Hemlock #39
Nuclear war, and nuclear risk, are still just as real and just as close as they have been during the tensest eras of the Cold War. I had questions about where suspected nuclear flashpoints were forming - in South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, and Iran - and wanted to review Trump's record of militarizing outer space, resuming nuclear testing, pre-emptively attacking Iran's nuclear reactor sites, and spending billions in a never-ending American quest for "Star Wars" or missile defense (in this latest iteration: not Reagan's SDI, but rather The Golden Dome). Which is why I invited Jack on the show.
Jack Kennedy is the nuclear risk editorial fellow for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. His research focuses include strategic stability under conditions of multipolarity, extended deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. He previously worked at the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, and as a journalist. He holds a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
You can read Jack's very insightful article Washington's neglect of South Korea's security concerns is a proliferation problem here. We had a wide-ranging and largely in-tune conversation about horizontal proliferation, nuclear latency, real policy wonk shit like specific treaties, and dug into the nuclear histories of the US, Iraq, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea.
All this to say: this is how you don't blow up the world.
References:
1981 Iraqi Osirak Reactor Bombing (Operation Opera)
Seymour Hersh Article about Iran's Nuclear Reactor Strike:
I sort-of misremembered this article - estimates vary on how much the US strike set back the program. I said 'sixty days' which I heard somewhere but can't recall. Sy Hersh suggests 'years' but others imagine less, given that the centrifuges were likely not destroyed but merely buried. The size of the setback is ultimately immaterial to the point being made, a question of tactics. The principle of the strike itself was what made the situation dangerous and destabilizing and ultimately unworkable.
https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/was-it-obliteration?utm_source=publication-search
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By William Engels
4.8
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Hemlock #39
Nuclear war, and nuclear risk, are still just as real and just as close as they have been during the tensest eras of the Cold War. I had questions about where suspected nuclear flashpoints were forming - in South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan, and Iran - and wanted to review Trump's record of militarizing outer space, resuming nuclear testing, pre-emptively attacking Iran's nuclear reactor sites, and spending billions in a never-ending American quest for "Star Wars" or missile defense (in this latest iteration: not Reagan's SDI, but rather The Golden Dome). Which is why I invited Jack on the show.
Jack Kennedy is the nuclear risk editorial fellow for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. His research focuses include strategic stability under conditions of multipolarity, extended deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. He previously worked at the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, and as a journalist. He holds a master’s degree from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
You can read Jack's very insightful article Washington's neglect of South Korea's security concerns is a proliferation problem here. We had a wide-ranging and largely in-tune conversation about horizontal proliferation, nuclear latency, real policy wonk shit like specific treaties, and dug into the nuclear histories of the US, Iraq, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea.
All this to say: this is how you don't blow up the world.
References:
1981 Iraqi Osirak Reactor Bombing (Operation Opera)
Seymour Hersh Article about Iran's Nuclear Reactor Strike:
I sort-of misremembered this article - estimates vary on how much the US strike set back the program. I said 'sixty days' which I heard somewhere but can't recall. Sy Hersh suggests 'years' but others imagine less, given that the centrifuges were likely not destroyed but merely buried. The size of the setback is ultimately immaterial to the point being made, a question of tactics. The principle of the strike itself was what made the situation dangerous and destabilizing and ultimately unworkable.
https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/was-it-obliteration?utm_source=publication-search
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