Iran's Gambit

As the Islamic Republic commemorated the fifth anniversary of assassination of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Suleimani, many public figures, who had personal interactions with him delivered lengthy interviews discussing this near-mythical individual. On January 2nd, I discussed former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with Khorasan newspaper, and today, I'll discuss current Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi's interview. He delivered the interview on January 1, and my translation is based on the partial transcription released by Iran's al-Alam network. As you will see, there are significant differences between Dr. Zarif's account and Dr. Araghchi's, but this is understandable: the former no longer serves as foreign minister, and the latter is and must deal with the Quds Force bureaucracy in his everyday work. Nevertheless, as you will hear, you can always detect signs of inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, even in the guarded comments delivered by Dr. Araghchi.

Former Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammad-Javad Zarif's interview with January 1, 2025 edition of Khorasan newspaper not only provides some insights into his relationship with the late Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem, but also into inter-agency rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force. An audio recording, allegedly leaked to the media in 2021, provides greater insights into how the Quds Force undermined the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts.

In the history of most countries, some eras appear more glorious than others. And at times, the past appears more glorious than what we expect of the future. This was my sense monitoring Iran's state-censored media today. Addressing the families of martyrs, including the family of Quds Force Chief Major General Qassem Soleimani, widows of Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, and other affiliated groups, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a speech commemorating the fifth anniversary of Soleimani's assassination. In his address, Ayatollah Khamenei reflected on the apex of Soleimani's influence, particularly from 2003 to 2020—a period, which coincides with the height of Iranian geopolitical leverage in the Middle East. Regarding future prospects, however, Ayatollah Khamenei's rhetoric conveyed aspirations and hope but lacked a clearly articulated strategic framework. Clearly, glory was in the past and the future looks more uncertain.

On December 30, Tehran witnessed two competing demonstrations emblematic of Iran's polarized political climate: one orchestrated by the regime and the other a spontaneous expression of public dissent triggered by the latest depreciation of the Iranian Rial against the U.S. Dollar. The state-organized rally aimed to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of what the regime frames as "the sedition of 2009," a characterization starkly contrasting with global narratives that recognize this period as the Green Movement uprisings in Iran.

As some may recall, Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 under contentious circumstances ignited political contention. His rivals, Mr. Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mr. Mehdi Karrubi, contested the election results, sparking mass mobilizations. On December 27, 2009, millions of demonstrators took to the streets, marking a pivotal moment as chants against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emerged for the first time. In reaction, the regime organized pro-government demonstrations on December 30, 2009, events that the Islamic Republic's propaganda apparatus celebrated yesterday in an act of political mythmaking.

In contrast, the second rally, as noted earlier, arose organically as thousands of merchants in Tehran's Grand Bazaar protested the Rial's devaluation against the Dollar. This economic grievance underscores the regime's persistent struggle with public dissatisfaction fueled by economic mismanagement.

In today's program, I will analyze the Iranian media's selective coverage—or deliberate omission—of these dueling demonstrations, alongside a critical examination of the function and symbolism of pro-regime rallies within the broader context of Iranian political strategy and governance.

While presence of Iranian nationals among the Tahrir al-Sham Movement risks radicalizing the Sunnis in Iran, and therefore constitutes a security threat to the Islamic Republic, some of those radicals may be Intelligence Ministry infiltrators. However, infiltrators too can at times go rogue and pursue their self-interests.

On December 15, Iran's Supreme National Security Council issued a statement announcing suspension of the so-called "Hijab and Chastity Law," formally known as the "The Bill Supporting Families By Propagating the Culture of Chastity and Hijab". The bill, which was passed on June 13, 2024, was the regime's reaction to anti-hijab protests in the wake of the September 16, 2022 killing of 22-year-old Ms. Mahsa Amini in the custody of the so-called "Morality Police". It was also a reaction to the fact that increasingly, many women ignore the requirements for covering their head with a scarf in public spaces. Why is the regime capitulating on the hijab issue? In short, because President Masoud Pezeshkian, his Cabinet, and even the Revolutionary Guard and the Law Enforcement Forces, no longer believe enforcement of the bill can intimidate Iran's urban middle class into submission. On the contrary, enforcement of the Hijab bill can potentially provoke another round of anti-regime protests. The 1980's are over!

While President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the technocratic elites of the Islamic Republic appear to have accepted Iran's total defeat in Syria, and are reaching out to the new rulers of that country to establish formal relations, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard and IRGC affiliated media outlets are still in denial and talk of "Syrian youth" rebelling against the new regime.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's December 22 address on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Fatemeh Zahra had little to do with plight of women, and a good deal to do with regional developments, in particular Syria. He appeared irritated by Israel's "boasting" and "grand standing," assured the Iranian public that Israel was defeated rather than victorious, and expressed hope Israel would be "evicted" from the Middle East region. On the same day, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, Supreme National Security Council secretary, delivered an interview expressing similar views. Doest the regime, and in particular, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, believe his own propaganda? If his advisers, the likes of Mr. Ahmadian, constantly confirm his worldview, is Ayatollah Khamenei capable of distinguishing between propaganda and reality?

In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.

In the Islamic Republic, there is no government. Everyone is a member of the opposition when there is public criticism of the regime's performance. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkheni, Supreme National Security Council secretary from 2013 to 2023 is one of the few exceptions to this rule, and today's program is dedicated to his answers to critical questions from a group of students visiting Nour News Agency's headquarters at the Supreme National Security Council.