Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 1:24-CR-00027-TS-1)

The Tenth Circuit granted the government’s motion to enforce an appeal waiver contained in a plea agreement and dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The court applied the three-part standard established in *United States v. Hahn*, evaluating whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights, and whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Because the defendant, through counsel, conceded that all three prongs were satisfied, the court enforced the waiver and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the underlying conviction or sentence.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 2:21-cv-00122-

The ninth-circuit denied petitions for panel rehearing and/or rehearing en banc regarding a challenge to the denial of a preliminary injunction that sought to block a land exchange mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. The court’s decision was based on its binding precedent established in *Apache Stronghold v. United States*, 101 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc), which held that the disposition of government real property generally does not impose a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., absent specific exceptions such as coercion or discrimination. Consequently, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of relief because the proposed mining project at Oak Flat, while destroying a site sacred to the Western Apache, fell within this categorical exception for government land dispositions. The practical consequence is that the petitions for further review were rejected, leaving the district court’s order denying the injunction in place and allowing the land exchange and subsequent mining project to proceed unless stayed by a higher court or altered by legislation.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 1:94-CR-00152-WJM-1)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a six-month prison sentence and one year of supervised release following the revocation of Darrel Bailey’s supervised release for failing to register as a sex offender. The court held that Bailey failed to demonstrate the sentence was substantively unreasonable under an abuse of discretion standard. Applying the legal test from *United States v. Carter* and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the panel determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or manifestly unreasonable in balancing the sentencing factors. The appellate court noted that the district court expressly considered Bailey’s arguments regarding his age, mental health, and low risk of recidivism, while also weighing his unrepentant refusal to comply with registration laws as an aggravating factor. Because the sentence was well below the applicable Guidelines range, it was presumed reasonable, and Bailey offered no specific evidence to rebut this presumption or justify a lower variance beyond a request for the appellate court to re-balance the factors de novo. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and Bailey must serve the imposed term.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 5:26-CV-04006-TC-ADM)

The tenth-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The court applied an abuse of discretion standard, reviewing whether the district court’s ruling was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. The appellate panel determined that the district court correctly applied the rule that a Rule 60(b) motion is not a vehicle to advance new arguments or facts that were available at the time of the original judgment. Because Ms. Lawson’s motion sought to file an amended complaint to address deficiencies in her original filing rather than presenting exceptional circumstances justifying relief from the final judgment, the court found no abuse of discretion in the denial. Consequently, the district court’s order denying the motion remains in effect, and the underlying dismissal of the civil rights action stands.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

The Tenth Circuit denied Donovan Mercer’s application for a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismissed the matter. To obtain a COA to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a federal prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution or that the issues are adequate to deserve further proceedings. The court held that Mercer failed to meet this standard because he did not show extraordinary circumstances justifying his failure to file the Rule 60(b)(6) motion within one year of the judgment, and a six-year delay was deemed unreasonable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Additionally, the court found no basis for disagreement with the district court’s conclusion that the presiding judge had properly analyzed prejudice before applying procedural bars to Mercer’s claims. Consequently, relief was denied, and the appeal is barred from proceeding.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Pueblo County and the AFSCME unions, dismissing Patricia Hernandez’s claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as her claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. The court applied de novo review and utilized the *McDonnell Douglas* burden-shifting framework to evaluate the ADA claims. Under this standard, the court found that Hernandez failed to establish a prima facie case because she could not provide evidence that the decision-makers responsible for denying her 2022 reinstatement or selecting another candidate for a 2023 position were aware of her disability or her prior protected activity regarding discrimination. The court rejected Hernandez’s argument that knowledge of her disability should be imputed to the employer, noting that the specific hiring panel did not know of her condition or previous lawsuit, and that her cited authority (*Schneider*) concerned § 1983 liability rather than ADA claims. Additionally, the court found no causal connection between her 2019 protected activity and the adverse employment actions due to the four-year temporal gap and lack of evidence regarding the decision-makers’ knowledge. Regarding the union, the court held that Hernandez offered only conjecture to support her claim that the union’s refusal to represent her was motivated by disability discrimination, which is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Consequently, the judgment against Hernandez stands, and she receives no relief.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 5:22-cr-00017-GAP-PRL-1

The eleventh-circuit granted the government’s motion for summary affirmance, upholding the district court’s denial of Jorge Mojocoa’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court applied a de novo standard to review eligibility and an abuse of discretion standard to the denial of the motion. The panel determined that Mojocoa failed to meet his burden of establishing an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for release, specifically failing to provide sufficient evidence that his wife was incapacitated as required by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3). The court noted that Mojocoa’s submission of a list of physician contact information, rather than updated medical records, was insufficient to prove incapacity, particularly after he admitted in his renewed motion that HIPAA restrictions prevented him from obtaining further documentation. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion without first allowing Mojocoa to supplement the record, nor did it err by failing to analyze the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, as a finding of ineligibility on the threshold “extraordinary and compelling” requirement precludes further analysis. The practical consequence is that Mojocoa’s sentence remains unchanged; however, because the district court denied his motion without prejudice, he retains the ability to file a new motion if he obtains the necessary medical evidence in the future.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 1:25-cv-02035-TRJ

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Leon Benjamin’s civil rights complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred by dismissing the entire complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine without conducting a claim-by-claim analysis to determine whether each individual claim required federal review and rejection of a state-court judgment. The court applied the standard of de novo review for subject matter jurisdiction conclusions and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in *T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp.* (2026), which clarified that Rooker-Feldman bars federal jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced, regardless of whether those judgments are final or pending appeal. However, citing *Behr v. Campbell*, 8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that Rooker-Feldman applies only if the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state-court judgment itself and requires a specific inquiry into whether resolution of each claim necessitates overturning that judgment. The court found that Benjamin’s complaint included requests for damages and prospective injunctive relief barring future proceedings, which do not inherently require the modification or rejection of prior state-court orders. Consequently, the district court was required to analyze each of the 13 claims individually rather than dismissing the case as a whole based on a general challenge to state-court orders. The practical consequence is that the case returns to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The lower court must now re-evaluate Benjamin’s specific claims to determine which, if any, are barred by Rooker-Feldman and which may proceed, while also considering alternative defenses such as immunity or other preclusion doctrines that were not addressed in the initial dismissal.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 6:18-cr-00078-CEM-UAM-1

The eleventh circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to a state sentence, followed by two years of supervised release, imposed upon revocation of supervised release. The court applied an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing claims of procedural error and substantive reasonableness. Regarding the procedural claim, the court held that the district court did not commit plain error in failing to adequately explain its sentence because the court explicitly stated it considered the advisory guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and the parties’ arguments, while also providing a reasoned basis for the consecutive term by noting the defendant’s escalation from drug user to dealer and the lethality of the drugs involved. Regarding the substantive claim, the court found the sentence reasonable because the district court acknowledged the mitigation evidence through its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and parties’ arguments, and the imposed sentence fell within the advisory guidelines range and below the statutory maximum. As a result, the defendant’s conviction and sentence remain in effect.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-09-29

Docket: 1:26-cv-04400-SDG

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that remand orders based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction are unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d), citing *New v. Sports & Recreation, Inc.* and *Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust*. Additionally, the court determined the order was not otherwise reviewable because the defendant’s notice of removal did not properly invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443, as required by *BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore*. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without consideration of the merits, leaving the district court’s order remanding the dispossessory action to state court in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.