A building owned by 3371 Reading burned down during renovations. The insurer, Ohio Casualty, denied the claim because the insured had not erected a fence around the construction site as required by the policy’s Protective Devices Endorsement. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurers on all claims, including breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent inducement, and a violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The court applied Ohio law to interpret the insurance policy, noting that provisions must be construed in favor of the insured if ambiguous but applied as written if unambiguous. The court found that while the policy required a fence that completely surrounds the jobsite, the physical layout of the property made compliance impossible because the building shared a wall with a neighbor. The court held that the fencing provision was illusory and unenforceable under Ohio law because performance was impossible. The court rejected the dissent’s argument that a three-sided fence would suffice, stating the policy required a complete enclosure. The court also affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of bad faith and fraud claims, noting that negligence in drafting the policy does not constitute fraud and that the ODTPA does not apply to consumer fraud claims in this context.

We are simply assuming that there is and then holding that it is unenforceable because performance was impossible.

3371 Reading, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., No. 25-3439, at 6 (6th Cir. 2026)

The doctrine of impossibility of performance applies only where an interceding, unforeseen event renders performance impossible.

Paul G. Readler

Insurers in the Sixth Circuit must now recognize that fencing requirements in insurance policies may be unenforceable if the physical layout of the property makes complete enclosure impossible, even if the policy language appears clear.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The fifth-circuit dismissed the petition for review in part for lack of jurisdiction and denied it in part regarding Johanna Briseyda Vasquez Bonilla’s motion to reopen her removal proceedings. The court applied a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision. Regarding the claim that she lacked notice of her in absentia hearing, the court held the argument was waived because the petitioner failed to brief it, citing *Yohey v. Collins*. On the claim involving changed country conditions in El Salvador, the court declined to consider evidence outside the administrative record pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) and found the petitioner failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions as required by *Garcia v. Garland* and *Nunez v. Sessions*. Furthermore, the court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte regulatory reopening due to its entirely discretionary nature under *Garcia-Gonzalez v. Garland*. As a result, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction regarding the sua sponte claim and denied on the merits for the other claims.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 1:24-cv-04098-SEG

The eleventh-circuit dismissed the appeal sua sponte as moot because the district court subsequently granted the appellant’s motion for reconsideration, vacated the original dismissal order, and reopened the case. The court applied the doctrine that federal courts lack authority to adjudicate moot controversies, citing *Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t* and *Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections*, which establish that an appeal becomes moot when the underlying order being challenged is vacated and the case is reinstated. As a result, the appeal was terminated without a decision on the merits, and all pending motions were denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 1:24-cv-23477-BB

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Isabel del Pino Allen’s amended complaint with prejudice and its denial of her motion for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff’s pleadings constituted impermissible “shotgun pleadings” because they failed to provide the defendant with fair notice of the specific claims asserted or the factual grounds supporting them. The court applied the standard of review for abuse of discretion, requiring affirmation unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal standard. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b), a complaint must contain a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief with claims set forth in numbered paragraphs limited to a single set of circumstances. The appellate court found that Allen’s amended complaint, while containing numbered paragraphs, failed to separate distinct causes of action into separate counts or clearly link factual allegations to specific legal theories. Instead, the filing contained loose references to Florida statutes and contradictory statements regarding her intent to assert a bad faith claim, rendering it impossible to discern which facts supported which claims. The court further reasoned that allowing further amendment would be futile because Allen had already been given an opportunity to correct these deficiencies and had explicitly stated she did not intend to pursue the only viable cause of action (bad faith) while attempting to relitigate claims previously rejected in prior suits against the same defendant. Additionally, the district court properly considered documents outside the four corners of the complaint, such as previous judicial records and GEICO’s motions, to conclude that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the court’s inherent authority to control its docket. The denial of the Rule 59(e) motion was upheld because Allen failed to present newly discovered evidence or demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact, instead attempting to relitigate issues already resolved. As a practical consequence, the dismissal stands with prejudice, meaning the case is closed and Allen cannot refile the same claims in federal court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Charlotte and three law enforcement officers on claims alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and failure to accommodate a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court held that the officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because, from the perspective of an officer on the scene, Bobby Morgan posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm by repeatedly drawing and discharging a firearm in a residential neighborhood while defying commands to stand down. The court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test under *Graham v. Connor*, emphasizing that the suspect’s gun appeared functional and sounded like a real weapon, rendering the officers’ belief that it could fire lethal bullets reasonable even though it was actually a prop gun firing only blanks. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the officers failed to deescalate or accommodate Morgan’s mental illness, ruling that exigent circumstances arising from active gunfire justified the use of force and that the ADA requires reasonableness rather than perfection, particularly when time is of the essence. Consequently, the City of Charlotte bears no liability for the officers’ actions, and the judgment in favor of the defendants remains in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 3:23-cr-00153-WWB-LLL-1

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the 51-month sentence imposed on Nicole Danielle Devilbiss for conspiracy to create and distribute animal crush videos in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 48(a)(2) & (3). The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error by applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for Devilbiss’s role as an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, nor did it err in denying her a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1. The court applied clear error review to the district court’s factual findings regarding Devilbiss’s leadership status, concluding that her exercise of authority to remove members, moderate content, and control access to the Telegram group constituted sufficient “control and authority exercised over others” under the relevant sentencing factors, even if she was not the sole leader. Regarding substantive reasonableness, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found the sentence reasonable because it fell within the correctly calculated advisory guidelines range. The court rejected Devilbiss’s arguments that the district court improperly relied on a public petition expressing public outrage or failed to give sufficient weight to her mitigating circumstances, noting that the district court explicitly stated the petition would not be the basis for its decision and that sentencing judges have discretion to weigh factors differently based on the nature and circumstances of the offense. Consequently, Devilbiss’s conviction and sentence remain in effect, and she must serve the 51-month term of imprisonment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendant Arvinder Kakar on plaintiff Knockout Holdings’ defamation and declaratory judgment claims. The court first addressed a jurisdictional issue raised during oral argument, remanding the case to determine if complete diversity of citizenship existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 at the time the complaint was filed. Upon receiving the district court’s ruling that diversity existed because Kakar and a former member were Maryland citizens while no Knockout members were, the appellate court reviewed this finding for clear error and legal conclusion de novo, ultimately agreeing that complete diversity was present and affirming the jurisdictional ruling. Regarding the merits, the court applied a de novo standard of review to the summary judgment award, evaluating whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact and if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court rejected Knockout’s argument that Kakar’s statements to an IBM employee were defamatory, holding that the statements were protected opinions under the First Amendment because they expressed Kakar’s subjective views regarding ongoing state litigation and his business relationship with Knockout, rather than asserting verifiable facts. Additionally, the court reviewed the district court’s refusal to grant declaratory relief for abuse of discretion, concluding that no reversible error occurred because the underlying defamation claims were not actionable, thereby eliminating the controversy of sufficient immediacy required under the Declaratory Judgment Act. As a practical consequence, the judgment in favor of Kakar stands, Knockout Holdings’ appeal is dismissed, and the case is closed with no further proceedings in federal court.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 2:25-CV-00211-JNP)

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Lynda Kozlowicz-Gardner’s suit against Ute Tribal Council Members for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court applied a de novo standard of review and held that sovereign immunity bars the action because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the tribe or its officials waived immunity or that an exception, such as the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, applies. Additionally, the court determined that neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction exists; the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act does not provide a private cause of action for the alleged misuse of funds, and Native American tribes are not citizens of any state for diversity purposes. As a practical consequence, the appeal is dismissed with no further relief granted to the appellant, leaving the district court’s dismissal order in effect.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

Docket: 3:08-cr-00195-HES-PDB-2

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Jabari Hird’s motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court applied a three-part test requiring that (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction, (2) the reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13), and (3) the sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary under the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court reviewed eligibility de novo and the denial of the motion for abuse of discretion, noting that if any one of the three conditions is not satisfied, relief may be denied. The court held that Hird failed to establish an abuse of discretion regarding the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. The record indicated the district court considered a number of relevant factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, Hird’s history of recidivism, and available sentencing options, by incorporating an extensive analysis from a prior order. The appellate court emphasized that the weight given to mitigating evidence is within the district court’s sound discretion and that a district court need not address every statutory factor or all mitigating evidence so long as it acknowledges consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments. Consequently, because the district court properly applied the § 3553(a) analysis, the court affirmed the denial without addressing Hird’s alternative arguments regarding extraordinary and compelling reasons or danger to the community. The practical consequence is that Hird’s sentence remains unchanged.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-06-29

The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in part. The court held that while it has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review purely legal questions regarding a magistrate judge’s denial of qualified immunity, it lacks authority to reweigh record evidence or resolve factual disputes. Because Officer Devine’s arguments challenging the objective reasonableness of his use of lethal force relied on a view of the facts contrary to the magistrate judge’s findings, the court dismissed those portions of the appeal. The court affirmed the remainder of the ruling, concluding that no reversible error existed regarding the purely legal questions presented, specifically that the officer’s conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Consequently, the case proceeds to trial on the Fourth Amendment seizure claim.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.