Free Speech Press

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner Pierre Riley, ineligible for cancellation of removal or discretionary relief from removal, sought deferral in withholding-only proceedings, pursuant to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. After the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a decision reversing an immigration judge's grant of relief, Riley promptly petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Although both parties urged the court to decide the merits of the case, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1), which states "[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal."

This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited.

2. Whether a person can obtain review of the BIA's decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that BIA decision?

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

1. Whether the 30-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1) for filing a petition for review of an order of removal is jurisdictional.

2. Whether a noncitizen satisfies the deadline in Section 1252(b)(1) by filing a petition for review challenging an agency order denying withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture within 30 days of the issuance of that order.

STEPHEN J. HAMMER, ESQUIRE, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1270_j4el.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Over the State's strenuous objections, the Middle District of Louisiana held, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022)-and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574 (5th Cir. 2023)-that Louisiana likely violated Section 2of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by failing to create a second majority-Black congressional district. The Fifth Circuit gave the Legislature a small window of time to adopt its own remedial plan, or else the State would have to go to trial, which wouldalmost certainly end in the Middle District imposing its own preferred map. Rather than acquiesce in the Middle District's preferences, the Legislature reclaimed its sovereignredistricting pen and passed S.B. 8, which created a second majority-Black district as the courts demanded, protected the Legislature's sovereign prerogatives, and achievedits political goals.

In this case, a majority of a three-judge court sitting in the Western District of Louisiana enjoined S.B. 8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The questionspresented are:

1. Did the majority err in finding that race predominated in the Legislature's enactment of S.B. 8?

2. Did the majority err in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny?

3. Did the majority err in subjecting S.B. 8 to the Gingles preconditions?

4. Is this action non-justiciable?

CONSOLIDATED FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT WITH 24-110

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-109_7l48.pdf

Trump v. Hawaii

Docket Number: 17-965

Date Argued: 04/25/18

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/17-965_l5gm.pdf

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Constitution and Acts of Congress confer on the President broad authority to prohibit or restrict the entry of aliens outside the United States when he deems it in theNation's interest. Exercising that authority after a worldwide review by multiple government agencies of whether foreign governments provide sufficient information to screen theirnationals, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). In accordance with the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security following the multi-agency review, the Proclamation suspends entry, subject to exceptions and case-bycase waivers, of certain categories of aliens abroad from eight countries that do not share adequate information with the United States or that present other risk factors. The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Proclamation's entry suspensions worldwide, except as to nationals of two countries. The court of appeals affirmed,except as to persons without a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. The courts concluded that the Proclamation likely violates the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The questions presented are:

1. ​ Whether respondents' challenge to the President's suspension of entry of aliens abroad is justiciable.
2. ​ Whether the Proclamation is a lawful exercise of the President's authority to suspend entry of aliens abroad.
3. ​ Whether the global injunction is impermissibly overbroad.

In addition to the questions presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue Question 3 presented by the brief in opposition.

1. ​ Whether Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause

CC/Devas Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd.
Docket Number: 23-1201
Date Argued: 03/03/25

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1201_n758.pdf

Question Presented:

Whether plaintiffs must prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

DECISION BELOW: 832 F.3d 389

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court's decision in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), holds that the Constitution's fundamental federal structure does not permit Congress to "directly . . . compelthe States to require or prohibit [certain] acts." Id. at 166. In September 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act("PASPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq., against a constitutional challenge under New York by construing PASPA’s proscription against States "authoriz[ing]" sports wagering "by law"narrowly to prohibit only the "affirmative 'authorization by law' of gambling schemes," and not repeals by States of existing sports wagering prohibitions. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Gov. of N.J. (Christie I), 730 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). After New Jersey then proceeded to repeal certain of its prohibitions on sports wagering in specified venues in the State, the en banc court reversed course and interpreted PASPAa as making it "unlawful" for New Jersey torepeal its prohibitions and affirmed an injunction that requires the State to reinstate the repealed state-law prohibitions. The court then held that it was constitutional for federal law todictate the extent to which States must maintain their prohibitions on sports wagering.

The question presented is:

Does a federal statute that prohibits modification or repeal of state-law prohibitions on private conduct impermissibly commandeer the regulatory power of States in contravention of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)?

CONSOLIDATED WITH 16-477 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT.

NRC v. Texas
Docket Number: 23-1300
Date Argued: 03/05/25

Interim Storage Partners, LLC v. Texas (23-1312)

Consolidated

23-1300_e29g.pdf23-1300 NRC V. TEXAS DECISION BELOW: 78 F.4th 827 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-60743 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Whether the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2341 et seq., which authorizes a "party aggrieved" by an agency's "final order" to petition for review in a court of appeals, 28 U.S.C. 2344, allows nonparties to obtain review of claims asserting that an agency order exceeds the agency's statutory authority.

2. Whether the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private entities to temporarily store spent nuclear fuel away from the nuclear-reactor sites where the spent fuel was generated.

CONSOLIDATED WITH 23-1312 FOR ONE HOUR ARGUMENT

Smith & Wesson Brands v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Docket Number: 23-1141
Date Argued: 03/04/2523-1141_8m59.pdfDECISION BELOW: 91 F.4th 511 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1823 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Mexican Government has sued leading members of the American firearms industry, seeking to hold them liable for harms inflicted by Mexican drug cartels. According to Mexico, America's firearms companies have engaged in a series of business practices for decades-from selling semi-automatic rifles, to making magazines that hold over ten rounds, to failing to impose various sales restrictions-that have created a supply of firearms later smuggled across the border and ultimately used by the cartels to commit crimes. Mexico asks for billions of dollars in damages, plus extensive injunctive relief imposing new gun-control measures in the United States.

The district court dismissed the case under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars suits against firearms companies based on criminals misusing their products. But the First Circuit reversed. It held that PLCAA does not bar this suit because Mexico stated a claim that defendants' business practices have aided and abetted firearms trafficking to the cartels, proximately harming the Mexican government.

The questions presented are: 1. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States is the "proximate cause" of alleged injuries to the Mexican government stemming from violence committed by drug cartels in Mexico. 2. Whether the production and sale of firearms in the United States amounts to "aiding and abetting" illegal firearms trafficking because firearms companies allegedly know that some of their products are unlawfully trafficked

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman
Docket Number: 23-1259
Date Argued: 03/03/25

23-1259_3e04.pdf23-1259 BLOM BANK SAL V. HONICKMAN DECISION BELOW: 6 F.4th 487 LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1039 QUESTION PRESENTED: For more than 70 years, this Court has "required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60 (b)(6)" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to show 'extraordinary circumstances' justifying the reopening of a final judgment." Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). This Court has also stressed that a movant must be "faultless" to obtain relief. Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393 (1993). "This very strict interpretation of Rule 60(b) is essential if the finality of judgments is to be preserved." Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (cleaned up). In this case, Respondents declined multiple invitations and opportunities to amend their complaint. The District Court then dismissed their complaint with prejudice, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Only then did Respondents move to vacate the judgment so they could file an amended complaint. The District Court denied the motion under Rule 60(b)(6)'s well-settled standard. But the Second Circuit reversed, based on an unprecedented "balanc[ing]" test that requires district courts to consider Rule 15(a)'s "liberal pleading principles" when addressing a Rule 60 (b)(6) motion to reopen a judgment for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(6)'s stringent standard applies to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint

Ames v. OH Dept. of Youth Services
Docket Number: 23-1039
Date Argued: 02/26/25

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1039_1an2.pdf

DECISION BELOW: 87 F.4th 822

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3341

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Whether, in addition to pleading the other elements of Title VII, a majority-group plaintiff must show "background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant isthat unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." App. 5a.

Perttu v. Richards
Docket Number: 23-1324
Date Argued: 02/25/25

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1324_bq7d.pdf

DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 911

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1298

QUESTION PRESENTED:

In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regardingexhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?