Warfare increasingly takes place in cyberspace. Consequently, the question arises how a digital analogy of the protective emblems, the red cross, red crescent and red crystal, could be realized. How could such an emblem be part of computer-to-computer communication? And how could its usage be limited to legitimate parties?

In this post, continuing the discussion on the viability of a ‘digital emblem’, Felix E. Linker and David Basin from ETH Zurich present an overview of ADEM – an ‘Authenticated Digital EMblem’ – and how it would operate in an armed conflict.

The use of digital technology in armed conflict is rising sharply. Such developments come with risks, but they may also provide opportunities. For example, could new technologies help digitally signal that certain infrastructure and assets enjoy protection under international humanitarian law? For 150 years, the red cross and red crescent, and more recently the red crystal, have performed this function in the physical world. Would it be feasible, and advisable from a cyber-security point of view, to mark the digital assets of protected entities in times of armed conflict?

In this post, Tilman Rodenhäuser, Legal Adviser at the ICRC, Laurent Gisel, Head of the Arms and Conduct of Hostilities Unit at the ICRC; Larry Maybee, Legal Adviser at Australian Red Cross; Hollie Johnston, Senior Adviser at Australian Red Cross; and Fabrice Lauper, Technology Adviser at the ICRC present the main concepts and ideas of the ICRC’s research project on the digitalization of the red cross, red crescent, and red crystal emblems.

When biometrics enters the news cycle, it is usually in the context of a critical discussion on the risks versus the benefits – an ethical debate, as evidenced by recent events in Afghanistan, that can be a matter of life and death. Taking a step back to a more technical level, fundamental questions arise: what is the purpose of collecting biometrics, and is it possible to process it in a way that is fit for purpose?

In this post, ahead of the upcoming DigitHarium discussions on biometrics, ICRC strategic technology advisers Vincent Graf Narbel and Justinas Sukaitis investigate how modern techniques in information security can – or cannot – be applied to the unique nature of biometrics data in the humanitarian context.

Preventing persons from going missing, clarifying the fate and whereabouts of those who do and supporting their loved ones, including in their quest to know what happened and to seek justice for serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, are as important as ever.

Looking towards the International Day of Victims of Enforced Disappearance, ICRC legal advisers Ximena Londoño and Helen Obregón Gieseken provide key elements on how the law protects victims of enforced disappearance and other missing persons and on how the ICRC contributes to the broader global, regional, national and local efforts to prevent and address enforced disappearances as part of its work.

As the world faces simultaneous disasters and burgeoning risks, humanitarian actors need to develop more efficient ways of delivering aid to vulnerable populations. One current trend involves the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to process large amounts of data quickly to inform – and even autonomously undertake – decision-making processes. While these processes have the potential to facilitate faster and better anticipatory humanitarian action, they can pose unforeseen challenges if left unregulated and unchecked.

In this post, Christopher Chen, Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, explores the promise and perils of using artificial intelligence and machine learning in the context of anticipatory humanitarian action. Building on insights gleaned from a data governance and protection workshop co-hosted by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the ICRC, he highlights some of the implications of the use of new technologies in humanitarian action and how the principle of ‘do no harm’ can be applied in a digital age.

The rules and standards of war are not self-correcting. Contradictions, gaps, and ambiguities often endure until an external pressure makes them salient. This is particularly true of the laws governing military technology. In order to regulate new weapons, ‘shock’ is sometimes needed – a practical demonstration of harm that clarifies the morally and legally problematic status of the technology, and the urgency of a regulatory response. When used effectively, shock can galvanize a humanitarian campaign. When used carelessly, it can help undermine one.

In this post, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Neil Renic, explores the difficulty of using without abusing shock in the context of emerging military technology.

Drones are an increasingly common tool in humanitarian aid, but issues revolving around public perception and trust continue to slow their global rollout during disaster. Humanitarians can use new technologies that make it easier to tell drones apart from one another in flight to justify trust in the technology: they will also benefit from more research into why people distrust drones, and how the data that drones collect is being used in the communities that they serve.

In this post, drone technology researcher Faine Greenwood describes how the international aid community and private industry can address the long-standing problem of drone distrust with a combination of improved technology, expanded research into public opinion, and a better grasp of the risks that drone technology may present to the public.

No country or sector has been spared the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Gaza Strip has certainly been no exception. In this post, Professor Moamin Aljaro, Professor of Law at the University of Palestine, outlines the three main digital challenges lecturers and students of international humanitarian law have faced since the onset of the pandemic.

Over the past decade, there has been a large and growing demand for digital services – such as ‘connectivity as aid’. Such services can be of great help to people affected by conflict, including by helping connect families that have been separated, or to access legal rights. At the same time, unsafeguarded connectivity points can expose already vulnerable individuals and populations to increased risks, including targeting killing, exploitation and other harms.

In this post, Rakesh Bharania, director of humanitarian impact data at Salesforce.org, and Mark Silverman, strategic advisor in the ICRC’s Office for Digital Transformation and Data, argue that connectivity as aid is important and should be provided, and that it needs to be designed to be secure and protective for populations receiving humanitarian assistance from the outset.

In the spring of 2021, the ICRC and Geneva Academy jointly organized a student essay competition on the protection of civilians against the dangers posed by military cyber operations. Students from nearly 30 countries and all continents of the world contributed short essays answering the question: ‘Which measures – technical, policy, legal, or other – should States put in place to avoid or at least reduce the risk of civilian harm from military cyber operations during armed conflicts?’

Today, we are delighted to publish Isabelle Peart’s winning essay. In the words of one of the chairs of the jury, ICRC’s Laurent Gisel, Isabelle’s essay ‘impressed us by the maturity of the presented thoughts as well as by the well-argued suggestions on how to reduce the risk of harm to civilians that is posed by military cyber operations’. The essay adapts the IHL concept of demilitarized zones to the cyber context, and on that basis presents an argument for the establishment of international digital safe havens.