Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Earl Leroy Griffin, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence and vacated his conviction, holding that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause because it lacked a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug activity and the specific residence searched and contained facts that were too stale. The court applied the *Illinois v. Gates* totality-of-the-circumstances test, requiring a “substantial basis” for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause, which necessitates both a temporal connection (timing) and a factual link (nexus) between the evidence sought and the place to be searched. The court determined the affidavit was deficient because the only concrete allegation of drug activity inside the residence occurred thirteen years prior, rendering it stale, while recent observations described drug transactions in the general “Kent Bottom” area or involved individuals who did not clearly reside at or conduct business from the specific 6740 N. Solomons Island Road address. Furthermore, the court found that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known it failed to establish a fair probability that evidence would be found at the residence. Consequently, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, effectively barring the admission of the seized evidence and undermining the basis for the defendant’s conviction.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to make the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The court applied the standard that when a district court denies relief on procedural grounds, a prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. After independently reviewing the record, the court concluded that Herrington did not establish that Virginia law entitled him to additional earned sentence credit for time spent in jail prior to incarceration following a final order of conviction, citing Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-202.2(A) and *White v. Dotson*. Consequently, no certificate of appealability will issue, the appeal is dismissed, and Herrington’s motions to expedite and to request a certified question are denied as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Terrance Lamont Moore’s motions for reconsideration and compassionate release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider or in finding that Moore failed to establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for his release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the standard of review for abuse of discretion and relied on controlling precedent stating that Congress’s nonretroactive changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) do not render a prisoner eligible for compassionate release, nor does rehabilitation alone constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13(d). The court also denied Moore’s pro se motion for assignment of counsel on appeal and dismissed his motion for reassignment as moot. Consequently, the district court’s denial of relief remains in effect, and oral argument was dispensed with as unnecessary.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 1:24-CV-02524-PAB)

The Tenth Circuit denied Delano Medina’s application for a certificate of appealability (COA) and dismissed the matter. The court held that a COA is required to appeal the district court’s denial of Medina’s second motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as the motion effectively challenged the merits of his underlying § 2254 habeas petition. Under the standard established in *Slack v. McDaniel*, a COA may be issued only if reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. The court found Medina failed to meet this burden because he did not dispute the district court’s determination that his motion was untimely; rather, he argued only on the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding a plea offer. Citing *Banister v. Davis*, the court noted that Rule 59(e) motions must be filed within twenty-eight days and cannot be extended. Since Medina filed his second motion more than three months after judgment was entered, the court concluded no jurist of reason could debate the timeliness ruling. Consequently, relief was denied, and the appeal from the denial of the second Rule 59(e) motion was dismissed.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to noncitizen plaintiffs who alleged that the government lacked legal authority to arrest or remove them while they were pursuing provisional unlawful presence waivers under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e). The court held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on the current record because the regulatory framework governing provisional waivers does not operate as a statutory “shield” against removal, and the factual record is insufficient to support their alternative theory that the government used the waiver program as a “sword” to lure noncitizens for arrest. The court’s decision rests on two primary legal grounds. First, regarding the plaintiffs’ claim that the regulations prohibit enforcement during the waiver process, the court found that 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(2)(i) explicitly states that a pending or approved provisional waiver does not constitute a grant of lawful status or authorized stay, and the preamble to the 2013 Rule warned that filing an application does not protect against removal. The court further noted that intervening precedent in *Lovo v. Miller*, 107 F.4th 199 (4th Cir. 2024), established that USCIS has no legal obligation to adjudicate these applications, meaning plaintiffs have no protected liberty or property interest in access to the process sufficient to trigger Due Process protections against removal. Second, regarding the plaintiffs’ claim that the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and Due Process by using the waiver program as a “trap” to identify noncitizens for removal, the court ruled that the record, which was developed without any fact discovery, contained only allegations that noncitizens were arrested at USCIS interviews. The court concluded this sparse evidence did not demonstrate that the arrests were motivated by the plaintiffs’ pursuit of waivers rather than by a pre-existing decision to execute removal orders once the individuals could be located. As a practical consequence, the district court’s permanent injunction prohibiting the government from arresting or removing the plaintiffs is dissolved. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, allowing the parties to conduct discovery and develop a factual record sufficient to determine whether the government’s enforcement actions were motivated by an intent to target noncitizens seeking provisional waivers.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

Docket: 1:24-cv-00082-MW-ZCB

The eleventh-circuit affirmed the district court’s order upholding the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s decision denying Scott Cartlidge’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that the administrative law judge (ALJ) did not err in assessing Cartlidge’s residual functional capacity or in rejecting his subjective testimony regarding the intensity and limiting effects of his bipolar disorder. The court applied the “substantial evidence” standard of review, which requires affirming the Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if the evidence might also support a contrary result. Under this standard, the court cannot re-weigh evidence or make credibility determinations de novo. The court found that the ALJ complied with the five-step sequential evaluation framework and provided explicit and adequate reasons for not fully crediting Cartlidge’s testimony, specifically noting inconsistencies between his statements about missing work and the medical evidence showing ongoing treatment without symptoms severe enough to prevent all work. The court distinguished the appellant’s reliance on *Simon v. Commissioner*, clarifying that unlike in *Simon*, Cartlidge challenged the rejection of his own subjective testimony rather than a treating medical provider’s opinion, and the ALJ’s credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the court rejected Cartlidge’s argument that his lack of full-time employment for ten years automatically established disability, reiterating that the five-step framework, not a simple logic test based on work history, governs the evaluation. As a result of this affirmation, the Commissioner’s denial of benefits remains in effect, and Cartlidge is not entitled to receive disability insurance or supplemental security income benefits from the Social Security Administration.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The seventh-circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, holding that the police officers and private polygrapher are entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claims for unlawful detention, coerced confession, and destruction of evidence, and are entitled to absolute immunity regarding the fabrication of evidence claim. Regarding the Fourth Amendment unlawful detention claim, the court applied the “arguable probable cause” standard, determining that officers are protected if a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed based on the totality of circumstances. The court found that undisputed facts—including the discovery of a nightstick at the crime scene, witness testimony placing the plaintiff with the weapon, and reports from a news reporter and foster mother linking the plaintiff to the murders—provided arguable probable cause for the detention, thereby barring liability. On the Fourteenth Amendment claim regarding the destruction of evidence, the court applied the standard requiring proof that officers acted in bad faith and that the evidence had apparent exculpatory value at the time of destruction. The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to provide specific facts showing when the evidence was destroyed or that it was destroyed in bad faith. Furthermore, the court found that no clearly established law existed prior to 1984 (the date of *California v. Trombetta*) imposing a duty on officers to preserve such evidence for potential future DNA testing, as officers could not reasonably be expected to anticipate scientific advances decades later. Regarding the Fifth Amendment coerced confession claim, the court applied the “clearly established law” standard to determine if the officers’ interrogation tactics were obviously unconstitutional at the time they occurred in 1977. The court concluded that while the plaintiff’s treatment was not textbook by modern standards, it was not so egregious that no reasonable officer could have believed the conduct was lawful. The court distinguished the plaintiff’s case from controlling precedents like *Haley v. Ohio* and *Gallegos v. Colorado*, noting that the plaintiff received Miranda warnings, met with his father and probation officer, and confessed after a shorter duration than the minors in those cases. Consequently, the officers were not on notice that their specific conduct was beyond a doubt illegal. Finally, regarding the claim that officers fabricated evidence and testified to it, the court held that individuals are entitled to absolute immunity for trial testimony under *Briscoe v. LaHue*. The court reasoned that because the allegedly fabricated police reports were never introduced or used as evidence at the plaintiff’s criminal trials, they did not violate his right to a fair trial. Even if the officers’ testimony was consistent with fabricated reports, such testimony is protected by absolute immunity, and the plaintiff could not establish liability based on the reports alone since they were not admitted into evidence. The practical consequence of this ruling is that the civil rights lawsuit against the officers and polygrapher for these specific claims is dismissed at the summary judgment stage, preventing the case from proceeding to trial. The plaintiff’s appeal regarding these immunity defenses was resolved in favor of the defendants, effectively ending their liability exposure for the alleged constitutional violations described.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Quantrese Brazzell’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Regarding the motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of Brazzell’s vehicle, the court applied the inevitable discovery doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. The court held that even if the initial warrantless search was invalid, the contraband (pills and a rifle) would inevitably have been discovered during a subsequent inventory search conducted pursuant to Memphis Police Department policy before the vehicle was towed. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the inventory search was conducted for legitimate administrative purposes rather than as a ruse for investigation, noting that the failure to inform Brazzell of towing alternatives was harmless because no practical options existed at the scene. Regarding the admission of jail call recordings, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). The court concluded that any potential error in admitting statements where Brazzell alluded to a second firearm was harmless because the government presented overwhelming independent evidence of his guilt, including body camera footage showing the rifle and uncontested portions of the calls where he discussed the firearm he actually possessed. Consequently, the conviction and 150-month sentence stand.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of a proposed securities class action lawsuit alleging that Elanco Animal Health Inc. and its officers engaged in “channel stuffing” to deceive investors about underlying product demand. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to meet the heightened pleading standards required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Regarding claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5(b), the court applied the *Tellabs* standard, which requires plaintiffs to state facts giving rise to a “strong inference” of scienter that is cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent intent. While the court agreed with the Second Circuit that liability under Rule 10b-5(b) does not depend on whether the underlying conduct (channel stuffing) was inherently fraudulent, it concluded the complaint failed to allege scienter. The court determined that the strongest inference drawn from the allegations was that Elanco’s executives pursued a legal “move in” sales strategy with a realistic hope of success, rather than an intent to deceive. The court found that the plaintiffs’ reliance on anonymous confidential witnesses did not sufficiently overcome the competing inference of innocent business judgment, particularly given the lack of evidence that executives knew the strategy would fail or that inventory returns were unusually high. Regarding claims under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the court ruled that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for fraud applied, despite the plaintiffs’ attempt to frame the claims as negligence or strict liability. The court reasoned that because the complaint alleged a single, coordinated scheme to defraud investors across both Exchange Act and Securities Act theories, the “substance” of the allegations sounded in fraud. Consequently, the plaintiffs were required to plead the circumstances of the alleged fraud with particularity, which they failed to do. The court also affirmed the dismissal of claims under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, ruling that the regulation pertains to external market trends rather than internal sales strategies like channel stuffing. Finally, because the primary violations were not adequately pleaded, the court affirmed the dismissal of secondary liability claims against control persons under Section 15 of the Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. The practical consequence is that the plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint was deemed futile, and the lawsuit remains dismissed with prejudice.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-08-14

The Fourth Circuit vacated Zerion Marcos Franklin’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing because the district court committed procedural error by applying a two-level firearm enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) without making express factual findings linking the firearm to the offenses. The court held that the phrase “in connection with” in this guideline requires a determination that the weapon facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the offense, analogous to the standard applied under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). While the record showed the firearm was found in Franklin’s vehicle alongside stolen checks, the district court failed to evaluate whether the gun served a purpose such as protection or emboldenment rather than being present by accident or coincidence. Because the district court did not make these necessary findings and provided no reasoned explanation for why it would have imposed the same 48-month sentence under a correct Guidelines range, the error affected Franklin’s substantial rights and seriously impacted the fairness of judicial proceedings. Consequently, the case is remanded to the district court to conduct resentencing with proper factual findings regarding the applicability of the firearm enhancement.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.