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Esteras v. United States
Docket Number: 23-7483
Date Argued: 02/25/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-7483_6k47.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 88 F.4th 1163
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-3422
The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(A)-the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of theoffense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. The question presented is:
Even though Congress excluded section 3553(a)(2)(A) from section 3583(e)'s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, may a district court rely on thesection 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release?
Five circuit courts of appeals, including the panel orders below, have concluded that district courts may rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. Four circuit courts ofappeals, plus the dissents from orders denying rehearing en banc below, have concluded that they may not.
Gutierrez v. Saenz
Docket Number: 23-7809
Date Argued: 02/24/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-7809_3e04.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 93 F.4th 267
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-70009
QUESTION PRESENTED:
In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023), this Court held that Rodney Reed has standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas's post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ''Reed suffered an injury in fact," the named defendant "caused Reed's injury," and if a federal court concludes that Texas's statute violates due process, it is "substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order."
In this case, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to follow that ruling over a dissent that recognized that this case was indistinguishablefrom Reed. The majority formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which requires scouring the record of the parties' dispute and any legal arguments asserted, to predictwhether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court's declaratory judgment. Gutierrez v. Saenz, 93 F.4th 267, 274(5th Cir. 2024).
The Fifth Circuit's new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which have applied the standingdoctrine exactly as this Court directed in Reed. See Johnson v. Griffin, 69 F.4th 506 (8th Cir. 2023); Redd v. Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874 (9th Cir. 2023). The question presented is:
Does Article III standing require a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment?
Cunningham v. Cornell University
Docket Number: 23-1007
Date Argued:01/22/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1007_10n2.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 86 F.4th 961
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-88, 21-96, 21-114
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (C), prohibits a plan fiduciary from "engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest." The statute elsewhere defines "party in interest" broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B).
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a "literal reading" of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce "results that are inconsistent with ERISA's statutory purpose." Albert v. Oshkosh Corp., 47 F.4th 570, 585 (7th Cir. 2022). The question presented is:
Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision's text.
Barnes v. Felix
Docket Number: 23-1239
Date Argued:01/22/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1239_4fbi.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 91 F.4th 393
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-20519
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using "unreasonable" force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotation marks omitted). But four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth-cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the "moment of the threat doctrine," which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer's actions only in the narrow window when the officer's safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits-the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits-reject the moment of the threat doctrine and follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer's actions leading up to the use of force.
In the decision below, Judge Higginbotham concurred in his own majority opinion, explaining that the minority approach "lessens the Fourth Amendment's protection of the American public" and calling on this Court "to resolve the circuit divide over the application of a doctrine deployed daily across this country." Pet. App. 10a-16a (Higginbotham, J., concurring). The question presented-which has divided twelve circuits-is:
Whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.
McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp.
Docket Number: 23-1226
Date Argued:01/21/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1226_apl1.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 2023 WL 7015279
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-15710, 22-15732
QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
FDA v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.
Docket Number: 23-1187
Date Argued:01/21/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1187_hgcj.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 1945307
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-60037, 23-60128, 23-60545
QUESTION PRESENTED:
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, "any person adversely affected by such * * * denial may file a petition for judicial review of such * * * denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business." 21 U.S.C. 387l(a)(l). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit. The question presented is:
Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer's products that is located within that circuit.
Free Speech Coalition v. Paxton
Docket Number: 23-1122
Date Argued: 01/15/25
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-1122_4f15.pdf
DECISION BELOW: 95 F.4th 263
LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-50627
QUESTION PRESENTED:
This Court has repeatedly held that States may rationally restrict minors' access to sexual materials, but such restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny if they burden adults' access to
Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services
Docket Number: 23-971
Date Argued: 01/14/25
Thompson v. United States
Docket Number: 23-1095
Date Argued: 01/14/25
Stanley v. City of Sanford
Docket Number: 23-997
Date Argued: 01/13/25
23-997 STANLEY V. CITY OF SANFORD, FLORIDA
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/23-997_o75p.pdf
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