit analysis satisfied the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice requirements because the final Regulatory Impact Analysis was a logical outgrowth of the earlier Economic Assessment and the public comment process. Additionally, the court determined that EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its economic calculations or its decision to regulate despite uncertainties, noting that CERCLA contains extensive procedural safeguards and liability limitations that prevent immediate financial exposure for regulated parties. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed, leaving the designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances in effect.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-18

Docket: 2:23-cv-02531-DJC-SCR

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and denied their motions for leave to amend and for entry of default judgment. The court held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that creates no new causes of action, as Congress alone possesses the power to recognize such claims under the separation of powers doctrine established in *Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Doe I*. Because the plaintiffs asserted a cause of action for “intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” that Congress has not recognized, and because this claim does not fall within the limited category of historic torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses (violation of safe conducts, infringement of ambassadorial rights, or piracy), the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellate court ruled that any amendment to the complaint would be futile and that the district court correctly denied default judgment against non-appearing defendants due to the absence of jurisdiction over the underlying claim. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ case remains dismissed without prejudice to filing a new action only if they can identify a cause of action explicitly recognized by Congress or falling within the narrow historical scope permitted under the ATS.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.