Free Speech Press

24-924 HENCELY V. FLUOR CORP.

DECISION BELOW: 120 F.4th 412

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1994

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Former U.S. Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely was critically and permanently injured by a suicide bomber inside Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. The bomber, Ahmad Nayeb, worked on base for a government contractor. An Army investigation found that the attack's primary contributing factor was the contractor's actions in breach of its Army contract and in violation of the military's instructions to supervise Nayeb. Hencely sued the government contractor for negligence under South Carolina law. He did not sue the military under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Even so, the Fourth Circuit held that Hencely's state claims are preempted by unspoken "federal interests" emanating from an FTCA exception. Invoking Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court of appeals held that the FTCA's exception immunizing the government for "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces ... during time of war," 28 U.S.C. §2680(j), barred Hencely's South Carolina claims against the contractor. The decision below reaffirmed a 3-1-1 split among the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits over Boyle's reach when contractors defend against state tort claims by invoking §2680(j).

The question presented is:

Should Boyle be extended to allow federal interests emanating from the FTCA's combatant-activities exception to preempt state tort claims against a government contractor for conduct that breached its contract and violated military orders?

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-924_c18e.pdf

24-1056 RICO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 720900

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 24-2662

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether the fugitive-tolling doctrine applies in the context of supervised release.

CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-1056_4gd5.pdf

24-624 CASE V. MONTANA

DECISION BELOW: 553 P.3d 985

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: DA 23-0136

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.

CERT. GRANTED 6/2/2025

See transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-624_3eah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-109

Decision Below: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

Question Presented

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin , 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin , 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which would almost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereign redistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achieved its political goals.

In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questions presented are:

1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?

2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?

3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?

4. Is this action non-justiciable?

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110. THESE CASES ARE RESTORED TO THE CALENDAR FOR REARGUMENT. IN DUE COURSE, THE COURT WILL ISSUE AN ORDER SCHEDULING ARGUMENT AND SPECIFYING ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING.

Order of August 1, 2025:

THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFS ADDRESSING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION RAISED ON PAGES 36—38 OF THE BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: WHETHER THE STATE’S INTENTIONAL CREATION OF A SECOND MAJORITY-MINORITY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VIOLATES THE FOURTEENTH OR FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U. S. CONSTITUTION.

JURISDICTION NOTED 11/4/2024

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24-110 ROBINSON V. CALLAIS

DECISION BELOW: 732 F.Supp.3d 574

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 3:24-cv-00122-DCJ-CES-RRS

The questions presented are:

1. Did the District Court err in concluding that race predominated in the design of CD6 based on the Legislature's stated intent to comply with the rulings of the Robinson courts without presuming the good faith of the legislature, attempting to disentangle the Legislature's racial and political considerations, or requiring an alternative map that satisfied both §2 and the Legislature's political objectives, as required by Alexander v. S. C. State Conf. of NAACP , 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1233-1234 (2024)?

2. Did the District Court err when it disregarded the rulings of the courts in Robinson that the Gingles preconditions could be (and had been) satisfied and instead required that the State's enacted map satisfy the first Gingles precondition to survive strict scrutiny?

3. Did the District Court err in failing to accord the Louisiana Legislature sufficient breathing room to account for political considerations that resulted in a less compact district than necessary to satisfy §2?

4. Did the District Court err in relying on extra-record evidence and ignoring the evidence in the record on SB8's respect for communities of interest in concluding that SB8 failed to satisfy strict scrutiny?

5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by unnecessarily expediting the proceedings and limiting the evidence presented in this complex, fact-intensive case?

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-109_feah.pdf

Docket Number: 24-482

Decision Bellow: 113 F.4th 839 (8th Cir. 2024)

Question Presented

Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

John F. Bash, Esquire, of Austin, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgement below.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-482_6j37.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5438

Decision Below: CA 11 Order 6/27/2024

Lower Court Case Number: 24-11704

Question Presented

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed." (emphasis added).

The first question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 22 U.S.C. § 2255.

* * *

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), "[t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari." (emphasis added).

The second question presented is:

Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Kasdin M. Mitchell, Esquire, of Dallas, Texas, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below as to question 1 presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Cert. Granted January 17, 2025

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5438_2dp3.pdf

Docket Number: 24-351

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 96 F.4th 799 (5th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-10179

Question Presented

Whether a plaintiff's claim that she and her tenants did not receive mail because Postal Services employees intentionally did not deliver it to a designated address arises out of "the loss" or "miscarriage" of letters or postal matter. 28 U.S.C. 2680(b).

Rule Presented

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq.), generally waives the United States' sovereign immunity for suits seeking damages "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee of the federal government "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The FTCA, however, excepts from that waiver of immunity "[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter." 28 U.S.C. 2680(b). 

Cert. Granted April 21, 2025

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-351_6jfl.pdf

Docket Number: 24-568

Date Argued: October 8, 2025

Decision Below: 114 F.4th 634 (7th Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 23-2644

Question Presented

Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.

The sole question presented is whether Petitioners, as federal Candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.

Cert. Granted June 2, 2025.

See Transcript https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-568_7l48.pdf

Docket Number: 24-5774

Decision Below: 102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024)

Lower Court Case Number: 21-1379

Question Presented

1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.

2. Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).

Petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to question 1 presented by the petition. Charles L. McCloud, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below.

Cert. Granted March 3, 2025.

See transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-5774_7648.pdf

Docket Number: 24-539

Date Argued: October 07, 2025

Decision Below: 116 F.4th 1178

Question Presented

Kaley Chiles is a licensed counselor who helps people by talking with them. A practicing Christian, Chiles believes that people flourish when they live consistently with God's design, including their biological sex. Many of her clients seek her counsel precisely because they believe that their faith and their relationship with God establishes the foundation upon which to understand their identity and desires. But Colorado bans these consensual conversations based on the viewpoints they express. Its content- and viewpoint-based Counseling Restriction prohibits counseling conversations with minors that might encourage them to change their "sexual orientation or gender, identity, including efforts to change behaviors or gender expressions," while allowing conversations that provide "[a]ccpetance, support, and understanding for ... identity exploration and development, including ... [a]ssistance to a person undergoing gender transition." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-245-202(3.5).

The Tenth Circuit upheld this ban as a regulation of Chiles's conduct, not speech. In doing so, the court deepened a circuit split between the Eleventh and Third Circuits, which do not treat counseling conversations as conduct, and the Ninth Circuit, which does.

The question presented is:

Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025.

See Transcript

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-539_7l48.pdf