Mid East Matters Online

When the civil war broke out in 1975, Lebanon was extremely polarized between Western-leaning ultra-nationalist Christians, and pro-Arab States (read: Sunni) pan-nationalist Muslims. This has changed not because of any introspection on the part of the Lebanese themselves, but because the world and Middle East have since changed for good, but not necessarily for the better.

The regional map, established mainly after World War I, is caught in a severe vortex, and the results are unpleasant. Sudan is cut in half, Iraq has effectively three rival enclaves (Shia, Sunni and Kurds), Syria will have two or more, Yemen is edging again towards a South-North divide if not a collection of regions, and the GCC is fractured because of a spat with Qatar.  Only Lebanon stands weakened, even failing, but not yet broken-up.

One hears in present day Lebanon repeated outcries against an Iranian Anschluss, specious declamations countering closer rapports with Saudi Arabia, and the usual condemnations of Israel for all evils. However, there barely are calls for an independent Marounistan or – on the opposite spectrum- for constitutional amendments to achieve a sanctimonious unity with the Arab world. Today, one can hardly imagine a declaration for Druze autonomy, styled after their modern-day role model, the Kurds. Did the old dream of breaking up Lebanon simply die?! That would be a cause for celebration, but alas the reality is that such dream has ran out of fantasy partners and of bedfellows.

The Christians are facing a post-religious West, that cares not for championing the causes of religious minorities, as was the case in the 19th and 20th centuries. Back then, Russia sided with the Greek Orthodox, Britain supported Protestant proselytizing, and France forged closer ties with the Maronites. A fork in history came up in 1982 with the failure to force a peace process onto Lebanon via the Israeli invasion, which left the Israelis completely disillusioned (not the other way around). The Israelis were shocked to learn that their staunchest ally, Bashir Gemayel, was busy working to maintain good rapports with the moderate Arabs, instead of publicly supporting their military campaign and rushing to sign a peace treaty. As it takes two to tango, the ultra-nationalist Christians were left –since 1982- without a dancing partner in the West or elsewhere, and the music suddenly stopped!

The Sunnis have given up on being the solo champions of an unconditional Arab unity. This, as with the case of the ultra-nationalist Christians, was also not the fruit of deep reflection on their part, but a re-assessment of a stark reality. In fact, their Arab world, that very same Nasserite Project of the 60s’, is after all well dead and deeply buried. Where is the Arab world that should be united? And where are the Arabs who want to be united? The Sunnis too lack a partner who is willing to nurture their fantasy dreams of a greater Arabia from the Sea of Oman to the Mediterranean Sea, with Lebanon only a small part thereof. Egypt is solely focused on its gigantic economic and security domestic problems: from curbing fanaticism, to managing the ambitions of Turkey and Iran, to handling the Gaza Strip etc. It has long lost that regional role it once assumed. All told, Egypt is in disarray, incapable of leading a Sunni majority abroad, let alone one at home. Syria is at war with itself, the Sunni-led revolt has failed and the country maybe broken up in several zones of influence, for years to come. Iraq is in the hands of Iranian puppet masters who share no common cause with the Lebanese Sunni establishment, and the GCC has always viewed them as a source of human talent not a human bridge for geopolitical claims.

The Druzes are the de facto Catalans of Lebanon minus the economic power, and with no need for an explicit vote to assert their desire for total autonomy.

Najib Mikati, former PM of Lebanon championed the cause of centrism in the fractured country of Lebanon and in the fragmented region of the Middle East. This policy –which he promoted whilst being PM in his second mandate from 2011 to 2013- was viewed with skepticism, as expected, by all factions of the political class. Centrism, what a neutral idea?! The basic principle of centrism is that extreme views lead to violent clashes from which retreat is very difficult. The idea is neither novel, nor revolutionary, but wise. And wisdom has been lacking from Lebanese politics for a while and, from the region for as long as one can remember. This policy is not about political correctness, or avoiding facing problems and critical issues but rather facing such problems with moderation, while maintaining a balancing act. Some would suggest that such policy resolves nothing but, contrasted and compared with the policy of brinkmanship that has characterized Lebanon’s modern history, it is a winning formula, not a magic one. A winning formula does not necessarily cure the ills, but prolongs the life of the patient till a cure is found or till recovery is on its way. A winning formula does not even pretend to be a 'win-win' solution, the favorite of consultants and peace makers. Until a long-lasting deal is achieved, centrism lessens the losses, cushions the blows, and limits the damages. This policy accepts all views as being legitimate, but rejects any one view to being superior or greater to another.

What centrism meant in Lebanon was to maintain an internal equilibrium between warring factions who are trigger happy and prone to use violence –whether verbal or physical- to get their views across, or worse above and beyond their opponents’.

Lebanon’s modern history is peppered with centrist politicians who have stirred the explosive-laden ship of government into safer shores. In the 1940s, Christian ultra-nationalists clamored for a closer relation with France and the West in general, and Muslim ultra-nationalists championed the cause of a Greater Syria with Lebanon just a province thereof. President El Khoury and PM El Solh stayed the difficult centrist course which gave birth to a Lebanon that is not at odds with the Arab Middle East, and that is reconciled with the rest of the world. In the mid 1950s, Christian ultra-nationalists and supporters of then President Camille Chamoun favored a NATO-like alliance with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Jordan. Muslim ultra-nationalists countered such efforts with an Arab unity with Egypt’s Nasser. Civil war ensued, and only a centrist, centralist President Shehab was capable of bringing the country together. He succeeded in building, for a while, a modern republic based on the equality of rights for all citizens. In the mid-1970s when the Christian ultra-nationalists staunchly opposed the growing danger of a militarized PLO and took arms from Israel, the Muslim ultra-nationalists sided with the PLO and took arms and funds from a wider coalition of nations who championed the cause of the PLO (not of Lebanon) including Syria, Iraq, Libya and Somalia to name just a few. That led to a civil war that lasted almost 15 years, wreaked havoc on the country, cost more than 100,000 lives, devastated the state coffers and infrastructure; and brought Lebanon to the brink of extinction.

The same re-occurred after the assassination of former PM Hariri in 2005, and Najib Mikati was called-in for a first premiership mandate, as a centrist politician who can help patch the wounds of a dying nation. Contrary to all of his predecessors, including the slain Hariri, he did not participate in the parliamentary election he was brought to monitor. In his second mandate, 2011-2013, Najib Mikati was attacked by the pro-Hariri camp and the larger March 14th Movement as a stooge of Hezbollah and its allies. Less than a year into his mandate he was equally attacked by Hezbollah and ...

Women in Saudi Arabia will be allowed to drive as of June 2018. What was regarded with disdain, irony and, almost derision by the world’s press, was hailed as a much-awaited reckoning in Saudi, as it should be. The issue is less the need for women to start practicing their ‘fast & fury’ routine on the roads and highways of Saudi, but one of individual freedom. The freedom of movement and of choice which, has started more than 50 years ago by a succession of reformist Saudi monarchs.

What kept women away from the steering wheel since the inception of Saudi Arabia was not Islam but rather a conservative, Bedouin, Arab culture that had little interactions with the outside world for centuries. Add to that, a group of firebrand scholars who interpreted the verses of the Koran with a narrow, ultra-conservative Wahhabi prism. This reclusive culture was suddenly face to face with the world preying inside its daily life due to the discovery of oil in 1938. However, why Saudi alone from all other Arab and Muslim countries applied such a ban and other similar restrictions on individuals? The answer could be found in part in the political and legal isolation that Saudi has experienced for hundreds of years. Roman legions invaded parts of the Middle East from Tunisia to Alexandria, but never set foot in the Arabian desert. The Moguls and Tatars did not attempt to conquer these sandy dunes, nor did the Crusaders maraud in such vicinity. Even the Ottoman Empire was selfishly interested in Mecca only, in order to legitimize its dubious claims to the Caliphate that was anyway exercised from distant Istanbul. After World War II, Britain and France exited from most of their colonial dominions. Again, Saudi, was never part of any colonial territory, or subject to a foreign mandate by the Society of Nations (the U.N.’s predecessor). Hence, as far as the law of the land was concerned, common law and the civil code never took roots in Saudi in parallel with Sharia law, as opposed to Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, the Levant and Maghreb. But again, Islam does not condone a ban on driving, or a veil for women for that matter, as argued ad nauseam by waves of reformist jurists such as Mohammad Abduh, Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899. So, Saudi being  politically distant from the rest of its regional environment, remained true to strict interpretation of Sharia law in a society beholden to old tribal customs, which kept women segregated.

The discovery of oil brought American oil companies, and soon the world’s flood of goods and services -from Coca Cola to Cadillacs- followed. In the early days of the kingdom, Saudi clerics who refused to use the telephone –claiming it was a Satanic instrument- were forced to do so by a reformist and charismatic leader. To make them accept this new tool of communication, King Abdul Aziz asked the caller on the other end of the phone to recite verses from the Koran. Only then, did the clerics admit its usage. Today Saudi has one of the highest per capita viewers of YouTube and mobile phone owners. Women’s education was also brought down by royal decree in the days of another reformist monarch: King Faisal who ushered the right for girls to receive education. Under Faisal’s rule, schools for girls were first opened in the kingdom in 1960. The policy was very unpopular with the clerical establishment, who believed that women should remain at home and without the benefits of any kind of formal education. Without this move education for Saudi women would not be what it is today, and the setback would have cost Saudi dearly. In 2015, women in Saudi Arabia have cast their first votes in the country's municipal elections. A total of 978 women have registered as candidates, alongside 5,938 men. This historic decision to allow women to vote was also taken via decree by a reformist King, late King Abdullah and is a key part of his legacy to the kingdom.

King Salman,

Kurdistan is about to conduct a referendum for independence on the 25th of September 2017. The Kurds who have aspired for a national home and got one for less than a year: the Republic of Mahabad between January 22 to December 15, 1946, are willing to try again. However, the world seems up in arms, conjuring every pretense and political trick to either delay, abort or annul the effects of such referendum.

Many justifications have been put forward but none are morally solid or practically convincing. The countries that host Kurds, apart from  Iraq, are Turkey, Iran and Syria. The logic goes that if the Kurds in Iraq declare an independent State, all other Kurdish minorities would follow. But that is simply untrue. To have a nation, one needs to have a well-defined territory, a majority vote by an aspiring population, sufficient resources to build and maintain a State apparatus, an army, a flag, a currency, a government, and the recognition of the U.N., among many other fundamentals. Only Kurdistan (Iraq) has such attributes. The region has been run semi-autonomously since 2003, date of the second Gulf war, has a Regional Government in Arbil that has almost nothing to do with the Central Government of Baghdad, a well-trained fighting militia (the Peshmerga), a police force capable of maintaining law and order, an airport, a flag, a production of 550,000 oil per day (as much as Oman), vast gas reserves and a pipeline that links its energy sources to the world via the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Where is the problem?

The US should not care if the Kurds of Iraq secede from Baghdad. The US’ mission is to pacify Iraq, annihilate ISIS, and bring about law and order so it can finally cut its ties and pack back home. The Kurds of Iraq have required little from the US Treasury compared to the Central Government of Baghdad. The Kurds caused no harm to the US troops, and have bravely fought on the side of the US army since the First Gulf War. Why then is the US putting pressure on the Kurds to delay or dilute the upcoming referendum? Isn’t the US all for self-determination, liberty and democracy? Isn’t the Jeffersonian republic built on people’s unbending will and unalienable right to freedom? Some hundred years ago, it is told that the Kurdish rebel leader Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji carried in his pocket a treasured document. It was a copy of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points from his 1918 speech on the Aims of War and Peace Terms. Like many minorities of the Middle East after World War I, the Kurds were truly inspired by the American’s policy of self-determination. And yet it was the US who would contribute in denying the Kurds the same right at every opportunity.

One fails to properly understand the motives of all these players against Kurdish aspirations. Not that Kurdistan will disappear from the map and relocate in Europe or the Far East. Not that Kurdistan will magically eliminate its physical borders with Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran and make do without its neighbors, or without vital trade routes linking it to cities and markets with whom it interacted since times immemorial. Not that the Kurds of Iraq with or without a referendum will forgo their language, flag, government, Peshmerga forces, oil and gas resources and their legitimate fears and anxieties of powerful armies/regimes surrounding them.

The world should take heed that these are the same Kurds who were abandoned in 1972, by the Shah of Iran and the US after being used and exploited against Saddam and his Soviet masters. These are the same Kurds who encouraged by the US, rose up against Saddam towards the end of the First Gulf War. Saddam sent in the army and slaughtered thousands of villagers. More than 1.5 million Kurds fled through the mountains to Turkey. American troops and arms never materialized. In 2003, these same Kurds fought side-by-side with US troops against the butcher of Baghdad and in 2014,

ISIS is on the run in Iraq and in Syria. Libya’s ISIS cohorts are somewhat contained, for the time being. However, the morning after is coming, and very soon. What happens after ISIS is defeated? For the several players in the military theater of the Middle East the roles will shift in a dramatic way, but the horror play will not end anytime soon. The freak show will continue with more bloodshed and a greater risk of war.

From ISIS’ standpoint, the end of the geographical caliphate, that swath of land cut out from the deserts and cities of both Iraq and Syria, will usher the continuum of a virtual caliphate that spreads from Montreal to Mosul and from Raqqa to Riga. ISIS thrives in the literature of martyrdom, of having lost ‘one battle but not the war’, and of portraying the coalition against it as modern-day band of infidel crusaders. The genie is out of the bottle, and the fanatical thoughts and heinous philosophy of waging war against all infidels (as defined by ISIS alone) is a millennial design, and a perpetual effort.  So what if Mosul has fallen and Raqqa is next? The destructive zeal and killing fervor will remain ignited in the hearts of thousands of fanatics, of ignorant, and of lone and banded wolves across the globe. ISIS has gained center stage in the eyes of its terrorist fans and the battle for winning their hearts and minds is complete. The loss of a sanctuary will only make its overt actions go covert. The absence of a dominion has never stopped evil ideas from traveling. Nazism still survives more than 50 years after the surrender of Berlin. The KKK and other supremacist groups have outlived the defeat of the Confederacy. The difference in this instance is that ISIS has a wider audience, willing homegrown suicide bombers in every country on the planet, and Internet, Facebook and Twitter to boost its message.

As for Iran, and its proxies, they truly believe that by fighting ISIS –the other face of a religiously inspired terrorism which they themselves embody- they are hiding the ugly truth about their own discriminating, factional and divisive form of insurgencies that run from Iraq, to Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Defeating ISIS presents many benefits for Iran and its cohorts: eliminating a Sunni competitor, scaring the moderate Arab regimes into political submission, and sending a message to the West (the US in particular) that Iran is the only force capable of defeating radical Islamic terrorism and of guaranteeing stability in the Middle East. However, what escapes the simple minds of the Iranian leadership is that Iran is viewed, with or without ISIS, as the real State-sponsor of terrorism in the region (if not the world) since the Islamic revolution of 1978. No matter what Iran does or pretends to do, this very fact, this harsh reality will be difficult to erase. In the late 70s and early 80s, the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran, the bombing of the US Marines Barracks in Beirut, of the US Embassy in Beirut and the kidnapping of US and Western diplomats in Lebanon, were only the early part of this sad series of terrorist acts. In the 1990s there were the bombings of the Marines barracks in Khobar and of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Cultural Center in Argentina. More recently, the meddling in the internal affairs of Bahrain, the direct and indirect engagement in combat in Syria along the troops of Assad, and the overt support of the Houthis rebels in Yemen are yet another wave of destabilization that Iran has waged against its neighbors. And, not to put a finer point on it, the mere threat of becoming one armed nuclear nation who has –on more than one occasion- threatened to use such nuclear capability against its avowed enemies, will not transform Iran from a Rogue State into a Rational State by simply joining the fray of routing out ISIS.

For the US-led coalition and their Arab allies, the end of ISIS will bring back to the fore the issue...

The Middle East region, and the Arab world in particular, is way behind on the economic curve of progress and is settling nicely into the backseat of globalization. On the world stage (and at WEF gatherings) the region’s grandees talk a big talk but walk in midget steps. To put things into perspective, the total market capitalization of Alphabet Inc. (formerly Google) is circa $659.2bln whereas the total market cap of the Saudi stock market stands at circa $431bln.

The erstwhile oil-rich Middle East is running out of options and out of revenue sources. Oil has been trading at below $50 for a good part of 2017, and no cuts –whether actual or threatened- have made a dent in such price. OPEC no longer carries the weight it used to, and the US shale gas revolution was hardly stopped by the concerted efforts of the world’s oil exporters. Add to that, the alternative energy resources (solar, wind, water) and the ultimate energy source (civilian nuclear power), and oil becomes an affordable commodity, not the ‘black gold’ it used to be.

On industrial output, the entire Arab region trails by far each of the Asian, European, and North American economic blocs. There are no industries germane to this region, except fossil fuels. Absolutely none. We know what the region imports and consumes by the tons, but what does it produce? What does the region create, patent, export, sell, or offer in an ever-globalized world? These are legitimate questions yet they are seldom posed with seriousness by any civil servant or business leader, including at the WEF closed-door meetings.

What went wrong? The answer is not straightforward, but few threads could be assembled to weave a plausible and almost convincing reply. Surely, one cannot blame the woes of the Middle East region on the desert’s weather. There are warmer spots in the world. One could not simply accuse the authoritarian nature of the prevailing regimes in Arabia. China and Taiwan are no democracies, and still they enjoy commercial success beyond norms. Could outdated traditions and customs or strict religious dogmas, be the reasons for such poor state of affairs? No. India, a role model for emerging markets, is riddled with communal taboos, religious discrimination, cast systems, and more modern-slaves (sexual, domestic, child labor) than the population of the Netherlands. Even Israel which has, on a pro rata basis, as many religious zealots as Saudi Arabia and where ‘God, Country and Army’ remains a strong trilogy, was not hindered in its quest to become a true Start-Up nation. Could it be geography?  History? What else can one conjure up in justifications or excuses for the failure of the Middle East to emerge from its stupor?

We posit that the failure of the region to join the road to modernity is the lack of true leadership (not dictatorship – there is plenty of that). Leadership does not necessarily spring from the womb of liberty or democracy or modernity. Ancient, past and recent histories are riddled with authoritarian leaders who overstepped rules and challenged the status quo from Caesar, to Robespierre, and from John Adams to FDR. Few were true consensus builders or overly democratic in all of their actions. However, they have pursued noble ideals and higher motives.

Political leadership stems from a sense of greater purpose, not entitlement. Such leadership reposes on the pedestal of far-reaching goals, not short-term gains. Few examples in the recent past of Arabia could be inspirational for the young generation of leaders, which is emerging.

Ibn Saud, founded modern Saudi Arabia with a greater sense of purpose, a sword, and a countrywide mission, way before oil was discovered. Sheik Zayed, the founder of the U.A.E. had a grand vision for his tiny country that transcended tribal rivalries and disputed territory. In the early part of the 20th century the founding fathers of young republics su...

After Mosul, Raqqa will fall surely and with it many other pockets of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This is a blessed piece of good news for the Middle East region that has been under a black cloud of terror and horror since the city of Mosul was first invaded almost 3 years ago day-for-day, by the hordes of Islamic radicals brandishing their black flags and black beards and destroying all signs of civility and civilization in a war-torn Iraq.

We will hear countless tails of heroism by the Shia militias and Iran for a battle that was truly won by the Iraqi Army, supported by US air and superior firepower, and assisted by the Kurds. But in the Middle East, like sometimes on Wall Street, those who rush to claim credit for a deal on which they have labored albeit marginally, tend to cling on to the idea, and spread it too, that they were the true fathers of such success. However, the ‘bonus pool’ so to speak in 2017 Iraq might be differently allocated now that a Trump administration is in place, and with it, an assertive Iraqi Prime Minister who revels in an image of a national (not only Shia) leader, and who is not –so far- branded as an Iranian puppet. Let’s hope he lasts that way.

What may be different this time around from the disastrous and failed policies of the Obama admiration is the so-called gang of ‘adults’ of the Trump administration. The new National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. HR McMaster has actually fought in Iraq and is an expert in counter-insurgency. He is also very wary of the expansionist drive of Iran in Middle Eastern affairs and especially in Iraq. In a WJS article, Lt. Gen. McMaster was critical of the roles of Russia and Iran. He is expected to be more surgical than tactical in his advice to the President on how to solidify the Iraqi Army, unify the country and tribal structures, and eliminate any loopholes that could give Iran a false sense of victory. Lt. Gen MacMaster, at a talk delivered at Policy Exchange earlier in the year, emphasized the ‘forward positioning of forces’ because ‘deterrence by denial is what is effective’. Someone should translate that in Farsi ASAP. The Secretary of Defense John Mattis’ animosity towards Iran is so intense that it led former Pres. Obama to replace him from Centcom. He is a Marine, and as it has been said in many circles, the US Marines are the closest thing to a military tribe. The Marines –and Mattis chief among them- holds a grudge against Iran since the bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Beirut in 1983. In 2012, he repeated that the three greatest threats facing the US were ‘Iran, Iran, and Iran’. Quite an obsession some would say, others would argue for a legitimate enmity. Mattis has linked Iran to the rise of ISIS. “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” he said. “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS; they have a lot to gain from the turmoil that ISIS creates.”  To make my point shorter and crispier when evoking the third adult in the current administration, Secretary Tillerson, when responding to a question from a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee about the U.S. position regarding regime change in Iran, said, “Our policy towards Iran is to push back on [its regional] hegemony, contain their ability to develop, obviously, nuclear weapons and to work towards support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government.”

Could such collective thinking  form the future US policy in the Middle East especially as it relates to ISIS and Iran? Time will tell, but one should remain hopeful that it will.

Raqqa will fall next, and as a result, ISIS will be denied a physical territory of its own. That is ‘actual’ ISIS whereas ‘virtual’ ISIS, the one that lives in the hearts and minds of thousands of followers, those sleeper and non-sleeper cells, in the Middle East, Europe, North America, Asia and elsewhere,

NATO was established in 1949, in the aftermath of WWII and has regrouped the post-war exhausted Western nations of Europe with the mighty U.S. The prospects of further communist expansion on the continent prompted these nations to form the alliance. Despite the ‘obsolescence’ jibe of Pres. Trump, NATO has played a pivotal role in deterring further Russian expansion, comforting allies, and strengthening ties between European nations who were previously at war (UK-France-Germany).

Fast forward to 2017, and a nuclear-armed Iran poses the largest threat ever encountered by the Arab world, including the Arabs’ arch-nemesis Israel. Iran is a regional superpower that has engaged in a protracted conventional war against an Arab nation to wit, Iraq (1980 to 1988), exported its guerilla warfare via proxy militias to Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; and threatens to destabilize the Arab established order (code: for Sunni nations). To thwart Iran’s relentless attempts at expanding its regional hegemony, some Arab nations ought to seriously consider forming a NATO-styled alliance. The Peninsula Shield Force, the military arm of the GCC, is effectively –for a lack of a better word- obsolete.

Forming a regional NATO-styled alliance is not a novel idea, but a timely one. Why not novel? Because, sixty years ago, in 1957, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East was a first attempt by a bold US administration to contain an assertive brand of Arab nationalism led by Nasser of Egypt. Nasser’s belligerent policies were directed at the former colonial powers (Britain & France) and their so-called 'implant' in the region (Israel), as well as, towards the moderate Arabs (Saudi). Arab nationalism had reached a new fervor after the 1957 tripartite attack by France, Britain and Israel on the Suez Canal. Nasser’s propaganda machine against Israel resembled to a large extent the vitriolic recitals of Iran’s theocratic leaders targeting the US and Israel, and more recently, Saudi. In 1957, there emerged a ‘royal axis’ regrouping the kingdoms of Saudi, Jordan, and Baghdad, with the Eisenhower Doctrine attracting  additional Arab and non-Arab nations. The non-Arab countries included such heavyweights as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. All found in the new world order led by the US a better orientation for their foreign relations, rather than the bombastic politics of Nasser and his chauvinist, zealot followers.

This idea of military alliance is worth reviving, with few exceptions and some noteworthy replacements. Iran being the target of this containment policy could not be part, this time around, of such alliance. Maybe this possibility could be revived after the Iranian youths topple the corrupt and out-of-touch regime. This revived alliance, if it sees the day, will find a strong backing by the US, Britain and France, and would have to include at inception Saudi, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan Egypt, and Morocco. Saudi and the UAE would bring advanced weapons’ systems, modern infrastructure (ports & airports), and funds. As a cherry on top, Bahrain being host to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet would add depth to maritime warfare capabilities. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco would bring demographics and hardened fighting experiences both in conventional and unconventional warfare.

Who else could join this posse? Qatar would be a ‘natural’ partner in such alliance, if and only if, the current dispute with its neighbors is quickly and efficiently resolved. Such addition could bring the host nation of a most advanced US Airbase. Few exceptions would have to be allowed. Kuwait and Oman would initially steer away from such alliance for separate reasons. Kuwait is still living the ‘national trauma’ of the first Gulf war and is struggling to free itself from the ghosts of another invasion by Iraq, Iran or whomever. Whilst more likely to contribute funds to such alliance,

The Ottoman Arab provinces were carefully divided by the Western Allies (read France and Great Britain) in 1916 according to the secret Asia Minor Agreement, more known as the “Sykes-Picot Accord”. Much has been written about this infamous deal which allocated areas of influence to Great Britain and France over dominions of the failing Ottoman Empire. However, post-world war II brought another refinement to this settlement by segregating these dominions into Arab and non-Arab groups. Iran, Turkey and Israel were built up as the linchpin of the post-world war II alliance, whereas the Arab nations were caught in the middle of this triangle. Teheran, Istanbul and Jerusalem are the capitals of the Persian, Turkic, and Hebrew ‘tribes’ whose reliance on the West and vice versa brought an era of stability into the turbulent Arab ‘tribal’ mess. Nasser of Egypt became in the mid 1950s a serious check to British power and had to be chastised after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, by a tripartite attack in 1957 led by no else than Israel, France and Great Britain. The Turkish strait crisis, a Cold War era territorial dispute between Turkey and the USSR, drew Turkey ever closer to the Western alliance, ultimately becoming a member of NATO. Finally, and until his ouster by the Islamic Revolution, the Shah of Iran was a close, if not the closest, ally of the Western Alliance in Asia Minor. He maintained a strategic relationship with the US, both regimes sharing a fear of/opposition to the expansion of the USSR , Iran's powerful northern neighbor.

 

The ‘tribes with flags’ of the Arab world were never treated with the same importance or deference by the British and French, and later by the US, as did the non-Arab entities of the Middle East. Judged unruly, sometimes untrustworthy, and lacking a military back-bone (save Egypt whose military was decimated in its successive wars with Israel), these Arab flailing nations presented the Western Alliance with little advantages apart from oil. However, when oil was nationalized in Libya, Iraq and Saudi this last piece of interest dwindled even further.

 

Fast-forward to present day. Turkey is a wavering NATO ally that attacks German and Dutch politicians and is bent on flirting with Russia. Iran’s staunch anti-US, Mullah-dominated regime, is fighting alongside Russian forces in Syria and is threatening the GCC nations. Israel is governed by an ultra-right, ultra-orthodox, ultra-everything government that sees no end to the Palestinian crisis except the end of the Palestinians. Furthermore, its repeated air strikes against Hezbollah missiles’ stockpile in Syria are closely coordinated with Russia. This renders the triangular nations of Iran, Turkey and Israel, either mortal enemies (such as Iran) or untrusted allies (as in the case of Turkey) or unsettled friends (Israel) of the US.

 

But what about the Arab nations? The GCC + Egypt, Jordan and Morocco form today the bulwark against Iranian ambitions and Turkish interferences into the matters of the Middle East. Israel, remains a separate case to be dealt with through the US and not in spite of it. Therefore, the Sunni Monarchies (as we posit that Gen. Sisi in Egypt is a virtual monarch) have appealed to the US and presented their case for a renewed partnership. Some critics have mocked this as a ‘coalition of the billing’ not ‘of the willing’, a jibe to the multi-billion dollar pledges that Pres. Trump has secured from Saudi alone. However, after being shaken to the core by the Obama’s administration pivot towards Iran and in favor of the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt and Turkey, these Sunni Monarchies have no reason and probably no option, but to throw their lot with the current US administration.

 

Iran is encircling the Arabs in the Gulf from Yemen to Bahrain, and is fighting fiercely in Iraq and Syria whilst taking ...

One God: for all the Abrahamic religions, One City: Jerusalem, and One Jurisdiction: Israel. What’s wrong with this picture? Nothing. All the Catholics of the world visit the eternal city of Rome where –apart from the symbolic Swiss guards- it is the Italian government, its armed forces and its laws that prevail at the doorsteps of this tiny walled square mile. All the Muslims of the world (Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and other branches) visit Mecca where Saudi authorities provide security, transport, food, lodging and support services to pilgrims. All religious sites happen to be –in our modern world- in the midst or on the outskirts of, urban centers or cities, that are necessarily part of a State with defined borders. All sites are subject to the jurisdiction and authority of one government, not two and surely not three. God has no government and no armies, and to my knowledge, no embassy or sole representatives on Planet Earth. Thus, no religion can claim that God has availed it with the keys to a city or with the access code to its shrines, temples and places of worship.

 

The other reality is that states have governments and local authorities that manage the implementation of law and order over all the parts of a city, any city, from Mecca to Jerusalem. In that regard, religious groups should visit their places of worship without hindrance. In that same vein, no government should block access to a holy place, or discriminate, or cherry-pick visitors on the basis of race, creed or religion. Logic follows that any visitor who would run afoul of prevailing laws and order should be ejected permanently from re-entering a holy site.

 

“Jerusalem is the holy city," writes Simon Sebag Montefiore, "yet it has always been . . . the cosmopolitan home of many sects, each of which believes the city belongs to them alone." Jew, Christian and Muslim alike feel compelled to rewrite its history to sustain their own myths. "A hundred patients a year," Montefiore notes, "are committed to the city's asylum suffering from the Jerusalem syndrome, a madness of anticipation, disappointment and delusion."

 

Jerusalem, in particular, happens to be crowded with shrines and overlapping with religious sites. As such it offers a more complex challenge for managing its holy sites, but not an unsurmountable obstacle. It is indeed mission difficult, but not mission impossible. Other places have managed throughout history as millions of tourists from all religions visit the Blue Mosque in Turkey, and the Chapel Sistine of the Vatican, and even the Wailing Wall of Jerusalem.

 

The Blue Mosque in Turkey, Hagia Sophia was not always a Mosque but rather a Greek Christian Orthodox patriarchal basilica built under the orders of Justinian between in 532/537AD. in 1453, Constantinople was conquered by the Ottoman Empire under Mehmed the Conqueror, who ordered this main church of Orthodox Christianity converted into a mosque. Hagia Sophia was, as of 2014, the second-most visited museum in Turkey, attracting almost 3.3 million visitors annually. According to data released by the Turkish Culture and Tourism Ministry, Hagia Sophia was Turkey’s most visited tourist attraction in 2015.

 

The Mosque–Cathedral of Córdoba whose ecclesiastical name is the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Assumption is the Catholic cathedral of the Diocese of Córdoba dedicated to the Assumption of the Virgin...