Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order denying the petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish a nexus between their alleged persecution and a protected ground. Specifically, the record indicates that the gang members targeted the petitioners solely for recruitment into a criminal enterprise rather than on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Because the lack of a protected ground nexus is dispositive of the asylum and withholding claims, the court declined to address other arguments. Additionally, the court rejected the petitioners’ due process claim regarding alleged judicial bias by the immigration judge, finding no evidence of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would preclude fair judgment, and noting that any such error would be harmless given the independent substantial evidence supporting the denial. As a result, the petition is denied, and the removal order remains in effect; the petitioners’ motion to stay removal was also denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 3:19-cr-00089-RRB-MMS-1

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Patrick Joseph Delumeau’s supervised release following a district court finding that he violated the terms of his release by committing Assault in the Third Degree—Causing Fear with a Weapon under Alaska state law. In addressing Delumeau’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court applied the standard from *United States v. Aquino*, asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that the evidence supported this finding because a rational fact-finder could conclude Delumeum acted at least recklessly, as defined by Alaska Statute § 11.81.900(a)(3), when he intended to scare a woman into returning stolen property while armed with a knife. The court further determined that the evidence, including witness testimony of the victim’s screaming and physical distress alongside Delumeau’s admission to his parole officer regarding the weapon, was sufficient to establish that he placed the victim in fear of imminent serious physical injury using a dangerous instrument, noting that Alaska law does not require direct victim testimony for the fear element. Consequently, the district court’s adoption of the magistrate judge’s findings was upheld, and the judgment is affirmed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The ninth-circuit denied the petition for review regarding the claims for asylum and withholding of removal but granted the petition in part and remanded the case concerning the claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that substantial evidence supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish a nexus between the alleged harm and a protected ground, as the abuse was personal rather than motivated by membership in a particular social group. Regarding the CAT claim, the court found legal error because the agency failed to provide reasoned consideration of the evidence, specifically disregarding the petitioner’s testimony regarding escalating threats to kill, the conclusion that the father sent masked men to abduct the children, and the fact that thwarted abduction attempts can constitute torture through threatened severe physical pain. Consequently, the case is remanded for the agency to reevaluate the CAT claim in the first instance, and the petitioners’ motion to stay removal is granted pending the issuance of the court’s mandate.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for review because it lacked jurisdiction over the case. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), the court can only review a final order of removal; however, a negative reasonable fear determination by an Immigration Judge is not a final order of removal and does not merge into one. Since the petitioner failed to challenge his underlying 2013 removal order or the reinstatement decision, the court had no authority to hear the appeal. Even assuming jurisdiction existed, the court found the petitioner’s claim lacked merit under the substantial evidence standard. The Immigration Judge determined that the petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the feared harm and a protected ground, that internal relocation was unreasonable, or that he faced a more likely than not risk of torture by Los Linieros or Mexican police. The court held that generalized concerns about violence in Mexico and speculative assertions regarding government corruption were insufficient to meet the legal standard for a reasonable fear of torture. As a result, the petition is dismissed without reaching the merits of the asylum claim. A temporary stay of removal remains in effect only until the mandate issues; otherwise, the motion to stay removal is denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit dismissed Juan Carlos Orellana Beltran’s petition for review challenging an Immigration Judge’s negative reasonable fear determination regarding his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because a post-reinstatement reasonable fear determination is not a final order of removal and does not merge into one; since Beltran did not challenge his underlying 2006 removal order or the reinstatement decision, judicial review was unavailable. Even assuming jurisdiction existed, the court found no error in the Immigration Judge’s refusal to consider additional evidence, applying the substantial evidence standard and noting that due process does not mandate a right to present new evidence so long as the judge exercises discretion, which occurred here. Consequently, the petition is dismissed without reaching the merits of the CAT claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:25-mc-00042-

The ninth-circuit reversed the district court’s order quashing an administrative subpoena issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to QueerDoc, PLLC pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 18 U.S.C. § 3486, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The panel held that the DOJ satisfied its prima facie burden by demonstrating statutory authority under HIPAA to investigate potential violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s misbranding prohibitions, compliance with procedural requirements, and relevance of the requested documents to an authorized investigation into federal health care offenses. The court applied the standard that a recipient challenging a subpoena on grounds of “improper purpose” or bad faith bears a heavy burden to produce specific facts and evidence supporting such allegations. The panel concluded that QueerDoc failed to meet this burden because the Executive Branch’s public opposition to gender-affirming care and policy directives from the President were insufficient to prove that the DOJ issued the subpoena in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The court emphasized the presumption of regularity regarding government officials’ actions and affirmed that the President may direct the DOJ to exercise its statutory authority in a manner consistent with broader policy goals, provided those directives are implemented within the bounds of applicable law. On remand, the district court is instructed to consider QueerDoc’s arguments that the subpoena was overbroad and posed an undue burden, issues not addressed by the district court in its original ruling. The panel directed the parties to cooperate on narrowing the scope of discovery and noted that any determination limiting the subpoena must be supported by objective evidence regarding the volume of records, estimated work hours, and costs of compliance, rather than conclusory allegations.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied Abner Alexander Rivera-Lopez’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard, upholding the agency’s determination unless the evidence compelled a contrary conclusion. The court held that Rivera waived challenges to the timeliness of his asylum application and his eligibility for CAT relief because he failed to address these dispositive factors in his opening brief. Regarding his due process claim, the court found no violation based on the Immigration Judge’s admission of an FBI rap sheet, which was consistent with prior evidence of Rivera’s criminal history; the lack of medical records to substantiate claims of mental illness despite testimony regarding substance abuse treatment; and clarifying questions about the death of Rivera’s father, which were not adversarial. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of withholding of removal because substantial evidence supported the finding that Rivera failed to articulate specific political opinions expressed in his artwork sufficient to establish a nexus between those opinions and the risk of harm he feared. Consequently, the petition for review is denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying the petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review, which holds that administrative findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court affirmed the adverse credibility determination against the primary applicant, Jasbir Kaur Kaur, finding that the agency reasonably relied on the totality of the circumstances, including her voluntary return to India twice after the alleged incidents and concerns regarding the veracity of a medical record for her father’s hospitalization. Additionally, the petitioners waived several grounds relied upon by the Immigration Judge and BIA by failing to specifically raise them in their opening brief. Regarding the CAT claim, the court noted that while an adverse credibility finding does not automatically preclude relief, reversing the denial would require evidence alone compelling the conclusion that the petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured; because the petitioners failed to make a specific argument regarding other evidence supporting this standard, the issue was waived. The practical consequence is that the petition for review is denied and the motion to stay removal is denied, leaving the agency’s order denying relief in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The federal-circuit court vacated the Merit Systems Protection Board’s decision denying corrective action to a veteran and remanded the case for reconsideration. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) of the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA), an agency cannot rely on a veteran’s status as a current federal employee to deny them the right to compete for vacant positions filled through merit promotion procedures when applications are accepted from individuals outside the agency’s own workforce. In reaching this decision, the en banc court overruled its prior precedent in *Kerner v. Department of the Interior*, 778 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015), which had incorrectly held that § 3304(f) applied only to veterans seeking initial federal appointments. The court determined that the plain language of § 3304(f)(1) unambiguously applies to all preference eligibles and veterans regardless of their current employment status, as the statute prohibits denying an opportunity to compete whenever an agency accepts applications from outside its workforce. While the VEOA guarantees the right to compete, the court clarified that this does not exempt veterans from standard eligibility criteria, such as time-in-grade requirements, which apply to all candidates. The practical consequence is that the Merit Systems Protection Board must reconsider Mr. Brimer’s appeal without relying on the now-invalidated interpretation that current federal employees are ineligible for VEOA protections. The Board will determine whether Mr. Brimer was deprived of an opportunity to compete based on the corrected legal standard, specifically examining whether his application was improperly rejected due to a misunderstanding of his eligibility versus a failure to meet objective qualification criteria.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The dc-circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment against DJI on three grounds but reversed the judgment regarding the Secretary’s finding that DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base, remanding the case for further proceedings. Regarding the due process claim, the court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not apply because DJI failed to demonstrate a deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest under the “stigma-plus” doctrine. The court reasoned that while the designation caused reputational harm and some business losses, it did not “broadly preclude” DJI from pursuing its chosen trade or business, as DJI remains the global market leader in drones with significant sales to consumers and non-government entities worldwide. Consequently, the court rejected DJI’s argument that the lack of advance notice violated due process. On the substantial evidence claim, the court found that the unclassified record contained sufficient evidence to support the Secretary’s determination that DJI was “knowingly receiving assistance” from the Chinese government through science and technology efforts initiated by the military industrial planning apparatus. The court relied on the Secretary’s report, which cited DJI’s recognition as a “National Enterprise Technology Center” (NETC) by China’s National Development and Reform Commission—a body connected to the Central Military Commission—and the associated tax breaks, cash subsidies, and financial support. The court deemed it reasonable for the agency to infer current receipt of these benefits from news reports stating that NETCs enjoy such policy benefits and DJI’s history of receiving similar subsidies. Regarding the arbitrary and capricious claim, the court rejected DJI’s argument that the Secretary acted unreasonably by failing to explain why he designated DJI but not other companies like Nokia Bell or Volkswagen. The court noted that DJI improperly assumed facts about those companies not in the administrative record and that the “prior position” doctrine does not require an agency to investigate every potentially similarly situated entity globally before making a designation. However, the court reversed the judgment on the issue of whether DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base. The Secretary’s report contained a section addressing this specific finding, but every word except the heading was redacted in the unclassified record. The district court had relied on arguments made by the Secretary’s attorneys and other parts of the report rather than the agency’s own stated grounds for that specific determination. The court held this violated the *Chenery* principle, which mandates that courts judge agency action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. Because the unclassified record provided no rationale for the “contribution” finding, the district court could not uphold it based on post-hoc arguments or classified information without first reviewing the proper administrative basis. The practical consequence is that the case is remanded to the district court. On remand, the district court must examine the Secretary’s classified record *ex parte* and *in camera* to determine whether the classified justification supports the finding that DJI “contributes” to the Chinese defense industrial base. The district court also has discretion to assess whether DJI or its counsel may be granted some form of access to the classified record during these proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.