Court: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The First Circuit dismissed LUMA Energy, LLC and LUMA Energy ServCo, LLC’s appeal from the Title III bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion to enforce the automatic stay against a Puerto Rico consumer protection lawsuit. The court held that LUMA lacked statutory standing to pursue the appeal because it failed to qualify as a “person aggrieved” under the stringent standard required for appellate review in bankruptcy proceedings. The court applied the “person aggrieved” standard, which requires an appellant to demonstrate that the appealed order directly and adversely affects its pecuniary interests. The First Circuit reasoned that the automatic stay is designed primarily to protect the debtor’s estate and to prevent inequitable treatment of creditors relative to one another. LUMA, asserting standing as a post-petition creditor relying on an indemnification provision in its contract with the debtor PREPA, failed to show that the Title III court’s order placed it on unequal footing compared to other creditors of PREPA. The court found that the risk of holding a claim against a debtor with limited resources is inherent to all creditors and does not constitute the specific type of injury the stay protects against. Furthermore, the court determined that LUMA’s alleged injuries—such as exposure to litigation or the potential loss of liability waivers—did not flow directly from the Title III court’s order permitting the state lawsuit to proceed; rather, those harms were contingent on the separate constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. Consequently, because LUMA lacked standing to invoke the appellate jurisdiction, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal and terminated the proceedings without addressing the merits of whether the automatic stay should have applied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 2:24-CR-00228-TS-CMR-1)

The tenth-circuit affirmed Gabriel Gigena’s conviction for assaulting a federal officer and his sentence of fifteen months’ imprisonment. The court applied de novo review to jurisdictional and sufficiency-of-evidence claims, plain error review to unpreserved procedural claims, and abuse of discretion review to the sentencing determination. Regarding the conviction, the court held that the government presented sufficient evidence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and 1114 that Officer Piekarczyk was a federal officer because he was deputized by the United States Marshals Service as part of a task force. The court further ruled that the government was not required to present evidence to rebut defenses, such as self-defense or excessive force, which Gigena did not raise at trial. Claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct, *Brady* violations, and speedy trial delays failed under plain error review because Gigena did not identify specific misconduct, material exculpatory evidence, or presumptively prejudicial delay. The court also rejected Gigena’s argument that tribal immunity deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and found no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to disqualify the trial judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144 due to a lack of sufficient affidavit and procedural compliance. Regarding the sentence, the court affirmed the below-guidelines term, noting that such sentences are presumptively reasonable. The court rejected Gigena’s challenge to his criminal history calculation, holding that he failed to meet his affirmative duty under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(2)(B) to show the Presentence Investigation Report was unreliable. Additionally, the court found no substantive unreasonableness in the sentence, as the district court properly considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court also directed that Gigena’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be brought in collateral proceedings rather than on direct appeal. All pending motions were denied as meritless.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 9:21-cr-80113-DMM-1

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Thomas James Sheely, Jr.’s sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court held that the district court properly enhanced Sheely’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) based on his prior Florida felony battery conviction, finding it qualified as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines’ elements clause. The court applied the standard of review de novo for the interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Relying on the binding precedent established in *United States v. Vail-Bailon*, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), the panel concluded that Florida felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041 requires an intentional use of physical force capable of causing pain or injury, thereby satisfying the elements clause definition. The court rejected Sheely’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in *Borden v. United States*, 593 U.S. 420 (2021), abrogated *Vail-Bailon*. The court reasoned that *Borden* was a plurality opinion establishing only that offenses requiring a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under the elements clause, and it did not address or contradict the specific holding in *Vail-Bailon* regarding intentional conduct. Because *Borden* was not clearly on point and contrary to *Vail-Bailon*, nor did it “demolish” the fundamental props of that precedent, the panel remained bound by *Vail-Bailon*. As a result of this affirmation, Sheely’s sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release stands as imposed by the district court following remand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 1:24-cr-00090-KD-B-1

The eleventh-circuit granted the Government’s motion to dismiss Timothy Allen Arthur’s appeal based on an appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement. The court applied the standard that such waivers are enforced if made knowingly and voluntarily, provided it was clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances. The court further noted that these waivers can only be set aside due to a miscarriage of justice if the sentence is marred by egregious error bringing the judicial system into disrepute. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the district court’s judgment stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 5:21-cr-00033-JA-PRL-5

The eleventh-circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation of the appellant pursuant to *Anders v. California* and affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellant’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Following an independent review of the entire record, the court determined that counsel’s assessment regarding the lack of merit in the appeal was correct, as no arguable issues were identified. Consequently, the district court’s original order denying the sentence reduction remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 5:12-CR-00297-R-13)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Bani Moreno’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis, thereby denying relief. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to review the denial, evaluating whether Moreno satisfied the three requirements for issuing such a writ: (1) that he could not have obtained relief through other remedies; (2) that absent relief, he would suffer an extraordinary injury constituting a miscarriage of justice; and (3) that he acted diligently in seeking the writ. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Moreno failed to satisfy the diligence and miscarriage-of-justice requirements. Regarding diligence, the court found Moreno’s explanation for waiting over two years after obtaining a critical affidavit from a government witness insufficient to justify the delay, noting that his prior post-conviction motions were unrelated to this specific claim. Regarding the miscarriage of justice standard, the court agreed with the district court’s assessment that even assuming the allegations in the new affidavit were true, the evidence of Moreno’s guilt presented at trial was overwhelming, meaning any potential error did not undermine public confidence in the judiciary or result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Additionally, the court rejected Moreno’s arguments that the district court violated his due process rights by denying leave to file a reply brief and violated his right of access to the courts by imposing filing restrictions. The appellate panel found that reply briefs are not constitutionally required and that the district court’s restrictions on Moreno’s ability to file pro se motions were a permissible response to his history of frivolous pleadings, as they allowed him to proceed with future filings if represented by counsel or granted leave to proceed pro se. Consequently, the judgment denying the petition and upholding the filing restrictions remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 5:25-cv-00145-TES-CHW

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely. The court determined that, absent a declaration or notarized statement regarding when the notice was mailed to prison officials, the earliest possible filing date under the prison mailbox rule was January 6, 2026. This date exceeded the 30-day deadline mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) for civil cases following the November 26, 2025 judgment. The court applied the strict compliance standard required for prisoners to invoke the prison mailbox rule under Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1), citing *Daniels v. United States*, and reaffirmed that timely filing is a jurisdictional requirement under *Green v. Drug Enf’t Admin*. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and all pending motions were denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 0:24-cr-60196-DSL-1

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Kyle Kerian Maharaj’s motion to dismiss his criminal indictment for unlawful reentry of a removed alien under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The court held that Maharaj failed to satisfy the requirements for a collateral attack on his underlying deportation order under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), specifically failing to demonstrate that his deportation proceedings deprived him of judicial review or were fundamentally unfair. The court applied the three-prong test established in *United States v. Zelaya* and codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1)–(3), which requires a defendant to show: (1) exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) deprivation of judicial review due to improper proceedings; and (3) fundamental unfairness in the entry of the order. The court focused on the second and third prongs, rejecting Maharaj’s argument that his prior Florida robbery conviction did not qualify as an “aggravated felony” because he was sentenced to two years of “community control” rather than a term of imprisonment of at least one year. Relying on the statutory definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B), which defines a “term of imprisonment” to include any period of “incarceration or confinement,” and citing its prior decision in *Herrera v. United States Attorney General*, the court ruled that Florida community control constitutes a form of confinement equivalent to house arrest. The court determined that Maharaj’s two-year sentence of intensive, supervised custody restricted his freedom within the community and home, thereby satisfying the “term of imprisonment” requirement for an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Consequently, the deportation order was not fundamentally unfair, and the deprivation of judicial review prong was not met. The practical consequence is that Maharaj’s conviction for unlawful reentry stands, his motion to dismiss the indictment remains denied, and he must proceed with his criminal case without the ability to collaterally attack the validity of his prior deportation order based on the classification of his Florida conviction.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

Docket: 1:24-cr-00181-TFM-MU-1

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that a valid sentence-appeal waiver bars Eduardo Palomeque’s claim challenging the substantive reasonableness of his 135-month sentence. The court applied the standard that appeal waivers are enforceable if made knowingly and voluntarily, noting that the district court specifically questioned Palomeque about the waiver during the plea colloquy and he entered it voluntarily. The court ruled that a district judge’s erroneous statement at sentencing advising a defendant of their right to appeal does not negate an otherwise valid waiver, even if the government fails to object to that statement. This conclusion is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hunter v. United States*, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026), which forecloses the argument that such comments alter a plea agreement. Consequently, Palomeque’s challenge to his sentence is barred, and the appeal is dismissed without reaching the merits of his sentencing claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-13

The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DSM Biomedical, Inc., dismissing Gersen Gabriel’s Title VII claims for racial discrimination and retaliation. The court held that Gabriel failed to establish a prima facie case for either claim because he could not demonstrate that the alleged adverse actions harmed an identifiable term or condition of his employment, nor could he provide evidence that those actions were motivated by race. Regarding the discrimination claim, the court applied the standard requiring a plaintiff to show harm to an identifiable employment term, citing *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). The opinion clarified that Title VII does not ban stressful workplaces or difficult bosses; mere emotional harm and pressure do not constitute an adverse action unless they rise to the level of a hostile work environment or constructive discharge. The court found that the extra safety audits, Gabriel’s placement on a list of sites needing improvement, and the abrasive conduct of the Head of Safety were insufficient to meet the “severe or pervasive” standard required for a hostile work environment claim under *Castleberry v. STI Grp.*, 863 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2017). Furthermore, the court found no evidence that these actions were racially motivated, noting that the audits were routine or ordered by the CEO and that the Head of Safety’s rudeness was not shown to be based on race. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court applied the burden-shifting framework under *Lynn v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon*, 180 F.4th 133 (3d Cir. 2026). Although the court assumed Gabriel’s paid suspension following his EEOC charge could constitute an adverse action, it held that DSM Biomedical provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the suspension: Gabriel’s text messages to an employee group chat containing links to a song and video that were reasonably perceived as threats of violence. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could disbelieve this explanation or find that retaliation was more likely than not the motivating factor. As a practical consequence, the judgment for the employer stands, meaning Gabriel’s lawsuit is dismissed without a trial, and he receives no relief under Title VII.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.