Korea JoongAng Daily - Daily News from Korea

This article is by Kim Hyoung-gu, Michael Lee and read by an artificial voice.

U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson told U.S. lawmakers that he is against withdrawing U.S. troops from the peninsula during a congressional testimony in Washington on Wednesday.

He also said that Seoul and Washington aim to meet the conditions for transferring wartime operational control (Opcon) by early 2029, but he emphasized that the handover will not be rushed until conditions are met.

Speaking before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Brunson said that the allies have submitted a road map to the Pentagon to meet the required conditions "not later than the second quarter of fiscal year 2029."

The U.S. fiscal year 2029 runs from Oct. 1, 2028, to Sept. 30, 2029, placing the second quarter between January and March 2029.

Brunson's remarks point to a de facto target of early 2029 for fulfilling the conditions needed to transfer wartime control of South Korean forces from Washington to Seoul — a goal that President Lee Jae Myung has pledged to achieve within his five-year term, which ends in June 2030.

But the timing of the Opcon transfer forecast by the USFK commander overlaps with the end of the current U.S. presidential term and the start of the next administration, raising the possibility that final certification could fall to the successor of current U.S. President Donald Trump.

Brunson repeatedly stressed that the transition remains strictly "conditions-based," pushing back against any suggestion of an accelerated timeline driven by political considerations.

"Accelerated COTP is not time-based," he said, referring to the conditions-based Opcon transition plan. "As the bilaterally agreed-to framework dictates, the [South Korean] military must possess specific capabilities to meet conditions for COTP."

Under the current framework, South Korea must demonstrate that it has the military capabilities needed to lead combined defense operations before regaining wartime control — a process that has already been delayed multiple times over the past decade.

Brunson said that the allies plan to review Seoul's progress in fulfilling Opcon transfer conditions at upcoming high-level meetings, including the South Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington later this year.

He also struck a cautiously optimistic note on readiness, pointing to South Korea's expanding defense budget and growing military capabilities.

"I think that right now, where we stand based on the continued investments by the Republic of Korea [...] really an uplift of about 8.5 percent in their defense spending over the next three fiscal years, I think that we're in a good position," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name. "But there's still more work to be done."

Brunson noted that South Korea is pursuing "conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines" and that Washington "will work closely" with Seoul "to advance the requirements for that project, including avenues to source fuel."

He added that these commitments and South Korea's broader investment in security underscore its status as a "model ally."

At the same time, Brunson offered his clearest public pushback yet against speculation over a potential drawdown of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Asked whether there could come a point where it would be reasonable for allied forces to separate or for U.S. troops to leave South Korea, he said he "would not provide that as [his] best military advice."

Instead, Brunson suggested the transition would coincide with a broader shift in the role of USFK, as Washington looks beyond the peninsula to the wider Indo-Pacific region.

He said that U.S. forces would continue to provide "essential but more limited" support for North Korea-related missions once the Opcon transfer takes place and expand their strategic focus within the region.

In his prepared testimony, Brunson described the Korean Penins...

This article is by Kim Hyoung-gu, Michael Lee and read by an artificial voice.

U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson told U.S. lawmakers that he is against withdrawing U.S. troops from the peninsula during a congressional testimony in Washington on Wednesday.

He also said that Seoul and Washington aim to meet the conditions for transferring wartime operational control (Opcon) by early 2029, but he emphasized that the handover will not be rushed until conditions are met.

Speaking before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Brunson said that the allies have submitted a road map to the Pentagon to meet the required conditions "not later than the second quarter of fiscal year 2029."

The U.S. fiscal year 2029 runs from Oct. 1, 2028, to Sept. 30, 2029, placing the second quarter between January and March 2029.

Brunson's remarks point to a de facto target of early 2029 for fulfilling the conditions needed to transfer wartime control of South Korean forces from Washington to Seoul — a goal that President Lee Jae Myung has pledged to achieve within his five-year term, which ends in June 2030.

But the timing of the Opcon transfer forecast by the USFK commander overlaps with the end of the current U.S. presidential term and the start of the next administration, raising the possibility that final certification could fall to the successor of current U.S. President Donald Trump.

Brunson repeatedly stressed that the transition remains strictly "conditions-based," pushing back against any suggestion of an accelerated timeline driven by political considerations.

"Accelerated COTP is not time-based," he said, referring to the conditions-based Opcon transition plan. "As the bilaterally agreed-to framework dictates, the [South Korean] military must possess specific capabilities to meet conditions for COTP."

Under the current framework, South Korea must demonstrate that it has the military capabilities needed to lead combined defense operations before regaining wartime control — a process that has already been delayed multiple times over the past decade.

Brunson said that the allies plan to review Seoul's progress in fulfilling Opcon transfer conditions at upcoming high-level meetings, including the South Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue and the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Washington later this year.

He also struck a cautiously optimistic note on readiness, pointing to South Korea's expanding defense budget and growing military capabilities.

"I think that right now, where we stand based on the continued investments by the Republic of Korea [...] really an uplift of about 8.5 percent in their defense spending over the next three fiscal years, I think that we're in a good position," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name. "But there's still more work to be done."

Brunson noted that South Korea is pursuing "conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines" and that Washington "will work closely" with Seoul "to advance the requirements for that project, including avenues to source fuel."

He added that these commitments and South Korea's broader investment in security underscore its status as a "model ally."

At the same time, Brunson offered his clearest public pushback yet against speculation over a potential drawdown of U.S. forces on the peninsula.

Asked whether there could come a point where it would be reasonable for allied forces to separate or for U.S. troops to leave South Korea, he said he "would not provide that as [his] best military advice."

Instead, Brunson suggested the transition would coincide with a broader shift in the role of USFK, as Washington looks beyond the peninsula to the wider Indo-Pacific region.

He said that U.S. forces would continue to provide "essential but more limited" support for North Korea-related missions once the Opcon transfer takes place and expand their strategic focus within the region.

In his prepared testimony, Brunson described the Korean Penins...

This article is by Sarah Chea and read by an artificial voice.

Hyundai Motor will unveil a China-dedicated Ioniq EV at Auto China 2026, set to kick off on Friday, aiming to catalyze a long-elusive inflection point in a market that has struggled for a decade.

With EV demand softening in Europe and the United States, China has become an indispensable arena for Hyundai — the world's largest EV market, where sales continue to remain relatively robust.

The Korean automaker will unveil the Ioniq brand's first mass-produced model for the Chinese market at the 2026 Beijing International Automotive Exhibition, running from Friday through May 3, as well as its strategies to transit to a New Energy Vehicle (NEV) brand, a classification widely used in China, denoting vehicles powered by alternative energy sources in place of internal combustion engines, including EVs, hybrids and hydrogen cars.

Hyundai will equip the new model with autonomous driving technology developed by the local firm Momenta. It has also discussed with CATL on battery technologies while joining hands with Sinopec to advance a hydrogen ecosystem.

Buoyed by robust government support and led by domestic brands such as BYD and Geely, China's EV market has been growing at a rapid pace, where NEVs now account for 54 percent of new car sales.

Hyundai, which first entered the Chinese market in 2002, is seeking an ambitious comeback after its sales plunged due to conflicts over Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems in 2016 that sparked a consumer boycott of Korean goods.

Before the boycott, Hyundai and Kia held around 10 percent of market share, placing them as the big three with Volkswagen and General Motors. But the share dropped to just above 0.8 percent as of 2025.

Hyundai CEO José Muñoz said he plans to launch 20 China-dedicated models over the next five years, targeting sales of 500,000 units by 2030, in a new strategy called "In China, For China, To Global," specified in a letter to shareholders last month.

Kia also introduced the EV5 at the Chengdu Motor Show in 2023 and is now being mass produced at its Yancheng plant. The cars are also exported to Latin America and Australia.

This article is by Jang Seo-yun and read by an artificial voice.

The first app that a young office worker surnamed Jeon opens these days is no longer a shopping platform, but a brokerage account.

Although he used to spend up to 400,000 won ($270) a month on clothes, he now hesitates before making even small purchases.

"I used to buy clothes as soon as the seasons changed," he said. "Now I think, 'I could buy at least one more share with that money.'"

The shift reflects a broader change taking hold across Korea as the benchmark Kospi extends a record rally. Instead of the classic "wealth effect," where an increase in the value of assets boosts consumption, economists say a reverse dynamic is emerging: Households are cutting spending to funnel more money into the stock market.

In some cases, stocks themselves are being treated like consumer goods.

A working mother of three surnamed Son has set the 17th of each month as her "stock-buying day."

"I don't really feel like buying accessories, shoes or bags these days," she said. "But I really want to buy stocks. It gives me the same kind of dopamine rush as shopping."

She said she plans to keep putting money into index funds, betting that the market has further to rise.

The Bank of Korea (BOK) has taken note. In a February outlook, the central bank warned that the recent stock market boom could have a short-term impact on consumption, as households prioritize investing over spending.

The bank estimates that the marginal propensity to consume when it comes to financial assets — including stocks, bonds and funds — is just 1 percent.

That means a 10 million won increase in such assets translates into only about 100,000 won in additional consumption.

A key factor is what economists describe as the opportunity cost of spending. With expectations of further gains running high, households may be reluctant to spend cash they see as potential investment capital.

Market volatility is also playing a role. Even when investors book gains, they tend to view them as temporary rather than permanent income, making them less likely to increase spending.

Consumer sentiment reflects that caution. The consumer sentiment index fell to 107 in March amid market swings tied to conflict in the Middle East, down 5.1 points from a month earlier, marking the sharpest drop since December 2024.

Cutbacks on consumption in favor of investment is particularly pronounced among younger Koreans.

One interviewee in her late 20s surnamed Lee told the JoongAng Ilbo that she recently embarked on a "no spending" challenge ahead of her marriage next year. The resulting savings go directly into ETFs.

"With tighter lending rules, investing feels like the only way to save enough money to buy a home," she said.

Economists say the pattern tends to be strongest among those in straitened financial circumstances or people who are aggressively pursuing asset gains.

A similar phenomenon has surfaced in Japan, where the expansion of tax-advantaged investment accounts under the Nippon Individual Savings Account program has fueled a surge in retail investing — and, in some cases, a squeeze on everyday spending among younger households.

But even as the Korean stock market booms, those who benefit most are wealthier households, who tend to save or reinvest rather than spend.

The BOK estimates that the marginal propensity to consume among the top 20 percent of earners is just 0.8 percent, below the overall average.

As such, their gains are less likely to translate into higher consumption.

Analysts added that rising inflation also serves to depress spending.

"Even when people make money from stocks, rising prices have made consumption itself feel wasteful," said Kim Sang-bong, a professor of economics at Hansung University, adding that stabilizing inflation is key to reviving domestic demand.

Others caution that the strategy carries risks.

"Cutting current consumption is a choice to increase future consumption," said Suk Byung-hoon, an e...

This article is by Yoon Ji-won, Lee Yu-jung, Seo Ji-eun and read by an artificial voice.

South Korea's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has confirmed that the locations of North Korea's uranium enrichment facilities are classified as combined South Korea-U.S. secrets, a designation that could undermine the Lee Jae Myung administration's efforts to contain the political fallout from a minister's public remarks about the site.

The DIA disclosed the classification in a written response to main opposition People Power Party (PPP) Rep. Lim Jong-deuk of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee on Wednesday shared with the JoongAng Ilbo.

"Specific location names, including the sites in question, are classified as joint secrets," the agency stated.

Combined secrets are classified information jointly produced or shared between Korea and the United States, including intelligence on North Korea's military movements and combined operational plans. The "secret" tier in Korea-U.S. sharing aligns with South Korea's Class II military secret of its three-tier system.

The confirmation puts the military at odds with President Lee, who defended Unification Minister Chung Dong-young after Chung publicly named Kusong, in North Korea's North Pyongan Province, as a primary North Korean nuclear site during a parliamentary session on March 6.

On Monday, Chung maintained his remarks were based on already-public information, saying he finds it "deeply embarrassing" that a well-known fact is being characterized as an intelligence leak.

The president echoed the defense on his X Monday, saying that "all claims and actions premised on the assumption that Minister Chung leaked classified information provided by the United States are wrong."

Intelligence analysts, however, say there is a critical distinction between research institutions or media outlets making analyses or estimates, and a senior government official formally confirming such information on the record.

Chung had claimed his reference to Kusong was based on statements by the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but a statement provided by the IAEA of Director-General Rafael Grossi's remarks to the IAEA's board of governors made no mention of Kusong.

The Unification Ministry later defended Chung by citing a CSIS report alongside earlier sources like a 2016 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) report. But on Tuesday, CSIS Korea Chair Victor Cha posted on X that the organization "has never done a report on nuke facilities at Kusong," distinguishing it from their analysis on North Korea's Yongdok-tong nuclear high explosive test facility in Kusong.

"This is less a revelation of an unknown secret and more a Rumsfeldian 'unknown known' [something everyone knew but no one officially acknowledged], now spoken aloud by the state," said Prof. Lee Byong-chul of Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies, warning that the remarks broke what he described as the "implicit rules of the Korea-U.S. alliance."

Beyond the site name itself, Chung also referenced specific technical figures — including enrichment percentages and fuel rod counts — which analysts say could enable Pyongyang to infer the precise capabilities and orbital parameters of U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

The episode has also surfaced tensions between Seoul and Washington.

But multiple sources told the JoongAng Ilbo that Gen. Brunson raised concerns with Seoul counterparts during a video conference in late March.

Roughly a week earlier, Brunson visited the Defense Ministry in person, according to PPP Rep. Sung Il-jong, chairman of the National Defense Committee.

Rep. Sung demanded that the ministry "clarify the facts" surrounding Brunson's visits, citing the dates of March 10 and 11 at a press conference on Wednesday.

Later Wednesday, PPP members of the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee held a separate press conference, calling on the Democ...

Shim Dong-kyu

The author is an executive managing director of the PB Strategy Division at Korea Investment & Securities.

In the past, asset management depended largely on the capabilities of individual private bankers serving high-net-worth clients. That model is no longer sufficient. Clients are now segmented across individuals and corporations, employees and retirees, retail investors and business owners. Investment targets have also expanded beyond cash deposits and real estate to include overseas equities, exchange-traded funds, bonds, pensions and alternative assets. Asset management is no longer about selling products, but about designing how assets are divided and connected.

This shift begins with household choices. According to the Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions in 2025, real assets still account for more than 75 percent of total holdings. Yet in managing surplus funds, financial investments now far exceed real estate. The key is not the proportion but the direction. Investors are moving from asking what to buy to considering how to allocate.

Overseas investments illustrate this gap most clearly. While individual investment in foreign stocks has surged in recent years, portfolios have become more concentrated. Capital has crossed borders, but investments remain focused on a limited number of countries and stocks. Investors speak of diversification but choose concentration. As global investment expands, this paradox becomes more pronounced. This is where financial firms are differentiated. Expanding product offerings is easy; designing asset allocation is not.

The same principle applies to tax planning and inheritance. What matters more than returns is after-tax performance and the structure of wealth transfer. Yet many assets remain tied to inefficient accounts and outdated methods. As aging accelerates and demand for business succession grows, this gap is likely to widen. Asset management does not end with investment; it is only complete when preservation and transfer are planned.

This trend is spreading beyond ultra-high-net-worth individuals to ordinary clients and corporate customers. Individuals must consider retirement and taxation together, while companies must manage idle funds alongside owner-related risks. Real estate is no exception. The issue is no longer how much to acquire, but what role it plays within an overall portfolio. Concentrated assets increase risk before generating returns.

Ultimately, competition lies not in products but in structure. The key question is not who sells more products, but who offers better asset allocation, tax strategy and succession planning. Investors have entered global markets, but their methods remain anchored in the past. Performance is shaped not by assets, but by mindset.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

Shin Kyung-rim

The author is the president of the Korean Nurses Association.

The shortage of medical personnel can no longer be explained as a simple issue of supply. At its core lies a structural pattern of abnormal work force outflow. As of 2024, more than 200,000 licensed nurses in Korea are not working in clinical settings, accounting for about 40 percent of all license holders. The issue is not a lack of trained personnel, but a system in which nurses cannot endure conditions and ultimately leave. More troubling is that even those who return to the field struggle to stay, with 52.7 percent leaving again after reemployment. This points to a structural failure in retaining experienced professionals.

Some argue that wages are the primary cause, but the data suggest otherwise. Tertiary hospitals, Korea's highest-level general hospitals, which offer some of the highest compensation in the industry, report the highest rate of repeated resignations at 55.7 percent. Nurses are leaving not because of pay, but because of excessive workloads and staffing systems that fail to support them. The persistence of high attrition even in better-paying institutions highlights that the problem is rooted in working conditions rather than financial incentives alone.

The number of patients per nurse illustrates the strain. In tertiary hospitals, each nurse is responsible for nine to 10 patients, while in general hospitals, the number often exceeds 30. By contrast, countries such as the United States and Australia legally cap this ratio at four to seven patients per nurse. This gap is not merely statistical; it marks a threshold of risk directly tied to patient safety and quality of care.

In practice, that risk is already evident. At a general hospital in the Seoul metropolitan area, two nurses working a night shift in an internal medicine ward are often responsible for nearly 40 patients. In one case, an elderly patient complained of breathing difficulties during the early morning hours. At the same time, a fall occurred in another room, delaying the response. The patient's condition worsened significantly before intensive care was initiated. The nurse later expressed regret, saying that earlier intervention might have changed the outcome; the issue was not individual error but structural constraint embedded in the system.

Conditions in intensive care units are even more precarious. At a university hospital, a nurse assigned more patients than recommended due to staffing shortages had to respond simultaneously to changes in two patients' conditions. While one patient experienced a sharp drop in blood pressure, the nurse could not immediately detect a decline in another patient's oxygen saturation. The situation escalated into a full emergency response involving the entire medical team. Such incidents are not isolated but reflect a system in which staffing standards have eroded over time.

The situation is even more severe in community nursing. About 80 percent of visiting nurses leave their positions, while nursing homes report attrition rates of around 60 percent. Many enter expecting flexible work arrangements, but instead face low reimbursement rates, irregular schedules and isolated working conditions. One visiting nurse described managing high-risk patients alone across multiple locations each day, often without adequate backup or institutional support.

Korea has already entered a super-aged society, with more than 20 percent of its population aged 65 or older as of late 2024. Sustaining the health care system through the sacrifice and dedication of skilled workers alone is neither realistic nor sustainable in the long run.

Continuing to recruit new staff without addressing this pattern of departure is akin to pouring water into a leaking bucket. The focus must shift from recruitment to retention. First, legal limits on the number of patients per nurse are urgently needed. This is not only a labor issue but a minimum standard for patien...

The author is the social news editor at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Public interest in Korea's June 3 local elections has largely disappeared. Many people are preoccupied with tracking developments in negotiations to end the Iran war overnight and watching volatile stock markets during the day. Against a backdrop of high inflation, rising unemployment and slowing growth triggered by an oil shock, it is perhaps unsurprising that voters pay little attention to local candidates they barely recognize. Some forecasts suggest turnout could fall below the 50.9 percent recorded in the 2022 local elections, the second lowest on record.

From a voter's perspective, disengagement can seem rational if the outcome appears unlikely to bring meaningful change. Instead, attention has focused on the government's 26 trillion won ($17.6 billion) supplementary budget linked to the war, including 6.1 trillion won in payments of up to 600,000 won per person to 35.77 million people affected by high oil prices. A similar dynamic was seen in 2020, when the Moon Jae-in administration announced 14.2 trillion won in emergency relief payments ahead of the general election, contributing to a landslide victory for the Democratic Party. Cash handouts risk becoming a defining feature of election strategy.

Even the Seoul mayoral race, which oversees the country's largest local budget at about 52 trillion won, has failed to generate momentum. The contest between former Seongdong District chief Chong Won-o and incumbent Mayor Oh Se-hoon was set earlier than in other major races, yet public awareness remains low. Chong, despite serving three consecutive terms over 12 years in Seongdong, is largely unknown to the broader population of 9.3 million Seoul residents. His background as a former aide to lawmaker Im Jong-seok has not translated into wider recognition, and his policy agenda remains unclear to many voters.

Oh faces his own challenges. Seeking a fourth term after a decade-long gap, he is entangled in allegations related to covering polling costs, raising legal uncertainties. Court proceedings are expected after the election, meaning that even if he wins, his tenure could be overshadowed by ongoing judicial review.

An unusual feature of this election is the prominence of party leaders over candidates. Jung Chung-rae, leader of the Democratic Party, has drawn attention by replacing all five incumbent provincial governors within his party, including those in Gyeonggi, North Jeolla, Gwangju, South Jeolla and Jeju. Many of the new candidates, such as Choo Mi-ae and Min Hyung-bae, are closely aligned with reformist factions formed during the Moon administration. The election outcome is expected to influence the party's leadership contest in August, with Jung's position likely to be strengthened.

By contrast, Jang Dong-hyeok, leader of the People Power Party, has faced criticism for a perceived leadership vacuum. His recent extended trip to the United States drew backlash as the party struggled with internal disputes over candidate nominations. Calls for his resignation have grown amid concerns about the party's direction.

With both major parties dominated by leadership struggles, voter attention has shifted to parliamentary by-elections featuring prominent figures such as Han Dong-hoon and Cho Kuk. These races, rather than local contests, have become focal points of political interest.

The likely outcome of the local elections may already be apparent, given the ruling party's strong position and fiscal support, alongside the opposition's internal difficulties. Yet the more significant issue is not which party wins or loses. The election risks reinforcing the subordination of local politics to national dynamics, reducing opportunities for new leaders focused on regional issues.

This trend could deepen existing structural challenges. Regional inequality, declining youth employment outside major cities and demographic decline may intensify. Oversight of local government...

Jang Deok-jin

The author is a professor of sociology at Seoul National University.

A case from the United States offers a useful starting point. In 1988, Stephanie Nordlinger, a California lawyer, bought her first home. The following year, she was charged $1,800 in property taxes. Yet the nearly identical house next door was taxed at just $350. The reason was California's Proposition 13, under which property taxes are based largely on a home's acquisition value, meaning its purchase price, rather than its current market value. As a result, a person who bought earlier could pay far less tax than someone who bought later, even for a similar home.

Nordlinger sued, arguing that the system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In June 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that challenge. The court held that the gap between long-time owners and recent buyers had to be tolerated because longer-term owners had a stronger "reliance interest." In legal terms, that means the law protects people who arranged their lives in reliance on an existing rule or promise.

Homeowners expect taxes to follow a home purchase, and they expect tax burdens to rise as prices increase. On that basis, families make long-term plans, from education costs to retirement. If the state suddenly imposes a much larger burden than people had reasonably expected, it can destroy those settled expectations. That was the logic behind the ruling.

The same logic matters in Korea. Korea's constitutional doctrine commonly described in English as the principle of protection of legitimate expectations rests on a similar idea: When citizens act in reliance on an existing legal framework, the state should not casually overturn that reliance. Korea's long-term holding special deduction, introduced in 1988, adjusted for inflationary housing gains so that taxes fall on real gains, discouraged short-term speculation and protected housing stability.

For nearly 40 years, households have planned on the assumption that this framework would remain in place. Now imagine abolishing that deduction. People who held property for years in reliance on the existing rules could suddenly face sharply higher capital gains taxes. Overnight, long-term owners could be treated as if they were speculative traders. If that were to happen, the issue would not be only political. It would also raise a constitutional question about whether the state had broken the trust created by its own laws.

Put simply, if the government invites citizens to plan under one set of rules and later punishes them for doing so, it damages trust in the legal order itself. That is the core objection. The point is not that every tax preference must remain untouched forever. It is that when a system has lasted for decades and shaped private decisions on housing, savings and retirement, the state must treat those expectations with care.

Even if one sets aside the constitutional issue, the practical case for abolition remains weak. People who have held homes for a long time are more likely to be older and closer to retirement, or already there. Comparative research on housing policy has often found limited social benefit in imposing heavier tax burdens on such groups. A homeowner can, if necessary, sell, downsize or rely on a reverse mortgage to finance old age.

Some scholars describe this as a "hidden welfare state," meaning a situation in which people support themselves through accumulated assets rather than direct public transfers. From that perspective, a policy that strips such households of part of that buffer may not reduce inequality in any meaningful way. It may instead weaken their ability to provide for themselves and later force the state to step in through welfare spending.

That would produce little policy gain while increasing social conflict and administrative costs. This problem is especially serious in a super-aged society. If holding a home becomes too expensive because of property-relat...

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of United States Forces Korea, said on Tuesday that political expediency should not take precedence over conditions in the planned transfer of wartime operational control (Opcon). Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Brunson described the Korean Peninsula as a critical strategic location for defending the United States and advancing U.S. interests in the region. He stressed that the process must remain condition-based, saying such an approach would make both the United States and South Korea safer.

Brunson has consistently argued that the timeline for transferring wartime control should not override necessary conditions. His remarks can be seen as a reiteration of that position, reflecting a military perspective that emphasizes security realities over political considerations.

Still, his explicit reference to "political expediency" carries weight. It may be interpreted as dissatisfaction with South Korea's push to regain wartime control. The comment comes at a sensitive time, as concerns have been raised over a possible leak related to remarks by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young about a nuclear facility in Kusong, North Korea. Friction in South Korea-U. S. coordination has also been noted in recent weeks. Statements by President Lee Jae Myung on social media that appeared to defend the minister could be viewed by U.S. officials as politically motivated.

The Lee administration has expressed a strong commitment to reclaiming wartime operational control within its term. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back has said this year would mark the starting point for the transition. As a sovereign nation, South Korea's goal of holding and exercising wartime control is understandable, and efforts toward that end are legitimate.

However, the broader security environment remains challenging. North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities while also modernizing conventional forces across land, sea and air. It has recently demonstrated cluster munitions, weapons that pose risks to civilian populations, further heightening tensions.

Security failures are often irreversible. In this context, excessive urgency may be more dangerous than caution. A clear and objective assessment of South Korea's military readiness, including its ability to deter threats and conduct operations independently, should come first.

Equally important is the state of South Korea-U. S. cooperation. Effective military operations require close coordination and mutual trust. Misunderstandings or tensions between the allies could undermine deterrence and operational effectiveness.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.