Free Speech Press

Docket Number: 24-440

Decision Below: 2024 WL 5354482

Lower Court Case Number: 23-1620

Question Presented

This case presents a clear, recognized, entrenched conflict over an important question about the application of state procedural rules in federal court.

Delaware, like numerous states, requires that in certain actions the plaintiff must also file an affidavit of merit ("AOM") with the complaint. See 18 Del. C. § 6853. An AOM is an affidavit signed by an expert stating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that each defendant has committed the alleged misconduct. See id.§ 6853(a)(l).

The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits hold that AOM provisions and comparable statutes do not govern actions in federal court because they answer the same question as-and therefore conflict with-several different Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third and Tenth circuits, in contrast, hold that they present "no conflict" with any Federal Rules.

In the decision below, the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, for at least the fifth time, refused to hold that an AOM statute conflicts with any Federal Rules. Judge Phipps "concur[red] in only the judgment." Third Circuit precedent required him to vote to affirm, he explained, but ''writing on a clean slate ... he may not [have] arrive[d] at that same conclusion."

The question presented is:

Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Cert. Granted March 10, 2025

See Transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-440_q86b.pdf)

Docket Number: 24-557

Date Argued: October 6, 2025

Decision Below: 707 S.W.3d 138

Lower Court Case Number: Pd-0048-20

Question Presented

Whether a trial court abridges the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from discussing the defendant's testimony during an overnight recess.

Cert. Granted April 7, 2025

See transcript (https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2025/24-557_6j7a.pdf)

24A884 TRUMP V. CASA, INC.

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 654902

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A885 TRUMP V. WASHINGTON

DECISION BELOW: 2025 WL 553485

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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24A886 TRUMP V. NEW JERSEY

DECISION BELOW: 131 F.4th 27

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER:

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QUESTION PRESENTED:

THE APPLICATIONS (24A884, 24A885, AND 24A886) FOR PARTIAL STAYS ARE CONSOLIDATED AND DEFERRED PENDING ORAL ARGUMENT. THE APPLICATIONS ARE SET FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT AT 10 A.M. ON THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2025.

SET FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 4/17/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24a884_2c83.pdf

24-394 OK CHARTER SCHOOL BOARD V. DRUMMOND

DECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court has "repeatedly held that a State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits." Carson as next friend of O. C. v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022). Three times, the Court hasapplied that principle to strike down "state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations." Id. at 778-79 (citing Trinity Lutheran Church ofColumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464 (2020)).

Contrary to those precedents, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a state can exclude privately owned and operated religious charter schools from its charter-school program by enforcing state-law bans on "sectarian" and religiously affiliated charter schools. The court also held that a charter school engages in state action for constitutional purposes when it contracts with the state to provide publicly fundededucation. These rulings implicate an entrenched circuit split and present two questions for review:

o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.

o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter-school program solely because the schools are religious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-396 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

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24-396 ST. ISIDORE OF SEVILLE SCHOOL V. DRUMMOND

DECISION BELOW: 558 P.3d 1

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 121,694

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This Court has repeatedly held that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits a state from denying generally available benefits to a school solely because it is religious. That principle should have resolved this case. Petitioner is a private religious institution. Itseeks to partake in the benefits of Oklahoma's charter school program. But the court below invalidated Petitioner's contract with the charter school board. The court disregarded this Court's Free Exercise precedents because, in its view, Petitioner had become an arm of the government by virtue of that contract. It thus held that the Establishment Clause and Oklahoma laws aimed at creating "a complete separation ofchurch and state" compelled the court to deny Petitioner-on religious grounds-the benefits created by Oklahoma's Charter Schools Act.

The questions presented are:

o Whether the academic and pedagogical choices of a privately owned and run school constitute state action simply because it contracts with the state to offer a free educational option for interested students.

o Whether a state violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding privately run religious schools from the state's charter school program solely because the schools arereligious, or whether a state can justify such an exclusion by invoking anti-establishment interests that go further than the Establishment Clause requires.

CONSOLIDATED WITH 24-394 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. JUSTICE BARRETT TOOK NO PART.EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-394_1b72.pdf

24-304 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA V. DAVIS

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 489288

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-55873

QUESTION PRESENTED:

o Whether a federal court may certify a class action when some of its members lack any Article III injury.

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER A FEDERAL COURT MAY CERTIFY A CLASS ACTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(B)(3) WHENSOME MEMBERS OF THE PROPOSED CLASS LACK ANY ARTICLE III INJURY. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.

CERT. GRANTED 1/24/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-304_3e04.pdf

24-362 MARTIN V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 1716235

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10062

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Petitioners are the innocent victims of a wrong-house raid conducted by an FBI SWAT team in Atlanta, Georgia. Seeking a remedy for torts committed against them, Petitioners brought a cause of action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In its opinion below, the Eleventh Circuit held that all of Petitioners' FTCA claims are barred by sovereign immunity supplied either through the Constitution's Supremacy Clause or the FTCA's discretionary-function exception.

In one or more ways, the opinion below conflicts with decisions from every other circuit.

The questions presented are:

o Whether the Constitution's Supremacy Clause bars claims under the FTCA-a federal statute enacted by Congress-when the negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees "have some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reasonably be characterized as complying with the full range of federal law." Pet. App. 17a (quotation omitted).

o Whether the FTCA's discretionary-function exception bars claims for torts arising from wrong-house raids and similar negligent or wrongful acts by federal employees.

GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1) WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION’S SUPREMACY CLAUSE BARS CLAIMS UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT WHEN THE NEGLIGENT OR WRONGFUL ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HAVE SOME NEXUS WITH FURTHERING FEDERAL POLICY ANDCAN REASONABLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS COMPLYING WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FEDERAL LAW. 2) WHETHER THE DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION EXCEPTION IS CATEGORICALLY INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROVISO TO THE INTENTIONAL TORTS EXCEPTION. EXPEDITED BRIEFING.CHRISTOPHER MILLS, ESQUIRE, OF CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE, AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW AS TO THE FIRST QUESTION IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

CERT. GRANTED 1/27/2025

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-362_8njq.pdf

24-320 SOTO V. UNITED STATES

DECISION BELOW: 92 F.4th 1094

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2022-2011

QUESTION PRESENTED:

This case determines whether thousands of medically retired combat veterans should receive all the combat related special compensation (CRSC) that Congress specifically authorized for combat veterans. The government has elected to calculatethe period of retroactive compensation due using the procedure in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702) instead of the one in the CRSC statute (10 U.S.C. § 1413a)-a maneuver that allows the government to apply the Barring Act's six- year limitations period in order to pay the veterans less. But the Barring Act is a default provision and does not apply where "another law" provides a procedure for calculating the amount due-that is, for "settling" a demand for payment.

Although this Court's precedent defines "settlement" of demands for payment from the federal government as "the administrative determination of the amount due," it has not decided the test for whether a statute provides a settlement procedure that should apply in place of the Barring Act. And agency practice more broadly-which aligns with the test the District Court articulated and is consistent with this Court's definition of "settlement"-is irreconcilable with the novel test that the Federal Circuit applied, although both tests claim reliance on this Court's definition of "settlement."

The question presented is:

o When a person makes a demand for money from the federal government pursuant to federal statute, what test should courts and agencies use to determine whether that statute includes a settlement procedure that displaces the default procedures and limitations set forth in the Barring Act (31 U.S.C. § 3702)?

GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: GIVEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION UNDER 10 U. S. C. §1413a IS A CLAIM "INVOLVING ... RETIRED PAY" UNDER 31 U. S. C. §3702(a)(1)(A), DOES 10 U. S. C. §1413a PROVIDE A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM THAT DISPLACES THE DEFAULT PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE BARRING ACT?

CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025

You can read the oral argument here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-320_5436.pdf

24-249 A.J.T. V. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS

DECISION BELOW: 96 F.4th 1058

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-1399

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act) require public entities and organizations that receive federal funding to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities. In the decision below, the Eighth Circuit held that, for discrimination claims "based on educational services" brought by children with disabilities, these statutes are violated only if school officials acted with ''bad faith or gross misjudgment." App.3a.

That test squarely implicates an entrenched and acknowledged 5-2 circuit split over the standard governing such claims. It is also plainly mistaken on the merits: As theEighth Circuit itself acknowledged, the test lacks "any anchor in statutory text," App.5a n.2, and it arbitrarily departs from the more lenient standards that all courts-including the Eighth Circuit-apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.

The question presented is:

o Whether the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require children with disabilities to satisfy a uniquely stringent "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education.

CERT. GRANTED 1/17/2025

You can read the oral argument here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-249_lkgn.pdf

24-7 DIAMOND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, LLC V. EPA

DECISION BELOW: 98 F.4th 288

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-1081, 22-1083, 22-1084, 22-1085

QUESTION PRESENTED:

Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act generally preempts States from adopting emission standards for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). But under Section 209(b) of that Act, EPA may grant California and only California-a waiver from federal preemption to set its own vehicle-emission standards. Before granting a preemption waiver, EPA must find that California "need[s]" its own emission standards "to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." Id. § 7543(b)(1)(B).

In 2022, EPA granted California a waiver to set its own standards for greenhouse-gas emissions and to adopt a zero-emission-vehicle mandate, both expressly intended to address global climate change by reducing California vehicles' consumption of liquid fuel. Fuel producers challenged EPA's waiver as contrary to the text of Section 209(b). The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenge without reaching the merits, concluding that fuel producers' injuries were not redressable because they had not established that vacating EPA's waiver would have any effect on automakers.

The questions presented are:

(1) Whether a party may establish the redressability component of Article III standing by relying on the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties.

(2) Whether EPA's preemption waiver for California's greenhouse-gas emission standards and zero-emission- vehicle mandate is unlawful.

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

CERT. GRANTED 12/13/2024

You can read the oral argument transcript here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-7_d1o3.pdf

24-416 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. ZUCH

DECISION BELOW: 97 F.4th 81

LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 22-2244

QUESTION PRESENTED:

o Whether a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes becomes moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding.

CERT. GRANTED 1/10/2025

You can read the oral argument here:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2024/24-416_3e04.pdf