The
title is long and lays out the case before the readers as it prematurely reveals
the verdict of the writer. Let us not beat around the bushes and call a spade a
spade. US diplomacy in the Middle East has historically been wobbly and fretted
with more defeats and disappointments than successes, at the exception of the
peace treaties between Egypt, Jordan and, Israel. Before and after such milestones,
US diplomacy has been hovering between standoffs, tensions and the occasional
wars at great losses in treasure and lives.
Letting-down allies and rewarding foes, is how a cynical person would characterize, or caricature, the US diplomatic record in many nations between the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. Each administration dispatches its ‘newly minted’ team with no collective memory or consistent script except for undoing the job of the previous one. A kind of blood sport in Washington that has seen policies folded in great pomp and unfold in greater hurry, all in the space of 4, sometimes 8 years. Unlike their counterparts from the former colonial powers of Great Britain and France, US ambassadors and political advisers who roam the Middle East give the impression that they are visiting for the first time, or maybe the second. They look bewildered by the beauty of the place, the abundance of its resources and; the rich and diverse culture of its people. While the beauty of the place is exaggerated (save Oman, Morocco, and Mount Lebanon), and the richness of resources overplayed (compared with the dearth of modern-day innovations), it is the cultural part that puzzles the most. The next appointed US diplomat, or visiting Senator (during a recess period), or former President (and wife) seeking a pledge for a foundation, need not screen a ton of data to understand what motivates people in the Middle East. Watching ‘Laurence of Arabia’ directed by David Lean, reading ‘The Dream Palace of the Arabs’ written by Fouad Ajami, and listening to hours of Egyptian comedy by Adel Imam, would permit them to capture Arab culture, in a week. Reviewing US policy papers for background, is counter-productive. Any diplomatic issue, from the crisis of the Western Sahara, to the Arab Israeli conflict, to how best to deal (if at all) with the Kurds, has its counter-policy paper and counter-papers, sometimes drafted by the same US administration, albeit at different presidential terms.
The
US backed the Shah till his fall and welcomed the Iranian Revolution upon its
advent, only to be faced with the takeover of its Embassy in Teheran for 444
days. Since, it has been downhill. The US sided with Gamal Abdel Nasser against
Britain and France during the Suez crisis of 1956, only to do an about face and
back Israel in the 1967, and 1973 wars against Egypt. The PLO was a terrorist
organization in the 1970s-1980s, that turned into a peace partner in the
1990s-2000s, then into a foe at present time. The US was with Mubarak till its fall
from grace, then with Morsi till the coup, then with SiSi ever since. Libya
under Kaddafi was a pariah State responsible for such atrocities as the downing
of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, till it morphed into the darling of roving
diplomats and private equity tycoons, till it was no more again during the Arab
Spring. What lessons have been drawn?
Maybe being gullible about wooing avowed foes who declare explicitly that they
want to destroy the US is not such a good policy after all. Or, favoring long-term
allies who share fundamental interests (not opportunistic ones) despite their dubious
domestic records is not such a bad idea, when contrasted with chaos and the
loss of a valuable friendly nation?
There
is no method to this chaos except for the US diplomati...