In this episode, Jim talks about the habit of some deponents of qualifying their answers by using words like think, feel, believe, and presume. These words are known in academic and psychological circles as "linguistic hedges." They're common and harmless in social conversations. But in the unforgiving world of sworn testimony, they create a record suggesting witnesses don't know what they're talking about. Not only do hedges diminish the force of testimony, but they can render it entirely inadmissible. In the wrap-up, Jim provides specific practice strategies for impressing upon clients that the lax and incautious use of hedges can inflict grievous harm on their claims or defenses. He also explains how to train clients to avoid using hedges when testifying.

SHOW NOTES

Strategic Use Of (UN)certainty Expressions, Lorson, Cummins and Rohde, Frontiers in Communications, Mar. 18, 2021, https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/communication/articles/10.3389/fcomm.2021.635156/full

The Use of Hedging in Research Articles on Applied Linguistics, Livytska, I., Journal of Language and Cultural Education (July 2019), https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/jolace-2019-0003

Hedging and Academic Writing: An Analysis of Lexical Hedges, Demir, C., Journal of Language and Linguistic Studies, 14(4) (2018), https://www.jlls.org/index.php/jlls/article/view/812

Linguistic Hedging In The Light Of Politeness Theory, Vlasyan, G., European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences (2018), https://www.europeanproceedings.com/article/10.15405/epsbs.2018.04.02.98

A Study of Hedges in Courtroom Oral Arguments from the Perspective of Contextual Adaption, Chen and Zhang, International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications, https://ijmrap.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/IJMRAP-V4N8P114Y22.pdf

Hedging in Courtroom Discourse, Lebedeva and Gribanova, http://ial-journal.org/en/node/53

Middleton v. May, et al., Third Report and Recommendation [CM/ECF Doc. 107], Sherrill, J., Case No. 4:08-cv-452-RH-WCS (N. D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010) report and recommendation adopted, Order Granting Summary Judgment for Defendants, Hinkle, J., [Doc. 109] (“Plaintiff's statement as incorporated in doc. 93-3 is signed under penalty of perjury, although each material statement of fact is an equivocating statement beginning with "Upon information and belief . . . ." Such a statement is not sufficient as evidence and is inadmissible in its present form. A declaration expressing that statements are "true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief" carries with it the plain implication that the affiant does not know whether the statements are true or not, and does not wish to be held accountable if they are not.6 While admittedly the phrase "best of my knowledge and belief" or "information and belief" is a part of common speech, it equivocates and, therefore, does not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) that an affidavit "be made on personal knowledge" and "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Rule 56(e)'s personal knowledge requirements prevents such statement "from raising genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment." Pace v. Capobiano, 283 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Plaintiff's statement of facts and declaration cannot be considered in response to Defendants' summary judgment motion”)