Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The eighth-circuit denied the petition for review filed by Astrid Lucero Matias-Pablo and her minor son seeking asylum, statutory withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ factual findings, requiring the petitioners to demonstrate that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion but compels it. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court held that Matias-Pablo failed to establish the required nexus between her persecution and her membership in the proposed particular social groups of “Guatemalan females” or “Guatemalan females without protection.” The court reasoned that while domestic violence can qualify for asylum if motivated by a protected ground, the record demonstrated that her abuser was a generally violent individual whose actions were driven by substance abuse, jealousy, and paranoia rather than her status as a Guatemalan female. Consequently, the court found that her membership in the proposed social groups was merely incidental or tangential to the persecution, failing to meet the “one central reason” test required under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Regarding the CAT claim, the court denied relief because Matias-Pablo failed to show that it is more likely than not she would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government if removed. The court noted that while there was evidence of domestic violence in Guatemala, the record also showed significant government efforts to combat such violence, including specialized courts and victim service centers, which established that the government did not acquiesce in torture. The practical consequence is that the petition for review is denied, and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the final removal against Matias-Pablo and her son remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The seventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) but reversed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the merits of their claims for lifetime retiree healthcare benefits. Regarding class certification, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding commonality and typicality under Rules 23(a)(2) and 23(a)(3). The court reasoned that although the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) were silent regarding the duration of retiree healthcare benefits, the plaintiffs proffered common objective evidence—specifically testimony from Alcoa’s lead labor negotiator stating he believed the company could not unilaterally alter benefits for pre-1993 retirees and the company’s historical conduct—to demonstrate a latent ambiguity sufficient to rebut the presumption against vesting. The court further determined that Rule 23(b)(2) was appropriate because the primary relief sought was declaratory and injunctive, with any monetary damages being incidental to the determination of the class-wide contractual rights. Regarding the summary judgment ruling, the court reversed based on its application of the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel. The district court had granted summary judgment by estopping Alcoa from denying vested lifetime benefits because statements made by the company in prior litigation (*Curtis v. Alcoa, Inc.*) appeared to contradict its current position. The appellate court found that the prior statements were not clearly inconsistent with Alcoa’s present stance. The court noted that *Curtis* concerned post-1993 retirees subject to a benefit cap, whereas this case involves pre-1993 retirees; Alcoa’s references to “lifetime” benefits in *Curtis* were conditional or specific to the capped group and did not constitute an unambiguous admission regarding the uncapped rights of the pre-1993 class. Consequently, the court held that judicial estoppel did not apply and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, leaving it to the district court’s discretion to determine whether to conduct a new summary judgment analysis or proceed to trial.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Irma Herrera’s medical malpractice claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court held that the saving provision of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5), does not apply to cases involving federally funded health clinics removed to federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c). Relying on its recent precedent in *Evans v. United States*, 132 F.4th 473 (7th Cir. 2025), the panel declined to overrule that decision, citing the doctrine of stare decisis and finding no compelling reason to depart from established circuit law. The court clarified that for plaintiffs suing at clinics deemed employees of the Public Health Service, the exclusive remedy lies against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to removal cannot be cured by the Westfall Act’s saving provision in this specific statutory context. Consequently, Herrera’s suit was dismissed, leaving her without a judicial remedy for her alleged injuries.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that the American Freedom Law Center lacked Article III standing to pursue its First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court applied the three-element test for standing established in *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife* and *FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine*: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The court concluded that American Freedom failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury in fact traceable to the defendants’ actions. Regarding reputational harm, the court found no evidence that the defendants’ 2019 press release caused incremental harm beyond the existing Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) designation, as the release did not name the law firm and merely cited the SPLC’s report as a source for a general trend. Furthermore, the court noted that the state removed the press release from its website and disavowed any intent to collaborate with the SPLC or use its list for investigations, rendering any past reputational harm non-imminent and speculative for future relief. Regarding economic injury, the court found no evidence that donor contributions decreased specifically due to the defendants’ actions; alleged losses were either caused by the SPLC’s prior designations (such as the AmazonSmile denial) or lacked a causal link to the press release. Finally, the court rejected the diversion-of-resources theory, ruling it was forfeited on appeal and substantively insufficient because it relied on conclusory allegations of future expenditures without concrete details linking those costs to a specific, imminent injury caused by the defendants. As a practical consequence, the judgment in favor of the Michigan Attorney General and the Director of the Department of Civil Rights is upheld, and the law firm’s lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief is dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The sixth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Roy West’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from his § 2255 judgment, thereby denying habeas relief. The court held that even if the prior judgment were vacated, West’s underlying *Apprendi* claim regarding an uncharged “death results” sentencing enhancement would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The court applied the standard that Rule 60(b)(6) relief is appropriate only in exceptional circumstances and requires the underlying claim to be potentially meritorious and reviewable. The court reasoned that because West failed to raise the *Apprendi* issue on direct appeal or in his initial § 2255 motion, the claim was procedurally defaulted. To overcome this default, West would need to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence. The court found he could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel because an *Apprendi* error is subject to harmless error review, and the evidence linking West to the death of the victim was overwhelming; thus, he could not show a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted had the jury been properly instructed. Regarding the statute of limitations, the court rejected West’s arguments for tolling or relation back. It found no equitable tolling because West was not diligent in pursuing his rights during the seven-and-a-half years following the expiration of the limitation period, and attorney negligence does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. The court also ruled that the claim did not relate back to his 2014 motion because the core operative facts differed: the prior claim concerned ineffective assistance regarding the medical cause of death, while the current claim concerns the jury instructions and sentencing elements. Furthermore, the court found no fraud on the court or fraudulent concealment by the government, as there was no evidence of intentional misrepresentation or reckless disregard for the truth. Finally, West failed to establish actual innocence, as the new evidence (a polygraph report regarding a co-defendant’s witness) did not show it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Consequently, reopening the judgment would be an empty exercise because any new § 2255 petition would be time-barred.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit granted the consolidated petitions for review and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because the BIA abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal proceedings based on a finding that he was competent. The court applied the standard that an immigration judge must take measures to determine competency when there are indicia of incompetence, defined as having a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, the ability to consult with counsel, and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence. The court found such indicia in the record, noting that the petitioner was permanently blind due to a 2015 shooting, appeared pro se, struggled to recall basic facts, and explicitly informed the judge he was missing information and having trouble, yet the immigration judge failed to conduct any further inquiry. Consequently, the case is remanded so that the immigration judge may take measures to determine whether the petitioner was competent to participate in his removal proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 2:04-

The ninth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Andrew Lamont Brown’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, rejecting his challenges to his California conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder. The panel applied the deferential standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which requires finding that a state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of facts. Regarding Brown’s certified claims, the court held that the California Supreme Court reasonably determined trial counsel’s performance at the penalty phase was not deficient under *Strickland v. Washington*. The panel found that counsel conducted a reasonable investigation into Brown’s history of drug and alcohol abuse, mental health conditions, family abuse, poverty, and neighborhood environment, and made strategic choices regarding how to present this mitigation evidence to avoid prejudicing the jury. Additionally, the court held that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call specific rebuttal witnesses regarding uncharged acts or for failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing arguments describing Brown as a “sociopath.” The panel further affirmed that the state court did not unreasonably determine Brown was competent to stand trial and reasonably concluded Brown failed to make a prima facie showing of intellectual disability under California statutory standards, noting his IQ scores fell within the borderline range and lacked evidence of significant adaptive deficits. The court also declined to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) to include three uncertified claims: ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, a *Batson* claim regarding the exclusion of a Black juror, and a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim. The panel concluded that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court’s resolution of these issues, as Brown failed to demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right for any of them. As a practical consequence, the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief is affirmed, and Brown remains subject to his death sentence. No further federal appellate review on the merits of the certified or uncertified claims is available under this opinion.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order affirming an immigration judge’s denial of Mahamat Ibrahim Khalid’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied a substantial evidence standard to the agency’s factual findings and de novo review to questions of law. The court held that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding regarding Khalid’s use of fraudulent documents and misrepresentations. Specifically, the panel found that Khalid’s lies did not fall within the narrow *Akinmade* exception because he continued to present false information after reaching safety in the United States, such as during visa interviews where he falsely claimed business travel purposes and upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. The court further determined that Khalid’s actions, including leaving the United States for Canada shortly after arrival rather than seeking asylum immediately, contradicted his claim of fleeing persecution. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the agency’s conclusion that Khalid’s declarations were insufficient to corroborate his testimony because he personally translated them into English following his participation in document fraud. Regarding the CAT claim, the court ruled that the adverse credibility determination undermined Khalid’s testimony and documentary evidence. While acknowledging country conditions reports regarding politically motivated disappearances and incommunicado detention in Chad, the court held that this evidence did not compel a conclusion that Khalid faced a particularized risk of torture if removed. Consequently, the petition was denied, and the motion to stay removal was also denied.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit granted the petitions for review and remanded the consolidated cases to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because the BIA abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal proceedings based on a finding that he was competent. The court applied the standard that an immigration judge must take measures to determine whether a petitioner is competent when there are indicia of incompetency, defined as having a rational and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, the ability to consult with counsel, and a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence. The court found that the record contained clear indicia of incompetence, noting that the petitioner was permanently blind due to being shot in the face and had explicitly informed the immigration judge of his blindness and memory difficulties during pro se proceedings, yet the judge failed to conduct any further inquiry. Consequently, the case is remanded so that the immigration judge may take measures to determine whether the petitioner was competent to participate in the removal proceedings.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an Immigration Judge’s dismissal of Jose Raymundo Cordova Velasco’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court applied a substantial evidence standard to factual findings and de novo review to legal questions. Regarding asylum and withholding of removal, the court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s conclusion that Cordova Velasco failed to establish the required nexus between his past persecution and membership in his proposed particular social group, “Salvadoran land-owning family.” The agency reasonably determined that the three incidents of violence he alleged—robbery attempts in 2011, a beating by a man dressed as a police officer in 2014, and being shot at while refusing to join armed men in 2014—were motivated by ordinary criminality or random recruitment efforts rather than his family status. The court noted that the petitioner’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft bears no nexus to a protected ground. Additionally, the court precluded review of a new social group claim regarding “family of a Salvadoran individual who opposed gang norms” because Cordova Velasco failed to exhaust this argument before the agency. Regarding CAT relief, the court found substantial evidence supporting the denial of relief because Cordova Velasco failed to demonstrate that he would more likely than not be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of a public official upon removal. The court reasoned that isolated incidents, such as seeing the police officer who beat him at a gas station, did not constitute torture under CAT definitions. Furthermore, while country condition reports acknowledged human rights violations in El Salvador, they did not indicate that Cordova Velasco faced a particular threat of torture beyond what any other citizen would endure. The practical consequence is that the petition for review is denied, and the BIA’s order affirming the dismissal of his immigration relief applications remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.