
Sign up to save your podcasts
Or


In this episode Jerry and Stably discussed Leap of Faith by Michael J. Mazarr. Mazarr, a RAND Corporation scholar, draws on every available memoir, declassified document, and interviews with senior administration officials to dissect how the United States stumbled into the Iraq War. His central argument is that there was never really a decision — the invasion happened through a process of drift, assumption, and institutional momentum, with no memo ever formally ordering it. Jerry and Stably walked through Mazarr's typology of the principals — Bush and Wolfowitz as values-driven, Cheney and Rumsfeld as power-oriented unilateralists, and Powell and Rice as multilateralists — and how their clashing psychologies at every turn undermined coherent planning. They discussed how the easy initial victory in Afghanistan gave the administration a dangerously false sense of what a small-footprint war could accomplish, Saddam's catastrophic misreading of American intentions, and the near-total absence of any post-invasion plan. The conversation turned to the eerie parallels with the current situation in Iran, and whether the lessons Mazarr draws — about American missionary zeal and intuitive, values-driven foreign policy judgment — are simply baked in.
By Jerry Brito, Stan Tsirulnikov3.8
99 ratings
In this episode Jerry and Stably discussed Leap of Faith by Michael J. Mazarr. Mazarr, a RAND Corporation scholar, draws on every available memoir, declassified document, and interviews with senior administration officials to dissect how the United States stumbled into the Iraq War. His central argument is that there was never really a decision — the invasion happened through a process of drift, assumption, and institutional momentum, with no memo ever formally ordering it. Jerry and Stably walked through Mazarr's typology of the principals — Bush and Wolfowitz as values-driven, Cheney and Rumsfeld as power-oriented unilateralists, and Powell and Rice as multilateralists — and how their clashing psychologies at every turn undermined coherent planning. They discussed how the easy initial victory in Afghanistan gave the administration a dangerously false sense of what a small-footprint war could accomplish, Saddam's catastrophic misreading of American intentions, and the near-total absence of any post-invasion plan. The conversation turned to the eerie parallels with the current situation in Iran, and whether the lessons Mazarr draws — about American missionary zeal and intuitive, values-driven foreign policy judgment — are simply baked in.

91,072 Listeners

32,037 Listeners

38,244 Listeners

43,628 Listeners

27,076 Listeners

26,294 Listeners

9,632 Listeners

12,783 Listeners

87,546 Listeners

112,263 Listeners

4,186 Listeners

5,509 Listeners

16,331 Listeners

10,862 Listeners

3,511 Listeners