By David Stockman at Brownstone dot org.

It was pretty obvious even before February 28th that the US economy was grinding to a halt, even as inflation was already working up a head of steam. But then came war.

We are going to get a globe-shaking economic conflagration erupting from the void that was the Persian Gulf commodity fountain. That includes between 20% and 50% of all the basic commodities that drive global GDP, including crude oil, LPGs, LNG, ammonia, urea, sulfur, helium, and sundry more.

Accordingly, the global share of crucial industrial commodities that now stand in harm's way. This includes both those directly transiting the Strait of Hormuz and also the share of supply from the wider Middle Eastern region that is also exposed to the current Iranian War disruptions but is delivered by pipeline, train, or alternative waterways like the Red Sea/Suez Canal route.

This ballooning dislocation of daily global commodity flows will have a double whammy effect: It will both cause production and output to fall immediately in response to soaring input costs or limited availability—even as it encourages the central banks to "help" by printing more inflationary money.

This all adds up to a bout of classic stagflation, but it is not going to be merely the mildly painful type that unfolded during the 1970s. After all, despite a 120% rise in the price level during the decade, it wasn't a total wipeout when measured from the vantage point of real median family income.

As it happened, the 1970s stagflation came on the heels of what had been an actual Golden Age by the standards of history between 1954 and 1969. During that period, real median family incomes rose from $39,700 to $66,870 or by a robust 3.53% per annum.

Of course, that uphill march of Main Street prosperity slowed sharply during the inflationary 1970s, but the blue line in the chart below did at least keep drifting higher. So between 1969 and 1980, real median family incomes grew by a not very impressive 0.61% per annum, but the direction of travel was still higher.

But here's the thing. The US economy of the 1970s was able to cope with the pressures of high inflation, oil, and other commodity shocks and the stop-and-go disruptions of a Federal Reserve that had been newly released from the disciplinary effects of the Bretton Woods gold standard. In large part that was because the aggregate level of debt on the US economy was relatively modest.

Total public and private debt in 1970 stood at $1.5 trillion, representing just 147% of GDP, as shown in the graph below. Moreover, the latter was the long-time national leverage ratio (total debt divided by national income) through historic times of thick and thin, going all the way back to 1870.

Moreover, even after the large government deficits of the 1970s and a surge of inflation-driven private borrowing during the decade, total US debt stood at $4.6 trillion by 1980. That was just 162% of GDP.

In a word, the US economy during this decade of stagflation was battered by unprecedented peacetime inflation, but it was not yet smothered by crushing debt. As shown by the graph, the soaring national leverage ratio did not really leap skyward until after the mid-1980s, when Alan Greenspan took the helm at the Fed and launched the US (and the world) into a four-decade spree of money-printing and what amounts to Keynesian central banking.

As a consequence, total public and private debt is in a wholly different zip code today. Debt outstanding now totals nearly $108 trillion and weighs in at 343% of national income (GDP). That is to say, as we head into the next stagflationary era, the US economy will be carrying two turns of extra debt relative to income than was the case in 1970.

That does make a difference. The national leverage ratio during the 1970s averaged about 153% of GDP, meaning that had it been maintained since then total debt outstanding would now be $48 trillion. As it is, however, the actual leverage ratio currentl...