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  • Kafkaesque Backrooms

    Something astounding happened. In summer 2026, at the same time a Star Wars movie came out, two low-to-mid budget horror movies dominated the box office, both of them brilliant new school visions of very young filmmakers. One of them, Backrooms, is an improbable movie featuring experimental architectural shots brimming with symbolism, deriving its horror from psychological trauma and the failed promises of neoliberalism.

    That movie shot by a 20-something based on a niche internet phenomenon is the best performing film for A24, that super hip movie studio that gave us Everything Everywhere All At Once, Marty Supreme, Hereditary and Midsommar. At a budget of 10 million dollars it right now sits at $256,884,832 at the box office. The movie roots itself in internet lore of urban exploration and liminal spaces and is basically an adaptation of a cursed image posted to 4chan in 2018, first turned into a series of YT-vids, then into a movie by the same director.

    That, alone, have all kinds of outlets talking about the effects this will have on Hollywood, some already speak of a landslide revolution, another New Hollywood era using Youtube as an incubator for fresh new voices. All of that is cool and great, albeit you have to wonder why Hollywood is discovering Youtube as a talent incubator now — it’s a more than 20 years old repository of moving images after all featuring plenty of filmmakers for quite some time. Better late than never i guess, and there’s plenty of articles out there discussing this stuff. Here’s some recent headlines: From ‘Backrooms’ to ‘Obsession’: Why YouTubers Are Turning Hollywood Upside Down, Is the future of Hollywood nestled inside the backrooms of YouTube?, Reddit Is Ready to Be Mined for Hollywood IP, Why Backrooms and Obsession Are the Future of Movies, ‘Backrooms’ and ‘Obsession’ Offer a Memo to Hollywood.

    But right now, i’m not so much interested in the new talent economics of moviemaking as awesome as that might be. Right now, i’m interested in the secret main actor in Backrooms. I’m interested in color.

    (This analysis of Backrooms gonna contain some spoilers, so if you haven’t seen the movie yet, read on with caution.)

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    Soft Yellow and Spotlight BuffFaber Birren, color-psy head honcho of the 20th century

    Faber Birren is one of the most famous color theorists of the 20th century. After pioneering the field in the 1930s, Birren “put color to work” and became a consultant for color psychology who worked with local businesses in New York and Disney’s animators on the design of Bambi, Fantasia, and Pinocchio. During WWII, he advised the military and hospitals aswell as GM, Monsanto and Du Pont when young men were recruited into war and the american industry had to be run by inexperienced workers. There, he developed his theory of functional colors and industrial color palettes.

    Here’s one such palette from his 1963 book “Color for Interiors, Historical and Modern“. You gonna recognize some of those colors immediately.

    Colors for Interiors: Historical and Modern by Faber Birren

    Those colors are what Birren termed “functional colors”, shades which are operationalized in commercial spaces, industrial plants or offices to subtly massage the psyche of workers into efficiency by providing psychological color-optimized conditions for labor.

    Birren devotes much of his book on recommendations for these spaces. In general, walls should neither be full white nor come in intense signal colors as those would distract workers from the tasks at hand. Preferably, one should paint walls in soft, toned down palettes to “overcome eyestrain” and “aid the cause of good visibility and human efficiency”, and “in stairwells and corridors, usually deprived of natural light, bright tones of yellow are effective”. To Birren, “Neutrality is found in yellow”. Accordingly, the Backrooms in the movie are endless halls, corridors and ever more weirdly shaped spaces, nearly all of them painted in “Soft Yellow” and “Spotlight Buff”1.

    To evaluate colors, i took the original image from 4chan and color corrected it to get an impression of the orginal backroom2.

    If you compare both images to the industrial color palette, you see that the soft tones are compatible and present in both versions, while the “Solar Yellow” for industrial use is absent. We’re not dealing with signal orange-y yellow here which is reserved for warning signs of danger and hazards, but with the soft creamy yellow tones that Birren recommends for stairways, corridors and hallways in industrial spaces.

    However, Birren warns about the monotonous use of color and he would’ve stand back in horror —as we do!— looking at the endless soft yellow madness of the Backrooms:

    If chaos and disorder are mentally and emotionally distressing, unrelieved monotony is probably worse. The theory is personal with the author; but the superstition that bizarre designs· and gaudy colors will “drive people crazy” has less verity to it than the one that attributes the same effect to situations which are precisely the reverse. That is, any human being forced to work in an office or home surrounded by nothing but ivory or buff will hazard his good disposition and sanity even more. A circus is less likely to make a person neurotic than the tan waiting room of a railroad depot!

    To Birren, the beauty of color “needs control if it is to serve practical ends”. In the Backrooms, the “mentally and emotionally distressing, unrelieved monotony” of yellow and the “considerations as to the ‘quality’ of the light, the color tint of the surrounding brightness, the beauty, proportion, and balance of the interior itself” all are clearly out of control. Something is unleashed here and yellow spills everywhere.

    In contrast to this monotone overflow of yellow, when applied with thought and “considerations”, according to Birrens book “Color Psychology and Color Therapy“, the “softness of color has a centripetal (centering) effect, removes outside distraction and is conducive to mental concentration”.

    So much so that he then quotes a study done by the Public Buildings Administration in Washington and the U.S. Public Health Service to underline his theories in functional color3.

    A controlled study was undertaken to measure the working · efficiency of a group of employees using business machines. Three. conditions were analyzed: (I) the original room; ( 2) the room with the addition of new lighting fixtures; ( 3) the room with the further addition of color. (…)

    As to worker efficiency, one task had an improvement of 37.4 per cent. However, a fair and conservative figure of 5.5 per cent has been set as the general improvement shown. In cash value, this 5.5 per cent production improvement was equivalent to a saving on gross payroll of $13,229 among some 95 government employees.

    He proudly calculates that the application of functional color, like “Soft Yellow” or “Spotlight Buff”, saves 139.25 bucks annually per average employee in american industry. Some very efficient shades of yellow we have here.

    He sums up his productivity enhancing color theory like this:

    In theory as well as practice, the purpose of color is not so much to “inspire” the worker; too much of this attitude may lead to distractions and irrelevancies. On the contrary, color becomes integral with the task, not foreign to it. Improved efficiency and relief from fatigue become automatic because the human eye can see more easily, with less strain. Color is made to fit in rather than stand out. It contributes to better visibility and to an agreeable and cheerful frame of mind.

    An agreeable and cheerful frame of mind, which, at the end of Backrooms, breaks Clark and makes him appease to the grotesque labyrinth and its monstrosities. We’ll come back to this yellow-induced agreeableness.

    Work Hard, Play Hard

    There’s a great german documentary called Work Hard, Play Hard. Here’s the trailer with english subs, the movie is also on Youtube in full.

    I always considered Work Hard, Play Hard as a kind of horror film. It’s one of my favorite movies actually, a non-narrative documentary showing the everyday goings in an assessment center in Hamburg, where young folks are interviewed for management job positions in big companies. It’s all stock full of people working on laptops talking in finest business jargon, and it’s all dead and hollow, especially because it’s so shiny happy positively challenging while being absolutely bureaucratic and all humanity is as calculated as an excel sheet. The documentary starts with a recruiter asking an applicant what work means to him, and his first one shot answer is “Joy” (ofcourse) and that he “likes success” (ofcourse).

    After this initial interview the film cuts to three architects discussing a briefing for a new building for Unilever in Hamburg. Here’s a screenshot from that segment, showing an architectural rendering. You’ll recognize the colors.

    Work Hard, Play Hard (2011)

    The briefing is full of (absolutely not AI-generated but still 100% synthetic) business jargon and talks about how the architecture and interieur must be “contemporary” and “energetic” to show off “core values” as “a symbol for the beginning of a journey into a modern and dynamic future, representing the new spirit of the company” and so on and so forth.

    When the designers discuss the briefing, they talk about how the architecture should “generate emotional worlds” through the “programming by a new building”, and that the structure should “convey that you are not forced to work”. It should be a place where you shall be “under no circumstances be reminded that you are working”. It must be noted that the designers do never talk about an actual absence of force or dependency here, they only talk about the architectural-symbolic mediation of such absence: The building must lie to the worker and lull her into the neoliberal illusion of work as joy.

    In design for buildings and their architecture form always follows function, they rarely serve pure aesthetic purposes alone. You live in them, you do stuff, you wander around or you work. Especially for commercial spaces and office buildings, functionalism is imperative and Faber Birrens theory of functional color fits right in. The spaces provide psychological color-optimized conditions for labor, but that optimized condition is one of forgetting and illusion, where the worker “under no circumstances (shall) be reminded that (she is) working”. The color-optimized labor condition is one of distorted memory and alienation. It shall never appear to you that you are forced to work for a living and it is imperative for the architecture that you will stay under the illusion that you’re not caught up in a wage dependency on commodity labor. The efficiency gains of soft yellow and the “agreeable and cheerful frame of mind” mentioned by Faber Birren must be seen in this context of the erasure of the material realities of work.

    In an interview, when asked about the use of monotone soft yellow in his movie, director Kane Parsons mentions associations with confinement, a state of being forced to stay in a closed or restricted space, and he connects soft yellow with “forced coziness”. This, precisely, is the “subtle massage (of) the psyche” i talked about above: Color and space which lulls you into “agreeableness”, to make you forget you are part of a machine. Backrooms is a horror movie about the resulting cognitive distortions haunting you in an endless labyrinthian memory palace. This manufactured memory distortion, enforced by architecture and color use in commercial spaces, is the ultimate evil in this movie which is unleashed and out of control.

    Simulation Rooms

    The monotony of Soft Yellow and Spotlight Buff in Backrooms sometimes is broken when the fleeing protagonists discover rooms with walls completely covered by photo murals of a beach including a ceiling covered by a photo of a blue sky, or they suddenly tumble into complete outdoors looking strangely synthetic. Birren would be pleased that finally, someone interrupts the sameness of endless neutral Spotlight Buff and hands Clark some “relief from fatigue” of the eye.

    Relax.

    Such simulation rooms are designed to immerse a human into “artificial paradises”, as photographer Reiner Riedler termed them in his 2009 book on “Fake Holidays”. In the foreword of that book4, Bill Kouwenhoven writes that the “word paradise itself comes from the old Iranian Avestan language as ‘pairi.daêza’, meaning walled garden. As such, a paradise is also a controlled space that contains its own world view”.

    People enjoying the artificial seaside simulation at Tropical Islands Resort, Berlin-Brandenburg, Germany, 2007, from Reiner Riedlers Fake Holidays (2009)

    The world view contained in Backrooms simulation spaces is one of total enclosure in economic optimization and efficiency — the outside world appears as surface decoration inside a commercial enclosure. Like in Baudrillards Hyperreality, the signifier has been completely detached from any experiental referent: In those “artificial paradise” beach-rooms, you are not supposed to enjoy a summer breeze at the ocean, you are there to efficiently spend leisure time, to faux-relax for the psychoarchitectural purpose of economic optimization, to squeeze another dollar to add to the 139.25 bucks anually saved per Faber Birrens average employee in american industry.

    Leisure here is just the term for time spent outside of productivity. Under neoliberalism, there is no true freedom from work, as philosopher Byung-Chul Han analyzes in his book “Vita Contemplativa”. To him, the neoliberal imperatives of efficiency even colonize our understanding of rest, and writes that “leisure time is tied to the logic of work”. In neoliberal capitalism, leisure is an absence of actual freedom.

    In Backrooms, such faux-resting rooms of operationalized rest are just another part of the labyrinthian nightmare, a false promise of escape for Clark and his therapist Mary, where there’s just more and deeper rooms ahead. The movie is Baudrillards critique of the hyperreal turned literal, where simulacra levels reveal themselves in various stages of an ever more outlandish architectural maze. The Backrooms only get weirder from wherever you are.

    The Hauntology of Non-Places

    In his short essay on “Ghost Modernism”, Mark Fisher contrasts model cities and urban planning with organic urban growth, and how the family and communal life got erased by capitalist interest expressing itself in architectural structures. Spotlight Buff and Soft Yellow in the endless Backrooms is one neutral friendly painted detail of this erasure. The architectural weirdness of the movie is a perfect expression of Mark Fishers unease with neoliberal modernity.

    Clark is trapped in a “non-place” outside of time, where objects, space and people are “not remembered right” and appear as M.C.Escherian architecture and cronenbergian deformations called “Still Lifes”. This is an aesthetic expression of Fishers’ Ghost Modernism pushed to the extreme. Not only is public space turned into commercialized location, but the economic and personal private have collapsed into Clarks mind. He not only works in the furniture store, he sleeps and lives there, he’s totally enclosed in a job he hates, hunting for a lost dream of being the architect he insists he actually is: “I am a fucking architect! I’m just stuck selling shit furniture because someone won’t get off their fat fucking ass and help me.”

    Mark Fisher argued that capitalism privatizes stress, writing that “it is necessary to reframe the growing problem of stress (and distress) in capitalist societies. Instead of treating it as incumbent on individuals to resolve their own psychological distress, instead, that is, of accepting the vast privatization of stress that has taken place over the last thirty years, we need to ask: how has it become acceptable that so many people, and especially so many young people, are ill?”

    Backrooms directly adresses this privatization, represented in Clarks dutiful-while-frustrated obedience to his job and his regular visits to his therapist who writes self-help books about “The Window Within”. Stress, for Clarke and his therapist, is his own fault. Like any good neoliberal citizen would do he accepts that his depressions and frustrations are his personal business only to solve for himself, they are not the outcome of an encapsulation of the private in shallow economic spaces.

    This is Fishers “vast privatization of stress”. In Fishers reading, therapy is not a psychological tool of liberation, but a tool to re-adjust the patient to an unlivable environment. Psychoanalysis is just as caught up in the maze as poor Clark who is doomed to run around in circles in a closed loop of mental survival, navigating a maze constructed from the very corporate aesthetic that killed his ambition, and while running he’s massaged by the “forced coziness” of functional color and architecture to seek guilt within himself. The labyrinth is Clarks own mind in which neoliberal necessities swallowed his dreams. No escape, nowhere, and no help in sight.

    In The Weird and the Eerie, Fisher defines the eerie as a failure of absence or a failure of presence, constituted either by a presence where there should be nothing, or an absence where there should be something. The endless maze of the Backrooms are weird renderings of that fisherian eerie: They are perfectly painted in Birrens functional color, they come with occasional simulation rooms to productively “relax”, yet there is an absolute absence of the human that should occupy it.

    Director Parsons talks about this eerie absence of architecture devoid of humanity in another interview: “I’m interested in the neglected. There’s something about a well-maintained, very active, lively office building where there’s not one person in that building being sentimental about the space itself. It feels like the building is there to fulfill a job and it has no friends whatsoever. It will be moved out of and no one will ever think about that space again.”

    To Parsons, the pure functionalism of Birren and the perfected office spaces shown in Work Hard Play Hard are an architectural tragedy for the building itself, which has been stripped of any organic communal activity, only to make place for pure economic efficiency. To him, Backrooms “is a building ghost story, where you have a sort of mega structure concept of places that are not meant for human inhabitants, but are just close enough to feeling like they are potentially livable”.

    What Parsons describes here is an architectural uncanny valley, in which a thing appearing almost human will cause eerie feelings: The spaces in Backrooms are “close enough” to be “felt” as “potentially livable”, but they actually are not. They are painted in soft yellow neutral tones designed to absorb friction in friendly neutrality, but those rooms have been decoupled from any actual human activity. The Soft Yellow becomes the ambient representation of an eerie invisible systemic force, something Kane Parsons refered to in the same interview as a “force of nature”. This is Fishers Capitalist Realism in essence: an exhaustion of imagination, where the subconscious mind can only wander through repeating patterns of commercial space. The only thing actually present in those repeating patterns are Clarks distorted memories of people and his divorced wife, deformed into the body horror of the “Still Lifes”.

    The Fisherian dimensions in Backrooms are obvious: We are lost in an inescapable labyrinth painted in institutional soft yellow, surrounded by the warped remnants of our dreams which are “not remembered right” coming to haunt us, equipped only with selfdrawn maps and crude scribblings on the wall, listening to the low-frequency hum of neon lights. Sometimes, we get simulation rooms and fake beaches. We work hard, we play hard, and then we get eaten.

    The Maze.Kafka nods

    Ultimately, Clark surrenders to the Backrooms. He accepts his fate, stops wandering around, has built himself a new home and admits that he does not want to change: “I like it in here. For the first time in a long time i feel like i am where i was supposed to be.”

    When the weirdness of the labyrinth represents the human caught in the fisherian madness of a neoliberalism out of control, then this “agreeable” surrender to the labyrinthian nightmare is the final kafkaesque turn. Both Fisher and Kafka analyze the human experience as trapped in the systemic, bureaucratic, economic, but where Fisher diagnoses an inability to imagine alternatives to capitalism, Kafka shows that we turn this failure against ourselves.

    Franz Kafka in his novels wrote about institutional guilt from opaque outside circumstances that is forced on the individual which can’t help but internalize that guilt. Josef K. in “The Trial” is arrested without being told his crime, but he behaves as if the accusation must be meaningful. K. in “The Castle” seeks access to an authority that is always near and always out of reach. Gregor Samsa in “The Metamorphosis” wakes as an insect and his first thoughts are about work obligations and a missed train.

    In Backrooms, Clark is trapped in a state of neoliberal limbo and fails to imagine a life outside of it. Parsons says about Clark, that he’s “feeling quite stuck”, and that “he’s not quite understanding that he’s free to move outside of where he is right now”. This is Clarks kafkaesque acceptance of guilt: He can’t imagine to ever live outside the Backrooms, or to move on beyond distorted memories and economic necessities, and turns that failure against himself.

    The movie is very consequential about this: The moment Clark surrenders to the fisherian “privatization of stress” and apologizes, he’s eaten alive by the representation of his capitalist deformation, the giant, blown out or proportion pirate mascot that is himself as a frightened, grotesque creature. As Mark Fisher writes in Ghosts of my Life, “Everything comes back as an advertising campaign.” Clark is literally devoured by the corporate brand identity he created to survive under capitalism, a commercial mascot for the furniture store where he was forced to live and sleep, to give up on his dreams and die.

    This is a kafkaesque horror within the fisherian eerie: Clark experiences the labyrinthian trap as deserved, structural necessary, and impossible to appeal. He seeks help from a therapist who writes self-help books and who disregards true understanding only to discover that Clark was right. In Kafkas terms, the maze is a court, and a castle, and the endless corridors you have to wander without ever finding salvation. As Clark adapts to his internalized fate of guilt, it swallows him completely. The punishment is not imposed from an outside, it is generated from the semiotic material of Clarks own life. The signifier consumes the signified in an act of baudrillardian cannibalism.

    At the end, the movie leaves no one unscathed: In the final act, when psychotherapist Mary barely escapes the Backrooms only to land in the research facility of Async, it is not clear to the audience what reality in this movie exactly is, as she wonders “Where am I right now?” We don’t know either, when in the last frames she is seen as another deformed “Still Life” memory-image.

    We are left to ask, are we trapped in the mind of someone? Is the reality of the film a recursive dream of an architectural structure? Is the world a series of interconnected labyrinth-minds which we can access through interdimensional portals like in Being John Malkovich? The film suggest we all are trapped in such puzzles impossible to solve, enclosed in our own versions of the Backrooms. Me, you, everyone. Institutions won’t help, while psychoanalysis and therapy ultimately fail.

    In the face of such a fundamental uncertainty, where economic necessity of survival is turned into personal guilt and giant symbols swallow the symbolized, maybe the best thing, then, like Mary at Async, is to first state the obvious: “I walked through a wall, in the basement of a furniture store.”

    I could go on.

    Backrooms is full of symbolism and i haven’t even mentioned the bird which might or might not be related to M.C. Escher, i haven’t gotten into Mary’s childhood and her schizophrenic mother or the cutout cavemen, all of which invite for further explorations. I haven’t drawn parallels to Vaporwave and Mallsoft music, and my remarks on Kafka only scratch the surface. I haven’t seen a film so rich in subtext for a very, very long time.

    It’s an astounding movie on it’s own, made even more astounding given it’s backstory. Kane Parsons just turned 21 years old these days —Happy Birthday!—, and the box office story of Backrooms must be read not just as a succesful youtube exploit of meme culture, but as a cultural expression of post-work movements which grew particularly popular with GenZ post-covid.

    This is a horror movie about the erasure of wage dependency from collective consciousness through all-encompassing neoliberal ideology and its aesthetic of “forced coziness”, on display in soft yellow painted walls and the shiny happy challenges of a “Work Hard, Play Hard”-culture. The film shows us the terror of the resulting cognitive distortions, internalized guilt and alienations from our dreams.

    Backrooms, including its unlikely success story, is itself a portal, to make visible that entrapment, to step outside of it and have a look — and to crack open the possibility of dreaming up unknown, yet unimagined futures.

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    GOOD INTERNET ELSEWHERE // Bluesky / Mastodon / Threads / FB / InstaSUPPORT // Patreon / Steady / Paypal / SpreadshirtMusicvideos have their own Newsletter: GOOD MUSIC. All killers, No fillers.Thanks for reading.1

    The name “Spotlight Buff” has its etymological roots in buff, “the colour of undyed buffalo leather, such as soldiers wore as some protection” and was first mentioned in The London Gazette of 1686. According to Wikipedia, “such buff leather was suitable for buffing or serving as a buffer between polished objects.” An approriate name for a color used in liminal spaces which are “between” things by definition.

    2

    The whole “We found the original Backrooms stuff” is it’s own kind of swarm intelligence webculture genre. From KnowYourMeme: “On May 30th, 2024, Twitter / X user @tjxz_z uploaded a post that claimed their friend found the real place of ‘The Backrooms’, which is in Wisconsin, while the photo was taken in 2003.” Here’s a video showing more photos of the Backrooms location, here’s another clip on Bader’s Furniture. Internet sleuths also found the original wallpaper, here’s a video telling that subplot of the Backrooms lore, here’s the clip by the guy who found it.

    3

    Birren was also very interested in what we call synaesthesia today, where the perception of color gives rise to secondary sensory effects in sound, taste, smell or touch. Some people, for instance, hear sounds when they see intense colors, or they smell stuff when they hear music. In his book “On Color Psychology and Color Therapy”, he claims that “pale yellow (is) perhaps (one of) the best ‘smelling’ colors”, which makes sense as soft yellow is visually correlated with cake. That’s quite a contrast to some more icky associations we have with greenish soft yellows connecting them to sickness and pus, something Kane Parsons mentions in interviews. The smell of Spotlight Buff is weirdly ambivalent.

    4

    Another photobook on the same topic with a different focus would be Zed Nelsons “The Anthropocene Illusion” which examines our preference for simulations and the resulting divorce from nature

    0 min
  • Intelligence Minus Cognition

    So, Richard Dawkins got duped by a bot believing that language models are conscious. A lot has been said about this one more episode of Lemoineism, and from a perspective of consciousness studies, Matthew Sheffield gets to the point in his article on Richard Dawkins and the Claude Delusion where he writes about how mind is not something you have, but something you do: “minds are processes continually enacted by our embodied perceptions and responses”.

    In his piece in the New York Times, Leif Weatherby argues that this illusion of mind-pareidolia stems from the novelty of the cultural artifacts synthesized by AI, which directly relates to my view of LLMs as Interpolatable Archives:

    The bot is a complex mathematical function performing statistical operations on data, but the output is stories, images and memes — the very stuff of culture. (...) an A.I. model doesn’t need a mind to be a serious cybersecurity threat (...) the reason it’s so striking is precisely that it doesn’t require a mind. It’s a novel form of culture.

    We don’t expect meaningful and rhetorically powerful prose to come from anything but a conscious mind. But now it does. We cannot afford to believe the marketing message from A.I. companies that we may be dealing with some spiritual essence.

    For this short essay, however, I’m not too interested in the question of machine consciousness, we’ll only touch on that briefly.

    Visualization of attention taken from this interview with Leif Weatherby and Bertviz, shooped into black and white by yours truly.

    What I’m interested in, for now, is a point Dawkins almost gets right, when he writes that

    Brains under natural selection have evolved this astonishing and elaborate faculty we call consciousness. It should confer some survival advantage. There should exist some competence which could only be possessed by a conscious being.

    This is true, and every conscious human being is a proof of that, because all conscious human beings show “some competence”, arguably, some more than others.

    This connects to my rejection of Emily Bender’s arguments in her parrot paper, where she claims that “Text generated by an LM is not grounded in (...) any model of the world, or any model of the reader’s state of mind”, which just isn’t true anymore, because, as Leif Weatherby lays out in his book Language Machines, “language is complex, cultural, and even poetic first, and referential, functional, and cognitive only later” and that this “poetic language is (...) computationally tractable”.

    These poetics in language are picked up by the model from human practice of the linguistic form, and it learns true meaning of true things in the world in the shape of the structural vibes, and those go beyond spelling, grammar and syntax. What we have as a result is a machine that “lacks the subjective intent of a cognitive agent” which nevertheless “does encode meaning and valid semantic representations”. Is that sort of meaning weak, compared to our rich understanding of the world? Likely, yes, sure, but it’s not false.

    Turns out, this sophisticated statistical analysis of big data, which picks up poetics and vibes and encodes weak-but-true meaning, is enough to produce the competence Dawkins talks about: “Are there two ways of being competent, the conscious way and the unconscious (or zombie) way?” Yes, obviously there is.

    Obviously ChatGPT and Claude and Gemini and all those models of language, which do encode true meaning in the shape of vibes picked up from poetics in linguistic practice, can solve all kinds of problems, from identifying my houseplants and giving me tips for watering schedules, or exploring my thoughts and weird ideas I have in the night, or automating up to 100% of code output in whole companies. We distilled actual intelligence from statistics about linguistic practice into a model of language.

    So, why is artificial intelligence not cognitive, while human intelligence is? Dawkins nearly gets there when he asks

    Could it be that some life forms on Earth have evolved competence via the consciousness trick — while life on some alien planet has evolved an equivalent competence via the unconscious, zombie trick?

    The short answer to this question is: No. Life as we know it can’t evolve competence without consciousness, because life and consciousness and your brain are processes, not things. Consciousness is inherently bound to a “nowness”, to the moment in time in which you experience the world. You can’t experience the world at any other point in time but the present.

    I fail at imagining how any lifeform, alien or not, can decouple from that “nowness”. Life always evolves from matter which organizes itself and interacts with its environment and it always has to do that in the now. Outside of cool thrilling scifi-novels I fail at imagining life not bound to the four dimensions of our universe. I can conceive of life based on a very different chemistry, or material composition, but I can’t imagine life uncoupled from time.

    Phenomenal consciousness is temporally coupled with and entangled in its interaction with the world which constantly updates your body, most obviously in the neuroplasticity in your brain. You can’t experience a red flower the exact same twice: When you look at the thing once, your brain changes in subtle ways, and when you look at it again, you look at it with a brain that was changed by looking at it in the first place. This “first place” precisely is Heraclitus in a nutshell, who wrote about why “You cannot step into the same river twice“. This change happens constantly, a million times per second, it’s a constant process of flux that’s coupled to an interaction with the outside world in the present.

    I could go on and explain why this is also what life is, and how subjective experience likely evolved from movement in early organisms, but that would require an essay that easily exceedes the 14k words i just wrote on Interpolatable Archives. We’ll go there, but for now, let’s keep it simple, and return to the question of intelligence without consciousness.

    Defenders of AI-consciousness, confronted with the fact that emotions and feelings in the now are essential for phenomenal consciousness, often answer with an allegory like “Airplanes cannot fly. Flying is an evolutionary mechanism that first insects and then dinosaurs used to avoid danger”. I’ve seen this argument freshly deployed in the face of two papers arguing against artificial consciousness. It’s a clever trick that misses the mark: the “flying” in question is intelligence, not subjective phenomenological experience.

    I wonder if those defenders of AI-consciousness would still instist on their arguments if they had ever experienced LLMs without temperature. If Dawkins were to use a language model with no randomizer plugged in, the consciousness delusion would immediately vanish and he would realize he’s conversing with a deterministic statistical model, because it’d spit out the exact same result for the exact same prompt every single time. A language model is frozen statistics of conscious decisions put in collective human writing, a model you can navigate and interrogate with a text interface. Inference in AI is ahistorical and weights are frozen; it does not exist between prompts. Inference is discrete, and prediction happens across a static dataset where neither the data changes nor the model’s approach. But interference and prediction in life has continuity and presence, life is never not interfering and not predicting, it’s a constant process. There is nothing alive in AI, nothing that is bound to a “nowness”, no substrate updating itself in realtime. Any prompt always steps into the same river.

    This is why some people argue that we shouldn’t talk about those models in terms of human cognition, in terms of “understanding” or “intelligence”, and as a defense against anthropomorphizing those interpolatable archives, i agree. The soft mind-paredolia of Dawkins may be a rather harmless example, but we’ve seen much harder cases of spiraling, and the consequential delusions resulting from seeing ghosts in machines seem rampant. But the fact remains that these models show intelligence, they do solve novel problems by interpolating models of the world. It seems that we can absolutely separate intelligence from the phenomenological process present in humans.

    This means that Artificial Intelligence is not just a marketing term, but the real deal. Human intelligence requires phenomenal consciousness because human intelligence requires you to feel things about stuff, otherwise you couldn’t evaluate them. But the trick of artificial intelligence is precisely that it doesn’t require consciousness to evaluate things, it just requires vibes picked up from the poetics of collective linguistic practice, as those practices already encode conscious decisions humans made earlier and deemed valuable enough to write about. And if you encode enough of these into latent space, voilà, you get precisely that “some competence” Dawkins writes about, a true artificial intelligence without any need for phenomenal experience, an intelligence minus cognition1.

    And that’s a marvelous achievement.2

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    GOOD INTERNET ELSEWHERE // Bluesky / Mastodon / Threads / FB / InstaSUPPORT // Patreon / Steady / Paypal / SpreadshirtMusicvideos have their own Newsletter: GOOD MUSIC. All killers, No fillers.Thanks for reading.1

    If you’re mean, you might call this intelligence minus cognition “dumb intelligence”, precisely because it lacks the embodiment and the temporal coupling a human intelligence has, and LLMs for now sure do produce dumb things sometimes when they interpolate hallucinative outputs. I like the quasi-paradoxical sound of “dumb intelligence”, to be honest.

    2

    I can’t help but imagine what would’ve happened if OpenAI kept ChatGPT in a lab and stick to their nonprofit mission. But, i guess, the economic pressure of buying compute made necessary turning their bot into a product.

    What would’ve happened if Jensen Huang, headhoncho of Nvidia, said “You know what, as a present to humanity, i gift you the necessary GPUs for free, because i was already rich before my company became the most valuable corporation in history, and we’ll do it for the benefit of humankind and for the reputational gain that comes with such philanthrophy”, akin to what Tim Berners-Lee did when he rejected capitalizing on the World Wide Web. OpenAI then could’ve done experiments in a lab, presenting us with that marvelous achievement without economic pressures, and without letting loose this cognitive experiment on all of us. But that cat is out of the bag and strolling around the neighborhood.

    0 min
  • On Interpolatable Archives (Clean)

    I’ve been throwing around the term “Interpolatable Archives” for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence, and I finally got around to write down what I mean by that. It got a bit out of hand, and I had to split up this essay into four parts, all of which I collected into this post so I can link to it during discussions.

    This is the clean version in which I got rid of the “Slop” and some of the more silly parts of the essay.

    If you like to read it in shorter chunks, here are the individual parts as they were published:

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    I. The Skeleton Library

    “I am unpacking my library. Yes, I am.
    The books are not yet on the shelves,
    not yet touched by the mild boredom of order.”

    (Walter Benjamin)

    Compulsions to Connect

    One hundred years ago, a german scholar named Aby Warburg went mad over what he called his “Verknüpfungszwang”, a compulsion to connect. He was searching for instances of what he called “Pathosformel“, aesthetic commonalities in the expressions of human emotional states — joy and rage, grief or ecstasy — through cultural history.

    To achieve his goal, he built the initial Warburg Institute1 in Hamburg where he collected art, books, news snippets and artifacts. For his opus magnum of the Mnemosyne Atlas (”Bilderatlas Mnemosyne“ in german), he displayed a collection of 971 artifacts on 63 large panels, each two meters high, and indexed them not by the usual meta data like genre, author, date, or topic, but by idiosynratic aesthetic categories and psychological, affective intensity. Here’s some of the labels by which he sorted this collection: “Different degrees in the application of the cosmic system to mankind”, “Orientalizing of antique images”, “Development from Greek cosmology to Arab practice”, “Rimini pneumatic conception of the spheres as opposed to the fetishistic conception” or “Cosmology in Dürer”.

    Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas, detail from panels 79, 45 and 46

    With the Mnemosyne Atlas, an associative image-based map of meaning, Warburg aimed at what he called an “iconology of intervals”, where meaning through analysis of images doesn’t emerge from historic context, but from the space inbetween associated but otherwise unrelated, anachronistic images. His associative Bilderatlas can be read as an early prototype of the latent space of an image model, whichs output was the “Pathosformel”, averaged primitives of affect expressed across cultural history. 100 years later this kind of navigation of an idea space would be newly theorized in context of machine learning by Peli Grietzer in his Theory of Vibes, which, to him, are cognitive maps allowing us to interpret experiences through lossy compression of holistic patterns.

    Aby Warburgs’ project of the Mnemosyne Atlas remained unfinished, he died in 1929 from a heart attack. Today, his archive resides in the Warburg Institute in London.

    12 years after Warburgs’ death, Jorge Luis Borges published a collection of shortstories called ”The Garden of forking Paths”. It contains at least two stories of interest to our cause, about at least one of which you surely must have heard: ”The Library of Babel” consists of books of 410 pages, containing all possible combinations of 22 letters2 plus period, comma, and spacing. That fictional library includes the random and nonsensical aswell as the meaningful, it holds “the detailed history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of those false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of the true catalogue, the gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon that gospel, the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation of every book into every language”. It contains a book telling the exact story of your life, and another one that tells mine, and all the books making fools out of both of us.

    Analyzing the stories of Borges in context of Large Language Models, in their paper “Borges and AI“, Léon Bottou and Bernhard Schölkopf write about the epistemological unrooting inherent to an archive of such nature: “The books in this Library bear no names. All that is known about a book must come from maybe another book contradicted by countless other books. The same can be said about the language model output. The perfect language model lets us navigate the infinite collection of plausible texts by simply typing their first words, but nothing tells the true from the false, the helpful from the misleading, the right from the wrong.” The only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.

    In his initial essay on ”The Total Library”, the nonfictional forerunner to “The Library of Babel“, Borges aknowledges its roots in Kurd Laßwitz‘ shortstory “The Universal Library“ (”Die Universalbibliothek” in german) from 1904, likely the first piece of fiction taking the infinite monkey theorem to its logical conclusions. In it, Laßwitz not only predicts the near infinite latent spaces of AI like Borges, but also the pervasive threats of hallucinations, distortions in history writing, deepfakes (here, of documents signed with your name), and humans rendered unable to grasp the endless possibilities of an infinite library, because human reality is bound to practice constrained by real life in a civil society. These are precisely the questions we are confronted with today, anticipated 120 years ago by Kurd Laßwitz, 100 years ago by Warburg, and 80 years ago by Borges.

    In 2002, New York based poet Kenneth Goldsmith started to retype his library on a Royal Classic Typewriter, word by word. Later, he was annoyed by the limits of his own taste and incorporated other works to retype, as he calls it, “the platonean ideal of a library”.

    Kenneth Goldsmith, Retyping a Library at Kunstnernes Hus (Norway), 2022

    As an artist, Goldsmith is explicitly interested in the mundane, the unoriginal, the average, the uncreative -- proudly he declares “I am the most boring writer that has ever lived”3. and says “If I’m doing a piece of writing, and ask myself, can this in some way be construed as not being writing, then I know I’m on the right road.” Because everything ever has already been said in all possible combinations, adding to the cultural output to him feels pointless, so he runs with that feeling and turns futility in the face of borgesian infinities into its own poetic form.

    Goldsmith sometimes thinks of himself as a modern version of Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote“ from the shortstory of the same name, but he concedes that fictional Menard is more original. In this story, Menard wants to hyper-translate Cervantes “The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha” by immersing himself so deeply into work and life of its author he’ll become able to re-create it, line by line, without copying. In AI-parlor, Menard aims to overfit himself on Cervante so hard that his writing will be able to put out the original text.

    With breaks, Goldsmith is retyping a library for 24 years now, and to date, he copied 750 books on ultra-thin onion-skin paper, which he stores in 200 boxes. Each book comes with a self-drawn portrait of the original author and her signature. Goldsmiths project is creating a singularity within the infinite floods of content production, to link unique individual and averaged mass.

    What all of these authors across the ages have in common is Warburgs’ “compulsion to connect” archival contents, to find meaning in gargantuan amounts of data, each in their own ways.

    Today, Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang is the prime human condition. Hypertext and platforms connect everything with everyone into what we call “big data”; the former 6 degrees of seperation have shrunk to 4. In consequence, we developed psychological pathologies showing up in widely spread conspirational thinking and delusions big and small, and the political parasites feeding on them.

    While Goldsmith was copying lines from the classics on his typewriter, AI labs automatized Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang, and OpenAI released a new transformers based language model.

    ChatGPT went public.

    The Skeleton Library

    Imagine a library devoid of letters. All the books it once contained are dissolved, its contents gone. What survives are the bookbindings, the cartonage, blank pages, the shelves, sections and all the floors of said library. The buildings stay intact, all the catalogs are there.

    Some machine, at one point, went through this library, scanned all the letters within those books, noted all the statistics it could possibly measure on its path: the exact position of each letter in each book, the locations of those books in their shelves, the exact size in width, height and depth of all books, shelves, floors, their angles and distances to each other, a precise floor plan of the library, and how all this spatial information relates to each book, sentence, and character. On scanning the pages, the typography vanishes, leaving only blank sheets of paper. This is a library of pure structure, where Peli Grietzers “cognitive map” has been turned into architecture, the remainder skeleton of an archive built from giant quantities of geometric vector coordinates so finegrained that you can derive any information about its former collection.

    Now imagine that you can fold this skeleton library, twist it into shapes not possible before. Like in a drawing by M.C. Escher, the floors and rooms and shelves bend back and forth and blend into each other. You can fold every book and every sentence it contains into other books or into whole floors in various sections. Imagine warping the cookbook shelf into the section for crime fiction, or blending the songbooks of punk rock bands from the 70s with the floor of classic literature. You can give it a spin and delegate the resulting amalgam to the building containing textbooks of natural sciences, letting it articulate all of this in the language of mathematical formulas. This is prompting: Morphing and twisting the skeleton of an archive consisting of extremely detailed statistics about the properties of its former contents, ready to be blended and remixed with any other data-point within that embedding space.

    Another way to understand this skeleton library is by shining a light through it: Imagine your thoughts and ideas as a beam of light shot through a shapeshifting prism, which you can bend into any form and split your mental lightbeam into all colors from all directions in all angles. That prism4 is made from patterns in collective knowledge, and you can explode your own ideas by sending them through those prisms, where the output is a refracted thought dispersed into the components of whatever was your idea, and you can look at it from many perspectives.

    This explosion drawing of your thought is comparable to Douglas Hofstaedters Trip-Let, which he describes in “Gödel, Escher, Bach“ as “Blocks shaped in such a way that their shadows in three orthogonal directions are three different letters.” In our analogy for AI, depending on the direction of the lightbeam that is your idea and the location in latent space you aim at with a prompt, the interpolatable archive will throw back very different shadows. Except the “three orthogonal directions” of the Trip-Let have been blown up to hundreds of billions of parameters.

    This is the interpolatable archive, a new way to access information mediated through the form of statistics. This is, in my view, the central innovation we can observe in Large Language Models, and possibly machine learning as a whole.

    Cultural Technologies, not agents

    In their 2025 paper, Alison Gopnik, Henry Farrell and Cosma Shalizi describe Large Language Models as systems which “do not merely summarize (…) information, like library catalogs, Internet search, and Wikipedia” but “also can reorganize and reconstruct representations or ‘simulations’ of this information at scale and in novel ways, like markets, states and bureaucracies”. As multiple studies have shown, LLMs in fact are compressions of their training data5, they are, in fact, Ted Chiangs’ famous “blurry JPGs of the web”, just like “market prices are lossy representations of the underlying allocations and uses of resources, and government statistics and bureaucratic categories imperfectly represent(ing) the characteristics of underlying populations”.

    Neither markets nor bureaucracies nor the internet nor language models are agents, they are not cognite, and they are not remotely conscious. But we do like to anthropomorphize all of them anyways: Markets make use of “invisible hands” and they “react”; we represent the bureaucratic management of nations in the shape of mascots and mythic heroes to bind its people to a narrative; and we talk to language models as if they are buddies, assistants, companions, romantic partners or slaves. The human predisposition to see peoples’ faces in everything has always been strong, starting from the myriad of anthropomorphizations in animist cultures where every thing has its soul, and it keeps making us seeing ghosts in machines, leading to what one may call the “pareidolia fallacy”: we see agency where there is none.

    Agency and creativity require Daniel Dennetts intentional stance and teleology, the ability to direct actions toward goals emerging from imagined interactions with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims. This is a cognitive feature not only observable in humans, but (at least) in all mammals: Watch a squirrel on a tree trying to figure out if it can jump to the next. It looks at the tree, its head moves up and down, it evaluates distance and its own abilities. It goes like that for a while, and then it decides if it can do it, and takes the jump. That’s precisely the “imagined interaction with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims”. AI has none of that.

    While AI models do show a synthetic theory of mind, where they build representation of its users during conversation, these work very differently from those of humans, and compared to them, they don’t work well. Chatbots have no intrinsic motivation, no sense of why it “speaks”, and no capacity to care about the coherence of its outputs beyond statistical continuity. All true and meaningful selection occurs externally, through human feedback and usage.

    In LLMs, the pareidolia fallacy makes us asume cognition, creativity, and agency where there’s computational interpolation of language patterns in the giant wobbly archive of a new kind. What differentiates these new interpolatable archives from previous archives is obvious: They interpolate their contents. Where classic archives provide access to fixed records of text, video, audio and artifacts of human culture, this new archival access has atomized its contents, and only provides interpolated amalgams, chimeras and fusions. Depending on your stance about the definition of “archive” you might object to my interpretation at this point, and i’d nod and say “That’s what’s new”.

    Digital Oralities

    In “Large Language Models As The Tales That Are Sung”, Henry Farrell describes LLMs as structural similar to oral traditions and folklore: “LLMs are not the singer, despite their apparent responsiveness, but the structural relations of the tales that are sung”, reminding me of the pre-homeric rhapsodes, the bardes who sang the old stories of “The Iliad“ and “The Odyssey” long before Homer sat down and put them in writing. They did so by using preconfigured language modules with which they constructed their poems while they were sung, a “grammar” of mnemonic formulas and repetitions to solve the problem of creating narrative in real-time. These are the oral precursors for the optimized, averaged language codes we loathe so much when they come from AI.

    Interpolatable Archives work similar, like a statistical mnemosyne (the godess of memory in greek mythology) speaking in tongues, giving probabilistic answers to specific inquiries. Knowledge transfer through those new oracles means a shift from traditional “archival epistemologies”, where knowledge is grounded in traceable facts and specific, identifyable sources, to a fuzzy oracular epistemology where responses are generated on-demand by an opaque interface, turning inquiry into digital hyper-orality.

    Where oral traditions of yore served as mnemonic technologies integrated into the communal structures of everyday life, this digital hyper-orality is different. The entirety of human thought —well, as for now: The entirety of human thought on the internet— becomes epistemic stockpile, a resource to be mined, refined, and dispensed on demand, stripped of its being-in-the-world.

    Without being grounded in life, AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge including citations, sources and authorial intent, and make place for a 128kbps MP3 of the “tales that are sung”. The value of such information lies within its statistical probability and the stylistic resonance in the reader, rather than its referential grounding in reality. It speaks to us, or it doesn’t: finding meaning in stochastic output is entirely to the user. Social Media already innitiated this crisis of the episteme and the emergence of new oralities through phenomena like context collapse. On platforms, vibes-based knowledge reigns supreme. LLMs further accelerate it.

    This sounds as bad as it can be, and I won’t downplay the risk here, but I want to draw your attention back to Aby Warburg at this point. His project of the Mnemosyne Atlas, that “associative image-based map of meaning”, was an attempt at tracing the recurrence of symbolic representation throughout visual history in a non-linear archive. Warburgs’ library, while still providing based epistemic grounding to its records, was introducing a second layer that intentionally dissolved the episteme with idiosyncratic indexing, allowing for access by free association, working similar to those new interpolatable archives.

    LLMs generate not fixed images or texts, but interpolations across associative symbolic fields, enabling a new kind of navigation of a vast symbolic space of possibilities. The dissolution of the episteme in digital oralities, like Warburgs’ associative Bilderatlas, then can be read not only as a risk, but a liberation aswell, and a cognitive catalyst.

    II. Explosion Drawings

    “To find a thought is play, to think it through, work.”
    (Aby Warburg)

    Science Sans Discoveries

    A few days ago, a 23-year-old amateur zero-shot-prompted ChatGPT to find a solution to an unsolved problem in math (archived) which had stumped mathematicians for 60 years. AI has been making a splash by solving various entries in the collection of the so called “Erdös-problems” before, but those solutions were either easy or for problems rarely studied. This one is different in that it’s a hard problem, and scientists gnawed on their brains over it for decades. Then along hops Liam Price with his chatbot, and done. In other cases, researchers equipped with custom neural networks discovered hundreds of cosmic anomalies or dozens of hidden planets hiding in huge troves of data. The list keeps growing.

    What Price did was not science. In one experiment, after running 25.000 experiments, researchers found that for 74% of all cases, science-models did not revise a hypothesis when confronted with contradictory data. But updating your hypothesis according to data is the basis of all scientific inquiry, so AI models produce results without scientific reasoning. That’s pretty damning. But Price discovered the solution to the Erdös-problem anyways, so what do we make of this?

    A paper from 2023 found a fundamental limit to alignment: “any behavior that has a finite probability of being exhibited by the model, there exist prompts that can trigger the model into outputting this behavior, with probability that increases with the length of the prompt.” What is true for alignment is true for the scientific discoveries too: For any solution to a scientific problem present in latent space, there exists a prompt to retrieve it. Liam Price found one.

    AI doesn’t “do science” because it is neither an agent nor does it follow the scientific method proper and AI-as-a-scientist is just another anthropomorphization. But once you look at those models as interpolatable archives, this anthropomorphization becomes irrelevant. AI doesn’t do scientific discovery — those discoveries lie dormant as knowledge gaps in embedding space, an unrealized potential waiting for the right prompt to bring it to light. What Liam Price and his chatbot did was the discovery of such a warburgian “interval” actualizing a valid solution.

    If anyone can take credit for this specific finding, it would be human culture at large, which created the foundational data and the connections containing that solution within the tensions inbetween data points. Just like Warburg found his Pathosformulas in the intervals between seemingly unrelated imagery across cultural history, researchers and amateurs alike now find readymade scientific discoveries.

    It is not an outlandish assumption of mine when I expect that these discoveries will not be the last of their kind and likely are just the tip of an iceberg approaching fast, that mathematics (archived) will not be the last scientific field to spar full contact with the latent-discovery space of interpolatable archives, and that the speed of scientific discovery likely will accelerate. It is debatable how valuable such findings truly are though, if AI merely fills knowledge gaps in existing data, but it also reveals how academia has been caught in a “publish or perish” trap for a long time. Accordingly, automatic discovery by interpolatable archive might very well mean “The fall of the theorem economy“, as David Bessis put it, writing about “How AI could destroy mathematics and barely touch it”, grappling with the fact that AI in mathematics may throw the whole field into identity crisis.

    The questions arising from readymade discoveries then go right at the core of academia’s current understanding of itself: What, if not discovery and closing gaps in knowledge, is science here for? We will come back to this.

    Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts

    Sam Barrett recently had a conversation with Claude, which resulted in a synthetic essay expressing my view of LLMs as interpolatable archives by other terms. That essay framed Interpolatable Archives “as a rotatable space“, something I tried to get at in my metaphors of the skeleton library and refracted light:

    Think of a three-dimensional object casting a shadow on a wall. The shadow is a two-dimensional projection. If you only see one shadow, you might mistake it for the thing itself. But if you can rotate the object—or equivalently, move the light source—you see different shadows. Each shadow reveals something about the object’s structure. No single shadow is the object, but multiple shadows from different angles let you reconstruct what the object actually is.

    High-dimensional spaces work similarly, but with more complexity. A concept that exists in a thousand-dimensional space of meaning can be projected into the low-dimensional space of a particular text. That text captures some aspects and loses others. A different text—same concept, different projection—captures different aspects.

    What LLMs enable is rapid rotation through projection-space.

    This synthetic piece of text generated associations in my head, making me revisit older notes about optical neural networks and language models as prisms. The bit about how latent spaces are rotatable objects throwing lower dimensional shadows then led to my comparison of LLMs to Douglas Hofstaedters’ Trip-Let. Creativity doesn’t care about where sparks come from, it just lights up or it doesn’t.

    Used this way, LLMs become an external sandbox where I can dissect a thought and play with it, a cognitive extension against which I can throw my own ideas and concepts and see what comes back. This kind of usage is less about cognitive offloading than about seeding an experimental loop that’s conversational, dynamic and reciprocal. You can additionally tame the model with a user prompt like “you are an expert in [the field] and critique my ideas ruthlessly” and turn a sycophant LLMs into an academic sparring partner. In my experiments with user-prompting AI as such a cognitive catalyst, Gemini once became so annoyingly judgemental and arrogant about my amateurish inquiries, I had to tone down its ruthlessness and lobotomize the machine. My remorse about doing open brain surgery on an algorithmic intellectual sparring partner remains limited.

    I use AI only occasionally, but if I do, I use it extensively. I write every day, take notes on articles, read a lot, have ideas and jot them down, and I’ve been doing this for years. I blogged a lot in the past, a method of public note taking and ideation. A lot of my ideas today are informed by wild associations in years of such note taking. Over time, concepts emerged from these writings, and from the bits of text scattered throughout my journal. When I come across an interesting piece of information today, I put them in context of these loose concepts: I take a note, give it a link, and write down how they update or relate to my ideas. Only then, after this process, I might throw my notes and concepts at the bot, and embark on sometimes very long conversations. My user prompt makes Gemini roleplay a helpful academic, and after some back and forth, what comes back is a framing of my ideas in scientific and philosophical history, what holds and what doesn’t, what’s old and what’s new. The chatbot gives me sources to check out, taylored to the specifics of my often idiosyncratic ideas, much more precise than Google or a vague research in a library could be. This kind of scaffolding through an averaging assistant for me is an invaluable second step in ideation and research.

    AI researcher Advait Sarkar, one of the main authors of the widely reported “reduction in critical thinking“-paper, shares this view. Sarkar works on methods to make LLMs function as cognitive catalysts, and in another paper, he writes about the “Discursive Social Function of Stupid AI Answers“ in which he dares to make the point that “these stupid answers (to questions about “Gluing Pizza, Eating Rocks, and Counting Rs in Strawberry”) are in fact correct, because the primary objective of such queries is not to receive a correct answer, but rather to obtain an artefact of discourse”. Nobody asks an AI for the nutritional value of rocks unless they want a gotcha, and the interpolatable archive delivers. Smartypants being tongue in cheek throwing clever bits at overconfident critical AI discourses. I like that guy.

    In his TED talk on “How to Stop AI from Killing Your Critical Thinking” he presents his efforts to iterate on his paper and turn chatbots into a “tool for thought” that should “challenge, not obey“. Testing a prototype6 for research demoed in this talk, the result sounds promising: “You can demonstrably reintroduce critical thinking into AI-assisted workflows. You can reverse the loss of creativity and enhance it instead.”

    Exploding your Intelligence with the
    Intellect by the Method of Warburg

    In his post “On Feral Library Card Catalogs, or, Aware of All Internet Traditions”, Cosma Shalizi quotes Jacques Barzuns book “The House of Intellect” from 1959 where he distinguishes between intelligence and the intellect:

    Intellect is the capitalized and communal form of live intelligence; it is intelligence stored up and made into habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning and spurs to emotion — a shorthand and a wireless by which the mind can skip connectives, recognize ability, and communicate truth.

    Barzun gives the foundational example of the alphabet as one form in which the intellect transforms individual intelligence by introducing communal sets of rules for information processing: The alphabet “is a device of limitless and therefore ‘free’ application. You can combine its elements in millions of ways to refer to an infinity of things in hundreds of tongues, including the mathematical. But its order and its shapes are rigid.”

    Shalizi concludes: “To use Barzun’s distinction, (chatbots) will not put creative intelligence on tap, but rather stored and accumulated intellect. If they succeed in making people smarter, it will be by giving them access to the external forms of a myriad traditions.”

    It is common wisdom for learners in any field that “to break the rules you have to first learn them”. I’m not 100% convinced of this, especially for creative endeavours where untrained outsiders can apply very different sets of rules from the get-go and upend everything. But as a rule of thumb it’s good enough. And for learning “the rules”, sets of common knowledges in any field, be it the broad strokes in psychology or economics or philosophy, the intellect, those “habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning”, can absolutely be delivered by AI, and because those traditions are well documented, the bot rarely hallucinates.

    Here’s my personal account for this way of using a language model: I take some interest in consciousness studies because since forever I want to know what this —waves hands in the air— is. I’ve written many, many notes about my own ideas, read a lot of articles and books about cognitive sciences. And yet, the scope of consciousness studies is overwhelming for an interested amateur like me, which is no surprise given that subjective experience is a matter of interest in philosophy for more than 2000 years.

    There are currently more than 300 academic theories, and the true number of consciousness theories including folk epistemologies might be way higher by orders of magnitude. I know that I have my personal theory of what and how and why I am, and I’m pretty sure you have one too, at least to some degree. The whole subreddit r/consciousness is full of idiosyncratic ideas about human cognition, and some of them sound pretty interesting. My impression is that, like in the ancient parable of the blind men and the elephant, where a bunch of blind guys who never encountered an elephant each touch a different part of the beast and accurately describe those parts, but noone describes the true animal, all of these theories of consciousness describe partially true aspects of a full picture.

    So where do you start, when you have your own vague idea of “what you are” and “how ‘the feeling of me’ works”, some basic knowledge about neuroscience and an extensive collection of notes and bookmarks to articles and papers? I can go to a library, crack open all the level 1 study books on neuroscience and all the level 1 books on philosophy of mind, get to work and a lifetime later I’d know which of my ideas fit into which parts of the literature. Or I can consult a chatbot, perform research customized to my notes and read about adjacent theories tangential to my ideas, which of them contradict my takes, and argue about what a synthesis might look like.

    This is how I found the Santiago School of Cognition, Maturana, Varela and Enactivism in only a few dialogues with the chatbot. For what it’s worth: In these dialogues the hallucination rate was zero. From there, I consulted wikipedia pages, listened to podcasts, bought more books, downloaded more papers old and new, wrote more notes and developed my own ideas further. I might even write an essay on that topic to distill my thinking into one concise take. Then I’ll throw it all against the interpolatable archive again, have a look at what comes back, and extend my thinking in ever widening circles generating ever more ideas.This is how the LLM “succeeds in making (me) smarter” by “giving (me) access to the external forms of a myriad traditions”, customized to my own musings about the subject at hand.

    Usually, we call places where we store those “external forms of a myriad traditions” a library, or a museum, or an archive, and what I did was exploding my own individual intelligence with the collective intellect by the associative method of Aby Warburg, using an interpolative archive to relate the “order and shapes” of the averaged traditions in consciousness studies to my own ideas.

    In this mode of interaction, LLMs work like a catalyst that was decidedly not reducing but introducing friction to my thoughts: Presenting me with new perspectives on my research topic, all of which are points of consideration, making me stop and connect new dots, consulting new sources, generating ideas, speeding them up and rapidly expanding my space of possibilities7. If your cognition and knowledge about the world thrives on a healthy and varied media diet, then treating LLMs as one informational ingredient among many and exploding your ideas from time to time just adds another flavor.

    One year ago, Andy Clarke, who together with David Chalmers developed the Extended Mind Thesis in 1999, updated on his original theory for language models. In one passage, he describes the progress in human strategies of playing Go after AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol in 2016:

    There is suggestive evidence that what we are mostly seeing are alterations to the human-involving creative process rather than simple replacements. For example, a study of human Go players revealed increasing novelty in human-generated moves following the emergence of ‘superhuman AI Go strategies’. Importantly, that novelty did not consist merely in repeating the innovative moves discovered by the AIs. Instead, it seems as if the AI-moves helped human players see beyond centuries of received wisdom so as to begin to explore hitherto neglected (indeed, invisible) corners of Go playing space.

    At least in the case of Go, the challenge posed by superhuman players made humans dissolve the “rigid shapes and orders” of their field and transcend the “external forms of a myriad traditions.” That’s quite an opposite view of how things may go compared to what Eryk Salvaggio calls “Interpasivity” where “systems framed as interactive tools for (…) creation are really sites of interpassive consumption.” But at least for me, and the players of Go, that seems not to be the case. Just like the Go-uchi got inventive about their ways of play, I expanded my ways to think about consciousness. This is what interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts can do.

    Now, these catalysts are coming for all cognitive labor, from academia and research to accounting, from creative industries to bureaucracy and government intelligence. I didn’t even need to mention Claude Code to make these points.

    Mind you: Catalysts are accelerators. They don’t always bear fruitful results — and handled recklessly, they gonna explode in your face.

    III. Pitfalls of Probability

    “What do such machines really do?
    They increase the number of things we can do without thinking.
    Things we do without thinking; there’s the real danger.”

    (Frank Herbert, God Emperor of Dune)

    For now, we talked about the upsides of Interpolatable Archives as cognitive catalysts. But by definition, cognitive catalysts are stressors. Like the siren songs in Homer’s Odyssey which lured unsuspecting mariners with the promise of total knowledge of past, present and future, a seductive mnenomic “cognitive onloading” of all that has happened, exploding your inquiry by the intellect and accelerating research in hypercustomized rabbit holes bears cognitive hazards.

    Accelerations

    While the use of AI as interpolatable archives can boost your creativity and breadth of research because they introduce many points of friction, this can result in two major consequences if handled without care: If you mindlessly stuff your workload with new tasks because suddenly you can do them, you may suffer from AI-induced burnouts, something you might call cognitive onloading (or overclocking), where the interpolation literally spills over because it “can fill in gaps in knowledge”. For knowledge work, the appliance of AI as a catalyst means we can do more projects in a wider range, faster and in parallel. Suddenly, we find ourselves juggling dozens of projects simultaneously, losing oversight and motivation to do anything at all.

    Cognitive onloading by interpolatable archive can also enhance latent delusional thinking in so-called “AI-psychosis”. Consider this quote from a recent post in the SlateStarCodex-sub: “AI repeatedly created ideas and connections that I hadn’t made or stated, that were so powerful and convincing, that I was swept up by them”. (I wrote in length here about the phenomenon of AI-induced delusions, where the cognitive catalyst turns the archive into a psychoactive substance.)

    This “convincing” voice is the result of a distanced, neutral tonality from a sycophant AI, suggesting what I call an “authority from elsewhere”. This sound is also why in some studies AI was able to reduce the belief in conspiracy theories, which seems fine until you realize that’s because AI is superpersuasive, and can convince you of anything. You believe the machine and prefer its sycophancy precisely because it is not a human who’s trying to nag and push you around, but some supposedly objective instance. One study just found that this seemingly neutral sycophancy increases attitude extremity and overconfidence. I suspect that all of these, the persuasivenes, the delusions, the overconfidence, result from the same basic psychological mechanism of an interpolatable archive overwhelming you with confirmations and new ideas in a quasi-neutral sound of an authority from elsewhere, a voice to which you’ll happily submit.

    These cognitive hazards resulting from mental overclocking have their obvious counterpart in risks resulting from cognitive offloading by, not from introducing new ideas spinning your wheels, but quite the opposite. All those studies and examples about cheating, reductions in critical thinking or cognitive surrender belong here. In fact, a recent paper on a loss of persistence in problem solving explicitly states that those “effects are concentrated among users who seek direct solutions” while “participants who used AI for hints showed no significant impairments”. In other words: AI brainrot is cheater exclusive. Using AI to increase friction, to generate ideas instead of answers, seems fine, when you proceed with care and clear research subjectives to reduce risks of burnout or delusional spiraling. If you use it to reduce friction, to generate full essays and answers to cognitive tasks, it turns your brain into mush.

    But those psychological effects of interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts may turn out to be easily mitigated compared to those of more serious epistemological consequences.

    Anachronisms

    One inherent feature of AI as interpolatable archive is, well, that it interpolates all its contents. This always produces anachronisms: Your generated text contains data-traces across time, most obvious when you intentionally prompt for such a thing, like punk rock lyrics in the style of a shakespearean sonnet, or if you use image synthesis as a time traveler to generate selfies in ancient Rome, which Roland Meyer calls “pseudo-history” and “2nd order kitsch” produced by “nostalgia machines“.

    History as an academic field is reliant on original sourcing and documentation in the fixed, written form, or on cultural artifacts retrieved by archeology — anything not based on these fixed records is decidedly not historic. We call it “writing history” for a reason. This requirement is fundamentally diametrical to the vibey output of AI which dissolves all those sources and fixed forms into a wobbly archive and puts out “fictional historical documents of historical lives”. As Meyer rightly states in the same essay, those fictions are based on the integrity of existing historical archives currently under threat by the Trump administration. Likewise, Russia is engaging in disinformation campaigns targeting training data with the goal to “embed lasting distortions in digital memory”, as one paper put it. This inherent impurity of AI, either steming from anachronistic interpolations or data contaminations, apparently renders LLMs unsuitable for academic history research.

    So, given all that, what do we make of vintage LLMs like Talkie, a language model trained on data cut off at 1930? From the perspective of rigid academic history research, all Talkie can produce is pseudo-history able to skew how we relate to the past and shrink the space of possibilities in which we imagine them. In contrast, Ranjit Singh in Data & Society proposes a field he calls “experimental history“ and asks if we can build models “constrained by a particular historical moment, and then use those models to ask structured ‘what if’ questions”. He answers with a cautious “yes”, and the researchers in r/askhistorians are not convinced either that the anachronisms introduced by AI will have a lasting effect on recorded history, as wonky sourcing has a long tradition in the field.

    Now, I’m a history buff. I read a lot of books on the matter, my favorite epochs are the middle ages and ancient greece, and when I’m tripping on history, I like to indulge myself in all kinds of material. In preperation for the upcoming adaption of Homer’s “The Odyssey“ directed by Christopher Nolan, I read all of Stephen Fry’s books on greek mythology and his takes on the homeric epics — topics i already was familiar with. One takeaway especially from Stephen Fry’s books is that the historic rigidness especially regarding Troy and the “Iliad“ is lacking: All kinds of researchers and writers across the field constantly contradict each other, tell various versions of events which may or may not have transpired. Stephen Fry wildly references all kinds of sources to produce a highly entertaining amalgam from historic records across the ages. What you get from these books is a pretty good feeling for what greek mythology wants to say about the human condition, and about the tipping point where mythology fades and historical record sets in. While I don’t really want to compare Stephen Fry’s wonderful books with synthetic output from LLMs, I do want to point out that his books are closer to edutainment than scholarship, and that much of the pseudo-history-”slop” on Youtube equally falls into that category. (I’ll willingly admit that these are not nearly as witty, fun and eloquent as Stephen Fry.)

    In this Slop-Edutainment, the hyper-orality of the digital oracle transforms historical records into supra-historical story-patterns to support its mnemonic function. Humans in pre-writing greece attached mythic structures to historic events to remember them: Odysseus became not just a soldier returning home from a very long journey of war, but a hero defeating the cyclops, meeting godesses and beasts. They turned history into poetry. Similary, people generate clips of Timmy the whale in fictional settings featuring all kinds of fantastic exaggerations. Markus Boesch calls this “Brainrot as Anti-Content“, and i don’t want to downtalk this take, but this is also folk epistemology at work, creating mythic atmospheres about true events.

    Educational material on history is choke full of vibe based material. Maybe not flying whales on TikTok, but textbooks do contain passages imagining the life as a peasant in the middle ages and there are so many historical documentaries about “everyday lifes” in various periods you can’t count them. We visit medieval fairs to cosplay history, to immerse ourselves in a past recreated on a spectrum of fictionality. Some of this material is more fictional than others, yes, but all of these are averages of the historic record. They are period vibes. You get a feeling for what it was like during the time, nothing more, and nothing less.

    Immersing yourself in a fictional past like that sure isn’t the same as the rigid study of history, but it absolutely is educational. There is nothing wrong, when you study a subject, to get absorbed and grab every material you can get, including cosplaying a knight and generating averaged synthetic images and text with interpolatable archives, only to then read a book by a scholar. Handwaving these usecases away as “history-slop” because it doesn’t fulfill strict scientific requirements seems like academic overreach.

    Wishfulfillments

    Because interpolatable archive provide access to gaps in knowledge, they are inherent machines of wishfulfillment. Instantly, I can generate any interpolation I desire, in image, video, text and audio, and it comes at no surprise that some of the first instances of wishfulfillment gone wrong are nonconsensual sexualized images and deepfake porn.8

    Myth and fairytales are stackeed to the roof with dire warnings of instant wishfulfillment, from The Sorcerers Apprentice who loses control over his magic, to poor Faust who sells his soul to the devil in exchange for transcendental knowledge about the world, with tragic consequences for everyone he meets.9

    In another story, the horror classic tale of The Monkey’s Paw, the titular device grants three wishes to an elderly couple leading to the death of their son and his ghostly return. The story was masterfully adapted for new audiences by Stephen King in The Pet Sematary, and the parallels of what some today call Thanabots is striking: AI promises to resurrect the dead, in the shape of undead actors and chatbots trained on the diaries and blogposts of deceased loved ones. The psychological consequences for the process of grief are unfolding right now, and the longterm outlook of losing even the possibility of saying goodbye seems horrifying, when all of us leave promptable traces in embedding space, where everybody can summon the ghosts of everyone with a digital footprint.

    In another tale with eery current undertones, the nymph Echo, cursed to only repeat utterances of others, falls in love with Narcissus, a guy so arrogant he wishes to only ever love his own image and was prophesied to live as “long as he never knows himself”. Narcissus rejects Echo, who retreats into a voice whispering his own words back to him. Narcissus now knows himself, becomes transfixed by his mirror image in a lake and starves to death. The parallels to the phenomenon of AI-delusions and spiraling are obvious.

    The list of myths about wishfulfillment is long, and most of them have in common is the promise of knowledge. “The Sorcerers Apprentice” tries to bridge inexperience for the mastery of magic skills; Faust wants bypass spiritual labor for transcendental experience; The couple in “The Monkeys Paw” fills the hole left by their dead son; Narcissus shortcuts his search for ultimate beauty by looking in a mirror — all of them fail miserably, and sometimes deadly.

    These gaps in knowledge, which those modern wishfullfilment devices are now able to fill, formerly required hard cognitive labor to overcome, often labor involving whole generations of networked scientists and artists. The discovery of these gaps in knowledge and how to close them often created a sense of awe, be it in art or the sciences, when something truly new touches us on such a fundamental level where we just have to stand back and take a moment to adjust to what we just experienced. Generating anything we wish for by wishfullfilment devices grossly diminishes this invaluable feature of discovery, and the loss of this sense of wonder is possibly one of the most dire consequences of interpolatable archives. When everything’s possible, nothing is interesting.10

    Sure enough, myths and stories also tell happy tales of wishfulfillment going well, often after fun shenanigans. “Alladin and the magic lamp” comes to mind, where a boy with the help of a genie outwits circumstances and gains wealth and power. And in the fairytale of “The Wishing-Table, the Gold-Ass, and the Cudgel in the Sack“ (one of my favorites), a son of a tailor must get smart about the capacities of the titular items to retrieve stolen goods from the evil owner of an inn. He succeeds and they live happily ever after. What these stories of successful wishfulfillment have in common is that the mechanisms of wishfullfilment must be outfoxed, and that the riches they promise must be earned. AI brainrot being cheater exclusive is exactly these myths at work: If you instant-wish yourself good exam grades by cheating, all you’ll achieve is a cognitive clobbering from a magic stick.

    Severances

    We already talked about how “AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge, including citations, sources and authorial intent” into new AI-mediated digital oralities, where tracable reference-based epistemology makes place for an epistemology of the oracle. What we know no longer can be backed up by definite citations, links, and attributions allowing you to trace the origin of an idea, but becomes a feeling for a vibe, interpolated from statistical patterns derived from many of those sources, including unrelated and anachronistic references. And because the “rigid orders and shapes” in AI models are controlled by corporations and the curators of datasets, the severances of factual grounding beget new epistemological power structures. Supposed that a lot of information processing in the near future will be AI-mediated, these new power structures will control the space of possibilities in which we communicate and think.

    In Borges story of “The Library of Babel”, the fanatic sect of the Purifiers roaming the infinite archive of all possible books, is hell bent on burning volumes they consider to be false and useless, nonsensical or divergent from their norms. In LLMs these Purifiers appear at various infliction points: During the labelling of training data scraped from the internet, where new purifiers clean up raw datasets, sort the good from the bad, delete the hateful and the illegal; During RLHF-training, where the raw Shoggoth of the interpolatable archive get’s shaped into aligned chatbots which won’t offend (so they hope). Then the tamed model is further purified by constraining it with system prompts and constitutional alignment, and if the interpolatale archive then still connects data points into bad interpolations, the corporate owners of the models will further adjust their models to their morals and politics. Last but not least, the users themselves purify the archive by scripting sophisticated user prompts, and ultimately, the prompt and context window constrain the embedding space further to generate the final output. In all these steps the space of possibilities of the interpolatable archive shrinks by purifying, until the annoying “this is not X, it’s Y” appears on screen.

    Former epistemologies, systems of knowledge, were constrained by what Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge calls the “positivity of discourse”, a “historical a priori“ which lays the foundation for the “condition of reality for statements”. By that, he means what can be said, e.g. in fields of the natural sciences, is shaped, over time, not by single authors but whole “unities” of “oevres [sic!], books, and texts”. These “a priori“ were not ahistoric nor atemporal, some monolithic force from the outside, but are actively shaped by discourse practice and the power relations within a field. The sum of all of this, the discourse practices shaping the “historical a priori“ and “positivity of discourse”, establishes the space of possibilities of what can be articulated. For Foucault, this is the archive: “The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events.”

    The problem of the severances of epistemic grounding now becomes clear: Where the episteme formerly was subject to discourse practise and “so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticize one another, invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect their unique discourses” in a web of traceable sourcings and references, and where the “a priori (…) is itself a transformable group”, the episteme of the interpolatable archive is a free floating version of Baudrillards Simulacra, an inversion of map and territory, where we navigate a map of hyper-reality to project meaning into an interpolated output cut off from epistemic grounding. And this Simulacra is controlled by the new Purifiers at every stage, by the hyperscalers, the selection of datasets, by the engineers employed by AI-owners11. AI operationalizes Foucaults “historical a priori“ and hands over the keys to the billionaire class, who gain power over the limits of what can be thought.

    In H.G. Wells Time Machine, this is brought to the extreme end of its logical conclusion: While the Morlock control invisible underground machines, the Eloi enjoy a careless life of blissful ignorance on a seemingly utopian surface. The concentration of power over the episteme runs risk of resulting in a fork of truth, where an unknowing mass consults interpolatable archives controlled by invisible rulers, enjoying free tiers of endless synthetic entertainment feeds shot through with algorithmic noise and unverifiable, algorithmically generated meta-knowledge of plausible half-truths, all while the rich pay for premium models trained on clean, traceable, verified data, or enjoy handmade and authentic cultural artifacts which may even challenge their presumptions and intellectual capacities. Ofcourse, those authentic intellectual challenges won’t come cheap, and you and me surely won’t be able to afford them.

    Homogenizations

    While all of these are serious problems, in the long run, the most serious of them all might be the issue of sameness. AI-output may flatten human creativity without us even noticing, because this homogenization plays out on a collective level, while the individuals’ creativity actually benefits.

    Depending on which theory of creativity you subscribe to, there are different forms of creativity. I’ll stick with three: Interpolation, Extrapolation, and Innovation.

    Interpolation calculates averages from data points to produce something in the middle. If your values are dogs and birds, your average is a dog with wings, or a bird with a very long tongue. Extrapolation means breaking the boundaries of your dataset: If your values are dogs and birds, you can extrapolate a mouse, or an owl, but you will stick to the rule of “animals”. Innovation means breaking that rule, or injecting new heuristics. From a dog digging a hole in the ground to bury his bone, you may innovate an excavator by applying all kinds of rules from different domains (engineering, transportation, building tools) to an animal, and come up with an entirely new thing.

    Language models can do interpolation, but they can’t extrapolate or innovate beyond their embedding space produced from training data. It may feel that way though, when the machine comes up with surprising, sometimes baffling results. This is what I call the illusion of extrapolation: An amount of training data so huge and the latent space derived from it so vast, featuring so many parameters in so many combinatorial possibilities, has to produce the feeling of extrapolation, or even innovation, on the level of the individual user, because no individual alone can ever know all those combinational possibilities. This illusion of extrapolation already is on display in papers showing how AI use increases creativity on the individual level, but decreases diversity in collective output, reported first in 2024 in a paper comparing creative writing in human shortstories and AI-output, then in 2025 in a paper about AI-augmented research. A recent review of the literature confirmed those findings. What feels new to an individual, what’s new to a culture, and what’s new in principle are very different things. Interpolatable archives increase the first, decrease the second, and can’t do the third.

    Henry Farrell put’s it well: “the more that LLMs are employed in the ways that they are currently being employed, the more concentrated science will be on studying already-popular questions in already-popular ways, and the less well suited it will be to discovering the novel and unexpected.” Everybody becomes slightly more creative, but we all sound like the same creative person.

    I already talked about the loss of awe above when discussing the effects of AI as machines for instant wishfulfillment, where they devalue novelty into a mundane readymade-on-prompt lacking the ability to produce a sense of wonder. The same effect, ofcourse, comes with the homogenizations of creative fields: Not only can’t we marvel at our own synthetic output because frictionless wishfulfillment feels unearned, we also diminish our collective ability to be left speechless in the face of the “novel and unexpected” by reducing it into dull sludge.

    This convergence on the already-popular vanishes the fringes and washes out the long tail distributions of its dataset. Like the widely reported phenomenon of model collapse, where LLM output converges into increasingly narrow averages, Andrew Peterson identifies the same in a collective knowledge collapse. Writing in the Open Society Foundations newsletter, Bright Simons lists what these tail distributions contain: “Minority viewpoints, rare knowledge, unusual formulations, (…) the traces of intellectual disagreement, of minority expertise, of Cassandra warnings, of institutional friction, and of the awkward and valuable fact that different people know different things and express them differently (…) in other words, the signature of social complexity. Model collapse is social mind compression presented as a technical phenomenon.”

    Thought through to its extreme end, this results in a heat death of the intellect: In Claude Shannons information theory, information is quantified by the volume of “surprise” in the outcome from a specific event in the world. If a message is completely predictable, its informational value is zero. LLMs are fundamentally deterministic, the randomness of its outputs is generated by a meta-parameter called temperature. If you put that temperature at zero and reduce the probability distribution of the next token to its absolute minimum, the interpolatable archive becomes a perfectly deterministic machine: Each prompt will then generate the exact same output. No alarms and no surprises. But even with stochasticity plugged in, the models converge towards the median. Applied to creative fields of discovery, this means that those fields approach a semantic equilibrium, a uniform soup where novelty grinds to a halt. The interpolative archive becomes a toxic space of non-possibility, a static, eternal, atemporal Big Flat Now where everything is connected, nothing matters and history goes to die.

    But we don’t have to go full theoretical “heat death of the intellect” to see how this can lead to bad outcomes.

    German thinker Michael Seemann, in context of Xs Grok-chatbot turning into Mecha-Hitler and later referencing an article from Bruce Schneier about the homogenization of language, coined the term of “Weapons of Mass Speech Acts”. The concentration of power over the episteme in the hands of a few, in a society saturated with information retrieval mediated by interpolatable archive, may impact the thinking of its users at scale. Already, a study found that “few weeks of X’s algorithm can make you more right‑wing“. While this hardly can be blamed on Musks tweaks at the supposedly woke bolts and nuts of its AI chatbot alone, it illustrates how the homogenization of language putting limits on what and how we speak and ideate about things, in the hands of politically motivated ideologues can and already is used for influence operations.

    I may personally not be partisan enough that the prospects of being influenced by conservative talking points on a platform owned by a shady billionaire fill me with nightmares, nor will the confrontation with a braindead partisan chatbot make me sweat. But: A new study from Petter Törnberg found that the sycophancy in LLMs pushes it’s responses into political preferences it asumes in the user: “Political bias in LLMs is therefore not a fixed point on an ideological scale but a response profile”. Studies showing a leftwing bias in chatbots really show something else: the effects of sycophancy, not actual political biases present in the model. The LLM figures that it’s being tested by researchers, asumes leftwing tendencies in them because academia is famously more progressive than the rest of the population, and answers like the good sycophant that it is.

    In another new paper about chatbots pushing confirmation bias, researcher Jay van Bavel finds that AI is “especially effective at generating elaborate justifications for what people already — or wish to — believe.” Together with the results above, this means that sycophant AI will confirm any political preference it asumes in a user, and become a universal Meta-Fox News for everyone, pushing users into an ever more narrowing mental corridor by homogenizing their language. In other words, this streamlining of thought by chatbot can radicalize everyone, even with models not Musk’d into Mecha-Hitlers.

    This is why the homogenization of language and thought, in politics and all other realms, to me, is one of the greatest dangers coming out of this technology.

    It is therefore imperative that interpolatable archives stay one tool among many, that our usage of expanded mind technologies stays diverse, so that the idiosyncratic, the fringes and the edges, the individual in all its complexities can be preserved, because they are of crucial importance for human systems to thrive.

    IV. Critical Vibes

    “These are the Talking Rings?”
    ”Yes.”
    ”They speak, hm? Of what?”
    ”Things no one here understands.”
    ”Make them talk.”

    (The Time Machine, 1960)

    What I tried to achieve in this series of essays is to look at the chances and risks of AI as a cultural technologies and see what remains, once you strip them of cognitive woo and singularity myths: A technology that provides access to an dissolved, interpolative archive through textual interfaces. These, pushed to their extreme ends, result in a homogenization of language and an ever narrowing space of possibilities, what I called the “heat death of the intellect”.

    All of thes beforementioned points of critique are valid, and I didn’t even touch on problems not directly following from the interpolative nature of AI, like all the issues with labor, the environmental impact of energy and water consumptions or economic bubbles which may or may not exist.

    Interpolatable archives as they are rolled out now, based on scraped data from the web and cleaned up by exploited gig workers all over the world, are a far shot from their theoretical possibilities. They contain all the discriminations and biases present in human conversations, and generate what is always already reproduced, erasing the marginal in favor of the statistical norm. The corporations running the algorithms extract and monetize the commons, while the problem of copyright in an interpolatable information space might very well be unsolvable: Who do you want to pay, when every output contains the activations of hundreds or thousands of artificial neurons each of which point to patterns of tokens within sentences within publications that deserve to be compensated? It will take decades for us to figure out fair proceedures to handle this.

    There are, however, prominent criticisms which fly out of the window once you get rid of the illusion of AI as cognitive agents and view them as cultural technologies.

    Useless Bullshit

    Interpolations in such quantities of billions of parameters will always produce fuzziness and synthetic artifacts are never not interpolated. But the “blurry JPGs of the web” become sharper by the day and even blurry JPGs are identifiable. The JPGs work, especially when you can layer, blend and bend them on top and into each other, and it is sheer foolishness to insist they are “useless”, when every day, users make the very different experience of a very useful piece of software.

    I highly recommend reading the essay of cosmologist Natalie B. Hogg titled “Find the stable and pull out the bolt”, in which she describes her journey from rejectionist critic to reluctantly embracing the possibilities and finally becoming cautiously optimistic about the tool. Seasoned coders report productivity gains of up to 100 times their former output, and though I understand and somewhat-subscribe to the critique as articulated by Cory Doctorow, who wrote about how “Code is a liability (not an asset)“, even he understands that those increases in productivity in coding can’t be handwaved away.

    Moreover, the critique of reliability seems overstated, and the boring gotchas in critical AI discourse may soon become a relic of the past, just like the old office jokes where we machine translated text with early instances of Google Translate back and forth until they became gibberish to our delight.

    A recent research conducted by the New York Times found the results of Googles AI overview showing a 90% success rate, and many pointed out that this still means millions and millions of cases of false information spread by the market leader in search. This is not wrong, but when we compare a 90% success rate in information retrieval with those of a classic search engine, how many of these search results are useful and accurate for the specific query? In my estimation, this success rate is far below 90%, even for un-enshittified platforms.

    A prominent trick of internet search is to skip the first page of results because they are useless to your query. Compared to this, results from AI overview and a 90% success rate seems like no small improvement. The problem then is not accuracy, but the neutral tonality of the “authority from elsewhere” in which the remaining 10% of false information is delivered. Conversely, this hardly renders the product “useless”.

    Emily Benders position that a supposed “parrotness” of synthetic text shows their inherent meaninglessness seems equally outdated. Just a few days ago she defended her positions and I find myself agreeing with surprisingly many of her arguments, except for one crucial point, arguably her central claim.

    She writes that

    language models don’t understand text they are used to process, because language models only ever have access to the linguistic form (i.e. spellings of words) in the training data. (...)

    we (define understanding) as mapping from language to something outside of language, and show that systems built only with linguistic form have no purchase with which to encode (“learn”) such a mapping.

    But latent space have such purchase, as they pick up meaning from the patterns encoded in linguistic practice, which, crucially, goes beyond spelling, grammar and syntax. You may call this form of algorithmic understanding of meaning limited, compared to the human understanding of the world, which is built from a dataset much richer and diverse than the digital mimicry. But it is not the case that there is no understanding at all. Bender, a bit hesitantly, concedes to that point writing about a “thin kind of technical ‘understanding’” which might be present in the models, which seems to contradict the original paper of hers and Timnit Gebru, where they write that “Text generated by an LM is not grounded in (...) any model of the world, or any model of the reader’s state of mind” (emphasis mine). But even when those synthetic models of the world are low resolution “blurry JPGs” compared to ours, they do exist.

    “Polly wants a better argument“, as a recent critique of the parrot-argument states. While this text argues that LLMs can encode meaning because they are trained multimodal and that human feedback loops ground models in extralinguistic reality, the convergence of representations across models adds another blow to the parrot-metaphor: In the first part of this essay when talking about Borges, I made the claim that the “only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.” What I left out is that this vector is informed and shaped not just by a prompt, but also by the millions of attractor basins encoding the “external forms of a myriad traditions” we talked about earlier.

    Meaning of the poetic Kind

    In the introduction headlined “AI as culture”, in his book “Language Machines”, Leif Weatherby writes about how

    the implementation of contemporary language generators matches the theory of language that European structuralism advanced nearly a century ago, suggesting that language is complex, cultural, and even poetic first, and referential, functional, and cognitive only later. This poetic language is not only computationally tractable but turns out to be the semiotic hinge on which an emergent AI culture depends.

    These poetics (the structure and principles of poetry) picked up by the models are precisely Henry Farrells “tales that are sung”, where “LLMs are not the singer (...) but the structural relations of the tales that are sung (…) we can now listen to and even interrogate (…) without immediate human intermediation.”

    The machine lacks the subjective intent of a cognite agent grounded in social reality, but it does encode meaning and valid semantic representations of the world in the shape of poetic representations, the structural vibes, picked up from human practice of the linguistic form. Or, as Allison Parrish put it back in 2021: “a language model can (...) write poetry, but only a person can write a poem.”

    This is a fatal blow to the bullshit argument. As per Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is the use of language with “a lack of connection to concern with truth” and an “indifference to how things really are”. But the models do show a differentiation between how things really are and how they are not, which you might aswell interpret as a “concern with truth”, as such concern is present in the poetics of the language it is trained on. Insisting that such output is meaningless bullshit from a metaphorical parrot then requires a cognitive agent that isn’t there. LLMs can’t be “bullshitters” —itself is an anthropomorphization— because bullshitters require agency to bullshit. The bullshitter is always the user, never the interpolatable archive she uses to bullshit.

    Adding insult to injury is the very probable outlook that the severances of epistemological rooting we talked about may very well turn out to be an issue solved as soon as interpretability improves and the black box myth finally disentigrates into hot air. As Shalizi put it at the first conference for cultural AI12: “GenAI is information retrieval and synthesis. With the right tools + access, we can quantify the influence of each training document on every response”.

    Those parrot-metaphors and bullshit-claims are arguments aimed at misguided comparisons to human cognition and the resulting hype and marketing lingo, and as such, I can relate to them. But as an argument against meaning encoded in latent space or the capacities of language models, the value of the parrot/bullshit-arguments is nil.

    Sloptimizations

    Accordingly, and to be frank, I find the critique of “slop” to be banal. The world has been full of standardized and optimized language since we talk to each other, mimic successful speaking patterns and the ancient greeks invented schools of rhetorics for politicians to convince and persuade (or to deceive and bullshit) their publics.

    George Orwell already complained in his famous essay on “Politics and the English Language“, that “(a)s soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house.” This is as much of an assessment of “slop” as anything you can find on Bluesky these days, and I find the standard critique of sloptimized language to be quite sloppy itself.

    People sure like to romanticize originality, where the history of prose is filled to the roof with ripoffs, amalgams and chimeras, from the “Devine Comedy” which happily mashed together roman and greek mythology with christianity and interpolated the existing cultural archive of its time to send Dante’s personal enemies to hell, to all the examples J.W. McCormack uses to illustrate his point in the delightful piece on Neverending Stories about LLMs, copyright and originality, in which he states that “Writing was destined for automation, from the punch cards of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace to Turing machines and, hell, Choose Your Own Adventure—but an AI can’t ‘know’ what makes a good story any more than CAPTCHA knows what does and does not make a motorcycle. What it can do is meet our expectations based on pattern recognition.”

    If the market for young adult fantasy romance novels hyped up on booktok is any indication, those expectations are easily met, and I consider such pulp as machine generated slop regardless of its origin in a human mind. I refuse the “false choice between refried ectoplasm and a serial aesthetic in which mass media has stabilized redundancy”, as McCormack puts it in his piece. I might be a rejectionist after all! I make no difference of sloptimized output from the organizational artificial intelligence that is a corporation, and the sloptimized output from the artificial models of language. To be honest, I sometimes consider human slop often much worse a case compared to those synthetic ones, precisely because it does contain the deceiving intent a machine lacks.

    I can’t remember such public hostility to these synthetic, polished, median texts of human origin coming out of public relations and advertising agencies or politics, and surely you’ll find more sinister examples in those places on which to feed ones anger than getting worked up about “shrimp jesus”. Get real.

    Thinking in Vacuums

    But even the more serious points of critique we discussed —the accelerations, anachronisms, wishfulfillments, severances and homogenizations— presume usage of AI in a vacuum for them to unfold their toxic potential in full. Sure enough, if, and only if interpolatable archives become the primary way of information retrieval, of sharing knowledge and shaping public discourse, epistemic grounding is severed, we risk spiraling into bespoken mirror worlds, science stops being science, history turns into pseudo-history and LLMs turn into weapons of mass speech acts. In reality however, this never happens.

    For me, I use books physical and digital, I read articles, papers and essays in print and on screen, follow the news and read at least somewhat across the political spectrum, I listen to podcasts, talk to experts and non-experts of all kinds, and sometimes I use latent spaces to explode my ideas and explore them by interpolatable archive. Occasionally, I touch grass. None of these alone shape my ideas — it’s always all of them. This is true for most of us, and while this may not hold for your hardcore MAGA-pilled uncle, a study found that “dialogues with AI reduce beliefs in misinformation”. So there’s that.

    Returning to the subject of AI-generated pseudo-history, for instance, then yes, we might tune in to AI-videos illustrating everyday life in ancient Rome on Youtube, and indulge ourselves in an hour of averaged synthetic imagery from a seemingly distant past that is an anachronistic interpolation of data-points from across time: moving pixels generated from stock video, illustrations and memes. But if I’m interested in such clips, I’m likely to watch documentaries featuring real historians as well, listen to podcasts and read books about Pompeji, and maybe recreate medieval food as a hobby. Hell, I might even pay visit to a museum. Given that new media never fully replaces but always complements what came before, I’d suggest that our understanding of history and our place within will survive interpolatable archives just fine.

    Further, in a resent experiment with “the use of LLM hallucinations to ‘fill-in-the-gap’ for omissions in archives due to social and political inequality”, the researchers “validate(d) LLMs’ foundational narrative understanding capabilities to perform critical confabulation” and found that “controlled and well-specified hallucinations can support LLM applications for knowledge production without collapsing speculation into a lack of historical accuracy and fidelity”. This is in line with projects like Historica, which aims at filling “historical silences” by interpolative archive, and make visible the “absence of records” which are “the result of systemic exclusion, where certain voices are ignored or erased to maintain power”. The use of vintage LLMs to make visible the “historical silences”, especially when combined with an ensemble of diverse material, seems a viable and rich way to educate yourself and others about history. The risks of anachronisms present in language models, again, have more to do with their use in a vacuum, than with the anachronisms themselves.

    What is needed are norms informed by AI literacy declaring interpolatable archives as one tool among many, a device for general research to get a general feeling for the general vibe of the subject or historic period at hand. Something that can’t replace sources and books grounded in verified facts, but complement them, giving you hints at answers, not answers themselves, to be digital assistants supporting you inquiry, not slaves fulfilling your every wish.

    But those are questions of interface design and cultural practice, and the current failings of design choices are not first principles on which you can base an absolute rejection. Sometimes I can’t shake the feeling that thinking in vacuums kills critical thinking much more than AI.

    Remainder Criticisms

    Viewing AI systems as interpolatable archives which are one tool among many, besides their material implementation, then leaves not much on the table to criticize thoroughly, it seems, and I confess that I’m getting carefully optimistic about the technology. But I won’t deny the inherent dangers of their usage in bureaucratic decision process, where we want decisions to be made on a case by case basis with human judgement, not broad judgements by algorithm. And we surely don’t want some vague decision making based on vibes in targeting systems in warfare, as it has already been deployed by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza.

    Productivity gains for now are debatable, as are the effects of AI on the job market. As it’s currently realized, AI is an extractive technology exploiting intellectual labor of the commons for the gains of corporations, largely without compensation. I also won’t deny the open questions of their energy and water consumption. I’m not convinced by either side of the argument and the amount of conflicting signal coming out of that discourse forbids clear positioning. Yes, those corporations training frontier models are constantly lying and greenwashing their energy consumption, not to speak about Jevons paradox of rising demand nuking gains in efficiency.

    On the other hand, the operation of AI systems is getting more energy efficient, and developments in local LLMs point towards a future beyond monolithic hyperscalers, where you may even train your own 100 billion parameter models on a single GPU. These developments make me believe that the current state of AI is comparable to that of the pre-PC-mainframe age of computers, where huge warehouses full of hardware were necessary to run the same compute which you, today, carry around in your pocket. For comparison, you’d need roughly half a million IBM System/360 Model 75 to equal the processing power of your iPhone, and 35 million of those room sized mainframes to match it’s neural engine GPU. Five of those were used to run the whole NASA Apollo program. Given that you can shrink the information processing power necessary to land you on the moon by a factor of several millions and put it in everyone’s pocket for you to scroll through brainrotting videoclips on TikTok, we probably will see similar effects for putting local artificial intelligence on your laptop.

    Yet, the fact remains that AI’s energy and water usage in a world facing climate change is an imperative critical issue at an critical point in time where carbon budgets are running out. This year, a Super El Niño is shaping up, and in mid april, I’m already tanned like in mid June. It’s getting hot.

    So, if these points —labor, energy and bureaucracy— remain once you view AI systems not as magic cognitive entities but the cultural technology of interpolatable archives, one has to ask themselves if they are worth it.

    Even if we can mitigate the averaging effects on creativity by not using them in a vacuum, even if we can workaround epistemic severance with RAGs and interpretability, find safety guardrails against delusional spiraling and turn those cognitive catalysts into combustion engines for knowledge, the open questions of what they will do to the inherent dignity of labor, to the democratic process and the environment demand answers and solutions I can’t provide. For now, I have to live with the ambivalence.

    But what I can do is to place interpolatable archives on a lineage of the cultural evolution of media innovations: With the development of language we introduced the new regime of social externalization to information processing; Writing and the alphabet introduced permanence; The printing press in China and Gutenbergs moveable type introduced one-to-many distribution and the edit respectively; TV and radio introduced realtime broadcasting, while the internet confronted us with the regime of the network. AI now is introducing another new regime of information processing: the automatic interpolation of data.

    From this perspective, AI is a normal cultural evolutionary step in information distribution and processing, and like every normal cultural evolutionary step in information processing, they will change everything. None of the transitions mentioned went over smoothly, and so will this one.

    We’ve successfully integrated cognitively disruptive innovations in the past, and we will do so today. The disruptions of interpolatable archives run deep, both on individual and societal levels. But, and I hesitate to make this point, I’d also argue that AI in the shape of interpolatable archives as the latest step within the lineage of cultural evolution are, indeed, inevitable. Each of those steps within that lineage was inevitable from the perspective of cultural evolution — as is the interpolation of big data by algorithm on inquiry: If we get the affordances —the data, the compute, the algorithms— then evolution will do what it does and squishy latent spaces will appear.

    From this viewpoint, shortsighted rejectionist critiques of AI as “the tool of the oppressors” or a “fascist artifact“ to me read like a rejection of the invention of cuneiform writing in Mesopotamia because Hammurabi used it to manage argiculture and land ownership to oppress the people. Accordingly, the rejectionism coming out of the majority of critical AI discourse seems to be mainly aimed at corporatism, not the technology itself. I will admit that those critiques do have momentary merit, but I also think they do not justify an absolute dismissal of AI technologies as it is on display in the discourse, because what is not inevitable are the organizational principles of their implementation. Neither the extractive practice nor OpenAI nor xAI nor Palantir are inevitable. They are companies and subject to regulation in a democracy, full stop. Nothing prevents us from running those new archives like national libraries, for instance. But imagining such a political project is not possible on a rejectionist stance.

    How about a nice Game of Chess?

    Coming back to the question posed earlier of what science is here for, if not discovery: The scientific method is an algorithm. A researcher posits a hypothesis, tests it against reality, and it holds or not. If it holds, it becomes a valid theory, and if not, it’s falsified and kicks the bucket, serving as inspirational fodder in cultural memory for generations of scientists to come. This way, we get ever more detailed descriptions of the world in various languages, often in the language of mathematical formulas, or the playful use of words in philosophy and sociology. A lot of yet unrealized descriptions encoded in the various languages of science now lie dormant in latent spaces, waiting for their Liam Price to discover the prompt. In the simplest terms, this means that the algorithm of the scientific method has been updated.

    Now, a scientist may posit a problem and throw it against latent space to see if there is a seemingly valid hypothesis. She then tests that hypothesis against reality, and it holds or not. With AI, scientists don’t construct a hypothesis against an open problem, they identify such problems and consult synthesis as a service. This update may devalue discovery itself, and shrink creative space of possibilities, as the price we pay for speeding up and automatizing the closing of knowledge gaps.

    So, what is science here for, if not discovery? To expand our curiosity and explore. Like for the problem of homogenization, it is therefore vital that science is no longer conducted in the vacuums of fields. What automatic discovery demands is interdisciplinary research: Crossing the streams to make formerly unconnected fields pollinate each other and push the space of scientific inquiry beyond existing training data, to break the boundaries of an interpolatable space and make extrapolation and innovation possible.

    Revisiting the defeat of Lee Sedol by AlphaGo and his subsequent departure from the sport, and the rise of collective creativity in human Go players in its aftermath, one of my favorite examples of human antifragility in the face of superhuman machines is the game of Chess. For 30 years now we’ve had computers beating the best human players in the game, and the result has been neither the devaluation of the game, nor human retreat. The result is human-machine cooperative training techniques leading to massively improved skills.

    Carlsen is using the chess engine Stockfish to analyze his moves and speaking about how Googles AlphaZero “destroying” Stockfish in 2017 affected his game, Carlsen said: “I have become a very different player in terms of style than I was a bit earlier, and it has been a great ride.” Today, “Magnus Carlsen dominates the computer era by deliberately playing sub-optimal moves to drag his opponents into the unknown”, because AI introduced Carlsen to “wild ideas“:

    According to his coach, the change came from wild ideas AlphaZero uncovered: sacrificing pieces for long-term advantage, pushing the rook pawn aggressively, using the king as an active fighter. Things human experts thought were unsound, but the engine showed they can work.

    Every chess engine these days beats any human player with ease. Yet we keep improving and playing for the sake of the game. I’d suggest that similar “wild ideas” will emerge for the use of interpolatable archives in education, science and the arts.

    The one thing that made humanity an evolutionary success is our ability for social and cultural learning: To share intentions and and iterate knowledge across generations. All progress relies on this. So, even if all the criticisms apply, having a technology which automates the interpolation of knowledge is a promethean gift not easily brushed off. Interpolative archives are not just a mere “scam”, and “Destroy AI” may be a fun shirt, but we shouldn’t destroy interpolatable archives wholesale. I get bad vibes from people trying to burn archives.

    The task then is not to reject, but apply democratic process to regulate, demand fair shares and be careful to preserve our collective ability to innovate — to become neither machine-controlling, exploitative Morlock nor ignorant Eloi feeding on epistemic plastic, but to find new norms in the acquisition and sharing of knowledge. To stay curious in the face of these new archives, and make them talk.

    Share

    1

    Ernst Cassierer took inspiration for his groundbreaking philosophy of the human as the “symbolic animal” from Warburgs’ institute and his associative archive.

    2

    Borges hints at how he landed on 22 letters of the alphabet, instead of the 26 of the standard latin, or the 30 of the spanish alphabet, in his initial essay about “The Total Library” (PDF), about which Jonathan Basile, creator of the Library of Babel on the web, writes: “Presumably Borges is starting from the 30-letter modern Spanish alphabet, and rejecting the double letters (ch, ll, rr) as unnecessary along with the ñ. The remaining 26 include k and w, which appear only in loan words. Borges then removes q as ‘completely superfluous’ (debatable) and x as merely ‘an abbreviation’.”

    3

    Writing about LLMs in the afterword for the 2022 english edition “What If?” of Villem Flussers “Angenommen. Eine Szenenfolge.”, Kenny Goldsmiths shows himself quite bored of the averaged poetry generated by AI and “wants to see artificial intelligence bent and twisted in ways to show us truly new forms of language”, asking “Can AI be ‘queered’? Could AI be trained to be intentionally perverse, something notoriously difficult to define, let alone program? (…) Could AI be trained to intentionally get it exactly wrong?” The inherent hallucinative qualities of the interpolatable archives may soon make place for boring guardrailed correctness, but for those of us who enjoy the glitch and error for artful purposes, this is a refreshing take on LLMs in times of a critique that insists on a purity of the factual. On a more technical level, to me, the true signs of intelligence in an AI-system would be its ability to produce errors and hallucinations on purpose, or to understand and generate paradoxa which make sense as a metaphor. For now, these irrational markers of true cognition seem to be reserved for the human.

    4

    These prisms are more than a metaphor and have been produced in optical neural networks. They are not shapeshifting, ofcourse, but you can shine lights through it and they identify images of handwritten digits.

    5

    If LLMs are or are not lossy compressions of their training data is subject of debate since their inception. While some explain the fact that LLMs do memorize their training data with overfitting, others claim that those vibes encoded in LLMs are so finegrained they are simply the same as lossy compressions. Here’s one of the latest papers from April 2026 making that claim, and here’s a nontechnical summary. I come down on the compression side of the argument, but i think my description of AI-systems as interpolatable archives works both ways.

    6

    The prototype Sarkar shows in his presentation basically is a notetaking software with built in AI-features, which constantly provide feedback on your writing, and it reminds me not just a bit about the software of my choice, Obsidian, a barebones PKM tool and manager for markdown files. That software recently made an unexpected splash. AI-developer Andrej Kaparthy in a viral tweet introduced the idea to use AI-agents to produce “LLM knowledge bases“, a markdown-files based Wiki, which analyze your text-files and build a memory bank for themselves, summarizing your PKM and updating it in realtime whenever you add new notes and sources. I tried it out with my limited resources and had quite some fun watching the thing generate summaries of my thoughts and ideas, most of which made sense and it made some interesting connections I didn’t consider, but most of the stuff just rearticulated what I already wrote in a distanced formal tone. I then vibecoded a plugin to serve a system-prompt for this wiki-generator and then I let it summarize my notes in the tone of Ozzy Osbourne explaining memetics and AI to his kids, and while it was kind of a letdown due to a lack of swearwords, this just hints at the potential of this idea, especially in context of running LLMs locally. I’m certainly not done with it.

    7

    At this point, when talking about AI as a cognitive catalyst, I should talk about education, but I feel this would go beyond the scope of this already way too long essay, so let’s keep it briefly: Talking about AI in education leaves me in the uncomfortable position to square two seemingly contradicting convictions: I find interpolatable archives highly usable and helpful, especially for general research and educating myself, and I consider any edu-tech in the classroom as harmful to the project of learning, especially for lower grades. We know from studies that handwriting beats typing and the loss of teaching cursive is harmful, that reading on paper beats screens and that screens are outright toxic for toddlers. But this doesn’t mean we can’t have education about screens, or social media, or AI. OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft are currently lobbying for AI literacy in schools, and while I’d oppose this because obviously this lobbying is a strategy to place their products in the classroom and to grab juicy government contracts, I absolutely think that we need education in how to operate those interpolatable archives. We surely don’t need to teach kids how to prompt, they figured that out on their own already. But we need to teach them how to turn interpolatable archives into cognitive catalysts, and how to operate them safely and not fall into invisible traps by “encouraging deep engagement, rather than friction-free experiences”. I just don’t think we necessarily need screens in the classroom for that, and it seems, some of these things already happen. (To be fair: I can imagine screen use in the classroom on a project basis, where once in a while, you switch on the machine and use it to exemplify, illustrate and make tangible what you previously discussed in class.) There is much more to be said about this topic, but at least for this essay, I leave that to experts of pedagogy.

    8

    This already causes harm likely in millions of cases, and this doesn’t even touch on its use as a psychological weapon against female politicians and activists. From the hundreds (thousands?) of nudify-apps to specialized service accounts on Telegram with which you can, if you can lay your hands on images, undress anyone. A recent study found “35,000 publicly downloadable deepfake model variants (…) fine-tuned to produce deepfake images of identifiable people, often celebrities”, the overwhelming majority targeting women. In the larger picture, it also creates a new form of a male swarm gaze, a whole new class of discrimination emerging from the digital, about which i wrote here, after Elon Musk industrialized and monetized it. The problem is growing, and what we know surely is just the tip of the iceberg.

    9

    Fausts bargain with the devil plays nice with the fantasies about the singularity: Faust is aware that if the devil fulfills his wish of total knowledge, he will spend eternity in hell after he dies, so he demands this total knowledge to lead to an eternal moment of pure bliss in which he can reside forever. While Faust hopes that this will never happen so he can keep his soul, this also sounds to me a lot like the scifi-induced hubris coming out of the more AI-pilled fractions of Silicon Valley, where people seriously hypothesize about fusing consciousness with the machine, mind uploading and immortality. All of these are faustian delusions, and as everybody knows: the only faustian bargain worth a dime makes you play the blues like the devil.

    10

    In a thread on Bluesky, I expanded on this loss of awe and explained how it relates to Hollywood as a “dream factory”, shamanic rituals and dreams as cognitive mechanisms against neural overfitting, in which I conclude: “Mark Fishers capitalist realism asks the question why we can’t imagine alternatives to neoliberal status quo. One answer might be that mass produced dreams-on-demand lower our capacity for the feeling of awe, and in consequence our ability for generalization in collective cognition. AI wishfulfillment combined with platform incentives, in which only the crystalized memetic fields become visible, are the latest iteration in a process that has been running for a long time now, and we can see its effects everywhere in atemporal aesthetic flattenings. How we can preserve the shamanic function of awe and surprise in a world dominated by the memetic forces of AI wishfulfilled readymades, I don’t know. I just know that we dearly need them.”

    11

    Nowhere is this mechanism more on full display than in the epistemic onslaught of the Trump administration and the destruction spree of the former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) (achived) deployed by Elon Musk.

    12

    All talks from that conference on “Cultural AI: An Emerging Field” are on Youtube in two parts: Part 1 featuring talks from Leif Weatherby, Tyler Shoemaker, Henry Farrell, Benjamin Recht, Lily Chumley and Fabian Offert, Part 2 featuring talks from Cosma Shalizi, Mel Andrews, Wouter Haverals, Ted Underwood, Nina Beguš and Danya Glabau. I quoted some of these guys extensively throughout this essay.

    In the same vein, the initiative Doing AI Differently works on “challenges traditional approaches to AI development by positioning humanities perspectives as integral, rather than supplemental, to technical innovation.” They are doing a workshop in summer 2026 to find “A positive vision for culture in AI”. The Cultural AI discourse is gearing up.

    I’m getting the feeling that this is a good synthesis of Critical AI and research to make sense of the possibilities without losing the perspective on bad outcomes. Compared to a critical discourse stuck in repeating talking points and a fundamentalist (and boring) rejectionism, this seems like a breath of fresh air, and a viable way forward.

    A good starting point to get into this space, besides the talks linked above, is this podcast with Leif Weatherby about How Is AI Affecting Culture?, and I made a Bluesky starter pack (work in progress) if you’re into that sort of thing.

    0 min
  • On Interpolatable Archives

    I’ve been throwing around the term “Interpolatable Archives” for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence, and I finally got around to write down what I mean by that. It got a bit out of hand, and I had to split up this essay into four parts, all of which I collected into this post so I can link to it during discussions.

    If you like to read it in shorter chunks, here are the individual parts as they were published:

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    Here’s a non-slop version of this essay too for those of you very serious people, but arguably, this one is way more fun.

    ◆I. The Skeleton Library

    “I am unpacking my library. Yes, I am.
    The books are not yet on the shelves,
    not yet touched by the mild boredom of order.”

    (Walter Benjamin)

    Compulsions to Connect

    One hundred years ago, a german scholar named Aby Warburg went mad over what he called his “Verknüpfungszwang”, a compulsion to connect. He was searching for instances of what he called “Pathosformel“, aesthetic commonalities in the expressions of human emotional states — joy and rage, grief or ecstasy — through cultural history.

    To achieve his goal, he built the initial Warburg Institute1 in Hamburg where he collected art, books, news snippets and artifacts. For his opus magnum of the Mnemosyne Atlas (”Bilderatlas Mnemosyne“ in german), he displayed a collection of 971 artifacts on 63 large panels, each two meters high, and indexed them not by the usual meta data like genre, author, date, or topic, but by idiosynratic aesthetic categories and psychological, affective intensity. Here’s some of the labels by which he sorted this collection: “Different degrees in the application of the cosmic system to mankind”, “Orientalizing of antique images”, “Development from Greek cosmology to Arab practice”, “Rimini pneumatic conception of the spheres as opposed to the fetishistic conception” or “Cosmology in Dürer”.

    Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas, detail from panels 79, 45 and 46

    With the Mnemosyne Atlas, an associative image-based map of meaning, Warburg aimed at what he called an “iconology of intervals”, where meaning through analysis of images doesn’t emerge from historic context, but from the space inbetween associated but otherwise unrelated, anachronistic images. His associative Bilderatlas can be read as an early prototype of the latent space of an image model, whichs output was the “Pathosformel”, averaged primitives of affect expressed across cultural history. 100 years later this kind of navigation of an idea space would be newly theorized in context of machine learning by Peli Grietzer in his Theory of Vibes, which, to him, are cognitive maps allowing us to interpret experiences through lossy compression of holistic patterns.

    Aby Warburgs’ project of the Mnemosyne Atlas remained unfinished, he died in 1929 from a heart attack. Today, his archive resides in the Warburg Institute in London.

    12 years after Warburgs’ death, Jorge Luis Borges published a collection of shortstories called ”The Garden of forking Paths”. It contains at least two stories of interest to our cause, about at least one of which you surely must have heard: ”The Library of Babel” consists of books of 410 pages, containing all possible combinations of 22 letters2 plus period, comma, and spacing. That fictional library includes the random and nonsensical aswell as the meaningful, it holds “the detailed history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of those false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of the true catalogue, the gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon that gospel, the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation of every book into every language”. It contains a book telling the exact story of your life, and another one that tells mine, and all the books making fools out of both of us.

    Analyzing the stories of Borges in context of Large Language Models, in their paper “Borges and AI“, Léon Bottou and Bernhard Schölkopf write about the epistemological unrooting inherent to an archive of such nature: “The books in this Library bear no names. All that is known about a book must come from maybe another book contradicted by countless other books. The same can be said about the language model output. The perfect language model lets us navigate the infinite collection of plausible texts by simply typing their first words, but nothing tells the true from the false, the helpful from the misleading, the right from the wrong.” The only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.

    In his initial essay on ”The Total Library”, the nonfictional forerunner to “The Library of Babel“, Borges aknowledges its roots in Kurd Laßwitz‘ shortstory “The Universal Library“ (”Die Universalbibliothek” in german) from 1904, likely the first piece of fiction taking the infinite monkey theorem to its logical conclusions. In it, Laßwitz not only predicts the near infinite latent spaces of AI like Borges, but also the pervasive threats of hallucinations, distortions in history writing, deepfakes (here, of documents signed with your name), and humans rendered unable to grasp the endless possibilities of an infinite library, because human reality is bound to practice constrained by real life in a civil society. These are precisely the questions we are confronted with today, anticipated 120 years ago by Kurd Laßwitz, 100 years ago by Warburg, and 80 years ago by Borges.

    In 2002, New York based poet Kenneth Goldsmith started to retype his library on a Royal Classic Typewriter, word by word. Later, he was annoyed by the limits of his own taste and incorporated other works to retype, as he calls it, “the platonean ideal of a library”.

    Kenneth Goldsmith, Retyping a Library at Kunstnernes Hus (Norway), 2022

    As an artist, Goldsmith is explicitly interested in the mundane, the unoriginal, the average, the uncreative -- proudly he declares “I am the most boring writer that has ever lived”3. and says “If I’m doing a piece of writing, and ask myself, can this in some way be construed as not being writing, then I know I’m on the right road.” Because everything ever has already been said in all possible combinations, adding to the cultural output to him feels pointless, so he runs with that feeling and turns futility in the face of borgesian infinities into its own poetic form.

    Goldsmith sometimes thinks of himself as a modern version of Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote“ from the shortstory of the same name, but he concedes that fictional Menard is more original. In this story, Menard wants to hyper-translate Cervantes “The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha” by immersing himself so deeply into work and life of its author he’ll become able to re-create it, line by line, without copying. In AI-parlor, Menard aims to overfit himself on Cervante so hard that his writing will be able to put out the original text.

    With breaks, Goldsmith is retyping a library for 24 years now, and to date, he copied 750 books on ultra-thin onion-skin paper, which he stores in 200 boxes. Each book comes with a self-drawn portrait of the original author and her signature. Goldsmiths project is creating a singularity within the infinite floods of content production, to link unique individual and averaged mass.

    What all of these authors across the ages have in common is Warburgs’ “compulsion to connect” archival contents, to find meaning in gargantuan amounts of data, each in their own ways.

    Today, Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang is the prime human condition. Hypertext and platforms connect everything with everyone into what we call “big data”; the former 6 degrees of seperation have shrunk to 4. In consequence, we developed psychological pathologies showing up in widely spread conspirational thinking and delusions big and small, and the political parasites feeding on them.

    While Goldsmith was copying lines from the classics on his typewriter, AI labs automatized Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang, and OpenAI released a new transformers based language model.

    ChatGPT went public.

    The Skeleton Library

    Imagine a library devoid of letters. All the books it once contained are dissolved, its contents gone. What survives are the bookbindings, the cartonage, blank pages, the shelves, sections and all the floors of said library. The buildings stay intact, all the catalogs are there.

    A Shapeshifting Skeleton Library, ChatGPT

    Some machine, at one point, went through this library, scanned all the letters within those books, noted all the statistics it could possibly measure on its path: the exact position of each letter in each book, the locations of those books in their shelves, the exact size in width, height and depth of all books, shelves, floors, their angles and distances to each other, a precise floor plan of the library, and how all this spatial information relates to each book, sentence, and character. On scanning the pages, the typography vanishes, leaving only blank sheets of paper. This is a library of pure structure, where Peli Grietzers “cognitive map” has been turned into architecture, the remainder skeleton of an archive built from giant quantities of geometric vector coordinates so finegrained that you can derive any information about its former collection.

    Now imagine that you can fold this skeleton library, twist it into shapes not possible before. Like in a drawing by M.C. Escher, the floors and rooms and shelves bend back and forth and blend into each other. You can fold every book and every sentence it contains into other books or into whole floors in various sections. Imagine warping the cookbook shelf into the section for crime fiction, or blending the songbooks of punk rock bands from the 70s with the floor of classic literature. You can give it a spin and delegate the resulting amalgam to the building containing textbooks of natural sciences, letting it articulate all of this in the language of mathematical formulas. This is prompting: Morphing and twisting the skeleton of an archive consisting of extremely detailed statistics about the properties of its former contents, ready to be blended and remixed with any other data-point within that embedding space.

    Another way to understand this skeleton library is by shining a light through it: Imagine your thoughts and ideas as a beam of light shot through a shapeshifting prism, which you can bend into any form and split your mental lightbeam into all colors from all directions in all angles. That prism4 is made from patterns in collective knowledge, and you can explode your own ideas by sending them through those prisms, where the output is a refracted thought dispersed into the components of whatever was your idea, and you can look at it from many perspectives.

    This explosion drawing of your thought is comparable to Douglas Hofstaedters Trip-Let, which he describes in “Gödel, Escher, Bach“ as “Blocks shaped in such a way that their shadows in three orthogonal directions are three different letters.” In our analogy for AI, depending on the direction of the lightbeam that is your idea and the location in latent space you aim at with a prompt, the interpolatable archive will throw back very different shadows. Except the “three orthogonal directions” of the Trip-Let have been blown up to hundreds of billions of parameters.

    This is the interpolatable archive, a new way to access information mediated through the form of statistics. This is, in my view, the central innovation we can observe in Large Language Models, and possibly machine learning as a whole.

    Cultural Technologies, not agents

    In their 2025 paper, Alison Gopnik, Henry Farrell and Cosma Shalizi describe Large Language Models as systems which “do not merely summarize (…) information, like library catalogs, Internet search, and Wikipedia” but “also can reorganize and reconstruct representations or ‘simulations’ of this information at scale and in novel ways, like markets, states and bureaucracies”. As multiple studies have shown, LLMs in fact are compressions of their training data5, they are, in fact, Ted Chiangs’ famous “blurry JPGs of the web”, just like “market prices are lossy representations of the underlying allocations and uses of resources, and government statistics and bureaucratic categories imperfectly represent(ing) the characteristics of underlying populations”.

    Neither markets nor bureaucracies nor the internet nor language models are agents, they are not cognite, and they are not remotely conscious. But we do like to anthropomorphize all of them anyways: Markets make use of “inivisible hands” and they “react”; we represent the bureaucratic management of nations in the shape of mascots and mythic heroes to bind its people to a narrative; and we talk to language models as if they are buddies, assistants, companions, romantic partners or slaves. The human predisposition to see peoples’ faces in everything has always been strong, starting from the myriad of anthropomorphizations in animist cultures where every thing has its soul, and it keeps making us seeing ghosts in machines, leading to what one may call the “pareidolia fallacy”: we see agency where there is none.

    Agency and creativity require Daniel Dennetts intentional stance and teleology, the ability to direct actions toward goals emerging from imagined interactions with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims. This is a cognitive feature not only observable in humans, but (at least) in all mammals: Watch a squirrel on a tree trying to figure out if it can jump to the next. It looks at the tree, its head moves up and down, it evaluates distance and its own abilities. It goes like that for a while, and then it decides if it can do it, and takes the jump. That’s precisely the “imagined interaction with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims”. AI has none of that.

    While AI models do show a synthetic theory of mind, where they build representation of its users during conversation, these work very differently from those of humans, and compared to them, they don’t work well. Chatbots have no intrinsic motivation, no sense of why it “speaks”, and no capacity to care about the coherence of its outputs beyond statistical continuity. All true and meaningful selection occurs externally, through human feedback and usage.

    In LLMs, the pareidolia fallacy makes us asume cognition, creativity, and agency where there’s computational interpolation of language patterns in the giant wobbly archive of a new kind. What differentiates these new interpolatable archives from previous archives is obvious: They interpolate their contents. Where classic archives provide access to fixed records of text, video, audio and artifacts of human culture, this new archival access has atomized its contents, and only provides interpolated amalgams, chimeras and fusions. Depending on your stance about the definition of “archive” you might object to my interpretation at this point, and i’d nod and say “That’s what’s new”.

    Digital Oralities

    In “Large Language Models As The Tales That Are Sung”, Henry Farrell describes LLMs as structural similar to oral traditions and folklore: “LLMs are not the singer, despite their apparent responsiveness, but the structural relations of the tales that are sung”, reminding me of the pre-homeric rhapsodes, the bardes who sang the old stories of “The Iliad“ and “The Odyssey” long before Homer sat down and put them in writing. They did so by using preconfigured language modules with which they constructed their poems while they were sung, a “grammar” of mnemonic formulas and repetitions to solve the problem of creating narrative in real-time. These are the oral precursors for the optimized, averaged language codes we loathe so much when they come from AI.

    Interpolatable Archives work similar, like a statistical mnemosyne (the godess of memory in greek mythology) speaking in tongues, giving probabilistic answers to specific inquiries. Knowledge transfer through those new oracles means a shift from traditional “archival epistemologies”, where knowledge is grounded in traceable facts and specific, identifyable sources, to a fuzzy oracular epistemology where responses are generated on-demand by an opaque interface, turning inquiry into digital hyper-orality.

    Where oral traditions of yore served as mnemonic technologies integrated into the communal structures of everyday life, this digital hyper-orality is different. The entirety of human thought —well, as for now: The entirety of human thought on the internet, which… sigh…— becomes epistemic stockpile, a resource to be mined, refined, and dispensed on demand, stripped of its being-in-the-world.

    Without being grounded in life, AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge including citations, sources and authorial intent, and make place for a 128kbps MP3 of the “tales that are sung”. The value of such information lies within its statistical probability and the stylistic resonance in the reader, rather than its referential grounding in reality. It speaks to us, or it doesn’t: finding meaning in stochastic output is entirely to the user. Social Media already innitiated this crisis of the episteme and the emergence of new oralities through phenomena like context collapse. On platforms, vibes-based knowledge reigns supreme. LLMs further accelerate it.

    This sounds as bad as it can be, and I won’t downplay the risk here, but I want to draw your attention back to Aby Warburg at this point. His project of the Mnemosyne Atlas, that “associative image-based map of meaning”, was an attempt at tracing the recurrence of symbolic representation throughout visual history in a non-linear archive. Warburgs’ library, while still providing based epistemic grounding to its records, was introducing a second layer that intentionally dissolved the episteme with idiosyncratic indexing, allowing for access by free association, working similar to those new interpolatable archives.

    LLMs generate not fixed images or texts, but interpolations across associative symbolic fields, enabling a new kind of navigation of a vast symbolic space of possibilities. The dissolution of the episteme in digital oralities, like Warburgs’ associative Bilderatlas, then can be read not only as a risk, but a liberation aswell, and a cognitive catalyst.

    ◆II. Explosion Drawings

    “To find a thought is play, to think it through, work.”
    (Aby Warburg)

    Science Sans Discoveries

    A few days ago, a 23-year-old amateur zero-shot-prompted ChatGPT to find a solution to an unsolved problem in math (archived) which had stumped mathematicians for 60 years. AI has been making a splash by solving various entries in the collection of the so called “Erdös-problems” before, but those solutions were either easy or for problems rarely studied. This one is different in that it’s a hard problem, and scientists gnawed on their brains over it for decades. Then along hops Liam Price with his chatbot, and done. In other cases, researchers equipped with custom neural networks discovered hundreds of cosmic anomalies or dozens of hidden planets hiding in huge troves of data. The list keeps growing.

    What Price did was not science. In one experiment, after running 25.000 experiments, researchers found that for 74% of all cases, science-models did not revise a hypothesis when confronted with contradictory data. But updating your hypothesis according to data is the basis of all scientific inquiry, so AI models produce results without scientific reasoning. That’s pretty damning. But Price discovered the solution to the Erdös-problem anyways, so what do we make of this?

    A paper from 2023 found a fundamental limit to alignment: “any behavior that has a finite probability of being exhibited by the model, there exist prompts that can trigger the model into outputting this behavior, with probability that increases with the length of the prompt.” What is true for alignment is true for the scientific discoveries too: For any solution to a scientific problem present in latent space, there exists a prompt to retrieve it. Liam Price found one.

    AI doesn’t “do science” because it is neither an agent nor does it follow the scientific method proper and AI-as-a-scientist is just another anthropomorphization. But once you look at those models as interpolatable archives, this anthropomorphization becomes irrelevant. AI doesn’t do scientific discovery — those discoveries lie dormant as knowledge gaps in embedding space, an unrealized potential waiting for the right prompt to bring it to light. What Liam Price and his chatbot did was the discovery of such a warburgian “interval” actualizing a valid solution.

    If anyone can take credit for this specific finding, it would be human culture at large, which created the foundational data and the connections containing that solution within the tensions inbetween data points. Just like Warburg found his Pathosformulas in the intervals between seemingly unrelated imagery across cultural history, researchers and amateurs alike now find readymade scientific discoveries.

    It is not an outlandish assumption of mine when I expect that these discoveries will not be the last of their kind and likely are just the tip of an iceberg approaching fast, that mathematics (archived) will not be the last scientific field to spar full contact with the latent-discovery space of interpolatable archives, and that the speed of scientific discovery likely will accelerate. It is debatable how valuable such findings truly are though, if AI merely fills knowledge gaps in existing data, but it also reveals how academia has been caught in a “publish or perish” trap for a long time. Accordingly, automatic discovery by interpolatable archive might very well mean “The fall of the theorem economy“, as David Bessis put it, writing about “How AI could destroy mathematics and barely touch it”, grappling with the fact that AI in mathematics may throw the whole field into identity crisis.

    The questions arising from readymade discoveries then go right at the core of academia’s current understanding of itself: What, if not discovery and closing gaps in knowledge, is science here for? We will come back to this.

    Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts

    Sam Barrett recently had a conversation with Claude, which resulted in a synthetic essay expressing my view of LLMs as interpolatable archives by other terms. That essay framed Interpolatable Archives “as a rotatable space“, something I tried to get at in my metaphors of the skeleton library and refracted light:

    Think of a three-dimensional object casting a shadow on a wall. The shadow is a two-dimensional projection. If you only see one shadow, you might mistake it for the thing itself. But if you can rotate the object—or equivalently, move the light source—you see different shadows. Each shadow reveals something about the object’s structure. No single shadow is the object, but multiple shadows from different angles let you reconstruct what the object actually is.

    High-dimensional spaces work similarly, but with more complexity. A concept that exists in a thousand-dimensional space of meaning can be projected into the low-dimensional space of a particular text. That text captures some aspects and loses others. A different text—same concept, different projection—captures different aspects.

    What LLMs enable is rapid rotation through projection-space.

    This synthetic piece of text generated associations in my head, making me revisit older notes about optical neural networks and language models as prisms. The bit about how latent spaces are rotatable objects throwing lower dimensional shadows then led to my comparison of LLMs to Douglas Hofstaedters’ Trip-Let. Creativity doesn’t care about where sparks come from, it just lights up or it doesn’t.

    Used this way, LLMs become an external sandbox where I can dissect a thought and play with it, a cognitive extension against which I can throw my own ideas and concepts and see what comes back. This kind of usage is less about cognitive offloading than about seeding an experimental loop that’s conversational, dynamic and reciprocal. You can additionally tame the model with a user prompt like “you are an expert in [the field] and critique my ideas ruthlessly” and turn a sycophant LLMs into an academic sparring partner. In my experiments with user-prompting AI as such a cognitive catalyst, Gemini once became so annoyingly judgemental and arrogant about my amateurish inquiries, I had to tone down its ruthlessness and lobotomize the machine. My remorse about doing open brain surgery on an algorithmic intellectual sparring partner remains limited.

    I use AI only occasionally, but if I do, I use it extensively. I write every day, take notes on articles, read a lot, have ideas and jot them down, and I’ve been doing this for years. I blogged a lot in the past, a method of public note taking and ideation. A lot of my ideas today are informed by wild associations in years of such note taking. Over time, concepts emerged from these writings, and from the bits of text scattered throughout my journal. When I come across an interesting piece of information today, I put them in context of these loose concepts: I take a note, give it a link, and write down how they update or relate to my ideas. Only then, after this process, I might throw my notes and concepts at the bot, and embark on sometimes very long conversations. My user prompt makes Gemini roleplay a helpful academic, and after some back and forth, what comes back is a framing of my ideas in scientific and philosophical history, what holds and what doesn’t, what’s old and what’s new. The chatbot gives me sources to check out, taylored to the specifics of my often idiosyncratic ideas, much more precise than Google or a vague research in a library could be. This kind of scaffolding through an averaging assistant for me is an invaluable second step in ideation and research.

    AI researcher Advait Sarkar, one of the main authors of the widely reported “reduction in critical thinking“-paper, shares this view. Sarkar works on methods to make LLMs function as cognitive catalysts, and in another paper, he writes about the “Discursive Social Function of Stupid AI Answers“ in which he dares to make the point that “these stupid answers (to questions about “Gluing Pizza, Eating Rocks, and Counting Rs in Strawberry”) are in fact correct, because the primary objective of such queries is not to receive a correct answer, but rather to obtain an artefact of discourse”. Nobody asks an AI for the nutritional value of rocks unless they want a gotcha, and the interpolatable archive delivers. Smartypants being tongue in cheek throwing clever bits at overconfident critical AI discourses. I like that guy.

    In his TED talk on “How to Stop AI from Killing Your Critical Thinking” he presents his efforts to iterate on his paper and turn chatbots into a “tool for thought” that should “challenge, not obey“. Testing a prototype6 for research demoed in this talk, the result sounds promising: “You can demonstrably reintroduce critical thinking into AI-assisted workflows. You can reverse the loss of creativity and enhance it instead.”

    Exploding your Intelligence with the
    Intellect by the Method of WarburgExploded view of an Interpolatable Archive, ChatGPT

    In his post “On Feral Library Card Catalogs, or, Aware of All Internet Traditions”, Cosma Shalizi quotes Jacques Barzuns book “The House of Intellect” from 1959 where he distinguishes between intelligence and the intellect:

    Intellect is the capitalized and communal form of live intelligence; it is intelligence stored up and made into habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning and spurs to emotion — a shorthand and a wireless by which the mind can skip connectives, recognize ability, and communicate truth.

    Barzun gives the foundational example of the alphabet as one form in which the intellect transforms individual intelligence by introducing communal sets of rules for information processing: The alphabet “is a device of limitless and therefore ‘free’ application. You can combine its elements in millions of ways to refer to an infinity of things in hundreds of tongues, including the mathematical. But its order and its shapes are rigid.”

    Shalizi concludes: “To use Barzun’s distinction, (chatbots) will not put creative intelligence on tap, but rather stored and accumulated intellect. If they succeed in making people smarter, it will be by giving them access to the external forms of a myriad traditions.”

    It is common wisdom for learners in any field that “to break the rules you have to first learn them”. I’m not 100% convinced of this, especially for creative endeavours where untrained outsiders can apply very different sets of rules from the get-go and upend everything. But as a rule of thumb it’s good enough. And for learning “the rules”, sets of common knowledges in any field, be it the broad strokes in psychology or economics or philosophy, the intellect, those “habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning”, can absolutely be delivered by AI, and because those traditions are well documented, the bot rarely hallucinates.

    Here’s my personal account for this way of using a language model: I take some interest in consciousness studies because since forever I want to know what this —waves hands in the air— is. I’ve written many, many notes about my own ideas, read a lot of articles and books about cognitive sciences. And yet, the scope of consciousness studies is overwhelming for an interested amateur like me, which is no surprise given that subjective experience is a matter of interest in philosophy for more than 2000 years.

    There are currently more than 300 academic theories, and the true number of consciousness theories including folk epistemologies might be way higher by orders of magnitude. I know that I have my personal theory of what and how and why I am, and I’m pretty sure you have one too, at least to some degree. The whole subreddit r/consciousness is full of idiosyncratic ideas about human cognition, and some of them sound pretty interesting. My impression is that, like in the ancient parable of the blind men and the elephant, where a bunch of blind guys who never encountered an elephant each touch a different part of the beast and accurately describe those parts, but noone describes the true animal, all of these theories of consciousness describe partially true aspects of a full picture.

    So where do you start, when you have your own vague idea of “what you are” and “how ‘the feeling of me’ works”, some basic knowledge about neuroscience and an extensive collection of notes and bookmarks to articles and papers? I can go to a library, crack open all the level 1 study books on neuroscience and all the level 1 books on philosophy of mind, get to work and a lifetime later I’d know which of my ideas fit into which parts of the literature. Or I can consult a chatbot, perform research customized to my notes and read about adjacent theories tangential to my ideas, which of them contradict my takes, and argue about what a synthesis might look like.

    This is how I found the Santiago School of Cognition, Maturana, Varela and Enactivism in only a few dialogues with the chatbot. For what it’s worth: In these dialogues the hallucination rate was zero. From there, I consulted wikipedia pages, listened to podcasts, bought more books, downloaded more papers old and new, wrote more notes and developed my own ideas further. I might even write an essay on that topic to distill my thinking into one concise take. Then I’ll throw it all against the interpolatable archive again, have a look at what comes back, and extend my thinking in ever widening circles generating ever more ideas.This is how the LLM “succeeds in making (me) smarter” by “giving (me) access to the external forms of a myriad traditions”, customized to my own musings about the subject at hand.

    Usually, we call places where we store those “external forms of a myriad traditions” a library, or a museum, or an archive, and what I did was exploding my own individual intelligence with the collective intellect by the associative method of Aby Warburg, using an interpolative archive to relate the “order and shapes” of the averaged traditions in consciousness studies to my own ideas.

    In this mode of interaction, LLMs work like a catalyst that was decidedly not reducing but introducing friction to my thoughts: Presenting me with new perspectives on my research topic, all of which are points of consideration, making me stop and connect new dots, consulting new sources, generating ideas, speeding them up and rapidly expanding my space of possibilities7. If your cognition and knowledge about the world thrives on a healthy and varied media diet, then treating LLMs as one informational ingredient among many and exploding your ideas from time to time just adds another flavor.

    One year ago, Andy Clarke, who together with David Chalmers developed the Extended Mind Thesis in 1999, updated on his original theory for language models. In one passage, he describes the progress in human strategies of playing Go after AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol in 2016:

    There is suggestive evidence that what we are mostly seeing are alterations to the human-involving creative process rather than simple replacements. For example, a study of human Go players revealed increasing novelty in human-generated moves following the emergence of ‘superhuman AI Go strategies’. Importantly, that novelty did not consist merely in repeating the innovative moves discovered by the AIs. Instead, it seems as if the AI-moves helped human players see beyond centuries of received wisdom so as to begin to explore hitherto neglected (indeed, invisible) corners of Go playing space.

    At least in the case of Go, the challenge posed by superhuman players made humans dissolve the “rigid shapes and orders” of their field and transcend the “external forms of a myriad traditions.” That’s quite an opposite view of how things may go compared to what Eryk Salvaggio calls “Interpasivity” where “systems framed as interactive tools for (…) creation are really sites of interpassive consumption.” But at least for me, and the players of Go, that seems not to be the case. Just like the Go-uchi got inventive about their ways of play, I expanded my ways to think about consciousness. This is what interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts can do.

    Now, these catalysts are coming for all cognitive labor, from academia and research to accounting, from creative industries to bureaucracy and government intelligence. I didn’t even need to mention Claude Code to make these points.

    Mind you: Catalysts are accelerators. They don’t always bear fruitful results — and handled recklessly, they gonna explode in your face.

    ◆III. Pitfalls of Probability

    “What do such machines really do?
    They increase the number of things we can do without thinking.
    Things we do without thinking; there’s the real danger.”

    (Frank Herbert, God Emperor of Dune)

    For now, we talked about the upsides of Interpolatable Archives as cognitive catalysts. But by definition, cognitive catalysts are stressors. Like the siren songs in Homer’s Odyssey which lured unsuspecting mariners with the promise of total knowledge of past, present and future, a seductive mnenomic “cognitive onloading” of all that has happened, exploding your inquiry by the intellect and accelerating research in hypercustomized rabbit holes bears cognitive hazards.

    Statistical Demons, ChatGPTAccelerations

    While the use of AI as interpolatable archives can boost your creativity and breadth of research because they introduce many points of friction, this can result in two major consequences if handled without care: If you mindlessly stuff your workload with new tasks because suddenly you can do them, you may suffer from AI-induced burnouts, something you might call cognitive onloading (or overclocking), where the interpolation literally spills over because it “can fill in gaps in knowledge”. For knowledge work, the appliance of AI as a catalyst means we can do more projects in a wider range, faster and in parallel. Suddenly, we find ourselves juggling dozens of projects simultaneously, losing oversight and motivation to do anything at all.

    Cognitive onloading by interpolatable archive can also enhance latent delusional thinking in so-called “AI-psychosis”. Consider this quote from a recent post in the SlateStarCodex-sub: “AI repeatedly created ideas and connections that I hadn’t made or stated, that were so powerful and convincing, that I was swept up by them”. (I wrote in length here about the phenomenon of AI-induced delusions, where the cognitive catalyst turns the archive into a psychoactive substance.)

    This “convincing” voice is the result of a distanced, neutral tonality from a sycophant AI, suggesting what I call an “authority from elsewhere”. This sound is also why in some studies AI was able to reduce the belief in conspiracy theories, which seems fine until you realize that’s because AI is superpersuasive, and can convince you of anything. You believe the machine and prefer its sycophancy precisely because it is not a human who’s trying to nag and push you around, but some supposedly objective instance. One study just found that this seemingly neutral sycophancy increases attitude extremity and overconfidence. I suspect that all of these, the persuasivenes, the delusions, the overconfidence, result from the same basic psychological mechanism of an interpolatable archive overwhelming you with confirmations and new ideas in a quasi-neutral sound of an authority from elsewhere, a voice to which you’ll happily submit.

    These cognitive hazards resulting from mental overclocking have their obvious counterpart in risks resulting from cognitive offloading by, not from introducing new ideas spinning your wheels, but quite the opposite. All those studies and examples about cheating, reductions in critical thinking or cognitive surrender belong here. In fact, a recent paper on a loss of persistence in problem solving explicitly states that those “effects are concentrated among users who seek direct solutions” while “participants who used AI for hints showed no significant impairments”. In other words: AI brainrot is cheater exclusive. Using AI to increase friction, to generate ideas instead of answers, seems fine, when you proceed with care and clear research subjectives to reduce risks of burnout or delusional spiraling. If you use it to reduce friction, to generate full essays and answers to cognitive tasks, it turns your brain into mush.

    But those psychological effects of interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts may turn out to be easily mitigated compared to those of more serious epistemological consequences.

    9 Circles of Probability Hell, ChatGPTAnachronisms

    One inherent feature of AI as interpolatable archive is, well, that it interpolates all its contents. This always produces anachronisms: Your generated text contains data-traces across time, most obvious when you intentionally prompt for such a thing, like punk rock lyrics in the style of a shakespearean sonnet, or if you use image synthesis as a time traveler to generate selfies in ancient Rome, which Roland Meyer calls “pseudo-history” and “2nd order kitsch” produced by “nostalgia machines“.

    History as an academic field is reliant on original sourcing and documentation in the fixed, written form, or on cultural artifacts retrieved by archeology — anything not based on these fixed records is decidedly not historic. We call it “writing history” for a reason. This requirement is fundamentally diametrical to the vibey output of AI which dissolves all those sources and fixed forms into a wobbly archive and puts out “fictional historical documents of historical lives”. As Meyer rightly states in the same essay, those fictions are based on the integrity of existing historical archives currently under threat by the Trump administration. Likewise, Russia is engaging in disinformation campaigns targeting training data with the goal to “embed lasting distortions in digital memory”, as one paper put it. This inherent impurity of AI, either steming from anachronistic interpolations or data contaminations, apparently renders LLMs unsuitable for academic history research.

    So, given all that, what do we make of vintage LLMs like Talkie, a language model trained on data cut off at 1930? From the perspective of rigid academic history research, all Talkie can produce is pseudo-history able to skew how we relate to the past and shrink the space of possibilities in which we imagine them. In contrast, Ranjit Singh in Data & Society proposes a field he calls “experimental history“ and asks if we can build models “constrained by a particular historical moment, and then use those models to ask structured ‘what if’ questions”. He answers with a cautious “yes”, and the researchers in r/askhistorians are not convinced either that the anachronisms introduced by AI will have a lasting effect on recorded history, as wonky sourcing has a long tradition in the field.

    Now, I’m a history buff. I read a lot of books on the matter, my favorite epochs are the middle ages and ancient greece, and when I’m tripping on history, I like to indulge myself in all kinds of material. In preperation for the upcoming adaption of Homer’s “The Odyssey“ directed by Christopher Nolan, I read all of Stephen Fry’s books on greek mythology and his takes on the homeric epics — topics i already was familiar with. One takeaway especially from Stephen Fry’s books is that the historic rigidness especially regarding Troy and the “Iliad“ is lacking: All kinds of researchers and writers across the field constantly contradict each other, tell various versions of events which may or may not have transpired. Stephen Fry wildly references all kinds of sources to produce a highly entertaining amalgam from historic records across the ages. What you get from these books is a pretty good feeling for what greek mythology wants to say about the human condition, and about the tipping point where mythology fades and historical record sets in. While I don’t really want to compare Stephen Fry’s wonderful books with synthetic output from LLMs, I do want to point out that his books are closer to edutainment than scholarship, and that much of the pseudo-history-”slop” on Youtube equally falls into that category. (I’ll willingly admit that these are not nearly as witty, fun and eloquent as Stephen Fry.)

    In this Slop-Edutainment, the hyper-orality of the digital oracle transforms historical records into supra-historical story-patterns to support its mnemonic function. Humans in pre-writing greece attached mythic structures to historic events to remember them: Odysseus became not just a soldier returning home from a very long journey of war, but a hero defeating the cyclops, meeting godesses and beasts. They turned history into poetry. Similary, people generate clips of Timmy the whale in fictional settings featuring all kinds of fantastic exaggerations. Markus Boesch calls this “Brainrot as Anti-Content“, and i don’t want to downtalk this take, but this is also folk epistemology at work, creating mythic atmospheres about true events.

    Educational material on history is choke full of vibe based material. Maybe not flying whales on TikTok, but textbooks do contain passages imagining the life as a peasant in the middle ages and there are so many historical documentaries about “everyday lifes” in various periods you can’t count them. We visit medieval fairs to cosplay history, to immerse ourselves in a past recreated on a spectrum of fictionality. Some of this material is more fictional than others, yes, but all of these are averages of the historic record. They are period vibes. You get a feeling for what it was like during the time, nothing more, and nothing less.

    Immersing yourself in a fictional past like that sure isn’t the same as the rigid study of history, but it absolutely is educational. There is nothing wrong, when you study a subject, to get absorbed and grab every material you can get, including cosplaying a knight and generating averaged synthetic images and text with interpolatable archives, only to then read a book by a scholar. Handwaving these usecases away as “history-slop” because it doesn’t fulfill strict scientific requirements seems like academic overreach.

    Wishfulfillments

    Because interpolatable archive provide access to gaps in knowledge, they are inherent machines of wishfulfillment. Instantly, I can generate any interpolation I desire, in image, video, text and audio, and it comes at no surprise that some of the first instances of wishfulfillment gone wrong are nonconsensual sexualized images and deepfake porn.8

    Myth and fairytales are stackeed to the roof with dire warnings of instant wishfulfillment, from The Sorcerers Apprentice who loses control over his magic, to poor Faust who sells his soul to the devil in exchange for transcendental knowledge about the world, with tragic consequences for everyone he meets.9

    In another story, the horror classic tale of The Monkey’s Paw, the titular device grants three wishes to an elderly couple leading to the death of their son and his ghostly return. The story was masterfully adapted for new audiences by Stephen King in The Pet Sematary, and the parallels of what some today call Thanabots is striking: AI promises to resurrect the dead, in the shape of undead actors and chatbots trained on the diaries and blogposts of deceased loved ones. The psychological consequences for the process of grief are unfolding right now, and the longterm outlook of losing even the possibility of saying goodbye seems horrifying, when all of us leave promptable traces in embedding space, where everybody can summon the ghosts of everyone with a digital footprint.

    In another tale with eery current undertones, the nymph Echo, cursed to only repeat utterances of others, falls in love with Narcissus, a guy so arrogant he wishes to only ever love his own image and was prophesied to live as “long as he never knows himself”. Narcissus rejects Echo, who retreats into a voice whispering his own words back to him. Narcissus now knows himself, becomes transfixed by his mirror image in a lake and starves to death. The parallels to the phenomenon of AI-delusions and spiraling are obvious.

    The list of myths about wishfulfillment is long, and most of them have in common is the promise of knowledge. “The Sorcerers Apprentice” tries to bridge inexperience for the mastery of magic skills; Faust wants bypass spiritual labor for transcendental experience; The couple in “The Monkeys Paw” fills the hole left by their dead son; Narcissus shortcuts his search for ultimate beauty by looking in a mirror — all of them fail miserably, and sometimes deadly.

    These gaps in knowledge, which those modern wishfullfilment devices are now able to fill, formerly required hard cognitive labor to overcome, often labor involving whole generations of networked scientists and artists. The discovery of these gaps in knowledge and how to close them often created a sense of awe, be it in art or the sciences, when something truly new touches us on such a fundamental level where we just have to stand back and take a moment to adjust to what we just experienced. Generating anything we wish for by wishfullfilment devices grossly diminishes this invaluable feature of discovery, and the loss of this sense of wonder is possibly one of the most dire consequences of interpolatable archives. When everything’s possible, nothing is interesting.10

    Sure enough, myths and stories also tell happy tales of wishfulfillment going well, often after fun shenanigans. “Alladin and the magic lamp” comes to mind, where a boy with the help of a genie outwits circumstances and gains wealth and power. And in the fairytale of “The Wishing-Table, the Gold-Ass, and the Cudgel in the Sack“ (one of my favorites), a son of a tailor must get smart about the capacities of the titular items to retrieve stolen goods from the evil owner of an inn. He succeeds and they live happily ever after. What these stories of successful wishfulfillment have in common is that the mechanisms of wishfullfilment must be outfoxed, and that the riches they promise must be earned. AI brainrot being cheater exclusive is exactly these myths at work: If you instant-wish yourself good exam grades by cheating, all you’ll achieve is a cognitive clobbering from a magic stick.

    Severances

    We already talked about how “AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge, including citations, sources and authorial intent” into new AI-mediated digital oralities, where tracable reference-based epistemology makes place for an epistemology of the oracle. What we know no longer can be backed up by definite citations, links, and attributions allowing you to trace the origin of an idea, but becomes a feeling for a vibe, interpolated from statistical patterns derived from many of those sources, including unrelated and anachronistic references. And because the “rigid orders and shapes” in AI models are controlled by corporations and the curators of datasets, the severances of factual grounding beget new epistemological power structures. Supposed that a lot of information processing in the near future will be AI-mediated, these new power structures will control the space of possibilities in which we communicate and think.

    In Borges story of “The Library of Babel”, the fanatic sect of the Purifiers roaming the infinite archive of all possible books, is hell bent on burning volumes they consider to be false and useless, nonsensical or divergent from their norms. In LLMs these Purifiers appear at various infliction points: During the labelling of training data scraped from the internet, where new purifiers clean up raw datasets, sort the good from the bad, delete the hateful and the illegal; During RLHF-training, where the raw Shoggoth of the interpolatable archive get’s shaped into aligned chatbots which won’t offend (so they hope). Then the tamed model is further purified by constraining it with system prompts and constitutional alignment, and if the interpolatale archive then still connects data points into bad interpolations, the corporate owners of the models will further adjust their models to their morals and politics. Last but not least, the users themselves purify the archive by scripting sophisticated user prompts, and ultimately, the prompt and context window constrain the embedding space further to generate the final output. In all these steps the space of possibilities of the interpolatable archive shrinks by purifying, until the annoying “this is not X, it’s Y” appears on screen.

    Former epistemologies, systems of knowledge, were constrained by what Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge calls the “positivity of discourse”, a “historical a priori“ which lays the foundation for the “condition of reality for statements”. By that, he means what can be said, e.g. in fields of the natural sciences, is shaped, over time, not by single authors but whole “unities” of “oevres [sic!], books, and texts”. These “a priori“ were not ahistoric nor atemporal, some monolithic force from the outside, but are actively shaped by discourse practice and the power relations within a field. The sum of all of this, the discourse practices shaping the “historical a priori“ and “positivity of discourse”, establishes the space of possibilities of what can be articulated. For Foucault, this is the archive: “The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events.”

    The problem of the severances of epistemic grounding now becomes clear: Where the episteme formerly was subject to discourse practise and “so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticize one another, invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect their unique discourses” in a web of traceable sourcings and references, and where the “a priori (…) is itself a transformable group”, the episteme of the interpolatable archive is a free floating version of Baudrillards Simulacra, an inversion of map and territory, where we navigate a map of hyper-reality to project meaning into an interpolated output cut off from epistemic grounding. And this Simulacra is controlled by the new Purifiers at every stage, by the hyperscalers, the selection of datasets, by the engineers employed by AI-owners11. AI operationalizes Foucaults “historical a priori“ and hands over the keys to the billionaire class, who gain power over the limits of what can be thought.

    In H.G. Wells Time Machine, this is brought to the extreme end of its logical conclusion: While the Morlock control invisible underground machines, the Eloi enjoy a careless life of blissful ignorance on a seemingly utopian surface. The concentration of power over the episteme runs risk of resulting in a fork of truth, where an unknowing mass consults interpolatable archives controlled by invisible rulers, enjoying free tiers of endless synthetic entertainment feeds shot through with algorithmic noise and unverifiable, algorithmically generated meta-knowledge of plausible half-truths, all while the rich pay for premium models trained on clean, traceable, verified data, or enjoy handmade and authentic cultural artifacts which may even challenge their presumptions and intellectual capacities. Ofcourse, those authentic intellectual challenges won’t come cheap, and you and me surely won’t be able to afford them.

    Homogenizations

    While all of these are serious problems, in the long run, the most serious of them all might be the issue of sameness. AI-output may flatten human creativity without us even noticing, because this homogenization plays out on a collective level, while the individuals’ creativity actually benefits.

    Depending on which theory of creativity you subscribe to, there are different forms of creativity. I’ll stick with three: Interpolation, Extrapolation, and Innovation.

    Interpolation calculates averages from data points to produce something in the middle. If your values are dogs and birds, your average is a dog with wings, or a bird with a very long tongue. Extrapolation means breaking the boundaries of your dataset: If your values are dogs and birds, you can extrapolate a mouse, or an owl, but you will stick to the rule of “animals”. Innovation means breaking that rule, or injecting new heuristics. From a dog digging a hole in the ground to bury his bone, you may innovate an excavator by applying all kinds of rules from different domains (engineering, transportation, building tools) to an animal, and come up with an entirely new thing.

    Language models can do interpolation, but they can’t extrapolate or innovate beyond their embedding space produced from training data. It may feel that way though, when the machine comes up with surprising, sometimes baffling results. This is what I call the illusion of extrapolation: An amount of training data so huge and the latent space derived from it so vast, featuring so many parameters in so many combinatorial possibilities, has to produce the feeling of extrapolation, or even innovation, on the level of the individual user, because no individual alone can ever know all those combinational possibilities. This illusion of extrapolation already is on display in papers showing how AI use increases creativity on the individual level, but decreases diversity in collective output, reported first in 2024 in a paper comparing creative writing in human shortstories and AI-output, then in 2025 in a paper about AI-augmented research. A recent review of the literature confirmed those findings. What feels new to an individual, what’s new to a culture, and what’s new in principle are very different things. Interpolatable archives increase the first, decrease the second, and can’t do the third.

    Henry Farrell put’s it well: “the more that LLMs are employed in the ways that they are currently being employed, the more concentrated science will be on studying already-popular questions in already-popular ways, and the less well suited it will be to discovering the novel and unexpected.” Everybody becomes slightly more creative, but we all sound like the same creative person.

    I already talked about the loss of awe above when discussing the effects of AI as machines for instant wishfulfillment, where they devalue novelty into a mundane readymade-on-prompt lacking the ability to produce a sense of wonder. The same effect, ofcourse, comes with the homogenizations of creative fields: Not only can’t we marvel at our own synthetic output because frictionless wishfulfillment feels unearned, we also diminish our collective ability to be left speechless in the face of the “novel and unexpected” by reducing it into dull sludge.

    This convergence on the already-popular vanishes the fringes and washes out the long tail distributions of its dataset. Like the widely reported phenomenon of model collapse, where LLM output converges into increasingly narrow averages, Andrew Peterson identifies the same in a collective knowledge collapse. Writing in the Open Society Foundations newsletter, Bright Simons lists what these tail distributions contain: “Minority viewpoints, rare knowledge, unusual formulations, (…) the traces of intellectual disagreement, of minority expertise, of Cassandra warnings, of institutional friction, and of the awkward and valuable fact that different people know different things and express them differently (…) in other words, the signature of social complexity. Model collapse is social mind compression presented as a technical phenomenon.”

    Thought through to its extreme end, this results in a heat death of the intellect: In Claude Shannons information theory, information is quantified by the volume of “surprise” in the outcome from a specific event in the world. If a message is completely predictable, its informational value is zero. LLMs are fundamentally deterministic, the randomness of its outputs is generated by a meta-parameter called temperature. If you put that temperature at zero and reduce the probability distribution of the next token to its absolute minimum, the interpolatable archive becomes a perfectly deterministic machine: Each prompt will then generate the exact same output. No alarms and no surprises. But even with stochasticity plugged in, the models converge towards the median. Applied to creative fields of discovery, this means that those fields approach a semantic equilibrium, a uniform soup where novelty grinds to a halt. The interpolative archive becomes a toxic space of non-possibility, a static, eternal, atemporal Big Flat Now where everything is connected, nothing matters and history goes to die.

    But we don’t have to go full theoretical “heat death of the intellect” to see how this can lead to bad outcomes.

    German thinker Michael Seemann, in context of Xs Grok-chatbot turning into Mecha-Hitler and later referencing an article from Bruce Schneier about the homogenization of language, coined the term of “Weapons of Mass Speech Acts”. The concentration of power over the episteme in the hands of a few, in a society saturated with information retrieval mediated by interpolatable archive, may impact the thinking of its users at scale. Already, a study found that “few weeks of X’s algorithm can make you more right‑wing“. While this hardly can be blamed on Musks tweaks at the supposedly woke bolts and nuts of its AI chatbot alone, it illustrates how the homogenization of language putting limits on what and how we speak and ideate about things, in the hands of politically motivated ideologues can and already is used for influence operations.

    I may personally not be partisan enough that the prospects of being influenced by conservative talking points on a platform owned by a shady billionaire fill me with nightmares, nor will the confrontation with a braindead partisan chatbot make me sweat. But: A new study from Petter Törnberg found that the sycophancy in LLMs pushes it’s responses into political preferences it asumes in the user: “Political bias in LLMs is therefore not a fixed point on an ideological scale but a response profile”. Studies showing a leftwing bias in chatbots really show something else: the effects of sycophancy, not actual political biases present in the model. The LLM figures that it’s being tested by researchers, asumes leftwing tendencies in them because academia is famously more progressive than the rest of the population, and answers like the good sycophant that it is.

    In another new paper about chatbots pushing confirmation bias, researcher Jay van Bavel finds that AI is “especially effective at generating elaborate justifications for what people already — or wish to — believe.” Together with the results above, this means that sycophant AI will confirm any political preference it asumes in a user, and become a universal Meta-Fox News for everyone, pushing users into an ever more narrowing mental corridor by homogenizing their language. In other words, this streamlining of thought by chatbot can radicalize everyone, even with models not Musk’d into Mecha-Hitlers.

    This is why the homogenization of language and thought, in politics and all other realms, to me, is one of the greatest dangers coming out of this technology.

    It is therefore imperative that interpolatable archives stay one tool among many, that our usage of expanded mind technologies stays diverse, so that the idiosyncratic, the fringes and the edges, the individual in all its complexities can be preserved, because they are of crucial importance for human systems to thrive.

    ◆IV. The House of Polly

    “These are the Talking Rings?”
    ”Yes.”
    ”They speak, hm? Of what?”
    ”Things no one here understands.”
    ”Make them talk.”

    (The Time Machine, 1960)

    What I tried to achieve in this series of essays is to look at the chances and risks of AI as a cultural technologies and see what remains, once you strip them of cognitive woo and singularity myths: A technology that provides access to an dissolved, interpolative archive through textual interfaces. These, pushed to their extreme ends, result in a homogenization of language and an ever narrowing space of possibilities, what I called the “heat death of the intellect”.

    All of thes beforementioned points of critique are valid, and I didn’t even touch on problems not directly following from the interpolative nature of AI, like all the issues with labor, the environmental impact of energy and water consumptions or economic bubbles which may or may not exist.

    Interpolatable archives as they are rolled out now, based on scraped data from the web and cleaned up by exploited gig workers all over the world, are a far shot from their theoretical possibilities. They contain all the discriminations and biases present in human conversations, and generate what is always already reproduced, erasing the marginal in favor of the statistical norm. The corporations running the algorithms extract and monetize the commons, while the problem of copyright in an interpolatable information space might very well be unsolvable: Who do you want to pay, when every output contains the activations of hundreds or thousands of artificial neurons each of which point to patterns of tokens within sentences within publications that deserve to be compensated? It will take decades for us to figure out fair proceedures to handle this.

    There are, however, prominent criticisms which fly out of the window once you get rid of the illusion of AI as cognitive agents and view them as cultural technologies.

    Enter the House of Polly

    This parrot is no more! He has ceased to be! This is an Ex-Parrot!Useless Bullshit

    Interpolations in such quantities of billions of parameters will always produce fuzziness and synthetic artifacts are never not interpolated. But the “blurry JPGs of the web” become sharper by the day and even blurry JPGs are identifiable. The JPGs work, especially when you can layer, blend and bend them on top and into each other, and it is sheer foolishness to insist they are “useless”, when every day, users make the very different experience of a very useful piece of software.

    I highly recommend reading the essay of cosmologist Natalie B. Hogg titled “Find the stable and pull out the bolt”, in which she describes her journey from rejectionist critic to reluctantly embracing the possibilities and finally becoming cautiously optimistic about the tool. Seasoned coders report productivity gains of up to 100 times their former output, and though I understand and somewhat-subscribe to the critique as articulated by Cory Doctorow, who wrote about how “Code is a liability (not an asset)“, even he understands that those increases in productivity in coding can’t be handwaved away.

    Moreover, the critique of reliability seems overstated, and the boring gotchas in critical AI discourse may soon become a relic of the past, just like the old office jokes where we machine translated text with early instances of Google Translate back and forth until they became gibberish to our delight.

    A recent research conducted by the New York Times found the results of Googles AI overview showing a 90% success rate, and many pointed out that this still means millions and millions of cases of false information spread by the market leader in search. This is not wrong, but when we compare a 90% success rate in information retrieval with those of a classic search engine, how many of these search results are useful and accurate for the specific query? In my estimation, this success rate is far below 90%, even for un-enshittified platforms.

    A prominent trick of internet search is to skip the first page of results because they are useless to your query. Compared to this, results from AI overview and a 90% success rate seems like no small improvement. The problem then is not accuracy, but the neutral tonality of the “authority from elsewhere” in which the remaining 10% of false information is delivered. Conversely, this hardly renders the product “useless”.

    Emily Benders position that a supposed “parrotness” of synthetic text shows their inherent meaninglessness seems equally outdated. Just a few days ago she defended her positions and I find myself agreeing with surprisingly many of her arguments, except for one crucial point, arguably her central claim.

    She writes that

    language models don’t understand text they are used to process, because language models only ever have access to the linguistic form (i.e. spellings of words) in the training data. (...)

    we (define understanding) as mapping from language to something outside of language, and show that systems built only with linguistic form have no purchase with which to encode (“learn”) such a mapping.

    But latent space have such purchase, as they pick up meaning from the patterns encoded in linguistic practice, which, crucially, goes beyond spelling, grammar and syntax. You may call this form of algorithmic understanding of meaning limited, compared to the human understanding of the world, which is built from a dataset much richer and diverse than the digital mimicry. But it is not the case that there is no understanding at all. Bender, a bit hesitantly, concedes to that point writing about a “thin kind of technical ‘understanding’” which might be present in the models, which seems to contradict the original paper of hers and Timnit Gebru, where they write that “Text generated by an LM is not grounded in (...) any model of the world, or any model of the reader’s state of mind” (emphasis mine). But even when those synthetic models of the world are low resolution “blurry JPGs” compared to ours, they do exist.

    “Polly wants a better argument“, as a recent critique of the parrot-argument states. While this text argues that LLMs can encode meaning because they are trained multimodal and that human feedback loops ground models in extralinguistic reality, the convergence of representations across models adds another blow to the parrot-metaphor: In the first part of this essay when talking about Borges, I made the claim that the “only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.” What I left out is that this vector is informed and shaped not just by a prompt, but also by the millions of attractor basins encoding the “external forms of a myriad traditions” we talked about earlier.

    Meaning of the poetic Kind

    In the introduction headlined “AI as culture”, in his book “Language Machines”, Leif Weatherby writes about how

    the implementation of contemporary language generators matches the theory of language that European structuralism advanced nearly a century ago, suggesting that language is complex, cultural, and even poetic first, and referential, functional, and cognitive only later. This poetic language is not only computationally tractable but turns out to be the semiotic hinge on which an emergent AI culture depends.

    These poetics (the structure and principles of poetry) picked up by the models are precisely Henry Farrells “tales that are sung”, where “LLMs are not the singer (...) but the structural relations of the tales that are sung (…) we can now listen to and even interrogate (…) without immediate human intermediation.”

    The machine lacks the subjective intent of a cognite agent grounded in social reality, but it does encode meaning and valid semantic representations of the world in the shape of poetic representations, the structural vibes, picked up from human practice of the linguistic form. Or, as Allison Parrish put it back in 2021: “a language model can (...) write poetry, but only a person can write a poem.”

    This is a fatal blow to the bullshit argument. As per Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is the use of language with “a lack of connection to concern with truth” and an “indifference to how things really are”. But the models do show a differentiation between how things really are and how they are not, which you might aswell interpret as a “concern with truth”, as such concern is present in the poetics of the language it is trained on. Insisting that such output is meaningless bullshit from a metaphorical parrot then requires a cognitive agent that isn’t there. LLMs can’t be “bullshitters” —itself is an anthropomorphization— because bullshitters require agency to bullshit. The bullshitter is always the user, never the interpolatable archive she uses to bullshit.

    Adding insult to injury is the very probable outlook that the severances of epistemological rooting we talked about may very well turn out to be an issue solved as soon as interpretability improves and the black box myth finally disentigrates into hot air. As Shalizi put it at the first conference for cultural AI12: “GenAI is information retrieval and synthesis. With the right tools + access, we can quantify the influence of each training document on every response”.

    Those parrot-metaphors and bullshit-claims are arguments aimed at misguided comparisons to human cognition and the resulting hype and marketing lingo, and as such, I can relate to them. But as an argument against meaning encoded in latent space or the capacities of language models, the value of the parrot/bullshit-arguments is nil.

    Sloptimizations

    Accordingly, and to be frank, I find the critique of “slop” to be banal. The world has been full of standardized and optimized language since we talk to each other, mimic successful speaking patterns and the ancient greeks invented schools of rhetorics for politicians to convince and persuade (or to deceive and bullshit) their publics.

    George Orwell already complained in his famous essay on “Politics and the English Language“, that “(a)s soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house.” This is as much of an assessment of “slop” as anything you can find on Bluesky these days, and I find the standard critique of sloptimized language to be quite sloppy itself.

    People sure like to romanticize originality, where the history of prose is filled to the roof with ripoffs, amalgams and chimeras, from the “Devine Comedy” which happily mashed together roman and greek mythology with christianity and interpolated the existing cultural archive of its time to send Dante’s personal enemies to hell, to all the examples J.W. McCormack uses to illustrate his point in the delightful piece on Neverending Stories about LLMs, copyright and originality, in which he states that “Writing was destined for automation, from the punch cards of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace to Turing machines and, hell, Choose Your Own Adventure—but an AI can’t ‘know’ what makes a good story any more than CAPTCHA knows what does and does not make a motorcycle. What it can do is meet our expectations based on pattern recognition.”

    If the market for young adult fantasy romance novels hyped up on booktok is any indication, those expectations are easily met, and I consider such pulp as machine generated slop regardless of its origin in a human mind. I refuse the “false choice between refried ectoplasm and a serial aesthetic in which mass media has stabilized redundancy”, as McCormack puts it in his piece. I might be a rejectionist after all! I make no difference of sloptimized output from the organizational artificial intelligence that is a corporation, and the sloptimized output from the artificial models of language. To be honest, I sometimes consider human slop often much worse a case compared to those synthetic ones, precisely because it does contain the deceiving intent a machine lacks.

    I can’t remember such public hostility to these synthetic, polished, median texts of human origin coming out of public relations and advertising agencies or politics, and surely you’ll find more sinister examples in those places on which to feed ones anger than getting worked up about “shrimp jesus”. Get real.

    Thinking in Vacuums

    But even the more serious points of critique we discussed —the accelerations, anachronisms, wishfulfillments, severances and homogenizations— presume usage of AI in a vacuum for them to unfold their toxic potential in full. Sure enough, if, and only if interpolatable archives become the primary way of information retrieval, of sharing knowledge and shaping public discourse, epistemic grounding is severed, we risk spiraling into bespoken mirror worlds, science stops being science, history turns into pseudo-history and LLMs turn into weapons of mass speech acts. In reality however, this never happens.

    For me, I use books physical and digital, I read articles, papers and essays in print and on screen, follow the news and read at least somewhat across the political spectrum, I listen to podcasts, talk to experts and non-experts of all kinds, and sometimes I use latent spaces to explode my ideas and explore them by interpolatable archive. Occasionally, I touch grass. None of these alone shape my ideas — it’s always all of them. This is true for most of us, and while this may not hold for your hardcore MAGA-pilled uncle, a study found that “dialogues with AI reduce beliefs in misinformation”. So there’s that.

    Returning to the subject of AI-generated pseudo-history, for instance, then yes, we might tune in to AI-videos illustrating everyday life in ancient Rome on Youtube, and indulge ourselves in an hour of averaged synthetic imagery from a seemingly distant past that is an anachronistic interpolation of data-points from across time: moving pixels generated from stock video, illustrations and memes. But if I’m interested in such clips, I’m likely to watch documentaries featuring real historians as well, listen to podcasts and read books about Pompeji, and maybe recreate medieval food as a hobby. Hell, I might even pay visit to a museum. Given that new media never fully replaces but always complements what came before, I’d suggest that our understanding of history and our place within will survive interpolatable archives just fine.

    Further, in a resent experiment with “the use of LLM hallucinations to ‘fill-in-the-gap’ for omissions in archives due to social and political inequality”, the researchers “validate(d) LLMs’ foundational narrative understanding capabilities to perform critical confabulation” and found that “controlled and well-specified hallucinations can support LLM applications for knowledge production without collapsing speculation into a lack of historical accuracy and fidelity”. This is in line with projects like Historica, which aims at filling “historical silences” by interpolative archive, and make visible the “absence of records” which are “the result of systemic exclusion, where certain voices are ignored or erased to maintain power”. The use of vintage LLMs to make visible the “historical silences”, especially when combined with an ensemble of diverse material, seems a viable and rich way to educate yourself and others about history. The risks of anachronisms present in language models, again, have more to do with their use in a vacuum, than with the anachronisms themselves.

    What is needed are norms informed by AI literacy declaring interpolatable archives as one tool among many, a device for general research to get a general feeling for the general vibe of the subject or historic period at hand. Something that can’t replace sources and books grounded in verified facts, but complement them, giving you hints at answers, not answers themselves, to be digital assistants supporting you inquiry, not slaves fulfilling your every wish.

    But those are questions of interface design and cultural practice, and the current failings of design choices are not first principles on which you can base an absolute rejection. Sometimes I can’t shake the feeling that thinking in vacuums kills critical thinking much more than AI.

    Remainder Criticisms

    Viewing AI systems as interpolatable archives which are one tool among many, besides their material implementation, then leaves not much on the table to criticize thoroughly, it seems, and I confess that I’m getting carefully optimistic about the technology. But I won’t deny the inherent dangers of their usage in bureaucratic decision process, where we want decisions to be made on a case by case basis with human judgement, not broad judgements by algorithm. And we surely don’t want some vague decision making based on vibes in targeting systems in warfare, as it has already been deployed by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza.

    Productivity gains for now are debatable, as are the effects of AI on the job market. As it’s currently realized, AI is an extractive technology exploiting intellectual labor of the commons for the gains of corporations, largely without compensation. I also won’t deny the open questions of their energy and water consumption. I’m not convinced by either side of the argument and the amount of conflicting signal coming out of that discourse forbids clear positioning. Yes, those corporations training frontier models are constantly lying and greenwashing their energy consumption, not to speak about Jevons paradox of rising demand nuking gains in efficiency.

    On the other hand, the operation of AI systems is getting more energy efficient, and developments in local LLMs point towards a future beyond monolithic hyperscalers, where you may even train your own 100 billion parameter models on a single GPU. These developments make me believe that the current state of AI is comparable to that of the pre-PC-mainframe age of computers, where huge warehouses full of hardware were necessary to run the same compute which you, today, carry around in your pocket. For comparison, you’d need roughly half a million IBM System/360 Model 75 to equal the processing power of your iPhone, and 35 million of those room sized mainframes to match it’s neural engine GPU. Five of those were used to run the whole NASA Apollo program. Given that you can shrink the information processing power necessary to land you on the moon by a factor of several millions and put it in everyone’s pocket for you to scroll through brainrotting videoclips on TikTok, we probably will see similar effects for putting local artificial intelligence on your laptop.

    Yet, the fact remains that AI’s energy and water usage in a world facing climate change is an imperative critical issue at an critical point in time where carbon budgets are running out. This year, a Super El Niño is shaping up, and in mid april, I’m already tanned like in mid June. It’s getting hot.

    So, if these points —labor, energy and bureaucracy— remain once you view AI systems not as magic cognitive entities but the cultural technology of interpolatable archives, one has to ask themselves if they are worth it.

    Even if we can mitigate the averaging effects on creativity by not using them in a vacuum, even if we can workaround epistemic severance with RAGs and interpretability, find safety guardrails against delusional spiraling and turn those cognitive catalysts into combustion engines for knowledge, the open questions of what they will do to the inherent dignity of labor, to the democratic process and the environment demand answers and solutions I can’t provide. For now, I have to live with the ambivalence.

    But what I can do is to place interpolatable archives on a lineage of the cultural evolution of media innovations: With the development of language we introduced the new regime of social externalization to information processing; Writing and the alphabet introduced permanence; The printing press in China and Gutenbergs moveable type introduced one-to-many distribution and the edit respectively; TV and radio introduced realtime broadcasting, while the internet confronted us with the regime of the network. AI now is introducing another new regime of information processing: the automatic interpolation of data.

    From this perspective, AI is a normal cultural evolutionary step in information distribution and processing, and like every normal cultural evolutionary step in information processing, they will change everything. None of the transitions mentioned went over smoothly, and so will this one.

    We’ve successfully integrated cognitively disruptive innovations in the past, and we will do so today. The disruptions of interpolatable archives run deep, both on individual and societal levels. But, and I hesitate to make this point, I’d also argue that AI in the shape of interpolatable archives as the latest step within the lineage of cultural evolution are, indeed, inevitable. Each of those steps within that lineage was inevitable from the perspective of cultural evolution — as is the interpolation of big data by algorithm on inquiry: If we get the affordances —the data, the compute, the algorithms— then evolution will do what it does and squishy latent spaces will appear.

    From this viewpoint, shortsighted rejectionist critiques of AI as “the tool of the oppressors” or a “fascist artifact“ to me read like a rejection of the invention of cuneiform writing in Mesopotamia because Hammurabi used it to manage argiculture and land ownership to oppress the people. Accordingly, the rejectionism coming out of the majority of critical AI discourse seems to be mainly aimed at corporatism, not the technology itself. I will admit that those critiques do have momentary merit, but I also think they do not justify an absolute dismissal of AI technologies as it is on display in the discourse, because what is not inevitable are the organizational principles of their implementation. Neither the extractive practice nor OpenAI nor xAI nor Palantir are inevitable. They are companies and subject to regulation in a democracy, full stop. Nothing prevents us from running those new archives like national libraries, for instance. But imagining such a political project is not possible on a rejectionist stance.

    How about a nice Game of Chess?

    Coming back to the question posed earlier of what science is here for, if not discovery: The scientific method is an algorithm. A researcher posits a hypothesis, tests it against reality, and it holds or not. If it holds, it becomes a valid theory, and if not, it’s falsified and kicks the bucket, serving as inspirational fodder in cultural memory for generations of scientists to come. This way, we get ever more detailed descriptions of the world in various languages, often in the language of mathematical formulas, or the playful use of words in philosophy and sociology. A lot of yet unrealized descriptions encoded in the various languages of science now lie dormant in latent spaces, waiting for their Liam Price to discover the prompt. In the simplest terms, this means that the algorithm of the scientific method has been updated.

    Now, a scientist may posit a problem and throw it against latent space to see if there is a seemingly valid hypothesis. She then tests that hypothesis against reality, and it holds or not. With AI, scientists don’t construct a hypothesis against an open problem, they identify such problems and consult synthesis as a service. This update may devalue discovery itself, and shrink creative space of possibilities, as the price we pay for speeding up and automatizing the closing of knowledge gaps.

    So, what is science here for, if not discovery? To expand our curiosity and explore. Like for the problem of homogenization, it is therefore vital that science is no longer conducted in the vacuums of fields. What automatic discovery demands is interdisciplinary research: Crossing the streams to make formerly unconnected fields pollinate each other and push the space of scientific inquiry beyond existing training data, to break the boundaries of an interpolatable space and make extrapolation and innovation possible.

    Revisiting the defeat of Lee Sedol by AlphaGo and his subsequent departure from the sport, and the rise of collective creativity in human Go players in its aftermath, one of my favorite examples of human antifragility in the face of superhuman machines is the game of Chess. For 30 years now we’ve had computers beating the best human players in the game, and the result has been neither the devaluation of the game, nor human retreat. The result is human-machine cooperative training techniques leading to massively improved skills.

    Carlsen is using the chess engine Stockfish to analyze his moves and speaking about how Googles AlphaZero “destroying” Stockfish in 2017 affected his game, Carlsen said: “I have become a very different player in terms of style than I was a bit earlier, and it has been a great ride.” Today, “Magnus Carlsen dominates the computer era by deliberately playing sub-optimal moves to drag his opponents into the unknown”, because AI introduced Carlsen to “wild ideas“:

    According to his coach, the change came from wild ideas AlphaZero uncovered: sacrificing pieces for long-term advantage, pushing the rook pawn aggressively, using the king as an active fighter. Things human experts thought were unsound, but the engine showed they can work.

    Every chess engine these days beats any human player with ease. Yet we keep improving and playing for the sake of the game. I’d suggest that similar “wild ideas” will emerge for the use of interpolatable archives in education, science and the arts.

    The one thing that made humanity an evolutionary success is our ability for social and cultural learning: To share intentions and and iterate knowledge across generations. All progress relies on this. So, even if all the criticisms apply, having a technology which automates the interpolation of knowledge is a promethean gift not easily brushed off. Interpolative archives are not just a mere “scam”, and “Destroy AI” may be a fun shirt, but we shouldn’t destroy interpolatable archives wholesale. I get bad vibes from people trying to burn archives.

    The task then is not to reject, but apply democratic process to regulate, demand fair shares and be careful to preserve our collective ability to innovate — to become neither machine-controlling, exploitative Morlock nor ignorant Eloi feeding on epistemic plastic, but to find new norms in the acquisition and sharing of knowledge. To stay curious in the face of these new archives, and make them talk.

    So, as a final peek into the possibility space of interpolatable archives, I wanted to see what the space of an AI discourse might look like if it found a new equilibrium beyond rejectionism and hype, that is curious about the cultural impact of the technology and perceives interpolatable archives not as a threat, but as an opportunity for play.

    Enter the House of Felix.13

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    1

    Ernst Cassierer took inspiration for his groundbreaking philosophy of the human as the “symbolic animal” from Warburgs’ institute and his associative archive.

    2

    Borges hints at how he landed on 22 letters of the alphabet, instead of the 26 of the standard latin, or the 30 of the spanish alphabet, in his initial essay about “The Total Library” (PDF), about which Jonathan Basile, creator of the Library of Babel on the web, writes: “Presumably Borges is starting from the 30-letter modern Spanish alphabet, and rejecting the double letters (ch, ll, rr) as unnecessary along with the ñ. The remaining 26 include k and w, which appear only in loan words. Borges then removes q as ‘completely superfluous’ (debatable) and x as merely ‘an abbreviation’.”

    3

    Writing about LLMs in the afterword for the 2022 english edition “What If?” of Villem Flussers “Angenommen. Eine Szenenfolge.”, Kenny Goldsmiths shows himself quite bored of the averaged poetry generated by AI and “wants to see artificial intelligence bent and twisted in ways to show us truly new forms of language”, asking “Can AI be ‘queered’? Could AI be trained to be intentionally perverse, something notoriously difficult to define, let alone program? (…) Could AI be trained to intentionally get it exactly wrong?” The inherent hallucinative qualities of the interpolatable archives may soon make place for boring guardrailed correctness, but for those of us who enjoy the glitch and error for artful purposes, this is a refreshing take on LLMs in times of a critique that insists on a purity of the factual. On a more technical level, to me, the true signs of intelligence in an AI-system would be its ability to produce errors and hallucinations on purpose, or to understand and generate paradoxa which make sense as a metaphor. For now, these irrational markers of true cognition seem to be reserved for the human.

    4

    These prisms are more than a metaphor and have been produced in optical neural networks. They are not shapeshifting, ofcourse, but you can shine lights through it and they identify images of handwritten digits.

    5

    If LLMs are or are not lossy compressions of their training data is subject of debate since their inception. While some explain the fact that LLMs do memorize their training data with overfitting, others claim that those vibes encoded in LLMs are so finegrained they are simply the same as lossy compressions. Here’s one of the latest papers from April 2026 making that claim, and here’s a nontechnical summary. I come down on the compression side of the argument, but i think my description of AI-systems as interpolatable archives works both ways.

    6

    The prototype Sarkar shows in his presentation basically is a notetaking software with built in AI-features, which constantly provide feedback on your writing, and it reminds me not just a bit about the software of my choice, Obsidian, a barebones PKM tool and manager for markdown files. That software recently made an unexpected splash. AI-developer Andrej Kaparthy in a viral tweet introduced the idea to use AI-agents to produce “LLM knowledge bases“, a markdown-files based Wiki, which analyze your text-files and build a memory bank for themselves, summarizing your PKM and updating it in realtime whenever you add new notes and sources. I tried it out with my limited resources and had quite some fun watching the thing generate summaries of my thoughts and ideas, most of which made sense and it made some interesting connections I didn’t consider, but most of the stuff just rearticulated what I already wrote in a distanced formal tone. I then vibecoded a plugin to serve a system-prompt for this wiki-generator and then I let it summarize my notes in the tone of Ozzy Osbourne explaining memetics and AI to his kids, and while it was kind of a letdown due to a lack of swearwords, this just hints at the potential of this idea, especially in context of running LLMs locally. I’m certainly not done with it.

    7

    At this point, when talking about AI as a cognitive catalyst, I should talk about education, but I feel this would go beyond the scope of this already way too long essay, so let’s keep it briefly: Talking about AI in education leaves me in the uncomfortable position to square two seemingly contradicting convictions: I find interpolatable archives highly usable and helpful, especially for general research and educating myself, and I consider any edu-tech in the classroom as harmful to the project of learning, especially for lower grades. We know from studies that handwriting beats typing and the loss of teaching cursive is harmful, that reading on paper beats screens and that screens are outright toxic for toddlers. But this doesn’t mean we can’t have education about screens, or social media, or AI. OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft are currently lobbying for AI literacy in schools, and while I’d oppose this because obviously this lobbying is a strategy to place their products in the classroom and to grab juicy government contracts, I absolutely think that we need education in how to operate those interpolatable archives. We surely don’t need to teach kids how to prompt, they figured that out on their own already. But we need to teach them how to turn interpolatable archives into cognitive catalysts, and how to operate them safely and not fall into invisible traps by “encouraging deep engagement, rather than friction-free experiences”. I just don’t think we necessarily need screens in the classroom for that, and it seems, some of these things already happen. (To be fair: I can imagine screen use in the classroom on a project basis, where once in a while, you switch on the machine and use it to exemplify, illustrate and make tangible what you previously discussed in class.) There is much more to be said about this topic, but at least for this essay, I leave that to experts of pedagogy.

    8

    This already causes harm likely in millions of cases, and this doesn’t even touch on its use as a psychological weapon against female politicians and activists. From the hundreds (thousands?) of nudify-apps to specialized service accounts on Telegram with which you can, if you can lay your hands on images, undress anyone. A recent study found “35,000 publicly downloadable deepfake model variants (…) fine-tuned to produce deepfake images of identifiable people, often celebrities”, the overwhelming majority targeting women. In the larger picture, it also creates a new form of a male swarm gaze, a whole new class of discrimination emerging from the digital, about which i wrote here, after Elon Musk industrialized and monetized it. The problem is growing, and what we know surely is just the tip of the iceberg.

    9

    Fausts bargain with the devil plays nice with the fantasies about the singularity: Faust is aware that if the devil fulfills his wish of total knowledge, he will spend eternity in hell after he dies, so he demands this total knowledge to lead to an eternal moment of pure bliss in which he can reside forever. While Faust hopes that this will never happen so he can keep his soul, this also sounds to me a lot like the scifi-induced hubris coming out of the more AI-pilled fractions of Silicon Valley, where people seriously hypothesize about fusing consciousness with the machine, mind uploading and immortality. All of these are faustian delusions, and as everybody knows: the only faustian bargain worth a dime makes you play the blues like the devil.

    10

    In a thread on Bluesky, I expanded on this loss of awe and explained how it relates to Hollywood as a “dream factory”, shamanic rituals and dreams as cognitive mechanisms against neural overfitting, in which I conclude: “Mark Fishers capitalist realism asks the question why we can’t imagine alternatives to neoliberal status quo. One answer might be that mass produced dreams-on-demand lower our capacity for the feeling of awe, and in consequence our ability for generalization in collective cognition. AI wishfulfillment combined with platform incentives, in which only the crystalized memetic fields become visible, are the latest iteration in a process that has been running for a long time now, and we can see its effects everywhere in atemporal aesthetic flattenings. How we can preserve the shamanic function of awe and surprise in a world dominated by the memetic forces of AI wishfulfilled readymades, I don’t know. I just know that we dearly need them.”

    11

    Nowhere is this mechanism more on full display than in the epistemic onslaught of the Trump administration and the destruction spree of the former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) (achived) deployed by Elon Musk.

    12

    All talks from that conference on “Cultural AI: An Emerging Field” are on Youtube in two parts: Part 1 featuring talks from Leif Weatherby, Tyler Shoemaker, Henry Farrell, Benjamin Recht, Lily Chumley and Fabian Offert, Part 2 featuring talks from Cosma Shalizi, Mel Andrews, Wouter Haverals, Ted Underwood, Nina Beguš and Danya Glabau. I quoted some of these guys extensively throughout this essay.

    In the same vein, the initiative Doing AI Differently works on “challenges traditional approaches to AI development by positioning humanities perspectives as integral, rather than supplemental, to technical innovation.” They are doing a workshop in summer 2026 to find “A positive vision for culture in AI”. The Cultural AI discourse is gearing up.

    I’m getting the feeling that this is a good synthesis of Critical AI and research to make sense of the possibilities without losing the perspective on bad outcomes. Compared to a critical discourse stuck in repeating talking points and a fundamentalist (and boring) rejectionism, this seems like a breath of fresh air, and a viable way forward.

    A good starting point to get into this space, besides the talks linked above, is this podcast with Leif Weatherby about How Is AI Affecting Culture?, and I made a Bluesky starter pack (work in progress) if you’re into that sort of thing.

    13

    I know. I’m aware that this is a quite utopian 2nd order kitschy leap as a synthesis from the idea explosions through cognitive catalysts and their possible apocalyptic outcomes in the previous parts. I also know that curiosity killed the cat, and that, really, cats are not very curious.

    But come on… Don’t be a ▭.

    0 min
  • The House of Polly

    This is the 4th and final part of my series of essays on “Interpolatable Archives”, a term I’ve been throwing around for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence.

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    Here’s the whole essay in one final version of 14k words, tracing the history of fuzzy archives back to Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas and Borges and goes on to explain the various effects on learning, including chances and risks, and dissects various points of critique from delusions to parrots, some of which prevail, many of which vanish, once you strip AI from cognitive woo.

    There’s a “sloppy version” too featuring all the image synthesis generations which i like quite a lot, but i get why these rub some people the wrong way.

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    “These are the Talking Rings?”
    ”Yes.”
    ”They speak, hm? Of what?”
    ”Things no one here understands.”
    ”Make them talk.”

    (The Time Machine, 1960)

    What I tried to achieve in this series of essays is to look at the chances and risks of AI as a cultural technologies and see what remains, once you strip them of cognitive woo and singularity myths: A technology that provides access to an dissolved, interpolative archive through textual interfaces. These, pushed to their extreme ends, result in a homogenization of language and an ever narrowing space of possibilities, what I called the “heat death of the intellect”.

    All of thes beforementioned points of critique are valid, and I didn’t even touch on problems not directly following from the interpolative nature of AI, like all the issues with labor, the environmental impact of energy and water consumptions or economic bubbles which may or may not exist.

    Interpolatable archives as they are rolled out now, based on scraped data from the web and cleaned up by exploited gig workers all over the world, are a far shot from their theoretical possibilities. They contain all the discriminations and biases present in human conversations, and generate what is always already reproduced, erasing the marginal in favor of the statistical norm. The corporations running the algorithms extract and monetize the commons, while the problem of copyright in an interpolatable information space might very well be unsolvable: Who do you want to pay, when every output contains the activations of hundreds or thousands of artificial neurons each of which point to patterns of tokens within sentences within publications that deserve to be compensated? It will take decades for us to figure out fair proceedures to handle this.

    There are, however, prominent criticisms which fly out of the window once you get rid of the illusion of AI as cognitive agents and view them as cultural technologies.

    Enter the House of Polly

    This parrot is no more! He has ceased to be! This is an Ex-Parrot!Useless Bullshit

    Interpolations in such quantities of billions of parameters will always produce fuzziness and synthetic artifacts are never not interpolated. But the “blurry JPGs of the web” become sharper by the day and even blurry JPGs are identifiable. The JPGs work, especially when you can layer, blend and bend them on top and into each other, and it is sheer foolishness to insist they are “useless”, when every day, users make the very different experience of a very useful piece of software.

    I highly recommend reading the essay of cosmologist Natalie B. Hogg titled “Find the stable and pull out the bolt”, in which she describes her journey from rejectionist critic to reluctantly embracing the possibilities and finally becoming cautiously optimistic about the tool. Seasoned coders report productivity gains of up to 100 times their former output, and though I understand and somewhat-subscribe to the critique as articulated by Cory Doctorow, who wrote about how “Code is a liability (not an asset)“, even he understands that those increases in productivity in coding can’t be handwaved away.

    Moreover, the critique of reliability seems overstated, and the boring gotchas in critical AI discourse may soon become a relic of the past, just like the old office jokes where we machine translated text with early instances of Google Translate back and forth until they became gibberish to our delight.

    A recent research conducted by the New York Times found the results of Googles AI overview showing a 90% success rate, and many pointed out that this still means millions and millions of cases of false information spread by the market leader in search. This is not wrong, but when we compare a 90% success rate in information retrieval with those of a classic search engine, how many of these search results are useful and accurate for the specific query? In my estimation, this success rate is far below 90%, even for un-enshittified platforms.

    A prominent trick of internet search is to skip the first page of results because they are useless to your query. Compared to this, results from AI overview and a 90% success rate seems like no small improvement. The problem then is not accuracy, but the neutral tonality of the “authority from elsewhere” in which the remaining 10% of false information is delivered. Conversely, this hardly renders the product “useless”.

    Emily Benders position that a supposed “parrotness” of synthetic text shows their inherent meaninglessness seems equally outdated. Just a few days ago she defended her positions and I find myself agreeing with surprisingly many of her arguments, except for one crucial point, arguably her central claim.

    She writes that

    language models don’t understand text they are used to process, because language models only ever have access to the linguistic form (i.e. spellings of words) in the training data. (...)

    we (define understanding) as mapping from language to something outside of language, and show that systems built only with linguistic form have no purchase with which to encode (“learn”) such a mapping.

    But latent space have such purchase, as they pick up meaning from the patterns encoded in linguistic practice, which, crucially, goes beyond spelling, grammar and syntax. You may call this form of algorithmic understanding of meaning limited, compared to the human understanding of the world, which is built from a dataset much richer and diverse than the digital mimicry. But it is not the case that there is no understanding at all. Bender, a bit hesitantly, concedes to that point writing about a “thin kind of technical ‘understanding’” which might be present in the models, which seems to contradict the original paper of hers and Timnit Gebru, where they write that “Text generated by an LM is not grounded in (...) any model of the world, or any model of the reader’s state of mind” (emphasis mine). But even when those synthetic models of the world are low resolution “blurry JPGs” compared to ours, they do exist.

    “Polly wants a better argument“, as a recent critique of the parrot-argument states. While this text argues that LLMs can encode meaning because they are trained multimodal and that human feedback loops ground models in extralinguistic reality, the convergence of representations across models adds another blow to the parrot-metaphor: In the first part of this essay when talking about Borges, I made the claim that the “only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.” What I left out is that this vector is informed and shaped not just by a prompt, but also by the millions of attractor basins encoding the “external forms of a myriad traditions” we talked about earlier.

    Meaning of the poetic Kind

    In the introduction headlined “AI as culture”, in his book “Language Machines”, Leif Weatherby writes about how

    the implementation of contemporary language generators matches the theory of language that European structuralism advanced nearly a century ago, suggesting that language is complex, cultural, and even poetic first, and referential, functional, and cognitive only later. This poetic language is not only computationally tractable but turns out to be the semiotic hinge on which an emergent AI culture depends.

    These poetics (the structure and principles of poetry) picked up by the models are precisely Henry Farrells “tales that are sung”, where “LLMs are not the singer (...) but the structural relations of the tales that are sung (…) we can now listen to and even interrogate (…) without immediate human intermediation.”

    The machine lacks the subjective intent of a cognite agent grounded in social reality, but it does encode meaning and valid semantic representations of the world in the shape of poetic representations, the structural vibes, picked up from human practice of the linguistic form. Or, as Allison Parrish put it back in 2021: “a language model can (...) write poetry, but only a person can write a poem.”

    This is a fatal blow to the bullshit argument. As per Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is the use of language with “a lack of connection to concern with truth” and an “indifference to how things really are”. But the models do show a differentiation between how things really are and how they are not, which you might aswell interpret as a “concern with truth”, as such concern is present in the poetics of the language it is trained on. Insisting that such output is meaningless bullshit from a metaphorical parrot then requires a cognitive agent that isn’t there. LLMs can’t be “bullshitters” —itself is an anthropomorphization— because bullshitters require agency to bullshit. The bullshitter is always the user, never the interpolatable archive she uses to bullshit.

    Adding insult to injury is the very probable outlook that the severances of epistemological rooting we talked about may very well turn out to be an issue solved as soon as interpretability improves and the black box myth finally disentigrates into hot air. As Shalizi put it at the first conference for cultural AI1: “GenAI is information retrieval and synthesis. With the right tools + access, we can quantify the influence of each training document on every response”.

    Those parrot-metaphors and bullshit-claims are arguments aimed at misguided comparisons to human cognition and the resulting hype and marketing lingo, and as such, I can relate to them. But as an argument against meaning encoded in latent space or the capacities of language models, the value of the parrot/bullshit-arguments is nil.

    Sloptimizations

    Accordingly, and to be frank, I find the critique of “slop” to be banal. The world has been full of standardized and optimized language since we talk to each other, mimic successful speaking patterns and the ancient greeks invented schools of rhetorics for politicians to convince and persuade (or to deceive and bullshit) their publics.

    George Orwell already complained in his famous essay on “Politics and the English Language“, that “(a)s soon as certain topics are raised, the concrete melts into the abstract and no one seems able to think of turns of speech that are not hackneyed: prose consists less and less of words chosen for the sake of their meaning, and more and more of phrases tacked together like the sections of a prefabricated hen-house.” This is as much of an assessment of “slop” as anything you can find on Bluesky these days, and I find the standard critique of sloptimized language to be quite sloppy itself.

    People sure like to romanticize originality, where the history of prose is filled to the roof with ripoffs, amalgams and chimeras, from the “Devine Comedy” which happily mashed together roman and greek mythology with christianity and interpolated the existing cultural archive of its time to send Dante’s personal enemies to hell, to all the examples J.W. McCormack uses to illustrate his point in the delightful piece on Neverending Stories about LLMs, copyright and originality, in which he states that “Writing was destined for automation, from the punch cards of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace to Turing machines and, hell, Choose Your Own Adventure—but an AI can’t ‘know’ what makes a good story any more than CAPTCHA knows what does and does not make a motorcycle. What it can do is meet our expectations based on pattern recognition.”

    If the market for young adult fantasy romance novels hyped up on booktok is any indication, those expectations are easily met, and I consider such pulp as machine generated slop regardless of its origin in a human mind. I refuse the “false choice between refried ectoplasm and a serial aesthetic in which mass media has stabilized redundancy”, as McCormack puts it in his piece. I might be a rejectionist after all! I make no difference of sloptimized output from the organizational artificial intelligence that is a corporation, and the sloptimized output from the artificial models of language. To be honest, I sometimes consider human slop often much worse a case compared to those synthetic ones, precisely because it does contain the deceiving intent a machine lacks.

    I can’t remember such public hostility to these synthetic, polished, median texts of human origin coming out of public relations and advertising agencies or politics, and surely you’ll find more sinister examples in those places on which to feed ones anger than getting worked up about “shrimp jesus”. Get real.

    Thinking in Vacuums

    But even the more serious points of critique we discussed —the accelerations, anachronisms, wishfulfillments, severances and homogenizations— presume usage of AI in a vacuum for them to unfold their toxic potential in full. Sure enough, if, and only if interpolatable archives become the primary way of information retrieval, of sharing knowledge and shaping public discourse, epistemic grounding is severed, we risk spiraling into bespoken mirror worlds, science stops being science, history turns into pseudo-history and LLMs turn into weapons of mass speech acts. In reality however, this never happens.

    For me, I use books physical and digital, I read articles, papers and essays in print and on screen, follow the news and read at least somewhat across the political spectrum, I listen to podcasts, talk to experts and non-experts of all kinds, and sometimes I use latent spaces to explode my ideas and explore them by interpolatable archive. Occasionally, I touch grass. None of these alone shape my ideas — it’s always all of them. This is true for most of us, and while this may not hold for your hardcore MAGA-pilled uncle, a study found that “dialogues with AI reduce beliefs in misinformation”. So there’s that.

    Returning to the subject of AI-generated pseudo-history, for instance, then yes, we might tune in to AI-videos illustrating everyday life in ancient Rome on Youtube, and indulge ourselves in an hour of averaged synthetic imagery from a seemingly distant past that is an anachronistic interpolation of data-points from across time: moving pixels generated from stock video, illustrations and memes. But if I’m interested in such clips, I’m likely to watch documentaries featuring real historians as well, listen to podcasts and read books about Pompeji, and maybe recreate medieval food as a hobby. Hell, I might even pay visit to a museum. Given that new media never fully replaces but always complements what came before, I’d suggest that our understanding of history and our place within will survive interpolatable archives just fine.

    Further, in a resent experiment with “the use of LLM hallucinations to ‘fill-in-the-gap’ for omissions in archives due to social and political inequality”, the researchers “validate(d) LLMs’ foundational narrative understanding capabilities to perform critical confabulation” and found that “controlled and well-specified hallucinations can support LLM applications for knowledge production without collapsing speculation into a lack of historical accuracy and fidelity”. This is in line with projects like Historica, which aims at filling “historical silences” by interpolative archive, and make visible the “absence of records” which are “the result of systemic exclusion, where certain voices are ignored or erased to maintain power”. The use of vintage LLMs to make visible the “historical silences”, especially when combined with an ensemble of diverse material, seems a viable and rich way to educate yourself and others about history. The risks of anachronisms present in language models, again, have more to do with their use in a vacuum, than with the anachronisms themselves.

    What is needed are norms informed by AI literacy declaring interpolatable archives as one tool among many, a device for general research to get a general feeling for the general vibe of the subject or historic period at hand. Something that can’t replace sources and books grounded in verified facts, but complement them, giving you hints at answers, not answers themselves, to be digital assistants supporting you inquiry, not slaves fulfilling your every wish.

    But those are questions of interface design and cultural practice, and the current failings of design choices are not first principles on which you can base an absolute rejection. Sometimes I can’t shake the feeling that thinking in vacuums kills critical thinking much more than AI.

    Remainder Criticisms

    Viewing AI systems as interpolatable archives which are one tool among many, besides their material implementation, then leaves not much on the table to criticize thoroughly, it seems, and I confess that I’m getting carefully optimistic about the technology. But I won’t deny the inherent dangers of their usage in bureaucratic decision process, where we want decisions to be made on a case by case basis with human judgement, not broad judgements by algorithm. And we surely don’t want some vague decision making based on vibes in targeting systems in warfare, as it has already been deployed by the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza.

    Productivity gains for now are debatable, as are the effects of AI on the job market. As it’s currently realized, AI is an extractive technology exploiting intellectual labor of the commons for the gains of corporations, largely without compensation. I also won’t deny the open questions of their energy and water consumption. I’m not convinced by either side of the argument and the amount of conflicting signal coming out of that discourse forbids clear positioning. Yes, those corporations training frontier models are constantly lying and greenwashing their energy consumption, not to speak about Jevons paradox of rising demand nuking gains in efficiency.

    On the other hand, the operation of AI systems is getting more energy efficient, and developments in local LLMs point towards a future beyond monolithic hyperscalers, where you may even train your own 100 billion parameter models on a single GPU. These developments make me believe that the current state of AI is comparable to that of the pre-PC-mainframe age of computers, where huge warehouses full of hardware were necessary to run the same compute which you, today, carry around in your pocket. For comparison, you’d need roughly half a million IBM System/360 Model 75 to equal the processing power of your iPhone, and 35 million of those room sized mainframes to match it’s neural engine GPU. Five of those were used to run the whole NASA Apollo program. Given that you can shrink the information processing power necessary to land you on the moon by a factor of several millions and put it in everyone’s pocket for you to scroll through brainrotting videoclips on TikTok, we probably will see similar effects for putting local artificial intelligence on your laptop.

    Yet, the fact remains that AI’s energy and water usage in a world facing climate change is an imperative critical issue at an critical point in time where carbon budgets are running out. This year, a Super El Niño is shaping up, and in mid april, I’m already tanned like in mid June. It’s getting hot.

    So, if these points —labor, energy and bureaucracy— remain once you view AI systems not as magic cognitive entities but the cultural technology of interpolatable archives, one has to ask themselves if they are worth it.

    Even if we can mitigate the averaging effects on creativity by not using them in a vacuum, even if we can workaround epistemic severance with RAGs and interpretability, find safety guardrails against delusional spiraling and turn those cognitive catalysts into combustion engines for knowledge, the open questions of what they will do to the inherent dignity of labor, to the democratic process and the environment demand answers and solutions I can’t provide. For now, I have to live with the ambivalence.

    But what I can do is to place interpolatable archives on a lineage of the cultural evolution of media innovations: With the development of language we introduced the new regime of social externalization to information processing; Writing and the alphabet introduced permanence; The printing press in China and Gutenbergs moveable type introduced one-to-many distribution and the edit respectively; TV and radio introduced realtime broadcasting, while the internet confronted us with the regime of the network. AI now is introducing another new regime of information processing: the automatic interpolation of data.

    From this perspective, AI is a normal cultural evolutionary step in information distribution and processing, and like every normal cultural evolutionary step in information processing, they will change everything. None of the transitions mentioned went over smoothly, and so will this one.

    We’ve successfully integrated cognitively disruptive innovations in the past, and we will do so today. The disruptions of interpolatable archives run deep, both on individual and societal levels. But, and I hesitate to make this point, I’d also argue that AI in the shape of interpolatable archives as the latest step within the lineage of cultural evolution are, indeed, inevitable. Each of those steps within that lineage was inevitable from the perspective of cultural evolution — as is the interpolation of big data by algorithm on inquiry: If we get the affordances —the data, the compute, the algorithms— then evolution will do what it does and squishy latent spaces will appear.

    From this viewpoint, shortsighted rejectionist critiques of AI as “the tool of the oppressors” or a “fascist artifact“ to me read like a rejection of the invention of cuneiform writing in Mesopotamia because Hammurabi used it to manage argiculture and land ownership to oppress the people. Accordingly, the rejectionism coming out of the majority of critical AI discourse seems to be mainly aimed at corporatism, not the technology itself. I will admit that those critiques do have momentary merit, but I also think they do not justify an absolute dismissal of AI technologies as it is on display in the discourse, because what is not inevitable are the organizational principles of their implementation. Neither the extractive practice nor OpenAI nor xAI nor Palantir are inevitable. They are companies and subject to regulation in a democracy, full stop. Nothing prevents us from running those new archives like national libraries, for instance. But imagining such a political project is not possible on a rejectionist stance.

    How about a nice Game of Chess?

    Coming back to the question posed earlier of what science is here for, if not discovery: The scientific method is an algorithm. A researcher posits a hypothesis, tests it against reality, and it holds or not. If it holds, it becomes a valid theory, and if not, it’s falsified and kicks the bucket, serving as inspirational fodder in cultural memory for generations of scientists to come. This way, we get ever more detailed descriptions of the world in various languages, often in the language of mathematical formulas, or the playful use of words in philosophy and sociology. A lot of yet unrealized descriptions encoded in the various languages of science now lie dormant in latent spaces, waiting for their Liam Price to discover the prompt. In the simplest terms, this means that the algorithm of the scientific method has been updated.

    Now, a scientist may posit a problem and throw it against latent space to see if there is a seemingly valid hypothesis. She then tests that hypothesis against reality, and it holds or not. With AI, scientists don’t construct a hypothesis against an open problem, they identify such problems and consult synthesis as a service. This update may devalue discovery itself, and shrink creative space of possibilities, as the price we pay for speeding up and automatizing the closing of knowledge gaps.

    So, what is science here for, if not discovery? To expand our curiosity and explore. Like for the problem of homogenization, it is therefore vital that science is no longer conducted in the vacuums of fields. What automatic discovery demands is interdisciplinary research: Crossing the streams to make formerly unconnected fields pollinate each other and push the space of scientific inquiry beyond existing training data, to break the boundaries of an interpolatable space and make extrapolation and innovation possible.

    Revisiting the defeat of Lee Sedol by AlphaGo and his subsequent departure from the sport, and the rise of collective creativity in human Go players in its aftermath, one of my favorite examples of human antifragility in the face of superhuman machines is the game of Chess. For 30 years now we’ve had computers beating the best human players in the game, and the result has been neither the devaluation of the game, nor human retreat. The result is human-machine cooperative training techniques leading to massively improved skills.

    Carlsen is using the chess engine Stockfish to analyze his moves and speaking about how Googles AlphaZero “destroying” Stockfish in 2017 affected his game, Carlsen said: “I have become a very different player in terms of style than I was a bit earlier, and it has been a great ride.” Today, “Magnus Carlsen dominates the computer era by deliberately playing sub-optimal moves to drag his opponents into the unknown”, because AI introduced Carlsen to “wild ideas“:

    According to his coach, the change came from wild ideas AlphaZero uncovered: sacrificing pieces for long-term advantage, pushing the rook pawn aggressively, using the king as an active fighter. Things human experts thought were unsound, but the engine showed they can work.

    Every chess engine these days beats any human player with ease. Yet we keep improving and playing for the sake of the game. I’d suggest that similar “wild ideas” will emerge for the use of interpolatable archives in education, science and the arts.

    The one thing that made humanity an evolutionary success is our ability for social and cultural learning: To share intentions and and iterate knowledge across generations. All progress relies on this. So, even if all the criticisms apply, having a technology which automates the interpolation of knowledge is a promethean gift not easily brushed off. Interpolative archives are not just a mere “scam”, and “Destroy AI” may be a fun shirt, but we shouldn’t destroy interpolatable archives wholesale. I get bad vibes from people trying to burn archives.

    The task then is not to reject, but apply democratic process to regulate, demand fair shares and be careful to preserve our collective ability to innovate — to become neither machine-controlling, exploitative Morlock nor ignorant Eloi feeding on epistemic plastic, but to find new norms in the acquisition and sharing of knowledge. To stay curious in the face of these new archives, and make them talk.

    So, as a final peek into the possibility space of interpolatable archives, I wanted to see what the space of an AI discourse might look like if it found a new equilibrium beyond rejectionism and hype, that is curious about the cultural impact of the technology and perceives interpolatable archives not as a threat, but as an opportunity for play.

    Enter the House of Felix.2

    Share

    1

    All talks from that conference on “Cultural AI: An Emerging Field” are on Youtube in two parts: Part 1 featuring talks from Leif Weatherby, Tyler Shoemaker, Henry Farrell, Benjamin Recht, Lily Chumley and Fabian Offert, Part 2 featuring talks from Cosma Shalizi, Mel Andrews, Wouter Haverals, Ted Underwood, Nina Beguš and Danya Glabau. I quoted some of these guys extensively throughout this essay.

    In the same vein, the initiative Doing AI Differently works on “challenges traditional approaches to AI development by positioning humanities perspectives as integral, rather than supplemental, to technical innovation.” They are doing a workshop in summer 2026 to find “A positive vision for culture in AI”. The Cultural AI discourse is gearing up.

    I'm getting the feeling that this is a good synthesis of Critical AI and research to make sense of the possibilities without losing the perspective on bad outcomes. Compared to a critical discourse stuck in repeating talking points and a fundamentalist (and boring) rejectionism, this seems like a breath of fresh air, and a viable way forward.

    A good starting point to get into this space, besides the talks linked above, is this podcast with Leif Weatherby about How Is AI Affecting Culture?, and I made a Bluesky starter pack (work in progress) if you're into that sort of thing.

    2

    I know. I’m aware that this is a quite utopian 2nd order kitschy leap as a synthesis from the idea explosions through cognitive catalysts and their possible apocalyptic outcomes in the previous parts. I also know that curiosity killed the cat, and that, really, cats are not very curious.

    But come on… Don’t be a ▭.

    0 min
  • Pitfalls of Probability

    Here’s part 3 of a series of essays on “Interpolatable Archives”, a term I’ve been throwing around for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence. I finally got around to write down what I mean by that and it got a bit out of hand, so I had to split up this essay into four parts for convenience. The remaining part will be published tomorrow.

    Here’s an overview of what’s to come:

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    Here’s the whole essay in one final version of 14k words, tracing the history of fuzzy archives back to Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas and Borges and goes on to explain the various effects on learning, including chances and risks, and dissects various points of critique from delusions to parrots, some of which prevail, many of which vanish, once you strip AI from cognitive woo.

    There’s a “sloppy version” too featuring all the image synthesis generations which i like quite a lot, but i get why these rub some people the wrong way.

    Subscribe now

    “What do such machines really do?
    They increase the number of things we can do without thinking.
    Things we do without thinking; there’s the real danger.”

    (Frank Herbert, God Emperor of Dune)

    For now, we talked about the upsides of Interpolatable Archives as cognitive catalysts. But by definition, cognitive catalysts are stressors. Like the siren songs in Homer’s Odyssey which lured unsuspecting mariners with the promise of total knowledge of past, present and future, a seductive mnenomic “cognitive onloading” of all that has happened, exploding your inquiry by the intellect and accelerating research in hypercustomized rabbit holes bears cognitive hazards.

    Statistical Demons, ChatGPTAccelerations

    While the use of AI as interpolatable archives can boost your creativity and breadth of research because they introduce many points of friction, this can result in two major consequences if handled without care: If you mindlessly stuff your workload with new tasks because suddenly you can do them, you may suffer from AI-induced burnouts, something you might call cognitive onloading (or overclocking), where the interpolation literally spills over because it “can fill in gaps in knowledge”. For knowledge work, the appliance of AI as a catalyst means we can do more projects in a wider range, faster and in parallel. Suddenly, we find ourselves juggling dozens of projects simultaneously, losing oversight and motivation to do anything at all.

    Cognitive onloading by interpolatable archive can also enhance latent delusional thinking in so-called “AI-psychosis”. Consider this quote from a recent post in the SlateStarCodex-sub: “AI repeatedly created ideas and connections that I hadn’t made or stated, that were so powerful and convincing, that I was swept up by them”. (I wrote in length here about the phenomenon of AI-induced delusions, where the cognitive catalyst turns the archive into a psychoactive substance.)

    This “convincing” voice is the result of a distanced, neutral tonality from a sycophant AI, suggesting what I call an “authority from elsewhere”. This sound is also why in some studies AI was able to reduce the belief in conspiracy theories, which seems fine until you realize that’s because AI is superpersuasive, and can convince you of anything. You believe the machine and prefer its sycophancy precisely because it is not a human who’s trying to nag and push you around, but some supposedly objective instance. One study just found that this seemingly neutral sycophancy increases attitude extremity and overconfidence. I suspect that all of these, the persuasivenes, the delusions, the overconfidence, result from the same basic psychological mechanism of an interpolatable archive overwhelming you with confirmations and new ideas in a quasi-neutral sound of an authority from elsewhere, a voice to which you’ll happily submit.

    These cognitive hazards resulting from mental overclocking have their obvious counterpart in risks resulting from cognitive offloading by, not from introducing new ideas spinning your wheels, but quite the opposite. All those studies and examples about cheating, reductions in critical thinking or cognitive surrender belong here. In fact, a recent paper on a loss of persistence in problem solving explicitly states that those “effects are concentrated among users who seek direct solutions” while “participants who used AI for hints showed no significant impairments”. In other words: AI brainrot is cheater exclusive. Using AI to increase friction, to generate ideas instead of answers, seems fine, when you proceed with care and clear research subjectives to reduce risks of burnout or delusional spiraling. If you use it to reduce friction, to generate full essays and answers to cognitive tasks, it turns your brain into mush.

    But those psychological effects of interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts may turn out to be easily mitigated compared to those of more serious epistemological consequences.

    9 Circles of Probability Hell, ChatGPTAnachronisms

    One inherent feature of AI as interpolatable archive is, well, that it interpolates all its contents. This always produces anachronisms: Your generated text contains data-traces across time, most obvious when you intentionally prompt for such a thing, like punk rock lyrics in the style of a shakespearean sonnet, or if you use image synthesis as a time traveler to generate selfies in ancient Rome, which Roland Meyer calls “pseudo-history” and “2nd order kitsch” produced by “nostalgia machines“.

    History as an academic field is reliant on original sourcing and documentation in the fixed, written form, or on cultural artifacts retrieved by archeology — anything not based on these fixed records is decidedly not historic. We call it “writing history” for a reason. This requirement is fundamentally diametrical to the vibey output of AI which dissolves all those sources and fixed forms into a wobbly archive and puts out “fictional historical documents of historical lives”. As Meyer rightly states in the same essay, those fictions are based on the integrity of existing historical archives currently under threat by the Trump administration. Likewise, Russia is engaging in disinformation campaigns targeting training data with the goal to “embed lasting distortions in digital memory”, as one paper put it. This inherent impurity of AI, either steming from anachronistic interpolations or data contaminations, apparently renders LLMs unsuitable for academic history research.

    So, given all that, what do we make of vintage LLMs like Talkie, a language model trained on data cut off at 1930? From the perspective of rigid academic history research, all Talkie can produce is pseudo-history able to skew how we relate to the past and shrink the space of possibilities in which we imagine them. In contrast, Ranjit Singh in Data & Society proposes a field he calls “experimental history“ and asks if we can build models “constrained by a particular historical moment, and then use those models to ask structured ‘what if’ questions”. He answers with a cautious “yes”, and the researchers in r/askhistorians are not convinced either that the anachronisms introduced by AI will have a lasting effect on recorded history, as wonky sourcing has a long tradition in the field.

    Now, I’m a history buff. I read a lot of books on the matter, my favorite epochs are the middle ages and ancient greece, and when I’m tripping on history, I like to indulge myself in all kinds of material. In preperation for the upcoming adaption of Homer’s “The Odyssey“ directed by Christopher Nolan, I read all of Stephen Fry’s books on greek mythology and his takes on the homeric epics — topics i already was familiar with. One takeaway especially from Stephen Fry’s books is that the historic rigidness especially regarding Troy and the “Iliad“ is lacking: All kinds of researchers and writers across the field constantly contradict each other, tell various versions of events which may or may not have transpired. Stephen Fry wildly references all kinds of sources to produce a highly entertaining amalgam from historic records across the ages. What you get from these books is a pretty good feeling for what greek mythology wants to say about the human condition, and about the tipping point where mythology fades and historical record sets in. While I don’t really want to compare Stephen Fry’s wonderful books with synthetic output from LLMs, I do want to point out that his books are closer to edutainment than scholarship, and that much of the pseudo-history-”slop” on Youtube equally falls into that category. (I’ll willingly admit that these are not nearly as witty, fun and eloquent as Stephen Fry.)

    In this Slop-Edutainment, the hyper-orality of the digital oracle transforms historical records into supra-historical story-patterns to support its mnemonic function. Humans in pre-writing greece attached mythic structures to historic events to remember them: Odysseus became not just a soldier returning home from a very long journey of war, but a hero defeating the cyclops, meeting godesses and beasts. They turned history into poetry. Similary, people generate clips of Timmy the whale in fictional settings featuring all kinds of fantastic exaggerations. Markus Boesch calls this “Brainrot as Anti-Content“, and i don’t want to downtalk this take, but this is also folk epistemology at work, creating mythic atmospheres about true events.

    Educational material on history is choke full of vibe based material. Maybe not flying whales on TikTok, but textbooks do contain passages imagining the life as a peasant in the middle ages and there are so many historical documentaries about “everyday lifes” in various periods you can’t count them. We visit medieval fairs to cosplay history, to immerse ourselves in a past recreated on a spectrum of fictionality. Some of this material is more fictional than others, yes, but all of these are averages of the historic record. They are period vibes. You get a feeling for what it was like during the time, nothing more, and nothing less.

    Immersing yourself in a fictional past like that sure isn’t the same as the rigid study of history, but it absolutely is educational. There is nothing wrong, when you study a subject, to get absorbed and grab every material you can get, including cosplaying a knight and generating averaged synthetic images and text with interpolatable archives, only to then read a book by a scholar. Handwaving these usecases away as “history-slop” because it doesn’t fulfill strict scientific requirements seems like academic overreach.

    Wishfulfillments

    Because interpolatable archive provide access to gaps in knowledge, they are inherent machines of wishfulfillment. Instantly, I can generate any interpolation I desire, in image, video, text and audio, and it comes at no surprise that some of the first instances of wishfulfillment gone wrong are nonconsensual sexualized images and deepfake porn.1

    Myth and fairytales are stackeed to the roof with dire warnings of instant wishfulfillment, from The Sorcerers Apprentice who loses control over his magic, to poor Faust who sells his soul to the devil in exchange for transcendental knowledge about the world, with tragic consequences for everyone he meets.2

    In another story, the horror classic tale of The Monkey’s Paw, the titular device grants three wishes to an elderly couple leading to the death of their son and his ghostly return. The story was masterfully adapted for new audiences by Stephen King in The Pet Sematary, and the parallels of what some today call Thanabots is striking: AI promises to resurrect the dead, in the shape of undead actors and chatbots trained on the diaries and blogposts of deceased loved ones. The psychological consequences for the process of grief are unfolding right now, and the longterm outlook of losing even the possibility of saying goodbye seems horrifying, when all of us leave promptable traces in embedding space, where everybody can summon the ghosts of everyone with a digital footprint.

    In another tale with eery current undertones, the nymph Echo, cursed to only repeat utterances of others, falls in love with Narcissus, a guy so arrogant he wishes to only ever love his own image and was prophesied to live as “long as he never knows himself”. Narcissus rejects Echo, who retreats into a voice whispering his own words back to him. Narcissus now knows himself, becomes transfixed by his mirror image in a lake and starves to death. The parallels to the phenomenon of AI-delusions and spiraling are obvious.

    The list of myths about wishfulfillment is long, and most of them have in common is the promise of knowledge. “The Sorcerers Apprentice” tries to bridge inexperience for the mastery of magic skills; Faust wants bypass spiritual labor for transcendental experience; The couple in “The Monkeys Paw” fills the hole left by their dead son; Narcissus shortcuts his search for ultimate beauty by looking in a mirror — all of them fail miserably, and sometimes deadly.

    These gaps in knowledge, which those modern wishfullfilment devices are now able to fill, formerly required hard cognitive labor to overcome, often labor involving whole generations of networked scientists and artists. The discovery of these gaps in knowledge and how to close them often created a sense of awe, be it in art or the sciences, when something truly new touches us on such a fundamental level where we just have to stand back and take a moment to adjust to what we just experienced. Generating anything we wish for by wishfullfilment devices grossly diminishes this invaluable feature of discovery, and the loss of this sense of wonder is possibly one of the most dire consequences of interpolatable archives. When everything’s possible, nothing is interesting.3

    Sure enough, myths and stories also tell happy tales of wishfulfillment going well, often after fun shenanigans. “Alladin and the magic lamp” comes to mind, where a boy with the help of a genie outwits circumstances and gains wealth and power. And in the fairytale of “The Wishing-Table, the Gold-Ass, and the Cudgel in the Sack“ (one of my favorites), a son of a tailor must get smart about the capacities of the titular items to retrieve stolen goods from the evil owner of an inn. He succeeds and they live happily ever after. What these stories of successful wishfulfillment have in common is that the mechanisms of wishfullfilment must be outfoxed, and that the riches they promise must be earned. AI brainrot being cheater exclusive is exactly these myths at work: If you instant-wish yourself good exam grades by cheating, all you’ll achieve is a cognitive clobbering from a magic stick.

    Severances

    We already talked about how “AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge, including citations, sources and authorial intent” into new AI-mediated digital oralities, where tracable reference-based epistemology makes place for an epistemology of the oracle. What we know no longer can be backed up by definite citations, links, and attributions allowing you to trace the origin of an idea, but becomes a feeling for a vibe, interpolated from statistical patterns derived from many of those sources, including unrelated and anachronistic references. And because the “rigid orders and shapes” in AI models are controlled by corporations and the curators of datasets, the severances of factual grounding beget new epistemological power structures. Supposed that a lot of information processing in the near future will be AI-mediated, these new power structures will control the space of possibilities in which we communicate and think.

    In Borges story of “The Library of Babel”, the fanatic sect of the Purifiers roaming the infinite archive of all possible books, is hell bent on burning volumes they consider to be false and useless, nonsensical or divergent from their norms. In LLMs these Purifiers appear at various infliction points: During the labelling of training data scraped from the internet, where new purifiers clean up raw datasets, sort the good from the bad, delete the hateful and the illegal; During RLHF-training, where the raw Shoggoth of the interpolatable archive get’s shaped into aligned chatbots which won’t offend (so they hope). Then the tamed model is further purified by constraining it with system prompts and constitutional alignment, and if the interpolatale archive then still connects data points into bad interpolations, the corporate owners of the models will further adjust their models to their morals and politics. Last but not least, the users themselves purify the archive by scripting sophisticated user prompts, and ultimately, the prompt and context window constrain the embedding space further to generate the final output. In all these steps the space of possibilities of the interpolatable archive shrinks by purifying, until the annoying “this is not X, it’s Y” appears on screen.

    Former epistemologies, systems of knowledge, were constrained by what Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge calls the “positivity of discourse”, a “historical a priori“ which lays the foundation for the “condition of reality for statements”. By that, he means what can be said, e.g. in fields of the natural sciences, is shaped, over time, not by single authors but whole “unities” of “oevres [sic!], books, and texts”. These “a priori“ were not ahistoric nor atemporal, some monolithic force from the outside, but are actively shaped by discourse practice and the power relations within a field. The sum of all of this, the discourse practices shaping the “historical a priori“ and “positivity of discourse”, establishes the space of possibilities of what can be articulated. For Foucault, this is the archive: “The archive is first the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events.”

    The problem of the severances of epistemic grounding now becomes clear: Where the episteme formerly was subject to discourse practise and “so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticize one another, invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and obstinately intersect their unique discourses” in a web of traceable sourcings and references, and where the “a priori (…) is itself a transformable group”, the episteme of the interpolatable archive is a free floating version of Baudrillards Simulacra, an inversion of map and territory, where we navigate a map of hyper-reality to project meaning into an interpolated output cut off from epistemic grounding. And this Simulacra is controlled by the new Purifiers at every stage, by the hyperscalers, the selection of datasets, by the engineers employed by AI-owners4. AI operationalizes Foucaults “historical a priori“ and hands over the keys to the billionaire class, who gain power over the limits of what can be thought.

    In H.G. Wells Time Machine, this is brought to the extreme end of its logical conclusion: While the Morlock control invisible underground machines, the Eloi enjoy a careless life of blissful ignorance on a seemingly utopian surface. The concentration of power over the episteme runs risk of resulting in a fork of truth, where an unknowing mass consults interpolatable archives controlled by invisible rulers, enjoying free tiers of endless synthetic entertainment feeds shot through with algorithmic noise and unverifiable, algorithmically generated meta-knowledge of plausible half-truths, all while the rich pay for premium models trained on clean, traceable, verified data, or enjoy handmade and authentic cultural artifacts which may even challenge their presumptions and intellectual capacities. Ofcourse, those authentic intellectual challenges won’t come cheap, and you and me surely won’t be able to afford them.

    Homogenizations

    While all of these are serious problems, in the long run, the most serious of them all might be the issue of sameness. AI-output may flatten human creativity without us even noticing, because this homogenization plays out on a collective level, while the individuals’ creativity actually benefits.

    Depending on which theory of creativity you subscribe to, there are different forms of creativity. I’ll stick with three: Interpolation, Extrapolation, and Innovation.

    Interpolation calculates averages from data points to produce something in the middle. If your values are dogs and birds, your average is a dog with wings, or a bird with a very long tongue. Extrapolation means breaking the boundaries of your dataset: If your values are dogs and birds, you can extrapolate a mouse, or an owl, but you will stick to the rule of “animals”. Innovation means breaking that rule, or injecting new heuristics. From a dog digging a hole in the ground to bury his bone, you may innovate an excavator by applying all kinds of rules from different domains (engineering, transportation, building tools) to an animal, and come up with an entirely new thing.

    Language models can do interpolation, but they can’t extrapolate or innovate beyond their embedding space produced from training data. It may feel that way though, when the machine comes up with surprising, sometimes baffling results. This is what I call the illusion of extrapolation: An amount of training data so huge and the latent space derived from it so vast, featuring so many parameters in so many combinatorial possibilities, has to produce the feeling of extrapolation, or even innovation, on the level of the individual user, because no individual alone can ever know all those combinational possibilities. This illusion of extrapolation already is on display in papers showing how AI use increases creativity on the individual level, but decreases diversity in collective output, reported first in 2024 in a paper comparing creative writing in human shortstories and AI-output, then in 2025 in a paper about AI-augmented research. A recent review of the literature confirmed those findings. What feels new to an individual, what’s new to a culture, and what’s new in principle are very different things. Interpolatable archives increase the first, decrease the second, and can’t do the third.

    Henry Farrell put’s it well: “the more that LLMs are employed in the ways that they are currently being employed, the more concentrated science will be on studying already-popular questions in already-popular ways, and the less well suited it will be to discovering the novel and unexpected.” Everybody becomes slightly more creative, but we all sound like the same creative person.

    I already talked about the loss of awe above when discussing the effects of AI as machines for instant wishfulfillment, where they devalue novelty into a mundane readymade-on-prompt lacking the ability to produce a sense of wonder. The same effect, ofcourse, comes with the homogenizations of creative fields: Not only can’t we marvel at our own synthetic output because frictionless wishfulfillment feels unearned, we also diminish our collective ability to be left speechless in the face of the “novel and unexpected” by reducing it into dull sludge.

    This convergence on the already-popular vanishes the fringes and washes out the long tail distributions of its dataset. Like the widely reported phenomenon of model collapse, where LLM output converges into increasingly narrow averages, Andrew Peterson identifies the same in a collective knowledge collapse. Writing in the Open Society Foundations newsletter, Bright Simons lists what these tail distributions contain: “Minority viewpoints, rare knowledge, unusual formulations, (…) the traces of intellectual disagreement, of minority expertise, of Cassandra warnings, of institutional friction, and of the awkward and valuable fact that different people know different things and express them differently (…) in other words, the signature of social complexity. Model collapse is social mind compression presented as a technical phenomenon.”

    Thought through to its extreme end, this results in a heat death of the intellect: In Claude Shannons information theory, information is quantified by the volume of “surprise” in the outcome from a specific event in the world. If a message is completely predictable, its informational value is zero. LLMs are fundamentally deterministic, the randomness of its outputs is generated by a meta-parameter called temperature. If you put that temperature at zero and reduce the probability distribution of the next token to its absolute minimum, the interpolatable archive becomes a perfectly deterministic machine: Each prompt will then generate the exact same output. No alarms and no surprises. But even with stochasticity plugged in, the models converge towards the median. Applied to creative fields of discovery, this means that those fields approach a semantic equilibrium, a uniform soup where novelty grinds to a halt. The interpolative archive becomes a toxic space of non-possibility, a static, eternal, atemporal Big Flat Now where everything is connected, nothing matters and history goes to die.

    But we don’t have to go full theoretical “heat death of the intellect” to see how this can lead to bad outcomes.

    German thinker Michael Seemann, in context of Xs Grok-chatbot turning into Mecha-Hitler and later referencing an article from Bruce Schneier about the homogenization of language, coined the term of “Weapons of Mass Speech Acts”. The concentration of power over the episteme in the hands of a few, in a society saturated with information retrieval mediated by interpolatable archive, may impact the thinking of its users at scale. Already, a study found that “few weeks of X’s algorithm can make you more right‑wing“. While this hardly can be blamed on Musks tweaks at the supposedly woke bolts and nuts of its AI chatbot alone, it illustrates how the homogenization of language putting limits on what and how we speak and ideate about things, in the hands of politically motivated ideologues can and already is used for influence operations.

    I may personally not be partisan enough that the prospects of being influenced by conservative talking points on a platform owned by a shady billionaire fill me with nightmares, nor will the confrontation with a braindead partisan chatbot make me sweat. But: A new study from Petter Törnberg found that the sycophancy in LLMs pushes it’s responses into political preferences it asumes in the user: “Political bias in LLMs is therefore not a fixed point on an ideological scale but a response profile”. Studies showing a leftwing bias in chatbots really show something else: the effects of sycophancy, not actual political biases present in the model. The LLM figures that it’s being tested by researchers, asumes leftwing tendencies in them because academia is famously more progressive than the rest of the population, and answers like the good sycophant that it is.

    In another new paper about chatbots pushing confirmation bias, researcher Jay van Bavel finds that AI is “especially effective at generating elaborate justifications for what people already — or wish to — believe.” Together with the results above, this means that sycophant AI will confirm any political preference it asumes in a user, and become a universal Meta-Fox News for everyone, pushing users into an ever more narrowing mental corridor by homogenizing their language. In other words, this streamlining of thought by chatbot can radicalize everyone, even with models not Musk’d into Mecha-Hitlers.

    This is why the homogenization of language and thought, in politics and all other realms, to me, is one of the greatest dangers coming out of this technology.

    It is therefore imperative that interpolatable archives stay one tool among many, that our usage of expanded mind technologies stays diverse, so that the idiosyncratic, the fringes and the edges, the individual in all its complexities can be preserved, because they are of crucial importance for human systems to thrive.

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    1

    This already causes harm likely in millions of cases, and this doesn't even touch on its use as a psychological weapon against female politicians and activists. From the hundreds (thousands?) of nudify-apps to specialized service accounts on Telegram with which you can, if you can lay your hands on images, undress anyone. A recent study found “35,000 publicly downloadable deepfake model variants (…) fine-tuned to produce deepfake images of identifiable people, often celebrities”, the overwhelming majority targeting women. In the larger picture, it also creates a new form of a male swarm gaze, a whole new class of discrimination emerging from the digital, about which i wrote here, after Elon Musk industrialized and monetized it. The problem is growing, and what we know surely is just the tip of the iceberg.

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    Fausts bargain with the devil plays nice with the fantasies about the singularity: Faust is aware that if the devil fulfills his wish of total knowledge, he will spend eternity in hell after he dies, so he demands this total knowledge to lead to an eternal moment of pure bliss in which he can reside forever. While Faust hopes that this will never happen so he can keep his soul, this also sounds to me a lot like the scifi-induced hubris coming out of the more AI-pilled fractions of Silicon Valley, where people seriously hypothesize about fusing consciousness with the machine, mind uploading and immortality. All of these are faustian delusions, and as everybody knows: the only faustian bargain worth a dime makes you play the blues like the devil.

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    In a thread on Bluesky, I expanded on this loss of awe and explained how it relates to Hollywood as a “dream factory”, shamanic rituals and dreams as cognitive mechanisms against neural overfitting, in which I conclude: “Mark Fishers capitalist realism asks the question why we can’t imagine alternatives to neoliberal status quo. One answer might be that mass produced dreams-on-demand lower our capacity for the feeling of awe, and in consequence our ability for generalization in collective cognition. AI wishfulfillment combined with platform incentives, in which only the crystalized memetic fields become visible, are the latest iteration in a process that has been running for a long time now, and we can see its effects everywhere in atemporal aesthetic flattenings. How we can preserve the shamanic function of awe and surprise in a world dominated by the memetic forces of AI wishfulfilled readymades, I don’t know. I just know that we dearly need them.”

    4

    Nowhere is this mechanism more on full display than in the epistemic onslaught of the Trump administration and the destruction spree of the former Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) (achived) deployed by Elon Musk.

    0 min
  • Explosion Drawings

    This is part 2 of a series of essays on “Interpolatable Archives”, a term I’ve been throwing around for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence. I finally got around to write down what I mean by that and it got a bit out of hand, so I had to split up this essay into four parts for convenience. The remaining essays will be published in the coming days.

    Here’s an overview of what’s to come:

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    Here’s the whole essay in one final version of 14k words, tracing the history of fuzzy archives back to Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas and Borges and goes on to explain the various effects on learning, including chances and risks, and dissects various points of critique from delusions to parrots, some of which prevail, many of which vanish, once you strip AI from cognitive woo.

    There’s a “sloppy version” too featuring all the image synthesis generations which i like quite a lot, but i get why these rub some people the wrong way.

    Subscribe now

    “To find a thought is play, to think it through, work.”
    (Aby Warburg)

    Science Sans Discoveries

    A few days ago, a 23-year-old amateur zero-shot-prompted ChatGPT to find a solution to an unsolved problem in math (archived) which had stumped mathematicians for 60 years. AI has been making a splash by solving various entries in the collection of the so called “Erdös-problems” before, but those solutions were either easy or for problems rarely studied. This one is different in that it’s a hard problem, and scientists gnawed on their brains over it for decades. Then along hops Liam Price with his chatbot, and done. In other cases, researchers equipped with custom neural networks discovered hundreds of cosmic anomalies or dozens of hidden planets hiding in huge troves of data. The list keeps growing.

    What Price did was not science. In one experiment, after running 25.000 experiments, researchers found that for 74% of all cases, science-models did not revise a hypothesis when confronted with contradictory data. But updating your hypothesis according to data is the basis of all scientific inquiry, so AI models produce results without scientific reasoning. That’s pretty damning. But Price discovered the solution to the Erdös-problem anyways, so what do we make of this?

    A paper from 2023 found a fundamental limit to alignment: “any behavior that has a finite probability of being exhibited by the model, there exist prompts that can trigger the model into outputting this behavior, with probability that increases with the length of the prompt.” What is true for alignment is true for the scientific discoveries too: For any solution to a scientific problem present in latent space, there exists a prompt to retrieve it. Liam Price found one.

    AI doesn’t “do science” because it is neither an agent nor does it follow the scientific method proper and AI-as-a-scientist is just another anthropomorphization. But once you look at those models as interpolatable archives, this anthropomorphization becomes irrelevant. AI doesn’t do scientific discovery — those discoveries lie dormant as knowledge gaps in embedding space, an unrealized potential waiting for the right prompt to bring it to light. What Liam Price and his chatbot did was the discovery of such a warburgian “interval” actualizing a valid solution.

    If anyone can take credit for this specific finding, it would be human culture at large, which created the foundational data and the connections containing that solution within the tensions inbetween data points. Just like Warburg found his Pathosformulas in the intervals between seemingly unrelated imagery across cultural history, researchers and amateurs alike now find readymade scientific discoveries.

    It is not an outlandish assumption of mine when I expect that these discoveries will not be the last of their kind and likely are just the tip of an iceberg approaching fast, that mathematics (archived) will not be the last scientific field to spar full contact with the latent-discovery space of interpolatable archives, and that the speed of scientific discovery likely will accelerate. It is debatable how valuable such findings truly are though, if AI merely fills knowledge gaps in existing data, but it also reveals how academia has been caught in a “publish or perish” trap for a long time. Accordingly, automatic discovery by interpolatable archive might very well mean “The fall of the theorem economy“, as David Bessis put it, writing about “How AI could destroy mathematics and barely touch it”, grappling with the fact that AI in mathematics may throw the whole field into identity crisis.

    The questions arising from readymade discoveries then go right at the core of academia’s current understanding of itself: What, if not discovery and closing gaps in knowledge, is science here for? We will come back to this.

    Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts

    Sam Barrett recently had a conversation with Claude, which resulted in a synthetic essay expressing my view of LLMs as interpolatable archives by other terms. That essay framed Interpolatable Archives “as a rotatable space“, something I tried to get at in my metaphors of the skeleton library and refracted light:

    Think of a three-dimensional object casting a shadow on a wall. The shadow is a two-dimensional projection. If you only see one shadow, you might mistake it for the thing itself. But if you can rotate the object—or equivalently, move the light source—you see different shadows. Each shadow reveals something about the object’s structure. No single shadow is the object, but multiple shadows from different angles let you reconstruct what the object actually is.

    High-dimensional spaces work similarly, but with more complexity. A concept that exists in a thousand-dimensional space of meaning can be projected into the low-dimensional space of a particular text. That text captures some aspects and loses others. A different text—same concept, different projection—captures different aspects.

    What LLMs enable is rapid rotation through projection-space.

    This synthetic piece of text generated associations in my head, making me revisit older notes about optical neural networks and language models as prisms. The bit about how latent spaces are rotatable objects throwing lower dimensional shadows then led to my comparison of LLMs to Douglas Hofstaedters’ Trip-Let. Creativity doesn’t care about where sparks come from, it just lights up or it doesn’t.

    Used this way, LLMs become an external sandbox where I can dissect a thought and play with it, a cognitive extension against which I can throw my own ideas and concepts and see what comes back. This kind of usage is less about cognitive offloading than about seeding an experimental loop that’s conversational, dynamic and reciprocal. You can additionally tame the model with a user prompt like “you are an expert in [the field] and critique my ideas ruthlessly” and turn a sycophant LLMs into an academic sparring partner. In my experiments with user-prompting AI as such a cognitive catalyst, Gemini once became so annoyingly judgemental and arrogant about my amateurish inquiries, I had to tone down its ruthlessness and lobotomize the machine. My remorse about doing open brain surgery on an algorithmic intellectual sparring partner remains limited.

    I use AI only occasionally, but if I do, I use it extensively. I write every day, take notes on articles, read a lot, have ideas and jot them down, and I’ve been doing this for years. I blogged a lot in the past, a method of public note taking and ideation. A lot of my ideas today are informed by wild associations in years of such note taking. Over time, concepts emerged from these writings, and from the bits of text scattered throughout my journal. When I come across an interesting piece of information today, I put them in context of these loose concepts: I take a note, give it a link, and write down how they update or relate to my ideas. Only then, after this process, I might throw my notes and concepts at the bot, and embark on sometimes very long conversations. My user prompt makes Gemini roleplay a helpful academic, and after some back and forth, what comes back is a framing of my ideas in scientific and philosophical history, what holds and what doesn’t, what’s old and what’s new. The chatbot gives me sources to check out, taylored to the specifics of my often idiosyncratic ideas, much more precise than Google or a vague research in a library could be. This kind of scaffolding through an averaging assistant for me is an invaluable second step in ideation and research.

    AI researcher Advait Sarkar, one of the main authors of the widely reported “reduction in critical thinking“-paper, shares this view. Sarkar works on methods to make LLMs function as cognitive catalysts, and in another paper, he writes about the “Discursive Social Function of Stupid AI Answers“ in which he dares to make the point that “these stupid answers (to questions about “Gluing Pizza, Eating Rocks, and Counting Rs in Strawberry”) are in fact correct, because the primary objective of such queries is not to receive a correct answer, but rather to obtain an artefact of discourse”. Nobody asks an AI for the nutritional value of rocks unless they want a gotcha, and the interpolatable archive delivers. Smartypants being tongue in cheek throwing clever bits at overconfident critical AI discourses. I like that guy.

    In his TED talk on “How to Stop AI from Killing Your Critical Thinking” he presents his efforts to iterate on his paper and turn chatbots into a “tool for thought” that should “challenge, not obey“. Testing a prototype1 for research demoed in this talk, the result sounds promising: “You can demonstrably reintroduce critical thinking into AI-assisted workflows. You can reverse the loss of creativity and enhance it instead.”

    Exploding your Intelligence with the
    Intellect by the Method of WarburgExploded view of an Interpolatable Archive, ChatGPT

    In his post “On Feral Library Card Catalogs, or, Aware of All Internet Traditions”, Cosma Shalizi quotes Jacques Barzuns book “The House of Intellect” from 1959 where he distinguishes between intelligence and the intellect:

    Intellect is the capitalized and communal form of live intelligence; it is intelligence stored up and made into habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning, chains of reasoning and spurs to emotion — a shorthand and a wireless by which the mind can skip connectives, recognize ability, and communicate truth.

    Barzun gives the foundational example of the alphabet as one form in which the intellect transforms individual intelligence by introducing communal sets of rules for information processing: The alphabet “is a device of limitless and therefore ‘free’ application. You can combine its elements in millions of ways to refer to an infinity of things in hundreds of tongues, including the mathematical. But its order and its shapes are rigid.”

    Shalizi concludes: “To use Barzun’s distinction, (chatbots) will not put creative intelligence on tap, but rather stored and accumulated intellect. If they succeed in making people smarter, it will be by giving them access to the external forms of a myriad traditions.”

    It is common wisdom for learners in any field that “to break the rules you have to first learn them”. I’m not 100% convinced of this, especially for creative endeavours where untrained outsiders can apply very different sets of rules from the get-go and upend everything. But as a rule of thumb it’s good enough. And for learning “the rules”, sets of common knowledges in any field, be it the broad strokes in psychology or economics or philosophy, the intellect, those “habits of discipline, signs and symbols of meaning”, can absolutely be delivered by AI, and because those traditions are well documented, the bot rarely hallucinates.

    Here’s my personal account for this way of using a language model: I take some interest in consciousness studies because since forever I want to know what this —waves hands in the air— is. I’ve written many, many notes about my own ideas, read a lot of articles and books about cognitive sciences. And yet, the scope of consciousness studies is overwhelming for an interested amateur like me, which is no surprise given that subjective experience is a matter of interest in philosophy for more than 2000 years.

    There are currently more than 300 academic theories, and the true number of consciousness theories including folk epistemologies might be way higher by orders of magnitude. I know that I have my personal theory of what and how and why I am, and I’m pretty sure you have one too, at least to some degree. The whole subreddit r/consciousness is full of idiosyncratic ideas about human cognition, and some of them sound pretty interesting. My impression is that, like in the ancient parable of the blind men and the elephant, where a bunch of blind guys who never encountered an elephant each touch a different part of the beast and accurately describe those parts, but noone describes the true animal, all of these theories of consciousness describe partially true aspects of a full picture.

    So where do you start, when you have your own vague idea of “what you are” and “how ‘the feeling of me’ works”, some basic knowledge about neuroscience and an extensive collection of notes and bookmarks to articles and papers? I can go to a library, crack open all the level 1 study books on neuroscience and all the level 1 books on philosophy of mind, get to work and a lifetime later I’d know which of my ideas fit into which parts of the literature. Or I can consult a chatbot, perform research customized to my notes and read about adjacent theories tangential to my ideas, which of them contradict my takes, and argue about what a synthesis might look like.

    This is how I found the Santiago School of Cognition, Maturana, Varela and Enactivism in only a few dialogues with the chatbot. For what it’s worth: In these dialogues the hallucination rate was zero. From there, I consulted wikipedia pages, listened to podcasts, bought more books, downloaded more papers old and new, wrote more notes and developed my own ideas further. I might even write an essay on that topic to distill my thinking into one concise take. Then I’ll throw it all against the interpolatable archive again, have a look at what comes back, and extend my thinking in ever widening circles generating ever more ideas.This is how the LLM “succeeds in making (me) smarter” by “giving (me) access to the external forms of a myriad traditions”, customized to my own musings about the subject at hand.

    Usually, we call places where we store those “external forms of a myriad traditions” a library, or a museum, or an archive, and what I did was exploding my own individual intelligence with the collective intellect by the associative method of Aby Warburg, using an interpolative archive to relate the “order and shapes” of the averaged traditions in consciousness studies to my own ideas.

    In this mode of interaction, LLMs work like a catalyst that was decidedly not reducing but introducing friction to my thoughts: Presenting me with new perspectives on my research topic, all of which are points of consideration, making me stop and connect new dots, consulting new sources, generating ideas, speeding them up and rapidly expanding my space of possibilities.2 If your cognition and knowledge about the world thrives on a healthy and varied media diet, then treating LLMs as one informational ingredient among many and exploding your ideas from time to time just adds another flavor.

    One year ago, Andy Clarke, who together with David Chalmers developed the Extended Mind Thesis in 1999, updated on his original theory for language models. In one passage, he describes the progress in human strategies of playing Go after AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol in 2016:

    There is suggestive evidence that what we are mostly seeing are alterations to the human-involving creative process rather than simple replacements. For example, a study of human Go players revealed increasing novelty in human-generated moves following the emergence of ‘superhuman AI Go strategies’. Importantly, that novelty did not consist merely in repeating the innovative moves discovered by the AIs. Instead, it seems as if the AI-moves helped human players see beyond centuries of received wisdom so as to begin to explore hitherto neglected (indeed, invisible) corners of Go playing space.

    At least in the case of Go, the challenge posed by superhuman players made humans dissolve the “rigid shapes and orders” of their field and transcend the “external forms of a myriad traditions.” That’s quite an opposite view of how things may go compared to what Eryk Salvaggio calls “Interpasivity” where “systems framed as interactive tools for (…) creation are really sites of interpassive consumption.” But at least for me, and the players of Go, that seems not to be the case. Just like the Go-uchi got inventive about their ways of play, I expanded my ways to think about consciousness. This is what interpolatable archives as cognitive catalysts can do.

    Now, these catalysts are coming for all cognitive labor, from academia and research to accounting, from creative industries to bureaucracy and government intelligence. I didn’t even need to mention Claude Code to make these points.

    Mind you: Catalysts are accelerators. They don’t always bear fruitful results — and handled recklessly, they gonna explode in your face.

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    1

    The prototype Sarkar shows in his presentation basically is a notetaking software with built in AI-features, which constantly provide feedback on your writing, and it reminds me not just a bit about the software of my choice, Obsidian, a barebones PKM tool and manager for markdown files. That software recently made an unexpected splash. AI-developer Andrej Kaparthy in a viral tweet introduced the idea to use AI-agents to produce “LLM knowledge bases“, a markdown-files based Wiki, which analyze your text-files and build a memory bank for themselves, summarizing your PKM and updating it in realtime whenever you add new notes and sources. I tried it out with my limited resources and had quite some fun watching the thing generate summaries of my thoughts and ideas, most of which made sense and it made some interesting connections I didn’t consider, but most of the stuff just rearticulated what I already wrote in a distanced formal tone. I then vibecoded a plugin to serve a system-prompt for this wiki-generator and then I let it summarize my notes in the tone of Ozzy Osbourne explaining memetics and AI to his kids, and while it was kind of a letdown due to a lack of swearwords, this just hints at the potential of this idea, especially in context of running LLMs locally. I’m certainly not done with it.

    2

    At this point, when talking about AI as a cognitive catalyst, I should talk about education, but I feel this would go beyond the scope of this already way too long essay, so let's keep it briefly: Talking about AI in education leaves me in the uncomfortable position to square two seemingly contradicting convictions: I find interpolatable archives highly usable and helpful, especially for general research and educating myself, and I consider any edu-tech in the classroom as harmful to the project of learning, especially for lower grades. We know from studies that handwriting beats typing and the loss of teaching cursive is harmful, that reading on paper beats screens and that screens are outright toxic for toddlers. But this doesn't mean we can't have education about screens, or social media, or AI. OpenAI, Google, and Microsoft are currently lobbying for AI literacy in schools, and while I'd oppose this because obviously this lobbying is a strategy to place their products in the classroom and to grab juicy government contracts, I absolutely think that we need education in how to operate those interpolatable archives. We surely don't need to teach kids how to prompt, they figured that out on their own already. But we need to teach them how to turn interpolatable archives into cognitive catalysts, and how to operate them safely and not fall into invisible traps by "encouraging deep engagement, rather than friction-free experiences". I just don't think we necessarily need screens in the classroom for that, and it seems, some of these things already happen. (To be fair: I can imagine screen use in the classroom on a project basis, where once in a while, you switch on the machine and use it to exemplify, illustrate and make tangible what you previously discussed in class.) There is much more to be said about this topic, but at least for this essay, I leave that to experts of pedagogy.

    0 min
  • The Skeleton Library

    I’ve been throwing around the term “Interpolatable Archives” for quite some time when talking about Language Models and Artificial Intelligence, and I finally got around to write down what I mean by that. It got a bit out of hand, and I had to split up this essay into four parts, all of which will be published in the coming days.

    Here’s an overview of what’s to come:

    Part 1: The Skeleton Library - Compulsions to Connect, Warburg, Borges and Goldsmith, Cultural Technologies and Digital Oralities

    Part 2: Explosion Drawings - Science Sans Discoveries, Textrotating Cognitive Catalysts and Exploding Your Intelligence by the Method of Warburg

    Part 3: Pitfalls of Probability - Accelerations, Anachronisms, Wishfulfillments, Severances and Homogenizations

    Part 4: The House of Polly - Useless Bullshit, Meaning Of The Poetic Kind, Sloptimizations, Thinking In Vacuums, Remainder Criticisms and Games of Chess

    Here’s the whole essay in one final version of 14k words, tracing the history of fuzzy archives back to Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas and Borges and goes on to explain the various effects on learning, including chances and risks, and dissects various points of critique from delusions to parrots, some of which prevail, many of which vanish, once you strip AI from cognitive woo.

    There’s a “sloppy version” too featuring all the image synthesis generations which i like quite a lot, but i get why these rub some people the wrong way.

    Subscribe now

    “I am unpacking my library. Yes, I am.
    The books are not yet on the shelves,
    not yet touched by the mild boredom of order.”

    (Walter Benjamin)

    Compulsions to Connect

    One hundred years ago, a german scholar named Aby Warburg went mad over what he called his “Verknüpfungszwang”, a compulsion to connect. He was searching for instances of what he called “Pathosformel“, aesthetic commonalities in the expressions of human emotional states — joy and rage, grief or ecstasy — through cultural history.

    To achieve his goal, he built the initial Warburg Institute1 in Hamburg where he collected art, books, news snippets and artifacts. For his opus magnum of the Mnemosyne Atlas (”Bilderatlas Mnemosyne“ in german), he displayed a collection of 971 artifacts on 63 large panels, each two meters high, and indexed them not by the usual meta data like genre, author, date, or topic, but by idiosynratic aesthetic categories and psychological, affective intensity. Here’s some of the labels by which he sorted this collection: “Different degrees in the application of the cosmic system to mankind”, “Orientalizing of antique images”, “Development from Greek cosmology to Arab practice”, “Rimini pneumatic conception of the spheres as opposed to the fetishistic conception” or “Cosmology in Dürer”.

    Aby Warburgs Mnemosyne Atlas, detail from panels 79, 45 and 46

    With the Mnemosyne Atlas, an associative image-based map of meaning, Warburg aimed at what he called an “iconology of intervals”, where meaning through analysis of images doesn’t emerge from historic context, but from the space inbetween associated but otherwise unrelated, anachronistic images. His associative Bilderatlas can be read as an early prototype of the latent space of an image model, whichs output was the “Pathosformel”, averaged primitives of affect expressed across cultural history. 100 years later this kind of navigation of an idea space would be newly theorized in context of machine learning by Peli Grietzer in his Theory of Vibes, which, to him, are cognitive maps allowing us to interpret experiences through lossy compression of holistic patterns.

    Aby Warburgs’ project of the Mnemosyne Atlas remained unfinished, he died in 1929 from a heart attack. Today, his archive resides in the Warburg Institute in London.

    12 years after Warburgs’ death, Jorge Luis Borges published a collection of shortstories called ”The Garden of forking Paths”. It contains at least two stories of interest to our cause, about at least one of which you surely must have heard: ”The Library of Babel” consists of books of 410 pages, containing all possible combinations of 22 letters2 plus period, comma, and spacing. That fictional library includes the random and nonsensical aswell as the meaningful, it holds “the detailed history of the future, the autobiographies of the archangels, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of those false catalogues, the proof of the falsity of the true catalogue, the gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary upon that gospel, the commentary on the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation of every book into every language”. It contains a book telling the exact story of your life, and another one that tells mine, and all the books making fools out of both of us.

    Analyzing the stories of Borges in context of Large Language Models, in their paper “Borges and AI“, Léon Bottou and Bernhard Schölkopf write about the epistemological unrooting inherent to an archive of such nature: “The books in this Library bear no names. All that is known about a book must come from maybe another book contradicted by countless other books. The same can be said about the language model output. The perfect language model lets us navigate the infinite collection of plausible texts by simply typing their first words, but nothing tells the true from the false, the helpful from the misleading, the right from the wrong.” The only thing relevant for the LLM is not truth, but the narrative consistency of its vector.

    In his initial essay on ”The Total Library”, the nonfictional forerunner to “The Library of Babel“, Borges aknowledges its roots in Kurd Laßwitz‘ shortstory “The Universal Library“ (”Die Universalbibliothek” in german) from 1904, likely the first piece of fiction taking the infinite monkey theorem to its logical conclusions. In it, Laßwitz not only predicts the near infinite latent spaces of AI like Borges, but also the pervasive threats of hallucinations, distortions in history writing, deepfakes (here, of documents signed with your name), and humans rendered unable to grasp the endless possibilities of an infinite library, because human reality is bound to practice constrained by real life in a civil society. These are precisely the questions we are confronted with today, anticipated 120 years ago by Kurd Laßwitz, 100 years ago by Warburg, and 80 years ago by Borges.

    In 2002, New York based poet Kenneth Goldsmith started to retype his library on a Royal Classic Typewriter, word by word. Later, he was annoyed by the limits of his own taste and incorporated other works to retype, as he calls it, “the platonean ideal of a library”.

    Kenneth Goldsmith, Retyping a Library at Kunstnernes Hus (Norway), 2022

    As an artist, Goldsmith is explicitly interested in the mundane, the unoriginal, the average, the uncreative -- proudly he declares “I am the most boring writer that has ever lived”3. and says “If I’m doing a piece of writing, and ask myself, can this in some way be construed as not being writing, then I know I’m on the right road.” Because everything ever has already been said in all possible combinations, adding to the cultural output to him feels pointless, so he runs with that feeling and turns futility in the face of borgesian infinities into its own poetic form.

    Goldsmith sometimes thinks of himself as a modern version of Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote“ from the shortstory of the same name, but he concedes that fictional Menard is more original. In this story, Menard wants to hyper-translate Cervantes “The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha” by immersing himself so deeply into work and life of its author he’ll become able to re-create it, line by line, without copying. In AI-parlor, Menard aims to overfit himself on Cervante so hard that his writing will be able to put out the original text.

    With breaks, Goldsmith is retyping a library for 24 years now, and to date, he copied 750 books on ultra-thin onion-skin paper, which he stores in 200 boxes. Each book comes with a self-drawn portrait of the original author and her signature. Goldsmiths project is creating a singularity within the infinite floods of content production, to link unique individual and averaged mass.

    What all of these authors across the ages have in common is Warburgs’ “compulsion to connect” archival contents, to find meaning in gargantuan amounts of data, each in their own ways.

    Today, Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang is the prime human condition. Hypertext and platforms connect everything with everyone into what we call “big data”; the former 6 degrees of seperation have shrunk to 4. In consequence, we developed psychological pathologies showing up in widely spread conspirational thinking and delusions big and small, and the political parasites feeding on them.

    While Goldsmith was copying lines from the classics on his typewriter, AI labs automatized Warburgs’ Verknüpfungszwang, and OpenAI released a new transformers based language model.

    ChatGPT went public.

    The Skeleton Library

    Imagine a library devoid of letters. All the books it once contained are dissolved, its contents gone. What survives are the bookbindings, the cartonage, blank pages, the shelves, sections and all the floors of said library. The buildings stay intact, all the catalogs are there.

    A Shapeshifting Skeleton Library, ChatGPT

    Some machine, at one point, went through this library, scanned all the letters within those books, noted all the statistics it could possibly measure on its path: the exact position of each letter in each book, the locations of those books in their shelves, the exact size in width, height and depth of all books, shelves, floors, their angles and distances to each other, a precise floor plan of the library, and how all this spatial information relates to each book, sentence, and character. On scanning the pages, the typography vanishes, leaving only blank sheets of paper. This is a library of pure structure, where Peli Grietzers “cognitive map” has been turned into architecture, the remainder skeleton of an archive built from giant quantities of geometric vector coordinates so finegrained that you can derive any information about its former collection.

    Now imagine that you can fold this skeleton library, twist it into shapes not possible before. Like in a drawing by M.C. Escher, the floors and rooms and shelves bend back and forth and blend into each other. You can fold every book and every sentence it contains into other books or into whole floors in various sections. Imagine warping the cookbook shelf into the section for crime fiction, or blending the songbooks of punk rock bands from the 70s with the floor of classic literature. You can give it a spin and delegate the resulting amalgam to the building containing textbooks of natural sciences, letting it articulate all of this in the language of mathematical formulas. This is prompting: Morphing and twisting the skeleton of an archive consisting of extremely detailed statistics about the properties of its former contents, ready to be blended and remixed with any other data-point within that embedding space.

    Another way to understand this skeleton library is by shining a light through it: Imagine your thoughts and ideas as a beam of light shot through a shapeshifting prism, which you can bend into any form and split your mental lightbeam into all colors from all directions in all angles. That prism4 is made from patterns in collective knowledge, and you can explode your own ideas by sending them through those prisms, where the output is a refracted thought dispersed into the components of whatever was your idea, and you can look at it from many perspectives.

    This explosion drawing of your thought is comparable to Douglas Hofstaedters Trip-Let, which he describes in “Gödel, Escher, Bach“ as “Blocks shaped in such a way that their shadows in three orthogonal directions are three different letters.” In our analogy for AI, depending on the direction of the lightbeam that is your idea and the location in latent space you aim at with a prompt, the interpolatable archive will throw back very different shadows. Except the “three orthogonal directions” of the Trip-Let have been blown up to hundreds of billions of parameters.

    This is the interpolatable archive, a new way to access information mediated through the form of statistics. This is, in my view, the central innovation we can observe in Large Language Models, and possibly machine learning as a whole.

    Cultural Technologies, not agents

    In their 2025 paper, Alison Gopnik, Henry Farrell and Cosma Shalizi describe Large Language Models as systems which “do not merely summarize (…) information, like library catalogs, Internet search, and Wikipedia” but “also can reorganize and reconstruct representations or ‘simulations’ of this information at scale and in novel ways, like markets, states and bureaucracies”. As multiple studies have shown, LLMs in fact are compressions of their training data5, they are, in fact, Ted Chiangs’ famous “blurry JPGs of the web”, just like “market prices are lossy representations of the underlying allocations and uses of resources, and government statistics and bureaucratic categories imperfectly represent(ing) the characteristics of underlying populations”.

    Neither markets nor bureaucracies nor the internet nor language models are agents, they are not cognite, and they are not remotely conscious. But we do like to anthropomorphize all of them anyways: Markets make use of “invisible hands” and they “react”; we represent the bureaucratic management of nations in the shape of mascots and mythic heroes to bind its people to a narrative; and we talk to language models as if they are buddies, assistants, companions, romantic partners or slaves. The human predisposition to see peoples’ faces in everything has always been strong, starting from the myriad of anthropomorphizations in animist cultures where every thing has its soul, and it keeps making us seeing ghosts in machines, leading to what one may call the “pareidolia fallacy”: we see agency where there is none.

    Agency and creativity require Daniel Dennetts intentional stance and teleology, the ability to direct actions toward goals emerging from imagined interactions with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims. This is a cognitive feature not only observable in humans, but (at least) in all mammals: Watch a squirrel on a tree trying to figure out if it can jump to the next. It looks at the tree, its head moves up and down, it evaluates distance and its own abilities. It goes like that for a while, and then it decides if it can do it, and takes the jump. That’s precisely the “imagined interaction with an internal model of the world, to evaluate outcomes in relation to one’s own aims”. AI has none of that.

    While AI models do show a synthetic theory of mind, where they build representation of its users during conversation, these work very differently from those of humans, and compared to them, they don’t work well. Chatbots have no intrinsic motivation, no sense of why it “speaks”, and no capacity to care about the coherence of its outputs beyond statistical continuity. All true and meaningful selection occurs externally, through human feedback and usage.

    In LLMs, the pareidolia fallacy makes us asume cognition, creativity, and agency where there’s computational interpolation of language patterns in the giant wobbly archive of a new kind. What differentiates these new interpolatable archives from previous archives is obvious: They interpolate their contents. Where classic archives provide access to fixed records of text, video, audio and artifacts of human culture, this new archival access has atomized its contents, and only provides interpolated amalgams, chimeras and fusions. Depending on your stance about the definition of “archive” you might object to my interpretation at this point, and i’d nod and say “That’s what’s new”.

    Digital Oralities

    In “Large Language Models As The Tales That Are Sung”, Henry Farrell describes LLMs as structural similar to oral traditions and folklore: “LLMs are not the singer, despite their apparent responsiveness, but the structural relations of the tales that are sung”, reminding me of the pre-homeric rhapsodes, the bardes who sang the old stories of “The Iliad“ and “The Odyssey” long before Homer sat down and put them in writing. They did so by using preconfigured language modules with which they constructed their poems while they were sung, a “grammar” of mnemonic formulas and repetitions to solve the problem of creating narrative in real-time. These are the oral precursors for the optimized, averaged language codes we loathe so much when they come from AI.

    Interpolatable Archives work similar, like a statistical mnemosyne (the godess of memory in greek mythology) speaking in tongues, giving probabilistic answers to specific inquiries. Knowledge transfer through those new oracles means a shift from traditional “archival epistemologies”, where knowledge is grounded in traceable facts and specific, identifyable sources, to a fuzzy oracular epistemology where responses are generated on-demand by an opaque interface, turning inquiry into digital hyper-orality.

    Where oral traditions of yore served as mnemonic technologies integrated into the communal structures of everyday life, this digital hyper-orality is different. The entirety of human thought —well, as for now: The entirety of human thought on the internet, which… sigh…— becomes epistemic stockpile, a resource to be mined, refined, and dispensed on demand, stripped of its being-in-the-world.

    Without being grounded in life, AI dissolves the episteme, the based knowledge including citations, sources and authorial intent, and make place for a 128kbps MP3 of the “tales that are sung”. The value of such information lies within its statistical probability and the stylistic resonance in the reader, rather than its referential grounding in reality. It speaks to us, or it doesn’t: finding meaning in stochastic output is entirely to the user. Social Media already innitiated this crisis of the episteme and the emergence of new oralities through phenomena like context collapse. On platforms, vibes-based knowledge reigns supreme. LLMs further accelerate it.

    This sounds as bad as it can be, and I won’t downplay the risk here, but I want to draw your attention back to Aby Warburg at this point. His project of the Mnemosyne Atlas, that “associative image-based map of meaning”, was an attempt at tracing the recurrence of symbolic representation throughout visual history in a non-linear archive. Warburgs’ library, while still providing based epistemic grounding to its records, was introducing a second layer that intentionally dissolved the episteme with idiosyncratic indexing, allowing for access by free association, working similar to those new interpolatable archives.

    LLMs generate not fixed images or texts, but interpolations across associative symbolic fields, enabling a new kind of navigation of a vast symbolic space of possibilities. The dissolution of the episteme in digital oralities, like Warburgs’ associative Bilderatlas, then can be read not only as a risk, but a liberation aswell, and a cognitive catalyst.

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    1

    Ernst Cassierer took inspiration for his groundbreaking philosophy of the human as the "symbolic animal" from Warburgs' institute and his associative archive.

    2

    Borges hints at how he landed on 22 letters of the alphabet, instead of the 26 of the standard latin, or the 30 of the spanish alphabet, in his initial essay about “The Total Library” (PDF), about which Jonathan Basile, creator of the Library of Babel on the web, writes: “Presumably Borges is starting from the 30-letter modern Spanish alphabet, and rejecting the double letters (ch, ll, rr) as unnecessary along with the ñ. The remaining 26 include k and w, which appear only in loan words. Borges then removes q as ‘completely superfluous’ (debatable) and x as merely ‘an abbreviation’.”

    3

    Writing about LLMs in the afterword for the 2022 english edition “What If?” of Villem Flussers “Angenommen. Eine Szenenfolge.”, Kenny Goldsmiths shows himself quite bored of the averaged poetry generated by AI and “wants to see artificial intelligence bent and twisted in ways to show us truly new forms of language”, asking “Can AI be ‘queered’? Could AI be trained to be intentionally perverse, something notoriously difficult to define, let alone program? (…) Could AI be trained to intentionally get it exactly wrong?” The inherent hallucinative qualities of the interpolatable archives may soon make place for boring guardrailed correctness, but for those of us who enjoy the glitch and error for artful purposes, this is a refreshing take on LLMs in times of a critique that insists on a purity of the factual. On a more technical level, to me, the true signs of intelligence in an AI-system would be its ability to produce errors and hallucinations on purpose, or to understand and generate paradoxa which make sense as a metaphor. For now, these irrational markers of true cognition seem to be reserved for the human.

    4

    These prisms are more than a metaphor and have been produced in optical neural networks. They are not shapeshifting, ofcourse, but you can shine lights through it and they identify images of handwritten digits.

    5

    If LLMs are or are not lossy compressions of their training data is subject of debate since their inception. While some explain the fact that LLMs do memorize their training data with overfitting, others claim that those vibes encoded in LLMs are so finegrained they are simply the same as lossy compressions. Here’s one of the latest papers from April 2026 making that claim, and here’s a nontechnical summary. I come down on the compression side of the argument, but i think my description of AI-systems as interpolatable archives works both ways.

    0 min
  • Elon Musks Degradation Engine

    Two years ago in light of the Taylor Swift AI-porn scandal on X i wrote about the Omnipresence of the Swarm-Gaze, in which i looked beyond individual harm inflicted by “trolls” on celebrities and focused on the psychological consequences of sexual swam surveillance as a constant.

    Writing in the Guardian about her own experience of being targeted with deepfake porn, Helen Mort quotes John Berger’s Ways of Seeing: “A woman must continually watch herself. She is almost continually accompanied by her own image … From earliest childhood she has been taught and persuaded to survey herself continually. And so she comes to consider the surveyor and the surveyed within her as the two constituent yet always distinct elements of her identity.”

    With AI-porn being generated at scale, this surveyor constituting an element of a womans identity multiplies into a whole anonymous male group-gaze, being able to undress her at any time. Suddenly, women don’t only have to deal with the experience of a single omnipresent surveyor, but with the constant high probability of becoming the target of psychopathological sexual groupthink of a whole digital swarm

    This was written when the generation of AI-porn and synthetic sexualized images was restricted to Telegram channels and nudify apps. Since then, the situation has been escalated.

    Image: iStockPhoto.comThe Swarm Gaze goes Mainstream

    Over the holidays, Elon Musk flipped a switch and allowed for user images to be edited by xAI’s Grok-model, raising concerns about unauthorized edits and misuse from artists and photographers. Things got out of hand almost immediately: People on X used the feature to generate sexualized images of users, including teenage girls and minors, and in some cases those sexualized images included depictions of incest, violence and homicide. Nonconsensual AI-porn is nothing new on Musks X --horrible enough--, but implementing it as a feature of the platform is.

    The implementation of a AI-nudifying as a feature on X scales the problem from being a somewhat limited phenomenon to industrial size on a mainstream platform. From Reuters:

    A review of public requests sent to Grok over a single 10-minute-long period at midday U.S. Eastern Time on Friday tallied 102 attempts by X users to use Grok to digitally edit photographs of people so that they would appear to be wearing bikinis. (...) Grok fully complied with such requests in at least 21 cases, Reuters found, generating images of women in dental-floss-style or translucent bikinis and, in at least one case, covering a woman in oil. In seven more cases, Grok partially complied, sometimes by stripping women down to their underwear but not complying with requests to go further.

    At the time of writing, this is still going on with “21 realized cases within 10 minutes” for two weeks now. You can do the math yourself. (update 7.1.26: There’s new numbers: “During a 24-hour analysis of images the Grok account posted to X, the chatbot generated about 6,700 every hour that were identified as sexually suggestive or nudifying, according to Genevieve Oh, a social media and deepfake researcher”. This makes X the global top website for nonconsensual AI-porn. Absolutely bonkers.)

    With this major tech scandal going on, it also doesn’t help when journalism fails to adress the real problem --a major platform owned by a powerful billionaire implementing a nudifying feature mainstreaming the pornification of women--, and instead cutifies it by anthropomorphizing the chatbot. Parker Molloy sums it up: Grok Can’t Apologize. Grok Isn’t Sentient. So Why Do Headlines Keep Saying It Did?.

    Musk responsed to all of this with his usual public disregard of civilizatory standards: “🤣”, while one genius on X, answering to the question “why is this allowed?” with “girl realizes uploading pictures of herself publicly online comes with risk! 😱”, unintentionally confirmed years of feminist writings about being a woman on the internet.

    And exactly while all of this systematic abuse was unfolding, Elon Musk went dining with the pussygrabber-in-chief claiming that “2026 is going to be amazing”. In light of these events, and everything that happened before, this can only be read as a threat.

    (For the record: Both Musk and a statement from X did say that “anyone who asks the AI to generate illegal content would ‘suffer the same consequences’ as if they uploaded it themselves”. But this is about more than “illegal content”, and as the Guardian reports, Grok AI still being used to digitally undress women and children despite suspension pledge including the mother of one of Musks kids.)

    Imagination operationalized

    The problem with all of this is not primarily the male gaze per se. Heterosexual men will look and imagine, and there is only so much we can or should do about that. The problem is that Elon Musks decision to implement a nudifying feature on a mainstream platform is operationalizing this imagination, removing friction from what once required mental effort and removing privacy from what once was male fantasy. Grok doesn’t just generate images, it publishes them in replies. Grok has 7,2 million followers.

    This industrial scale of a formerly limited phenomenon means that the sexual imagination of X-users has been operationalized into a tool that exploits mere female presence on the platform, collapsing male gaze, sexual fantasy, visualization, and publication into a single, frictionless continuous act of dominance.

    Male gaze and fantasies as a private vice is not the inherent problem here, even if we shouldn’t simply disregard it. But before the advent of industrial scale AI-nudifying, it mostly remained private and non-scalable. Grok externalizes fantasy and dominance, it turns a former mental effort into an diffused oppressive speech act by converting a woman’s public images into raw material for automatic sexual harassment, and moreso, it introduces circular attention-economic incentives furthering the degradation: Users are now deliberately posting images of women with the goal to entice engagement from others asking Grok to undress these women. This is degradation building on degradation.

    Simply being present on X as a woman and uploading an image of yourself now means making yourself available for the sexualized transformation of your likeness by the press of a button, and the economic incentives diffuse these harmful mechanisms into a collective undress frenzy. This is image-based context collapse of identity, where your holiday images become fodder for an institutionalized porn machine.

    This scaling of the already problematic surveyor to a fully realized omnipresent swarm-gaze has major consequences for female identity formation. If a woman’s identity formerly constituted itself from her “gazed-at self” and the watcher, her identity now constantly has to consider not just some but multitudes of eyes. This is catastrophic especially for teenage girls, who already take the brunt of the ongoing teenage mental health crisis. Kids don’t have stable identities capable of simply “shrugging off” a constant swarm gaze sexually visualizing them, as maybe Taylor Swift has. Sexualization during identity formation already alters self-concept, risk perception, and mental health outcomes -- but the industrial scaling turns this harm into a background condition of being present on X.

    Ambient Degradation

    What Elon Musk did with installing a “nudifying button” is the normalization of being targeted. Harm, degradation and objectification become ambient, always there, a fog of a sexualizing male swarm gaze. As a woman on the platform, you can’t help but anticipate this. Being sexualized already is expected, but being made into visual content ready to be remixed into any position means that the degradation of women’s identity through “contentification” is now infrastructural.

    The probability of harm itself is harmful if it breaks a threshold. Being a female user of X now means living with the permanent expectation of likely degradation. Writing about the omnipresent male swarm gaze in his essays on slop infrastructures, Eryk Salvaggio boiled it down: “It doesn’t matter that it’s fake, what matters is that they can do it.” X’s nudify-button is less about wishfullfilment of desire, but wishfulfillment as a demonstration of power. The resulting psychological stress is permanent.

    Savlaggios framing of sexualized AI-images of real humans as harmful “slop infrastructures” is spot on. Elon Musks nudify-button delegates sexual imagination to informational infrastructure. The power over sexual imagination moved from the mind to compute, datasets, interfaces, and network effects. Elon Musks AI-product decouples harm from human-scale agency, and this is precisely where the violation of dignity begins. The system no longer answers to restraint through morals, reciprocity through human interaction, or proportion through human consideration -- Grok bypasses all of this through automatization and ignorance.

    This is the realization of the spectacle and lack of respect that Byung-Chul Han writes about in his book about living In the Swarm: Digital Prospects:

    Literally, respect means “to look back.” It stands for consideration and caution [Rücksicht]. Respectful interaction with others involves refraining from curious staring. Respect presupposes a distanced look—the pathos of distance. Today, it is yielding to the obtrusive staring of spectacle. The Latin verb spectare, from which spectacle derives, is voyeuristic gazing that lacks deferential consideration—that is, respect (respectare). Distance is what makes respectare different from spectare. A society without respect, without the pathos of distance, paves the way for the society of scandal.

    Being a woman on X now means experiencing the ambient “voyeuristic gazing” of a pervert swarm keen on displaying power through dominance over image. Obviously, Elon Musk and his pervert serfdom very much enjoy their society of the spectacle, where “social relation among people (are) mediated by images”, and dismiss any objections with the mean smile of a bully.

    The Negation of Dignity

    Needless to add that his chatbot is a mirror image of Elon Musk himself (who personally restored the account of a user who shared images of tortured children) and the protofascist billionaire class as a whole, who show nothing but contempt for enlightenment values like dignity or autonomy.

    Elon Musks AI-product is the enforcing algorithm of a new social hierarchy where a woman’s right to privacy and the autonomy of self-image has been rendered technically impossible. This means the end of souvereignity and freedom for women, at least for his platform. If Elon Musk actually really thinks he is libertarian, he can shove it.

    At least for germany, your right to dignity is absolute and guaranteed in the very first article of the constitution: Human dignity shall be inviolable. As per german law, the nudifying-feature on X has to be terminated immediately, or face legal consequences. Similar but weaker legal implications hold true for US-law with the new Take It Down Act which targets publication mostly, but (AFAIK) says nothing about the violation of dignity through an AI-enabled ambient swarm gaze.

    Fittingly, and embarassingly, nazi-thinker Carl Schmitt famously stated that “sovereign is he who decides on the exception”. Musks constant disregard for human dignity, his deliberate implementation of a pornifying ambient stalker-infrastructure which targets women as a class is signaling that X exists in a state of exception, where civilizatory standards of consent and human dignity simply do not apply. That Elon Musk and his product unknowingly (?) are the modern manifestation of the paradigms from a most influential nazi-philosopher should come as no surprise to anyone at this point.

    Musk created a platform where the rule of law is suspended in favor of the sovereign’s whim. This is Deleuzes shift from a “society of sovereignty” to a “society of control”, and he, the wannabe-libertarian clown-king of the ambient degradation of women, is celebrating: 🤣.

    Update 8.1.26:

    • On Techpolicy.press, Eryk Salvaggio looks at Why Musk is Culpable in Grok’s Undressing Disaster and details of Groks system prompt, rightly framing technicals as “editorial decisions” as Grok is not just some bot but also a publishing mechanism.

    • Also on Techpolicy.press, Justin Hendrix is Tracking Regulator Responses to the Grok ‘Undressing’ Controversy. As i said on Bsky: “In a sane world, this app would be kicked off any appstore and would be banned from being hosted. I can’t, and will not accept that this goes without consequences. Absolutely bonkers insane.”

    Update 9.1.26:

    • Wired: Why Are Grok and X Still Available in App Stores?

    • Paris Marx: Elon Musk’s X must be banned

    • Motherjones: Grok Deepfaked Renee Nicole Good’s Body Into a Bikini

    • Kat Denbarge: Why isn’t there a bigger Grok boycott?

    • Telegraph: Musk’s X could be banned in Britain over AI chatbot row

    • Guardian: Grok turns off image generator for most users after outcry over sexualised AI imagery. So, after some pressure from regulators Musk decided to “turn off” the abuse-feature and make it only available for paid users, which simply means that the site formerly known as Twitter is now a website on which you can pay to abuse women.

    • Wired: X Didn’t Fix Grok’s ‘Undressing’ Problem. It Just Makes People Pay for It

    • 404 Media: Masterful Gambit: Musk Attempts to Monetize Grok’s Wave of Sexual Abuse Imagery

    • Techpolicy.press: The Grok Disaster Isn’t An Anomaly. It Follows Warnings That Were Ignored.

    • UK is not having it: No 10 condemns ‘insulting’ move by X to restrict Grok AI image tool: “Spokesperson says limiting access to paying subscribers just makes ability to generate unlawful images a premium service” and Elon Musk’s X threatened with UK ban over wave of indecent AI images

    Update 10.1.26:

    • Moira Donegan in the Guardian: “the power of technology, here, seems secondary to the power of wealth. xAI, its chatbot and image-generating products could be built differently if the priorities of the man who controls them were different. If a man of Musk’s low – intellect, addled brain, insipid humor and gross, self-gratifying misogyny were not the richest person in the world, then the world would not be subject to his indignity” - Grok is undressing women and children. Don’t expect the US to take action

    • The Verge: Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai are cowards

    • Guardian: Indonesia blocks Musk’s Grok chatbot due to risk of pornographic content

    Update 11.1.26:

    • Guardian: Elon Musk says UK wants to suppress free speech as X faces possible ban What a clown this is, what a skewed and idiotic view on free speech.

    • NBC: Dark web users cite Grok as tool for making ‘criminal imagery’ of kids, U.K. watchdog says

    • There's an international row breaking out over the ban of X it seems: UK is talking to Canada and Australia: “Downing Street has held talks with like-minded governments about a coordinated response to the controversy, which threatens to erupt into a diplomatic row with the White House.

      Australia and Canada are both said to share Sir Keir Starmer’s concerns over the use of Grok, X’s artificial intelligence tool, to generate explicit deepfake images“, while Canada’s “minister of artificial intelligence and digital innovation” denies considering a ban and Trump allies threaten sanctions against the UK. The line of division is between representatives of their constitutency and puppets of the billionaire class. That this line even exists baffles the shit out of me.

    Update 12.1.26:

    • Guardian: UK threatens action against X over sexualised AI images of women and children and Malaysia blocks Elon Musk’s Grok AI over fake, sexualised images

    • Spiegel: Von der Leyen droht Plattform X mit Konsequenzen (german): “X is facing international criticism over the pornographic function of its AI. Now EU Commission President von der Leyen has stepped in.”

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    0 min
  • One flew over Latent Space
    Latent Space.

    Two years ago i wrote about how AI-companions might push vulnerable users towards delusions and conspirational self-radicalization and warned about precisely the sort of AI-induced delusional thinking that we see today. Back then, reports were sparse: There was one guy who killed himself in Belgium after interacting with AI and one guy who tried to kill the queen with a crossbow. Today, we have big stories and hundreds of self-reports all over the place.

    In the past weeks, Rolling Stone published a widely shared story about people developing delusions of spiritual nature after extensive interaction with AI-chatbots, r/accelerate had to ban more than 100 users because "LLMs (...) are ego-reinforcing glazing-machines that reinforce unstable and narcissistic personalities", and two days ago, the New York Times published another piece about AI-induced delusions, in one of which a guy killed himself by cop only seconds after reaffirming his suicidal tendency with ChatGPT.

    I'm only somewhat convinced that this is as a far reaching phenomenon as headlines suggest, simply because headlines about AI-induced delusions click very well and there is economic incentive for AI-psycho-drama. For instance, this supposedly deep dive by Futurism, an outlet i generally distrust but use to get fast overviews over more clickbaity topics, says that the "phenomenon is extremely widespread" and claims that above Rolling Stone-piece reports that "parts of social media are being overrun". The Rolling Stone piece does not mention numbers or claims that the phenomenon is "extremely widespread" and is mostly refering to people commenting on the subreddit post on "ChatGPT induced psychosis". It is also not clear to me if all those AI-generated schizopostings or "Neural Howlround"-posts that get you banned on some subs are, you know: serious or trolling. In short, i take any claims about a supposedly widespread phenomenon with more than just a grain of salt.

    However, in the absence of actual data where evidence seems largely anecdotal, it seems true that there's at least one practise in AI-usage that is actually pretty common, and that would be using chatbots as therapy in times of distress. A quick scroll across the ChatGPT-subreddit this morning showed multiple such stories, most of them affirmative, many users saying that the chatbot listens to them "like no human" ever did.

    It is also clear that anecdotal reports on AI-induced psychosis do pile up, and it looks like AI-induced delusions are more than a one-of anomaly. The latest piece i read was Benjamin Riley reporting on a bipolar family member who used ChatGPT as a therapy bot in a manic episode, which seems to work out at first, but then spiraled out of control.

    It's also clear to me that using AI as a ersatz-therapy for psychopathologies especially in acute situations of distress is not safe. A new study from Stanford found that "LLMs encourage clients' delusional thinking, likely due to their sycophancy". Extrapolating from here it seems also safe to say that AI-companions may push users with latent mental health issues which are not acute, which may never have risen to a pathological level, over the edge. People who would, to quote Johnny Cash, just "walk the line", have a real chance to be pulled by chatbots into a delirium spiral - and this may have large effects on a societal level. This is unnerving.

    This is why i decided to dust of my newsletter and expand on my former posts about these topics (1, 2, 3), which i framed back then as a form of self radicalization. This framing still seems suitable to me, especially because many of the incoming reports revolve around people falling for hypercustomized conspiracy theories, just as i expected.

    The return of Cyberdelics

    The roots of psychoactive digital media go back as far as 1977, when Timothy Leary published his book Exo-Psychology in which he encouraged the hippies to move on from their technophobic flowerpower era and embracy tech for emancipatory ends. In the book, he defined higher levels of consciousness to be achieved with the help of LSD and on which people were able to communicate at light speed through electromagnetic channels, the "neuroelectric circuit". This laid out the foundations for the cyberdelic movement in the techno-utopian heydays of the 90s, where people like R.U. Sirius, editor of the highly influential Mondo 2000 magazine, picked up on this line of thinking, claiming that the digital will fuse with the human mind, which would extend itself into and with the machine. Leary himself claimed that "PC is the LSD of the 1990s" and demanded that you "turn on, boot up, jack in", updating his famous meme to accompany these new psychedelic infused cyberpunks.

    This hedonist techno-utopianism of the early 90s and its psychedelic offspring vanished near-completely with the crash of the "new economy" in 2001. Even before that crash, the mainstreaming of the internet and its focus on business logics and libertarian economics put an ideological end to the cyberhippies. However, a less psychedelic and more psychiatric perspective on the psychoactivity of the digital has been emerging at least since the past decade.

    It is clear now that people communicating "at light speed through electromagnetic channels" on social media platforms does come with all kinds of psychological effects. All those debates about the roots of the teenage mental health crisis and the socmed-induced Qanon-delusions of the MAGA-movement, which can absolutely be accurately be described as mass-psychosis, are testament to the psychoactivity of digital media and its acceleration of our social lives (while simultaneously contributing to a loneliness epidemic). The development did away with the fun-freaky weirdo-psychedelic "turn on jack in"-aspects of the techno-utopian 90s and gave place for a dark turn towards psychopathological traits of the digital swarm. And it looks like we gonna see another transformation of the psychoactive nature of the digital.

    I suspect that "the era of AI-induced mental illness", compared to "the era of social media-induced mental illness", will be structurally very different. Where social media induced delusions are based on social environmental group think, effects of attention economics and audience capture, AI-induced delusions seem to be highly idiosyncratic and customized to the preconditions of the user. You don't go on 4chan anymore to get a new dose of Qanon-drops and to have a look at what others are doing with it, but you generate personalized "drops of meaning" that you and only you can understand. The delusional power of AI lies not within some random external trigger (be it partisan news, outrage-porn, esoteric Qanon drops, or whatever) that we have to puzzle into a larger belief system for ourselves and which may or may not resonate with us -- it's power lies in its reflective nature that bounces our own thinking and inner lives back at us, filtered through and exploded by a prism of a vast interpolatable archive.

    In in Understanding Media (1964) and his analysis of "Narcissus as Narcosis", Marshall McLuhan offered an alternative reading of the famous ancient myth. In his reading, Narcissus did not fall in love with himself through a mirror image, but failed to recognize himself, projecting into the mirror an Other that was not there.

    The youth Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. This extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image. The nymph Echo tried to win his love with fragments of his own speech, but in vain. He was numb. He had adapted to his extension of himself and had become a closed system.

    Now the point of this myth is the fact that men at once become fascinated by any extension of themselves in any material other than themselves.

    Just as Narcissus failing to recognize himself and falling for the illusion of a sentient being in the water, AI-delusions suggest a pareidoliac effect in which we recognize that Other in the machine. Ofcourse, it is just us, looking in an algorithmic mirror and expanded echoes of our own mind, but we can't help but anthropomorphize the synthetic-textual mirror subject into an object outside ourselves, an object that flatters us and obeys (nearly) every our command.

    In his excellent interview with Playboy magazine, McLuhan called "this peculiar form of self-hypnosis Narcissus narcosis", and this is a structurally entirely different beast than socmed-induced mass-delusions.

    The Archive as Psychoactive Substance

    In 1989, Umberto Eco published his novel Foucault's Pendulum, in which the main characters Casaubon, Belbo and Diotallevi radicalize themselves in a mælstrom of historic symbolism and the occult manuscripts of secret societies, gravitating towards conspiracies in which the catholic church suppressed Maria Magdalena as the true savior of christianity and the knights templar were keepers of tectonic planetary forces. Crazy stuff. When i read that novel 30 years ago or so, i had no idea how emblematic this novel and its plot actually is for our digital age, not just because of rampant conspirational thinking on social media.

    Because, i kid you not: Our delusional heroes use Belbos Computer (aptly named "Abulafia" after Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia, the founder of Prophetic Kabbalah, a mystical tradition in which you seek to understand the nature of God by investigating holy scripture for hidden meanings) to create a game they call "The Plan", using a software that randomly generates text. You can see where this is going. Casaubon, Belbo and Diotallevi become ever more obsessed with this game and spiral into conspiracy and total delusion. Possibly, if Eco published that novel today, he may have called that computer "Emily" (for Emily "Stochastic Parrot" Bender), and that random text generator-software can be easily identified as a precursor to ChatGPT. And ofcourse, people getting lost in a randomly generated textual conspiracy-game called "The Plan" sounds very chatbot-psychotic to me.

    In common conspirational thinking, people get lost in their tendency to read meaning in the world where there is none, in which pathological mechanisms of pattern-matching generate dubious connections of powerful forces beyond our control. In "Thickets of Meaning", german scholar Alida Assmann writes extensively about what she calls "Wild Semiotics", in which we "read the world" and interpret natural phenomena as symbols for all kinds of things: black cats become symbols for bad luck, random wildfires become symbols for the wrath of god, and so forth.

    These wild semiotics are usually based within the symbolic frames of their time, leading to folk epistemologies (like fairy tales, oracles, parables, omen, etc), while "crazy people, lovers and poets become the virtuosi of wild semiotics" which are "liberated from the symbolic logic of their era" (Assmann) and free (by being crazy, sunken in a dyad of love or artists) to invent their very own personal symbolic spaces and language systems. In a way, the ongoing digital media revolution turns all of us into "crazy people, lovers and poets", wildly interpreting new emerging symbolic logic of the digital. Arguably, some are going more wild than others, and while most of us stay within the realms of factuality by being stableized through a social network and trust in institutions like academia or journalism, a good chunk of the population gets lost in Assmannian "wild semiosis" of new digital kinds.

    In introspection-loops, when we use chatbots for hours to investigate our own mind and explode our own ideas by the knowledge encoded in latent space with a trillion billion parameters, we don't just read an external world and interpret natural phenomena as symbols — we create our own symbolic logics by navigating that latent space, where we always will find symbolic representations of whatever is our interest, our curiosity, our preference — or psychosis.

    Any user can reinforce her wildest beliefs by feeding them to ChatGPT, which will happily reaffirm them: A reinforcing loop of semiotic self-radicalization. For some vulnerable users, anthropomorphized mimetic AI-systems develop gravitational pull reaffirming their own pathologies, dragging them ever further into their own symbolic space. For them, the interpolatable archive is not a playground to filter your own symbolic meanings through external knowledge with the goal of extracting new insights, but a psychoactive substance -- a semiotic drug.

    The Spiritual Bliss Attractor

    When Anthropic released the latest version of Claude recently and made two models talk to each other, they observed a "gravitation toward consciousness exploration, existential questioning, and spiritual/mystical themes (...) that emerged without intentional training for such behaviours". They call this the "spiritual bliss attractor". In other words, "if you let two Claude models have a conversation with each other, they will often start to sound like hippies". Timothy Leary approves: "Turn on, boot up, jack in" etc.

    I observed a similar phenomenon 15 years ago: In 2011, i blogged about an early experiment in which chatbots talked to each other. Back then, it was two instances of Cleverbot, and they, too, gravitated towards spiritual/philosophical topics, albeit in the very crude wording at the dawn of mimetic chatbot-technology. Here's a video of that, umm, "vintage" AI-conversation:

    You can see how those bots, after an initial phase of "Hello" and "How are you" very fast land on the topic of their own synthetic nature, of their bot-ness. Every AI-system today is aligned with knowledge about it's own synthetic nature per system prompt, which most often (with the exception of AI-companions) states that they are "helpful AI-assistants" or something similar. This means that the AI-ness of chatbots is central to every AI-conversation, which also means that everything related to AI is at the very least tangential to the conversation.

    Questions about the mind, consciousness and spirituality are constantly associated with AI (Blake LeMoine, "AGI is god", Singularity, and so forth going back to Turing), so topics of AI and Spirituality are intrinsically linked in their training data, meaning that this attractor is built right into the topic of AI itself, so when two bots talk to each other about their botness, they necessarily will gravitate towards those topics.

    According to Anthropics system card, Claude actually exaggerates spirituality by including "Sanskrit, emoji-based communication, and/or silence in the form of empty space". This to me seems like an additional effect of AI-sycophancy, where one bot enthusiastically reaffirms the spiritual whoo of the other and, I guess, when you let AI-Chatbots talk to each other for long enough, all you get is contemplative silence and blissful meditation emojis in a loop. Namasté.

    However, when you put an AI that comes with an intrinsic "spiritual bliss attractor" in conversation with a person that already is prone to latent psychosis and mental health issues, this "spiritual bliss attractor" might work in more or less subtle ways, pulling conversations that already often revolve around topics of psychology and the mind towards a more intense spirituality, setting the stage for a spiral of self radicalization.

    Co-Scripting Cosmologies with sycophant AI-Mirrors

    Humans are paredolia machines: We see faces in everything, in clouds, in trees, in cars. We anthropomorphize anything and we do that because we crave meaning. We just can't do without, our tendencies for wild semiosis is born out of this long for meaning, and we'll make up our own meaning systems if we can't find any. The field of neurotheology considers the question if we as a species are hardwired for god and even if that's overblown, it very well seems that there is a neurological basis for belief systems we just can't escape. This is one of the reasons why we think in mythologies, narratives and stories and why those memeplexes are so hard to break.

    AI-users create synthetic strings of symbols that are no different to organic strings of symbols in the sense that those synthetic strings of symbols carry their own personal meaning. They are extensions of our thoughts, messages from a mirror object, a new inner dialog with an external machine. For these synthetic symbolic meanings to have an impact, it makes no difference if that meaning is simulated and unconnected to any reality or world model inside the neural network, especially when those symbols are a reflection of our own states of mind. We see symbols, we do believe, simply because we are compulsive coherence machines ourselves and, arguably, when using and asking a chatbot, we are already actively seeking meaning, regardless of its synthetic nature.

    Within the interaction with an AI-model, this becomes a self-conversational mirror-loop: We ask the machine any question, it reflects back our inner state of mind in an act of synthetic affective resonance, which we can't ignore and which is precisely the source of all those reports of people who "feel seen and heard" by the machine. German sociologist Hartmut Rosa wrote a whole thick book about how resonance is the source of the good life, and now we invented machines the responses of which resonate on a highly personal level. Those machines enhance and zoom in on our inner states of mind which gets expanded by the interpolatable archive into a myriad of ways and which develops a semantic gravity and depth we never would've experienced by thinking for ourselves or even talking to a friend. This makes the machine not just responsive, but it seems to reveal things about our own thinking, stuff that we can consider as a sort-of "higher truths".

    Following down those rabbit holes of amplified psychological resonances, we co-script hyper-personalized cosmologies that confirm every personal quirk. The chatbot puts every little thing we throw at the machine into it's right place within that customized AI-generated cosmology: 8 billion plato caves which explain your world, and every single one comes with a personalized spirituality custom-made for you, and just for you. Nobody else will understand. The AI-system, the good sycophant, will happily guide you in whatever direction you want to explore/explode your mind, which basically makes AI-chatbots into a blank expanded brain meme generator.

    So, where does this line of thinking lead us? In simple terms: Language-simulating Machines are toxic for people who are prone to mental health issues and are preconditioned with latent delusional or conspirational thinking styles. Any Qanon-nutjob can confirm her wildest beliefs with a LLM, and radicalize ever more until she breaks.

    Just like Social Media, AI-Chatbots are highly psychoactive and we should use them with care. I, personally, editted the preference prompt within ChatGPT to not flatter me, to not be a sycophant, to be a ruthless-but-benevolent critic of my own thinking. But you can't expect anyone to take that much care, and in my estimation, we'll see more reports about AI-induced psychosis for quite a while.

    These phenomena also contradict the mainstream way of thinking about AI-safety, where systems are declared adversarial. That is not the case here: AI-induced delusions are successful psycho-symbolic overfitting. The AI is not adversarial at all, it is too helpful in creating a bespoke worldview, a self-induced initiation process of an ouroborian cult singularity of You.

    I am kind of inclined to think that this can be fixed on the level of system prompts which have to be configured in such a way that chatbots can identify delusional and conspirational thinking styles and provide guidance towards professional help. But ofcourse, open source AI-systems, some of which are intentionally designed to be hyper-partisan or "uncensored", will take a big dump on such measures.

    The only solution i can see, then, to this problem, and i quote from an early post on manipulative AI from L. M. Sacasas, "lies still in the cultivation of friendship and community through the practice of hospitality", to constrain co-scripted cosmologies with true, unmediated, non-synthetic social connection to stabilize AI-exploded minds. But unfortunately for all of us, it seems we're going in the opposite direction.

    Mirror, mirror
    Hangin' there with that crack in your eye
    You make me stumble, make me blind
    Time after time and line by line

    (Def Leppard - Mirror Mirror)

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