Paul Krugman Podcast

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TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with David Nir and G. Elliott Morris

(recorded 10/1/26)

Paul Krugman: Like almost everybody I know, I spend about 17 hours a day thinking about the midterms, and I’ve got G. Elliott Morris and David Nir from Strength in Numbers and The Downballot here to talk to me about: What do we know? What’s going to happen? What are the indicators? And then maybe some broader issues about what the heck we think is going on in U.S. politics. So, hi, guys. Welcome.

Elliott Morris: Hey, thanks, Paul.

David Nir: Paul, it’s a pleasure.

Krugman: So, yeah, as we record this, I guess it’s one month and two days before the midterms, and if I believe you guys, the polling and other indicators, which David will talk about, seem to be almost kind of shocking right now. Elliott, I just looked at your Fifty Plus One post, and I believe you now have 99% odds of Democrats controlling the House.

Morris: Yeah, well, it’s October, Paul. So we’re in what I consider spooky probability territory. 99% is when you start to go, “I hope these models are parameterized correctly.” Look, the way to unpack this: Our model at 50 Plus One shows a 99% chance that the Democrats will win 218 seats or more. 99% seems very large. As the forecaster, I don’t want to be wrong on the 99, but it makes sense when you look at the numbers on paper.

So, let’s take 2018 as a comparison case. That’s when Democrats won 235 seats in the House. That year, the generic ballot—which is a question that asks people how they will vote in their local congressional district, for which party they will vote—that has Democrats up somewhere between 8 and 9 points. Democrats won in 2018, leading the polls by about 8 or 9 points. They actually won the House popular vote by seven and a half points or so, if you account for some weirdness with, like, uncontested seats. So we are in a more favorable environment, if the polls are right, than 2018. And we also have a lot of other district-level indicators pointing the same way.

Krugman: But, I mean, the gerrymandering was fairly extreme before this, and if we go back to the beginning of this year, it was looking a little iffy, if I recall.

Morris: Yeah. So gerrymandering seems to have shifted maybe a handful of seats at most to the Republicans, accounting for some pretty rosy polling, for example, in South Texas and in Florida for the Democrats, where there’s been a larger shift than the national shift, which is about 10 or 11 percentage points. So if we are around eight points, our model says Democrats need to win the House popular vote by about three and a half points. So there’s room for the polls to be wrong by about five.

The average expected error for the polls at this point, 30 days before the election, is about three and a half percentage points. So we’re looking at a larger-than-average error in the polls. And then if you account for other indicators, district-level surveys, the race raters like we do, that’s how we get up to that 99. But yeah, I acknowledge this is a very, very large probability.

Nir: And Paul, just to address your point about the gerrymandering, which did heavily favor the GOP, it’s important to remember that Republicans were not doing that from a position of strength. They were doing it from a position of weakness, precisely because they knew that they were facing a very difficult midterm election. And they definitely—I can say this with certainty—definitely will not pick up, they will not flip, all of the seats that they targeted in Texas and Florida and elsewhere. And that has a lot to do with the quality of candidate recruitment on both sides.

And also, in particular in Texas and Florida as well, has a lot to do with Latino voters moving back against Trump after moving heavily for him in 2024. So, 2024 in a lot of ways was a high watermark. And so when you’re looking at how Trump performed in these districts two years ago, in a lot of cases, expect really a lot of fallback for the GOP.

Krugman: Tell me if I’m being underinformed here, but my understanding is that the gerrymandering was based, at least partially, on the assumption that the Hispanic shift towards Trump that took place in ‘24 was an enduring feature of the landscape, and that it all kind of goes wrong if, as now appears to be the case, it’s not enduring. Right?

Nir: That’s definitely what it appears to be. Because if you look at these redrawn districts, and instead of looking at how they went in 2024, if you go back a few years earlier and look at how they performed in 2020, when Joe Biden did much better with Latino voters than Kamala Harris did in many parts of the country, they show a much more competitive picture. And so you have Republicans talking about, you know, “Oh, these districts are Trump plus five, Trump plus ten, Trump plus 15.” But that’s 2024. You dial back to 2020, and suddenly we’re talking about districts that Joe Biden won, that Democrats have a real chance of holding on to in 2026.

Krugman: Okay. And I want to talk about other indicators, and polling in general. But just a question about the Senate: So now, we’re up into the 70s again for the Senate, right? And that’s a lot less. I mean, the Senate is sort of inherently gerrymandered. States that have about the population of some neighborhoods in the Bronx have as many seats as California. So, yeah. But that’s also looking pretty strong, right?

Morris: Well, speaking of state gerrymandering, don’t get me started about the drawing of the state border of Nevada. I mean, that was a gerrymander, right? So, look, the Democrats have 47 seats right now. They need 51 to have a majority and to overcome JD Vance’s tiebreaker as president of the Senate. So they need four pickups. They look likely, according to our model, to get a pickup in North Carolina, where the former governor, Roy Cooper, is running against the current chair of the Republican National Committee. So that’s what’s on my mind.

They look then likely as well to somewhere between a sort of toss-up and a lean Democratic seat in Texas and Ohio, where Democrats have got some good recruits in James Talarico and Sherrod Brown, a former incumbent senator of Ohio. And I should say Democrats are also very likely to hold on to their seat in Georgia, just for what it’s worth. And then we get into the seats that are, like, a lot, a lot tighter. That’s Iowa, currently Republican-held, but where the Democrat, Josh Turek, is leading the polls; Maine, where the polls were somewhat, you know, incredibly wrong in 2020, showing Susan Collins losing to—

Nir: Sarah Gideon.

Morris: See, this is why we do it together, Paul, right?

Krugman: Yeah, I know, it’s okay.

Morris: And then there’s Michigan, which seems like it should be a Democratic win in an environment where Democrats are ahead by eight points on the generic ballot. But the race is surprisingly close between Abdul El-Sayed and Mike Rogers. And there’s like a bunch of other reach seats that might be competitive. We can talk about Kansas, where Democrats currently have a polling deficit of under half a point in Kansas. Like, what’s the matter with Kansas?

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, objectively, Trump policies, especially a war that’s driven up diesel prices and fertilizer prices and all of that, has been really pretty bad for farm country. But I don’t know to what extent we’re seeing that, to what extent we’re just seeing really just bad Republican recruitment or just general Trump fatigue.

Morris: I’ll say one thing about the numbers and then hand it over to David. But the other Plains states—Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas are the ones I’m thinking of—are all much more competitive than you would expect, given the fact that Donald Trump won these places by, you know, between 10 and 28 percentage points. I think in the case of Nebraska, if I’m remembering correctly. These are all within a point or so in the polls today, and back in 2025, when I was looking at Trump’s approval rating and all of the polling we do at Strength in Numbers.

So these are individual interviews from these Plains states. Donald Trump was also much less popular than you would expect, given his margins, and deportations and, and tariffs especially were very unpopular, or even more unpopular than Trump overall in these places. So, I think you’ve triangulated maybe there’s more economic pain in these places. Donald Trump has certainly very publicly pushed for these policies. So I can imagine voters are putting more blame on him directly because of the press conferences for tariffs in the early part of last year.

Nir: And Paul, I would say you’re exactly right to bring up diesel prices, because as bad as gas prices have gotten, you know, diesel has gotten much more expensive. And an attack on diesel prices is almost perfectly an attack on Trump’s base, because diesel is what’s used to carry goods in these Plains states that Elliott is talking about. It’s so important to the agricultural world, and Trump is really assaulting his own most loyal voters as hard as possible.

But it’s not just on that front, as Elliott said. You know, Republicans are upset about the stepped-up ICE raids in Kansas affecting the cattle industry. And so I think it’s just so many factors all combined together. You probably can’t pull just one out of them. And I think that they combine to make a lot of people feel like they’re just not being heard in general at all.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, it’s one of those things where, for once, being an effete, liberal northeasterner makes me understate the amount of trouble that Trump is in, connected to diesel, because there’s not a whole lot of people driving tractors down the New Jersey Turnpike.

Nir: Not usually.

Krugman: But yeah, it’s actually kind of shocking to realize that gas sales are about two-thirds gasoline, one-third diesel, and the price of diesel is way up. So the actual pump shock out of the Iran war is more diesel than it is gasoline. And that’s hitting the states really hard.

One of the questions we all have now is, you know, polling. But David, you have this other indicator, which is kind of a cross-check on the polling, right? I want to hear about that, because I think it’s important.

Nir: It’s really fascinating, and I’m glad you brought it up. So at The Downballot, my colleague Daniel Donner published a new study recently, and we’re pretty sure that no one has actually looked at what Daniel looked at in precisely this way. So folks often ask, does turnout in primaries have anything to say about general elections? And they usually look at it on a state-by-state or case-by-case basis. Democrats, for instance, had incredibly strong turnout in the Texas primaries this year, better than Republicans, which is extremely unusual for Texas. So, does that actually mean anything for November? And when you look at these individual data points to compare primary turnout and general election performance, things kind of go all haywire.

But what Daniel did was he decided to look at primary turnout across the entire country. And he didn’t just do it for one year. He went back more than 100 years. And it turns out that there is a very close relationship in what we’re calling this national primary, when you add up primary votes for all 50 states, and then you look at the national House popular vote in the subsequent general election.

And what Daniel did, his real innovation here, it’s almost like he took the first derivative, because instead of looking at what primary turnout is in a given year, he looked at the change from midterm to midterm. And so if you look at the 2022 turnout, Democrats didn’t do particularly well that year. In fact, they are doing in 2026, 18 points better in this national primary that Dan essentially created synthetically. And what that extrapolates to, is that Democrats are looking like they’re doing 16 points better than in 2022, when you modify things a little bit, because, you know, Kamala Harris lost the popular vote in 2024.

But what this points to is a Democratic margin in the House popular vote of 13 points, which is considerably higher than what the current congressional ballot, the generic congressional ballot that Elliott was talking about, is pointing to. That’s around D+8. But what’s so important is that these metrics are all pointing in the same direction. And when we back-test this, when we look at how these perform historically, if these metrics are pointing in the same direction, then they tend to collectively be pretty accurate in predicting the House popular vote, which points to a real blowout for Democrats.

Krugman: I’m supposed to pretend to be objective and say “just the facts,” but actually I do care about how this election turns out. And what’s a little bit reassuring is these are actual votes. It’s sort of like the two things that we have that are actual votes, which are primary turnouts, and then special elections are not just based upon: Do people actually pick up the phone or actually respond online?

But how worried should we be? Response rates on polling are so low now, and how well are the pollsters managing to deal with this environment where people [are so overwhelmed with robocalls]? I think two-thirds of the time when my phone rings, it’s from my good friend, Spam Risk?

Nir: Hey, I’m buddies with them too.

Morris: Look, I really don’t have a whole lot of comfort for people who just want the polls to be right, because we just don’t know. Like, we just don’t know if the decisions pollsters are making to combat non-response bias—and I will define that—if their methodology, their decisions are right. Because, you know, the capital-P problem in polling is that the people that answer the phone are very often not like the people who don’t answer the phones. They’re not representative of the whole population.

That was true in 1936, the first big test of scientific polling, when there were too many high-income, Republican-leaning voters. It was the same case in 1948. It’s just been true for the entire history of this instrument. And pollsters have a lot of really fancy things they can do to try to make the poll look like the population in terms of demographics, because we do have a national poll funded by the U.S. government called the census every ten years. So we know how many white or Black or young or poor people there should be. We don’t know how many Democrats there should be in a poll, or how many Democratic voters for the upcoming election there should be, because that election hasn’t happened yet.

So we’re just left looking for signs that the polls are wrong. And I’ll say a couple words about that, and also just exploring what potential outcomes could happen given the fact that polls have been wrong before. That’s what our election forecast does. But the polls are +8 right now. As I said earlier, average error in the generic ballot is three points. Let’s simulate a lot of different elections given that distribution of error, the three-point standard deviation on error. What could that election look like? And we answer that question through the election forecast.

So then the thing that’s left is checking—checking the polling data. One thing we do at Strength in Numbers is to take a predictive model of how people voted in 2024, trained on 2024 data, not our current polling data, and predict the Democratic or Republican lean of the people who are actually answering our survey. And there’s some potential bias in that. But the trendline is really important, because if the types of people who are answering your poll in 2025, for example, look like a Donald Trump plus-one electorate based off of your predictive models, and then that drifts over time to be, you know, Harris +1, Harris +4, Harris +5, then you have some good indications that the types of people you’re getting are too Democratic. But we do not see that. It’s a totally flat line.

That’s one thing we’ve done. And there’s some other things we can do to look for red flags of non-response ahead of time, and basically they’re all fine right now. So I’m as confident as I ever am that the polls are right. I’m never really all that confident. That’s why we simulate the election.

Krugman: And in both your guys’ modeling, how much are you also doing fundamentals? For instance, state of the economy. And also, economic surveys, which may be less politicized.

Morris: The only fundamental that matters in a midterm election is the president’s approval rating. That might not be a fundamental for an economist. But historically, you know, growth in GDP, change in real disposable income, change in employment rate—these things have very little correlation to midterm election outcomes.

Krugman: Okay.

Morris: The only real structural factor is who’s the party in the White House. And to some extent, how many seats do they hold right now? There tends to be a slightly larger punishment historically when the party in the White House holds a bunch of seats. But that’s maybe a gerrymandering factor.

So, I do think the economic discontent in the country matters, but it is probably being proxied through the polling right now. It’s not the type of thing that is historically predictive of a midterm election in the way that these things are predictive of presidential elections.

Krugman: That’s interesting. I’ve been maybe a little off on that. I knew about the historically very strong predictive power of the economic variables, but for presidential elections. And so are you saying there’s no independent effect, or really just that it doesn’t help you at all with midterms, even if you didn’t have the polling?

Morris: Yeah. There’s a very weak correlation between some of these economic fundamentals and the outcome of the election. If you then look out of sample at your predictive accuracy of a model that is trained on previous elections using these fundamentals and test out-of-sample, it’s even worse. And yes, once you start accounting for some other factors, like literally not even the president’s approval rating, just which party’s in the White House, then any relationship totally falls away.

Krugman: Which does kind of raise a bit of a question, right? If you drop the presidential approval rating, then you still don’t get very much, right?

Morris: So, yeah, I mean, there is a positive correlation, but I think we’re looking at a +0.4 correlation here.

Krugman: Yeah. But then there are the obvious fundamentals: there’s the price of diesel, there’s just generally really bad vibes about the economy. But how do we reconcile that with the fact that the midterms look at this point so much like a blowout? What’s driving that?

Morris: Well, I think the economic discontent is a big part of the equation here. You know, Paul, we’ve talked about the “vibecession” on your podcast previously. So, there might be some other residual, just disapproval or poor rating on the economy that people map onto politics. Just because this isn’t a historical explanation for why midterms go the way they go doesn’t necessarily mean that it doesn’t matter this time around.

The thing I’ve identified in U.S. politics over the last year and a half of writing my Substack is just a very endemic, anti-status-quo, anti-incumbent bias. In our polling, like 70% of people say that they face significant hardship from inflation even this year. So I think these are all jumbled together.

Nir: And also we have seen some pretty remarkable correlations. In particular, when you drill down on Donald Trump’s approval rating about the economy and prices in general. Elliott, we have these wild graphs that when you look at Trump’s approval rating and overlay it with the change in gas prices and just shift it just by a couple of weeks, because the polls always lag a little bit, then they match up almost perfectly. Gas prices really do seem to dictate how people view Donald Trump’s success on prices. And so there’s no question that this anger is feeding into his low approval rating.

Krugman: During the Bush years we used to talk about that correlation a lot. And then, it seemed to go away. And now it’s kind of back. We used to say it was really terrible that so much seemed to depend upon gas prices over which the president really has no control. Which is not exactly true at this point, though, right?

Morris: Yeah. Historically I think that is right, yeah. This president has done a remarkable job of very publicly taking very unpopular stances on the policies that Americans notice the most, which is a very unique combination. And that might be the most simple explanation for why this midterm is going the way it looks like it’s going to go.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, a couple of questions related to that. How much do you think Trump is paying a price for all of those extravagant promises he made in 2024? Do people remember that? It’s always a question in my mind. For political pundits, we’re always saying, “You said this, and now you say that.” But does the public have a memory of these things?

Morris: I don’t have any quantitative data on this, so I will get into anecdotal territory here. I watched a segment on CNN—yes, I do watch cable news sometimes—earlier this week, with a reporter just interviewing people at a gas station in Florida and interviewing former Trump voters. And there’s some sentiment of dissatisfaction. People say, “Oh, things aren’t going well.” And maybe two out of the ten people they interviewed said, “I feel betrayed.” Someone said “hoodwinked.”

So I think that is definitely an undercurrent we could identify, but it would be very hard, putting on my quantitative hat here, to identify how many voters the Republican Party has lost over the last year and a half due to Trump making such large promises. There’s definitely, in hindsight, I think for him, a bit of an own goal to be promising prices are going to go down on day one. But maybe he doesn’t actually care about the midterms or 2028. He just wanted to be president again, in which case maybe it was worth it for him.

Nir: And we’ve seen the same thing with his immigration enforcement policy. How many articles have we read featuring quotes from ordinary Americans, many of whom voted for Trump and said, “Oh, I voted for him to deport the violent criminals. I didn’t vote for him to deport the lovely fellow who’s been living and working in my community for 20 years,” and we might all smack our foreheads or get very angry about what feels like a lot of naivete about that.

But I am struck, even to this point, we’re now in October of 2026, how many times voters say, “This is what I thought Trump was going to do and he did X.” So two years later, people are still saying, yeah, “This was what we thought the promise was and he’s breaking it.”

Krugman: Yeah. Again, you guys are tracking this systematically. I’m not. But there does seem to be an abnormally large number of people willing to say, “I made a mistake in 2024.”

Morris: Yeah, about 15%, I believe, of Trump’s voters on average, according to some polls. A Navigator Research poll came out last month, in September, that showed 20% of Trump’s 2024 voters say they regret—they will agree with a poll question using the words “regret” their vote in the last election.

I don’t have comparable numbers, but just in absolute terms, if Donald Trump loses a quarter of his vote, or even if he loses a quarter of that 20%, then the 2024 election is like a Dukakis-style electoral defeat for the Republican Party in 2024. That’s a meaningful slice of the electorate, even 4 or 5%.

Krugman: I am still thinking about “vibecessions” and all of that stuff. And there’s one thing I noticed, and maybe it’s just one poll, but in the new AP-NORC poll, one of the things that was true consistently through the whole Biden era was that if you asked people, “How is the national economy doing?” they said, “Terrible.” You asked them, how is your local economy doing? And it was much better. And that gap is now gone.

It’s an interesting thing. I don’t know exactly where this fits in all this. But it is interesting that we’re no longer in a period where people are, you know, hearing bad stuff, but personally experiencing better stuff. Just generally, everyone is really pretty mad at the state of things now, which probably has something to do with all of these numbers. I think that was a complete non-sequitur given our previous conversation, but whatever.

Morris: No, I think there’s something to triangulate here. And in that same poll, I think Donald Trump’s approval rating on the economy among Republicans is at an all-time low in this new survey out this morning from AP-NORC.

But, I’ll back up from first principles here. Much of the conversation about the inflated or deflated consumer expectations and consumer sentiment over the past year has been about this idea that people are overindexing on the national economy, which may or may not be true. This survey seems to indicate maybe some movement towards convergence. If that’s the case, Republicans are, I hasten to say, dramatically more exposed to inflation in diesel and gas prices.

Krugman: Yeah.

Morris: And so I think we’re at the point in this cycle where after 15 months of inflationary statistics and inflationary news, Republican voters would be now coming around to the idea that this isn’t working out for them the way that they wanted.

In our Strength in Numbers September poll, we also found Trump at an all-time low approval among Republicans. So, our mental model is that maybe independents are super rational and everyone else isn’t. And so Democrats and Republicans wouldn’t be reacting to economic news as much as independents. That’s just the traditional understanding. So it would take a pretty cataclysmic-like event for Republican voters to then be saying, “I disapprove of this Republican president.” About 20, 25% of them do now. So I think these are all sort of related in my mind and my sort of mental model of voter psychology at this point.

Krugman: Okay. So backing up from there, we think we have a pretty good idea of what’s going to happen in the midterms, maybe—definitely in the House, and maybe the Senate—but Elliott, you’ve written a lot about this, and I think David as well—the extent to which people treated 2024 as a real seismic moment, defining a fact that American politics is never going to be the same. That’s really awesomely wrong, isn’t it?

Nir: Yeah. I mean, there’s this old saw in baseball that the good teams win close games, and that’s just not true. The good teams win blowouts, and the pundit class and so much of the media and frankly, a lot of politicians, including politicians in the Democratic Party, they failed to grasp that Trump won by one and a half points in 2024. That’s really about as close as it gets.

And I think that because the stakes of Trump winning felt so extreme and so dramatic, and you knew it was going to be so much worse than his first term, that kind of mentally or maybe even emotionally translated into something that felt like an absolute drubbing. But electorally, it simply wasn’t. And anyone at the time who was crowing about some Republican conservative era of cultural dominance, a massive sea change, wound up being wrong. And there were a lot of people who were saying, no, this is totally wrong. People like Elliott. Elliott was outspoken on this. He said it was a close election. It doesn’t mean what you think it means. And folks who hew to that view were totally vindicated.

Morris: Well, lo and behold.

You know, I actually give people a lot less credit than David did, given my previous employment situation. I think that there’s just an endemic bias in Washington, D.C. Well, there’s a couple of them. One is to make every story the biggest story. If you want to run like three or four days of TV coverage of Donald Trump because people are tuning in, you can’t just say, “Oh, he won a small election.” He has to have won a big election so that you can do that TV coverage that is performing well so you can justify seeking the ratings journalistically. I think that’s part of it.

And maybe you saw this in your past lives as well—a tendency for pundits to draw patterns out of one or two data points for the sake of narration. And I think that’s something that’s going on here, too. But I think the real meat of it was just that a lot of journalists write stories to seem smarter than everyone else. And one way to seem smarter than everyone else in Donald Trump’s victory is to just say that the liberal class of journalists were all wrong: “Look at this. Look at this huge victory. We now have to adapt to this new world we’re in where Donald Trump is winning huge victories so that we continue to not be—not be like a Democratic liberal herd.” That’s an instinct that is especially strong in the more rationalist, empirical publications, say, and I think it breeds a lot of bad storytelling.

The other thing that was a product of this was the constant humdrum about illiberalism on college campuses, starting in 2010 and right up to 2022, 2023. Well, what’s the real illiberalism on college campuses after 2025? What’s the real threat to free speech on college campuses after 2025? It’s probably not students preventing certain speakers from coming. It’s probably more the attacks on freedom of collegiate education writ large. So I think that that is another example of journalists missing the broader story going on for the sake of trying to appear smart to their peers.

Krugman: Yeah. When I was more part of the sort of conventional, journalistic milieu—which I never was very much, but somewhat—the idea was everything had to be counterintuitive. And then being against liberal pieties, and so precisely because Trump was so horrible from the point of view of any kind of conventional liberal perspective, therefore it seemed important to talk up how epoch-making and transformative he was. That was part of being counterintuitive.

And in some sense, the fact that somebody so self-evidently harmful to have won had to mean that there was something supernatural about his appeal, when in fact, the reality is that most normal people don’t actually pay that much attention.

Nir: You know, Paul, when I first started reading you, it was back when you were at Slate. And that reminds me of the infamous Slate pitch. Not that you were ever guilty of that, but the contrarian, counterintuitive, anti-liberal piety article that Slate made famous.

Krugman: Yeah, exactly. Most people won’t even remember, but the Slate pitch was, roughly speaking, “Here’s why running down cyclists is a good thing.”

Morris: It’s the “Um, actually...” article, right?

Krugman: Right, yeah.

Morris: And this goes back to that sort of anti-incumbency bias that stems from economic hardship. There’s just a tendency for voters to want to throw the bums out, to borrow that old phrase. There’s just an endemic negativity in the American public right now. And voters really want some big changes. I mean, in our survey, like 55% of voters every month—this percentage barely changes—say that major disruptive changes are needed to the nation’s political system and economy, whereas like 7% of people say things are going well for them. There is a middle option, for what it’s worth. But like those extremes, there’s a very wide imbalance in those extremes. And you would expect from that a tendency to punish the incumbent party, or pretty much whoever is in charge.

Paul, in one of our earlier conversations last year, we also talked a lot about the low-information voters who I know you’ve written about. This is a good part in our conversation to remind all the high-information listeners out there: Most Americans are not like us, not like you. About 50% of Americans say they do not get news on a weekly basis.

Krugman: Isn’t your definition of the information voter—you think it’s some kind of insult, but you just mean people who don’t know which party controls Congress, right?

Morris: Right. So this is sort of the low engagement voter. And then there is the actual low-information people, which is not really a putdown. Like we all have stuff going on. It takes a lot of energy to know what’s going on in politics.

On our survey only about 80% of people can say who controls both houses of Congress. We will be asking this question on a recurring basis in an upcoming project that is yet to be announced, a weekly survey at Strength in Numbers, which is exciting, and I imagine this number will be really helpful for us to track Democratic and Republican vote share, Trump approval and such by those voters who are or are not high or low information, or high or low engagement.

Those are the people who decide elections, and this is my broader point. Those are the people who decided the 2024 election: People who sort of remembered in the folds in their brain that things used to be better, so let’s go back to those things. Now, they’re in the sort of find-out stage of the F.A.F.O. And I think they will inevitably vote Democrats in charge and expect big changes.

And the three of us can probably forecast the number of major transformative changes that will come from Democratic Party leadership in Congress under the Donald Trump presidency, or even under a unified Congress in 2028, which is probably not a whole lot, let’s be honest. I imagine the American people will then punish the Democratic Party just as harshly.

Krugman: Yeah, well, certainly the next Democratic president, by inheriting reality, will simply be at a disadvantage.

I’m going to ask one last thing: the AI data centers. This is the political storm that I did not see coming. The apparent intensity of opposition is a surprise. And Trump—I’m sure that he has absolutely no idea about how the models work, but—

Morris: “Let data reign!”

He had a tweet where he said, “Let data reign,” right?

Krugman: Yeah, but is this going to matter? I’ve been seeing some people saying that at least in a couple of swing states, it might actually be an important factor.

Nir: I think so. Like you said, Paul, this issue almost feels like it came out of nowhere. The intensity of the anger. When you look at the polls now, I mean, huge majorities say that they oppose, for instance, building new hyperscale data centers in their neighborhoods or in their areas. And even six months ago, the numbers were much less opposed. And there is no question in my mind that so many voters are using this as an opportunity to take a stand against so many of the things that they don’t like: you know, the tech bro oligarchs, AI being shoved into every last corner of our lives. And these data centers are a stand-in for that.

And, boy, there have been so many ads run on them, Paul. And most of the ads are being run by Democrats. It is definitely one of the top issues that we are seeing coming up this year. It’s not just gas prices. It’s not just Trump’s mass deportation policy. Data centers are definitely playing a real role in some of these races. And what we’re going to see is a lot of races, especially governorships in Midwestern states that have leaned red in recent years, they’re probably going to be pretty close. And I think that when you’re on the wrong side of an issue like this, that you could lose a close race as a result.

I look at the example of Governor Greg Abbott, who has never had to sweat a general election. Now he’s running against Democrat Gina Hinojosa. Polls show it very, very close. And all of a sudden, Greg Abbott, this ultraconservative team-player guy for the MAGA movement, is coming out in favor of data center moratoriums and issuing executive orders to that effect. And so I think there’s no way he’d be doing that if he wasn’t afraid that this was a real issue that has lit a huge fire under voters.

Morris: I mean, he was approving the Starbase project for Sam Altman and Oracle, I believe in Texas, just this time last year. And now he says you have to go through “special approval,” which just means delays, right?

One place this might show up in our polling data from September is our question: which party do you think cares more about people like you? This was really bad for the Democrats in 2024, for example. Now they have a pretty large lead. About 38% of people say Democrats care more about them. 26% of people say the Republican Party cares more about them. It’s very interesting. There’s the next category of people, the 7% who say both parties care equally about them, and I guess people could be reading that as both parties care a lot about me, or neither party cares about me at all. 22% of people say neither party cares most about people like me. It’s kind of a comparative question. So maybe we’ll change that wording now that I’m thinking about it.

But I imagine getting up at his press conferences with the tech billionaires, hosting them at state dinners, tweeting—or I guess, truth posting via Truth Social? Truthing? Truthers? Yeah. Truthing that “Let data reign” comment and saying communities are going to be backwards if they reject data centers, it makes sense to me that they would say, “Oh, that guy, the Republican Party guy who’s on the wrong side of the biggest land use issue right now, which is dramatically unpopular—that party doesn’t care about me. Maybe the Democrats do now.” But there is a notable seesawing in that question across the elections, too. It just goes back to the sort of anti-incumbency undercurrent.

Nir: Yeah. And Elliott, I think, to that point, and Paul, getting back to what you said earlier about how the punditry just totally misunderstood 2024, how much talk did we see about polls showing that the Democratic Party’s brand was in poor shape? Those polls are absolutely true, and those voters’ feelings were absolutely understandable, but it simply missed the fact that people have to actually vote for one or the other. And even if they dislike both parties, these so-called double haters, they have to make a choice or stay home altogether.

And so I think ignore the polling on political parties’ standing and look at the polling of voter intentions. And that’s going to tell you a totally different story. People can still vote for Democrats even if they’re not happy with them.

Krugman: Yeah. Neither of you, happily for your own sanity, is in the business of modeling the mind of Donald Trump.

Morris: Thank God.

Krugman: But to choose this of all issues to really go on. I guess I thought maybe he doesn’t care at this point, but I would have thought that this would be a good time to pretend to be worried about data centers and AI and all of that.

Morris: Well, we have to consider maybe—I don’t want to do too much putting myself in the mind of Donald Trump because, oh, God. But we can think about the information environment he’s operating under, which is like the CNN headlines: about 99% of self-identified MAGA voters still approve of Donald Trump. You say, okay, well, that’s tautological. Whatever. He’s just insulated by these tech billionaires in and out of the White House. That’s practically his social circle at this point.

Nir: Right.

Morris: And then to the extent he gets information, it’s either fed to him by staffers who spend all day on X or Truth Social or whatever. Streaming news, or whatever cable news service currently exists for the right. But especially X, which is very endemic with super right-wing tech bros on there. I mean, Elon Musk being the number one example. If you’re operating any type of business and that’s the information environment you’re in, maybe you just don’t believe all the polls for the midterms. Maybe you don’t believe that people see these moves as unpopular.

Not to give him any credit, right? But I think the “X factor,” as David has called it, I believe, is a real problem in American politics. And you can see it operating chiefly in the chief executive.

Krugman: And there we are. Okay. Well, let’s hope that they’re in the bubble and we aren’t. Thanks a lot. And we’ll probably want to have a conversation after the midterms and figure out now what.

Morris: I’ll tell you if they happen.

Krugman: Yeah, if they happen.

Morris: That’s a joke. Hoping they happen.

Nir: Oh, Elliott! Don’t go there.

Morris: Okay, I’m kidding.

Krugman: No, I’m quite sure the elections will proceed. And then we’ll have a coup that will overturn it. But never mind. Sorry.

Nir: Guys! Let’s pull it together!

Krugman: Ok, ok. Well, thanks so much for speaking with me.

Morris: Always a pleasure.

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Transcript

On September 28th Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, one of the most prominent, most successful financial figures in the United States, published an article in the Wall Street Journal titled, “The Hell with Trump, Let’s Go Back to Globalism.”

Okay, that’s a lie. That wasn’t what the article was titled, but it was, in effect, what it said.

And it was a very interesting message to be coming at this moment in time. I think Dimon’s op-ed can be viewed as a harbinger of a big shift in the business community’s political positions and its attitudes that may be coming in the very near future — in effect a bet that Trump and MAGA in general are going to be in the rearview mirror, not too far from now.

Now, a word about Dimon. He’s an extraordinarily successful financial leader. He navigated the 2008 financial crisis and aftermath better than almost anyone else in Wall Street. He had the good sense to limit JP Morgan’s exposure to the practices that helped to create that financial crisis.

He is also a very, very smart political operator. He has had a talent for not making enemies, for staying at least on decent relationships with administrations from both parties, which is no mean feat in 21st century America. He certainly did not join the cavalcade of business leaders rushing to prostrate themselves at Trump’s feet after the 2024 election, and yet he was subtle enough about his restraint to not get put on Trump’s enemies list. So,you know, his political judgment should be trusted.

His economic judgment, all right, being a great businessman is not at all the same thing as being a great economist. And there’s no particular reason to think that he is always right about economic affairs. But that is, in a way, mostly beside the point.

So what did Dimon call for? Well, he basically said, we need to repair theWestern alliance. We need to bring the Western world, the advanced democracies, above all the United States and Europe, back together in part as a way to stand up against the threat of a rising China. And his proposal for how to do that was to negotiate a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union.

That’s quite something. That’s a very un-MAGA position to take. You want to bear in mind that, first of all, we’re currently under a government of people who do not at all believe in the virtues of free trade. In fact, are extremely hostile to globalism. Certainly don’t believe in binding international agreements. Maybe they want agreements that bind other countries, but not them.

And they are also not of the mind that we have a lot of shared values with the democratic governments of Europe. The MAGA position, if anything, is that they like the anti-democratic forces in Europe. J.D. Vance essentially campaigned for Viktor Orban in Hungary. Trump officials have been quite clear that they have sympathy for the AfD in Germany. So if we have common values with some Europeans, the Europeans with whom they have common values are neo-Nazis. And Trump’s de facto support for Putin in his invasion of Ukraine has been alarmingly clear over the past two years.

What we’re seeing here is Jamie Dimon basically saying that I don’t care about any of that. I don’t believe that you people are going to be in charge. And I think that we can go back to trying to rebuild bridges to Western Europe.

Now, it’s kind of interesting the way he phrases it. He puts a lot of it in terms that I suspect are intended to appeal to economic conservatives in the United States who are not MAGA types. He sells his proposal in part as an incentive for Europe to conduct pro-business, pro-economic reforms. He cites the Draghi report on European Competitiveness, which has been very influential in Europe. And points to him for even knowing about it! There are probably not a lot of people in the United States who have read the Draghi Report, absorbed its lessons.

I myself have read it. I have had some criticisms of some of the analysis in the Draghi Report, but the reforms that Draghi proposes, which have a lot to do with completing the European internal market, making the capital markets in Europe more flexible and responsive and so on, are very much in the right direction. So this is a good thing. And I’m glad to see someone in the United States, someone prominent, actually taking European affairs seriously and wanting the Europeans to do things that will improve their own position.

Dimon is almost surely overstating how important a free trade agreement with the United States could be. The reality is that the obstacles to European reform are internal — as are the obstacles to all the reforms we should be making here. Politics is real on both sides of the Atlantic.

And we are not as important to Europe — or they to us — as a lot of people imagine. The fact of the matter is that Europe only exports around 3% of what it produces to the US. And we were pretty close to free trade with Europe until Trump II came along. We had our average tariffs of only something on the order of 2% on European products. So it’s not as if he’s actually offering a tremendous benefit to Europe, something that would radically dislocate their internal politics and move them in a positive direction.

But, all right, it’s a good proposal. And I think that, as I understand it, Dimon believes that the process of negotiating towards a free trade agreement would in itself help to improve politics. That it would be a signal that the ultra-nationalist, anti-democratic, often anti-European policies of theTrump era are behind us.

So he’s looking forward to the day when we can start to try to repair some of the immense damage that has been done to our international relations during the Trump years.

Dimon is a smart political operator. I’m reasonably sure he would not have written this op-ed if the polls weren’t pointing towards a Democratic blowout. And of course, he could be wrong in believing that that’s going to happen, as we all could. But I’m sure that he is looking at the situation and envisaging a Democratic Congress — almost surely the House and quite likely the Senate — after the November election.

And a reasonable president, not necessarily a Democrat, but most likely, but in any case a reasonable president after Trump has gone from the scene.And a president and Congress that would be interested in trying to rebuild the Western alliance. Because ultimately, although Dimon’s proposal is economic in the narrow sense, it’s really political. It’s about rebuilding an alliance.

That won’t be easy. The fact of the matter is that the United States did just casually rip up solemnly signed trade agreements. Almost everything that Trump has done on tariffs is a violation of agreements made over several generations. Also, it’s not just Trump. The American people elected Trump twice, and the rest of the world is not going to forget that.

But free trade agreements can be a way of not just of enhancing trade, which is important, but maybe not as important as economists would like to think. But they can also be a way of binding countries closer together. They can be a gesture of alliance. And Diamond obviously thinks that this is possible, or at least thinks that it might be possible — close enough to being something that would really be on the table, that it’s worth making a case for it, and that it’s worth positioning himself and his institution for a post-MAGA era. And as Isaid, Diamond is a smart guy with a very, very good political judgment.

So that op-ed was one of the most encouraging things I’ve seen in months.

On that happy note, take care.

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Transcript

Will crypto crash the blue wave? Probably not a question you’ve been asking, but you should.

Paul Krugman here with a video update for September 22nd. I want to talk about something that was a very big deal in the way we talked about the 2024 election, which was the role of the cryptocurrency industry.

We’re talking about it a lot less this time, I think largely because AI has stolen the limelight. But crypto is still out there. And while it has not succeeded in creating a viable business in the normal sense, it has been extraordinarily successful at buying political influence. And they’re set to do it again.

Now, the background here is, as I record this, the midterm elections look, based upon polling, based upon just impressions, looks like a big blue wave. Elliot Morris gives the Democrats a 97% chance of taking the House and two-to-one odds of taking the Senate.

But there’s still a few weeks to go and it looks like there’s a big wave of right-wing money that’s going to come crashing in. We don’t know how effective that will be. The role of money in politics, particularly of last-minute advertising blitzes, is somewhat unclear.

But it is coming and crypto is going to be a pretty big part of it. Based on Open Secrets, which tracks campaign financing, it appears that the crypto industry, which spent big in 2024, is going to spend even bigger in 2026, which is unusual because midterms are usually lower stakes than presidential years: They don’t usually involve as much spending.

But this industry is going to go all in. The crypto political strategy has been to knock out candidates that it considers hostile. And that is a strategy that was very effective in the last election cycle. They spent money in primaries knocking out Democrats, because Democrats were by no means united in their skepticism about crypto, but in some cases in favor. They knocked out Democrats in favor of other Democrats in primaries. And then in the general election, they spent quite a lot, not entirely on Republicans, but there were some big cases. And then Ohio spending was a particular success story.

And in general, crypto became seen in Washington as a force to be afraid of.

Not a force that has actually managed to get anywhere in the economy. It’s nothing like AI, which is everywhere. Crypto is still barely used for legitimate transactions. According to the Federal Reserve, only 2% of Americans have actually used crypto to buy something other than assets. So basically non-speculative crypto use remains trivial. And that’s after many years of trying to market this stuff.

But the political effectiveness has been huge, and it has intimidated a lot of politicians. Back in February, Chuck Schumer warned his colleagues not to do too much to offend Fairshake, the big crypto lobbying group.

Crypto has also, in addition to campaign contributions, done a lot of what in the old days, we would call bribery. There’s a lot of money that flows from the crypto industry to politicians and their relatives, and not just Trump. I don’t really want to ask too much about why there’s a lot of money going into a firm founded by Senator Gillibrand’s son. So there’s a big financial issue.

Now, the Clarity Act posed as “we’re going to establish a sound regulatory framework, especially for stablecoins” — cryptocurrencies that supposedly have a guaranteed value in dollars. Why exactly did Democrats turn on it? I mean, on the merits, they were right to be against this because whatever one may say, the purpose of the Clarity Act was to kind of legitimize cryptocurrency in the economy and particularly to legitimize stablecoins, which are, once you cut through the jargon and all of that, essentially poorly regulated banks.

It would essentially be posing new threats to the stability of the financial system and undermining banking regulation, which is something, of course, that the Trump administration and its allies are trying to do anyway, but this would have been another step in that direction. Presumably many of the Democrats who voted against this, and there were some Republicans as well, but presumably many of the senators who voted against this thing were genuinely concerned.

But I also think that there’s some spillover. For analytical purposes, cryptocurrency and AI are quite different things, and they are actually playing a very different role in the economy. Companies are really investing in AI, rightly or wrongly, but they are really trying to put it to use. And cryptocurrency is being used only for, pretty much only for, criminal activities, including, by the way, Iranian efforts to bypass U.S. sanctions. But in the public mind, it’s all tech. It’s all fancy jargon. It’s all doing stuff we don’t quite understand. Sounds fancy.

AI turned out to have an interesting political trajectory. It really is impressive. I mean, it really is impressive what it can do. Who would have thought that matrix algebra with a little bit of non-linearity could produce what feels like a conversation with a chatbot? Who would have believed that you could do vibecoding the way you do. Now whether all of that is economically productive is another question. And whether it kills us all is yet another question.

Still, crypto has not done any of that. But it feels, I think, to a lot of people similar. And the bad reputation that AI has quickly developed, I think, is spilling over to anything techie and therefore has meant that the support for crypto is weaker than it was.

It’s also true, by the way, that there was a big boom in Bitcoin prices after Trump was elected because everybody thought he was going to be the crypto president, was going to do great things for the industry, which then kind of evaporated. There’s been some recovery in crypto in the last few weeks, which I actually suspect, I mean, no one quite knows, but I actually suspect has something to do with the fact that, well, the Iranians have found a use for crypto. That basically illegitimate uses of cryptocurrency are turning out to be significant. So there is that.

But in any case, the industry is still out there. There are still trillions of dollars in assets. And it’s an industry that had developed a really effective political strategy. They couldn’t actually produce stuff. But if we count the 1.4 billion or so that Trump personally has made from crypto as part of its campaign contributions, then crypto may be the biggest single political financial force out there.

Will it work this time? The answer is, of course, I don’t know. It’s going to be a lot of money. It does look as if basically, as best I can make out from the Open Secrets data, crypto may end up spending, well, something like an Elon Musk-sized amount on these elections.

It’ll be much more partisan. The primaries are over, and in the general election, there are not going to be a lot of Republicans out there that they’re going to try to defeat. And also, they have a clear sense of where the balance lies.

I mean, Susan Collins did vote against the Clarity Act. Nobody, seriously, is going to give her credit. She’s pulled this too many times. Nobody’s going to think that the crypto industry should try to defeat Susan Collins. But they will try to defeat Sherrod Brown, even though Brown himself has softened his anti-crypto rhetoric. He has talked about it very little.

But if he wins, he might well be the deciding vote or one of the two deciding votes in a Democratic majority in the Senate. And we now know that the Democratic Party is not clean as the driven snow. It is not immune to financial influence.It’s not even immune to de facto bribery from crypto.

But it’s a completely different universe from the Trumpian Republican Party. And so the crypto industry knows that if Democrats really do sweep, if this is a blue wave which brings them not just the House but the Senate, it will be a less favorable environment. So their scam will be greatly endangered. And so here comes crypto.

Now, it’s only part of the broader story. I don’t know how much money is going to come that’s openly from AI, but we do know that the billionaires, that the oligarchs are gearing up, are already starting to spend large sums and will spend a lot of money.

So what we’re actually going to see, crypto is an important part of the story, but what we’re actually going to see in a few weeks is the collision of what really does look like a blue wave generated by very widespread public disgust with what has happened to America these past two years against a wave of plutocratic money, including crypto, but that’s just part of the story.

And I guess we’re going to learn something about how much of a democracy we remain. I mean, yes, a vote is a vote, even if it’s a vote that was influenced by money, but we’re going to find out, can a wave of largely corrupt money, clearly totally corrupt in the case of crypto, but largely corrupt in other cases, can a wave of corrupt money stop a popular electoral uprising against a really disastrous administration and its allies in Congress?

I don’t expect to get a whole lot of sleep on election night, and neither should you. Good luck.

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. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman

(recorded 9/10/26)

Paul Krugman: So, it’s a world full of choke points. Weaponized interdependence is a term I think coined by Henry Farrell and Abe Newman. Certainly I learned it from them. And there’s a big conference—not including them for some reason—taking place at the European Central Bank a few days after we record this. And so I thought I would talk again with my two favorite international relations people (although now I’m thinking of some friends who will be upset by my saying that.) But anyway, hi guys.

Both: It’s great to be here.

Paul Krugman: There was a seminal 2019 paper by the two of you, and then a book called Underground Empire. Anybody want to tell me what you meant by that? And let’s talk about the history, and then this weirdly more weaponized moment than anyone expected that we’re living in.

Henry Farrell: Maybe I’ll take a first stab at it.

So really, where this came from was that we had finished a long book looking at fights between the United States and European Union over privacy. And as part of that, one of the things we had looked at was the SWIFT system, which is a system which you use when you’re making bank transfers. It’s a messaging system that makes sure that the money gets to the right place, and that everything gets reconciled properly at the end of the day.

And so Abe pointed out after we had finished this, he said, “Well, nobody’s written anything about SWIFT, and there’s something interesting and important with geopolitics going on.” And I was working with a statistical physicist who does a lot of work on networks and network dynamics, and so he thought that we could come up with something on this.

And so we began to write. And we began to figure out that there was something really going on, which I think had been going on in plain sight for a number of years, but which nobody had really been able to put their finger on in such a way that they could actually sort of crystallize what the phenomenon was. And this was what we called “weaponized interdependence.” And the idea behind it was very straightforward. You know, we’ve been living for decades in a highly interdependent global economy, and the ways in which both political economy people in international relations and, I think, most economists had thought about it was in terms of the enormous efficiency advantages that flow from this. Because, if you think about interdependence in terms of trade theory, even in terms of the simple benefits of specialization that Adam Smith talked about a couple of centuries ago, the more interdependence you’re able to use, the better you’re able to achieve various outcomes collectively.

But we began to think about the ways in which this relied upon all of these really boring-seeming networks, such as SWIFT, and the ways in which these networks had increasingly and quietly become a target of international coercion, especially at that stage coming from the United States.

So we argued that if you had two conditions—one, a network which had some degree of centralization, so that there were some kinds of choke points in the network; and secondly, you had some great power which had a means of putting pressure on the actors that were in charge of those choke points—that you would begin to get the conditions where a weaponized interdependence could begin to happen. That is, that that great power could begin to weaponize that choke point against others.

And then our argument was that this could also set a longer dynamic in train, because our fundamental sense was that this was not an equilibrium. This was not something that was sticky and was static unless the weaponizing power was extremely careful, and that the more that a power like the United States sought to weaponize choke points against its adversaries—and here the U.S. used a dollar clearing system as a means of cutting Iran and other countries out of the global banking system; it began increasingly to use other forms of technology and also semiconductor supply chains after our work began—the more that we saw a power doing that, the more that other powers were likely either to look to defend themselves or to retaliate against us. And this, we think, is a world that has come into being.

Krugman: So if you were looking at SWIFT, that’s an interesting case, among other things, because the bureaucracy is formally based in Belgium. But that doesn’t really matter, right?

Abraham Newman: No. I mean, with many of these things, there are Americans that sit on the corporate board, and often that’s the way that the U.S. or anybody that’s weaponizing—they look for, like, a legal channel in order to influence the operations of a company. And so first, it was just like the personnel. But at the time that they were doing this, SWIFT also—they had a data center in the United States where they mirrored all of their data, in Virginia. And so that was also just easy pickings for the Bush administration at the time, as they were trying to kind of deal with the response to 9/11.

Krugman: What you were focused on very much was the U.S. trying to weaponize its control of financial and, I guess, information networks, largely against Iran, but also to some extent against China. And so this starts out as a U.S. initiative, right? So in some sense, you know, who started the fire? We did.

Newman: I think it’s important, as Henry was talking about, that the source of this power is often about that: the key platforms, infrastructures of the global economy are centralized. They’re not flat. You know, we were told this vision was like “the world is flat,” but actually, you know, look at even my iPhone: it’s not flat. Those products and platforms were often American companies. And so in many domains, what the U.S. kind of realized—and in our book, Underground Empire, we kind of chart how after 9/11, different U.S. bureaucracies start to see these places in the international system where they can either exclude actors, like with SWIFT—say you can’t have access—or they use it to monitor, to surveil. We call it the Panopticon. And that’s what you see in the Snowden revelations. And so it’s both the development of markets, that markets are centralizing around U.S. companies and products, and then also that the U.S. government has this legal jurisdiction over them.

Farrell: And the final thing to add to that is just that there’s also an institutional change that happens as well. And this is really connected with September 11th, 2001, because before that, you know, SWIFT manages to push back relatively successfully against U.S. efforts to try and get into its data. Mueller and other people—of course, Mueller is famous for his efforts to try and figure out what Donald Trump did, but at the time, he was in the FBI. And so he tries to get SWIFT to provide information, sort of via subpoena, and SWIFT’s response, crudely speaking, was, “We don’t do subpoenas.” And they are able to call on their friends in the U.S. Treasury, and Treasury sees part of its job at the time as being protecting the global financial system against the depredations of the United States national security state.

And then suddenly, after September 11th, that is completely reversed. Treasury radically revises its understanding of its self-interest as being—instead of trying to protect the global financial system—it begins to start looking at the global financial system, thinking, “What are the ways in which we can enhance U.S. power to defend against these actors, these terrorists?” And over time, as happens in every bureaucracy, this begins to creep. It begins to expand until the U.S. is willing to go after lots and lots of different actors, including, most recently under Trump, officials in the International Criminal Court.

Krugman: Okay, I want to come back to all of that. But when I read Underground Empire, the focus was, first of all, largely on U.S. actions, and largely on these kind of high-tech, you know, 21st-century choke points. As it’s turning out, there’s a lot of other kinds of choke points in the world, right? Strait of Hormuz, most obviously, but Chinese rare earths. So the potential for weaponizing interdependence seems to be a lot bigger than I think even I realized when I first read your book.

Newman: I mean, one of the things that Henry and I have been talking about and warning people is that, you know, it creates an escalatory dynamic where people say, “Okay, if you’re going to weaponize these choke points, then we’re going to look for ways to do it ourselves.” And with the Chinese rare earths example, China had weaponized their rare earths back in 2010, but they had done it in what I would say is like a much more traditional trade war kind of way. It was about market access, and it was saying, you know, “If you do this, we’ll block it.” But what happens is that they learn from the way that the U.S. uses these tools to kind of create their own system of weaponization.

And so what the U.S. had done is they had used export control systems in order to clamp down on Chinese access to semiconductors. And the legal system was that the U.S. has an Entity List. It’s basically a no-go. “You need licenses if you’re going to sell to these operators.” And it gives the U.S. extraterritorial power because they say, “Look, Taiwan or, you know, TSMC, if you’re going to make these chips with U.S. intellectual property, then you need permission to sell it to China.” And so the U.S. extends its ability to weaponize interdependence through basically intellectual property networks. And so physical goods, chips—this isn’t just about information or finance. It’s about physical goods. They get restricted.

What China does is they then implement the same system. They create their own Entity List. They basically say, “If you use Chinese intellectual property to make your machine tools to process rare earths, you’re going to be on these lists.” And so yes, they use just market access—like, you can’t sell these batteries or these magnets—but then they also say, “If you use our processing technology to do this, we’re going to limit your access.” In the latest round of back and forth, China is really copying and then escalating these dynamics.

And I think that part of it is just a norms thing. And that’s why I sometimes say, like, there’s weaponized interdependence, which is the tool; like, the choke points part; but there’s also the vibe, which is: these are now increasingly acceptable. Of course, the Strait of Hormuz was a choke point. Everybody knew that. But nobody was willing to do it because it had been seen as kind of against the norms of the economic system. And as actors like the United States and China do this, it becomes more acceptable. You know, Iran has now weaponized the Strait of Hormuz, and everybody’s like, “Oh, what do we do?” because up until this point, it was just not in the realm of what people thought you could do.

Krugman: How much do you think it was that there was a norm, and how much of it was that the U.S. was just such a hegemonic power that no one else even dared to do it? I haven’t made up my own mind on that. But it’s one of those things I’ve been thinking about a lot.

Farrell: So I think that our sense is that there is an enormous amount—and much more, I think, than academics who study this imagined, because we love models, and models make a lot of assumptions. So very often models assume that decision-makers have complete information about the world. And of course, anybody who knows an actual real-life decision-maker knows that this is not true.

So I think one of the things that really comes through from our research in the United States, but also other people’s research elsewhere, is that people very often don’t do this because they don’t know about it, because it’s difficult to coordinate sort of different parts of the bureaucracy together to get something done unless there is some perceived terrible threat. Or because they sort of know that it’s possible, but they don’t know about what kinds of unexpected repercussions it might have, and they’re worried that it might go very badly wrong.

And I think there’s a final thing here, which flows from—you had a piece on your Substack about weaponized interdependence where you’re talking about it primarily in terms of trade, and you talk a little bit about how you can threaten to use weaponized interdependence or you can actually use it. And I think a lot of the assumptions that you would have—and this is if you do think about things very rationally—is that a lot of the active use of weaponization, you would imagine, would happen off the equilibrium path; that is, that if I look at you as the United States and you’re incredibly powerful, I don’t necessarily want to weaponize against you unless I absolutely have to. And this creates an equilibrium where nobody actually sort of does the forceful stuff, but everybody behaves as if the forceful stuff is options in the background.

So trying to figure out what is happening in any particular case is really hard. But if you look at, for example, rare earths, Jessica Chen Weiss and Gloria Xiong had a piece in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, which looks at this, and it suggests that this really was a really haphazard process, just the same as in the United States. In the U.S., our experience is from talking to policymakers, people are not trying to create a grand system. Instead, they are improvising in response to particular crises. They’re trying to figure out what will fix the crisis, and then they’re trying to do that, not necessarily thinking about the precedent that it will set. And China, it seems, according to Jessica and Gloria’s account, seems to be doing very much the same kind of thing.

So there’s a lot of messiness, there’s a lot of improvisation. And the final thing I would say is that, if we look at the world of weaponization, as you say, there seem to be choke points everywhere. And also there are all sorts of ways in which the choke points are connected to parts of the economy where things can go very badly wrong. So you can think about this as being a complex system, and the standard way that people think about the world and complex systems is that if you do stuff, sometimes unexpected stuff happens. And the more that we see actors looking to weaponize without any very good maps of how and what they are doing or what kinds of unexpected repercussions might happen, the more we can expect not simply increased risks of tension and worry, but also people screwing up, doing dumb stuff.

And here you can think about the other side of the Strait of Hormuz, is that clearly the Trump administration thought that this was going to be a super quick operation: go in and sort of bomb the hell out of Iran. The people will revolt, and glory: Donald Trump is able to pat himself on the back and go back and pour a couple of bottles of ketchup onto his well-done burgers, and eat his dinner and watch TV. And of course, this isn’t what happened.

So I do think that the more that we’re in this world, the more that we find ourselves in a world where really unexpected things can happen, and where policymakers don’t have the strategic knowledge, and they also don’t have the sense of how the system works, that would really allow us to create the kinds of stability that, for example, businesses and ordinary citizens who want to live their lives without having to pay whatever ridiculous amount it is for diesel... You know, that is a world that is very far away from us right at the moment.

Krugman: By the way, I’m not sure that even now everybody knows about rare earths and what they are, but these are these sort of almost trace metals that are actually weirdly critical to electronic technology these days—magnets and things. And I’m not sure that the Chinese particularly have the world’s dominant deposits, but they’ve invested, and it’s apparently really expensive and extremely environmentally destructive to process them. And so China just dominates the production of these things. And the Chinese can say, “Oh, no rare earths for you.” And that is at least as influential as the United States saying, “No banking transactions for you.” Right?

Farrell: So the Trump administration discovered.

Krugman: Yeah. I try not to interject myself here too much, but I do have a story for you. A very old story, which is that I was in the Reagan administration, sub-political level, Chief International Economist at the Council of Economic Advisers. Chief domestic economist was a guy—what was his name? Summers… Larry Summers. Don’t know what happened to him. But anyway, the main virtue of that for me was sitting behind the table at interagency meetings, being the guy sort of passing those slips of paper to Marty Feldstein, my principal, saying, “Don’t forget to mention that.”

And there was a discussion that I remember, which was about the first of the gas pipelines from Russia to Germany. And two things were doubly relevant to this discussion. One was that the Americans were worried that the Soviet Union would be able to weaponize gas supply as a threat to the Western European economy, which was actually totally right, it turns out. But the other thing was that there was then talk of sanctions on third parties—that we were going to sanction anybody, any company that’s doing anything to help this construction. And I think it was the guy from the U.S. Trade Representative’s office that said, “We can’t do that. That’s illegal. That’s illegal under all our international agreements.” Which, of course, now we’ve learned that the fact that something is illegal under agreements doesn’t matter all that much, but it does say that there were norms that we just didn’t do that sort of thing back then, and all those are gone.

So anyway, sorry, moving forward. So, what we’re seeing right now, I’m actually having my doubts because the Strait of Hormuz—obviously, that’s a choke point, more of a literal choke point than these financial ones. And it’s weaponized interdependence in a form that is much more literally weaponized than any of us had in mind. I’m not even sure how in the end, if that’s ending up being the decisive factor. I don’t know if you have any thoughts. I mean, it’s really not your field nor mine.

Newman: Well, I mean, I would just say I think one of the points that Henry and I try to think about is: what’s the difference between more traditional forms of economic coercion—you know, market access restrictions or embargoes—and then the kind of things that we talk about in the book, which is these network-based types of coercion. And, you know, our argument is that the more traditional forms, which I think the Strait of Hormuz is, as a traditional kind of choke point, is that there are often then just questions of substitutes, and that increasingly actors are engaging in circumvention, they’re changing traffic patterns. There’s also the changes in the global economy and their ability to create... I mean, you’ve talked about this in your posts before about efficiency and the less dependent we really are on these systems.

But when it comes to things like the U.S. dollar clearing system, because it’s a network-based platform, it’s very difficult to switch. And, you know, there are people who said that the overuse of these tools will erode these systems over time, but that’s more of a long-term game than a short-term game. And so at least at one level, I think there are ways that these kinds of approaches, once you get technical, they can help you think about the difference between, let’s say, just embargo-based kind of actions and then these kind of more weaponized interdependence actions.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, Hormuz is a good example of how weaponizing in this way can be a kind of a wasting asset, right? That more oil is finding its way around the Strait. The ships are getting better at running dark through the Strait. That’s happening a bit with the dollar as well, right? You’re probably tracking this more than I am, even though it’s in some way more up my alley. But we are seeing not a replacement of the dollar, but more bypasses out there.

Newman: So that’s, I think, the key question, like everybody then asks: “Well, who’s going to create their own hub, their own network?” And sometimes that is what people are doing. But actually it’s very difficult. Like if you think about the dollar, the two alternatives are the yuan or the euro, and they’re both domestically hamstrung, for a whole bunch of reasons. So it’s very difficult for people to really put trust in the yuan or the euro basically because of politics.

But that doesn’t mean that people are not doing other things that are warping the global economy. And so if you think about, whether it’s crypto on the dollar, or if you think about the shadow fleets in terms of the oil, you’re getting what Henry and I often call dark spaces—places in the global economy that are allowing for bad actors to do bad things, and that will undermine the whole point of the full faith in credit, the kinds of things we want in a solid, stable, and chaos-free global economy. And so you can have bad stuff happening even if China or the EU doesn’t replace the dollar with their own reserve currency.

Krugman: The coercive ability of the U.S. also gets much eroded, even if only a few percent of world commerce is undertaken using these Chinese clearance systems or using crypto. The fact that those things are now out there and bigger than they were makes it a lot easier for somebody to adjust when, you know, the U.S. tries to cut somebody off by saying, “No, we’re gonna exclude you from all dollar-based banking transactions.” And they’re going to say, “Oh, that’s a pain, but at a 3% discount I can go through this other route.” Right?

Farrell: Yeah, I think that’s right. And I think that there are two things that are happening here. One is that the indiscriminate threat, you know, the Donald Trump approach of threatening, “The world will fall on your head today, and tomorrow we will have the awesomest deal ever.” This is a terrible way of doing things. And it also speaks to what you had in your Substack this morning—we’re recording this on Thursday—the Scott Bessent “speak bigly and carry a soft stick” approach, which turns out also not to work particularly well, because, you know, the real value to the United States in this is not when you have to apply this stuff, which is pretty costly and which, as you say, involves using a rapidly obsolescing asset, because the more that you use this, the more that you encourage other actors to figure a way around it.

But it is when you’re able to rely on this without actually having to threaten other actors all that much. So you see the United States, during the period when it was really at the peak of its power, what it used to do was it would go after big banks. There’s an article by these two political economy people in international relations—Early and Preble—where they called this whale hunting. So instead of going after lots of little actors, they would go after, say, HSBC or another enormous bank, and they would sort of extract billions of dollars’ worth of fines from the bank. And the idea was to terrify the rest of the banking system into submission, to get all of these other banks to actually apply internal controls, create internal bureaucracies such that they would not mess around or screw around in the future.

And this is what the Biden administration also was trying to do, which you would think is the rational approach, as it was trying to do this with crypto. So you saw this in the settlement they reached with one of the big crypto exchanges, Binance, which has been involved in all sorts of rather sketchy-seeming activities. The CEO has to go to jail for a short period. And clearly they’re trying to do the same thing with crypto. They’re trying to domesticate crypto and force crypto to adopt all of these internal financial controls so that they get sucked into the system that the U.S. controls.

But now we are in a world where, of course, anything goes. And I think the interesting thing about the United States is that at the moment it’s losing credibility on two fronts. First of all, by making big, enormous, empty threats, which 70 or 80% of the time it doesn’t actually deliver on. And secondly, by bringing into the heart of the system crypto, which is really sort of a set of pipelines around the traditional U.S. dollar which make it far, far more difficult to monitor who is sending money to whom.

And of course, that means that if you’re trying to do what U.S. diplomats used to do, which is to go to other countries and say, “Well, you know, we all have a shared interest in making sure that we’re in control of the system, so that everybody knows where our money is going; the terrorists, drug dealers, and so on aren’t able to swap money easily”—you don’t have that credibility anymore. And this really, I think, is leaking away U.S. power in ways which are going to reverberate long after Donald Trump has departed the scene.

Krugman: Yeah, I’ve been saying for a long time that I don’t think crypto has much of a real future because there are basically no legitimate uses for it. And the problem is, I think that the second part of that was right, but the first part may have been misunderestimating the extent to which illegitimate uses matter in today’s world.

Farrell: Well, I should also plug, Abe and one of his colleagues, Stacie Goddard, had this article which more or less argued that we can think about this as that one of the possible ways in which the world is moving, or the Trump people would like to move it, is towards a neo-royalist system in which you more or less have clans of different actors sort of coordinating together and sharing up the proceeds. And that world is a world where crypto is definitely very, very useful for concealing the flows through which things actually happen. And so, if you really want to have nightmares, I think William Gibson’s The Peripheral—it’s a portrait of a world that looks exactly like that, where that is the sort of major organizing principle of global politics. That’s the kind of world that you might end up in if we aren’t able to push back.

Krugman: One thing, just coming back to the policymakers and the extent to which they really don’t know what they’re doing—that’s the other thing I learned during my one year in the U.S. government: the extent to which—and the Reagan administration was a collection of philosopher kings compared with the current management, but still—the extent to which people just didn’t know what they were doing. And one thing that strikes me right now is that particularly the Trump administration, their notion is that what’s important is being able to sell into a market, as opposed to being able to get stuff. Are you still seeing that out there?

Newman: I mean, let me say, this world that we’re talking about, the world of weaponized interdependence, is in many ways very uncomfortable for a lot of policymakers. And that’s kind of where Henry started with: you know, Treasury was not built originally to manipulate markets in order to target coercion. So first, there’s just the level-setting of that: the bureaucracies were not structured for this purpose.

Then you start to add objectives. So if you think about, like, traditional trade wars, it’s often about trying to rebalance trade flows. But here we’re thinking about objectives: they start with counterterrorism, then we go to nonproliferation, then it’s about sovereign encroachment with Russia, all of a sudden it’s about technology restrictions on China. And now you get, you know, “Colombia, if you don’t take our deportees, we’re going to put sanctions on you.” So the objectives that these policies are trying to obtain are shifting.

And then the third part is, this is really fine-grained manipulation of market relations. And so in the book we talk about this: there’s a sanction that was put on Russia to kind of cripple one of the oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska. He has an aluminum empire. And when the U.S. sanctions them, it basically threatens this factory in Ireland. (And now, a disclosure: Henry’s Irish. But that’s not how we came across this one. You know, we don’t have any stocks or shares in that aluminum factory.) But this factory is like the only place in Europe that makes a very fine-grained aluminum that is used in German car production. So there are these ripple effects through the market because markets are very complex. And the Obama administration—they had to roll back these sanctions because it was having these unanticipated consequences.

What I think is as dangerous as all the things we’ve talked about is just the undermining of the bureaucratic state. You know, the whole DOGE process, the idea that we should take apart these bureaucracies that understand the markets at the same time that we’re basically unleashing a whole new arsenal of weapons on the world. I think Henry came up with this phrase: it’s like taking apart the engine while you’re flying at 30,000 feet. You know, it’s like we need a very sophisticated set of tools in order to do, basically, economic war, and instead we’re taking the whole thing apart as we’re flying. And so I think both of us are very worried that it’s not just new problems addressed by new agencies that aren’t used to it; we’re also taking away their expertise.

Krugman: Yeah. One of the things about the Tom Friedman world, the world of extreme interdependence, is that there’s just so many interdependencies you don’t realize are there, and that a DOGE-ified federal government is not going to know are there. I mean, we just saw Trump say, “No more Bombardier jets from Canada,” apparently completely unaware that a large part of Bombardier’s operations are in Kansas.

Newman: We’re not in Kansas anymore.

Krugman: The other thing that’s been striking me, and I think you’re getting at this a lot, is that there are so many choke points out there that in this world of extreme cross-border flows, the extent to which even what might seem to be minor players turn out to have choke points, to control particular things. I don’t know how much you’re looking at the absurd Canada stuff.

Farrell: Yeah.

Krugman: And what strikes me there is just, you know, Canada has a tiny economy. It’s polar bears and Mounties. How much can Canada matter to the United States? And then once you start to look, you see there are all of these things that actually, for the moment, are only made in Canada, and we don’t have domestic alternatives.

Farrell: So I think that there are two ways in which you can look at this. And one of the ways, I think, unfortunately, is the way which is prevailing. In a certain sense, a world of interdependence, crudely speaking, is almost necessarily going to be a world of choke points, because if you combine interdependence with the ordinary kinds of things that you, for example, wrote about—40 years ago was it? Geography and Trade?

Krugman: Yeah.

Farrell: The ways in which things cluster together in one of these—

Krugman: But that was only 35 years ago.

Farrell: Okay. Yeah, yeah. But that’s kind of naturally the way that production happens. And it’s also the way that a lot of other nonphysical networks happen as well, because you want to build a monopoly, because you want to make things just more efficient or whatever—networks tend to become choke points.

And so then I think the result is that we’ve moved from a kind of Thomas Friedman “the world is flat,” “everything is awesome” kind of view in which we completely cut out all of the geopolitics—we think politics is irrelevant because nobody would go to war against another country if they also have McDonald’s, and all of these theories—into a world where, I think, pretty well the opposite is happening. So we have these sort of policymakers now, squirrely-eyed, looking at the world, looking at every sort of possible external dependency as if it’s a massive threat.

Abe and I have a piece with Yeling Tan coming out in Foreign Affairs, so I don’t want to talk too much more about this, but this is its own sort of illusion, its own set of problems. And so I think really where we need to get to is to figure out ways to actually sort of accept a certain amount of risk, a certain amount of geopolitical difficulty, a certain amount of messiness, build forms of redundancy which minimize those risks without necessarily getting away from them completely—because you can’t get away from them completely—and try and build a form of globalization which is more robust than the form of globalization that we have at the moment.

But getting there from where we are at the moment, especially given the politics, not just in the U.S., but also in China, also in Russia—less so in Europe, but Europe has its own pathologies—it’s really hard to see how to get there.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, I have seen the paper, and I guess I should not step on it too much either. But I’ve seen your draft, and I think this is more my phrase than yours, but “choke points arms race,” where everybody starts basically investing in duplicative capacity, has industrial policies, maybe tariffs, to make sure that you have domestic capacity in all kinds of things, which can be highly inefficient. That’s part of what you’re talking about, right?

Newman: Yes. And maybe I’ll go back to the conclusion of Underground Empire, where we talked about some of these same things. It’s easy to focus on the weapons. You know, that’s what happened when nuclear weapons were first getting invented: it’s like, “Oh, look, this is amazing. We can blow up huge things.” And then everybody’s like, “Well, then I need to have the weapons.” But what you really then quickly come to learn is that it’s about a strategy. It’s not about the weapon. It’s about trying to figure out: how does this fit into a broader set of objectives?

And right now, just very simple things like risk assessments—Yes, there are a lot of choke points. Everybody’s looking for the choke points. But actually there’s a lot of things in the global economy that aren’t choke points. There’s a great piece by Guillaume Beaumier where he basically says, “Look, in the semiconductor supply chain, there’s multiple choke points, there’s multiple networks. It’s not like there’s just one set of these networks.” And actors control different pieces. So ASML, the Dutch company that makes the lithography, the etching systems—they sit in the Netherlands, whereas the software part is in the United States, and of course the production is in Taiwan. So who has the advantage? And that’s where really policymakers in our world focus less on these choke points and more on how do you manage a world where there are these interdependencies?

And the first cut should be to say, “Here’s all the places where there’s not a risk. Here’s the places where we should be, you know, less worried.” And that simple risk assessment system hasn’t happened. Henry and I have been talking with people at the European Commission, and they’ve threatened to make this risk assessment for about five years, and it’s still not out. So, creating the norms, creating just basic structures—how do we identify what are the risks of having these choke points in place? I think it’s an easy first step.

The other thing that I think is really important to emphasize is the danger if we don’t. If we look at the kind of choke point arms race, these things aren’t just economic. These are increasingly being intertwined with kinetic wars. And you see that very clearly in Russia and Ukraine. There’s a ground war happening, but at the same time, different types of economic levers are being used, whether it’s the price cap or it’s the sanctions regime. And what I get very worried about is when you have the U.S. negotiating, like, “Give us a big deal with Europe on a trade level,” and all of a sudden, the flip side is, “If you don’t, we’re going to cut you off from the arms that you need to do your war in Ukraine.” And up until about five years ago, these were very separate, or people were thinking of them as alternatives. It’s like, you can weaponize interdependence or you can do these military kinds of things. But increasingly what we’re seeing is that the carrots and sticks are being combined in, I think, increasingly dangerous ways.

Krugman: Yeah. One of the things that worries me a little bit on all of this is how much, at least as I understand it, the drones are very heavily Chinese components. So the two sides are basically blowing each other up with lots of Chinese inputs. We kind of know who China supports, but in a limited way in this war. But they haven’t really applied that kind of leverage.

Farrell: There are just risks everywhere. Nick Mulder has this fantastic book which came out maybe four or five years ago called The Economic Weapon. He is a historian who worked with Adam Tooze. And so his argument is that we used not to distinguish between economic war and actual war nearly as much as we do right now, that this was a somewhat artificial set of sort of legal changes which happened after World War I, and that the risk of slipping from the one to the other, or having the two intersect with each other, is much greater than you might think.

Equally, I think Abe is right: we want to focus on the ways in which you can build forward, rather than just being sort of paralyzed by the multitude of different threats. And one thing I’m really interested to see here is what is happening between Canada and the European Union. It’s clear that they are building something together. We’re going to hear some announcement in the next few weeks. You can wishcast enormous amounts onto these kinds of decisions; they’re always much more disappointing in practice than the hopes that you attach to them. But I think that this is the first moment where we are seeing a really concerted effort by, you know, one major-ish country plus Europe—which is not a country; it is a power, nonetheless, economically—to try and put something together which can provide some kind of a neutral system for building up.

In the worst-case scenario, this will just turn out to be a series of vaguely worded platitudes which will turn into nothing. But you could also see ways in which, for example, people in the European Union who are trying to escape their trap—which is that the member states dominate national security, so that it’s impossible to get agreement on important things—you could see ways in which some of the people who want to try and escape that trap could try to start using broader, sort of minilateral-type arrangements like this as a way to try and build something, and build some sort of more secure and robust means of coordination which actually might turn into something in the longer term. And who knows? Perhaps a future U.S. administration might actually be willing to enter into these things. You know, pigs could fly. It could happen.

Krugman: Well, I mean, for all of the exasperating things about the EU, Europe did succeed in creating both essentially a demilitarized continent, and the economic weapon has also basically been largely defanged in Europe. You don’t see the Germans having a dispute with the French and threatening to cut off their supply of, of whatever, diesel motors or something like that. So, I guess these things can happen.

Newman: Well, I think they definitely have defanged it internally. But a lot of times Europeans are like, “Oh, this is just China and the United States. China and the United States are messing everything up, and they’re weaponizing interdependence. And we’re these nice guys, and we’re about peace and trade and whatever.” But if you look at the Russia sanctions, how did that actually happen? Who froze the Russian central bank assets? You know, the 300 billion Euros—it’s mostly the Europeans. And so if you’re in Beijing and you watch that happen, you’re pretty clear that Europe has the power and capacity to be quite interventionist in the economic world.

And so I just think we should always remember that Europe has a lot of tricks up its sleeve as well, and is an incredibly powerful economy. Their problem in some ways is, in U.S.-European relations, they’re so dependent on U.S. security guarantees, it’s difficult for them to push back when Trump makes the ask, because they need our weapons right now.

Krugman: Okay. I actually have a beef with some of the research papers that I’ve been reading. There’s quite a lot of discussion of potential weaponization of economic relations between China and the United States, and some about possible Chinese weaponization against Europe. But no one ever seems to talk about what the Europeans could do. And yet the European Union is a huge economy with a lot of technology. There must be stuff.

Farrell: There is. And part of the problem, again, it’s institutional. So, as we say, when the United States really got its act together on this was when the different parts of the U.S. began to coordinate towards a common set of objectives, a common understanding of the strategic situation. Europe has not gotten there yet, and it is really hard.

And the fundamental, basic flaw that Europe has: it was exquisitely well adapted to deal with the Thomas Friedman world—that is, to deal with a world in which everything is about sort of markets and trade. And the European Union builds up its own form of power: it’s very, very good at using regulations to shape its internal market and then looking to impose those standards on the rest of the world. But we’re now in a world where markets and security are entangled. And that is a world that is absolutely godawful for the EU to deal with, because its market capacities are at the level of the EU, and so too its trade negotiating capacities. But the national security stuff is all at the level of the member states.

And this more or less forms a chaos for difficulty in coordinating for lots and lots of different member states with their particular national interests, each of which to squabble and to fight and to say, “No, we don’t want to do this because we are urgently dependent on China in X, or we depend completely on the United States in Y.” And so as a result, the European Union has had and will continue to have enormous difficulty in actually coordinating. Again, because the national security stuff happens at the level of the individual states, and the economic stuff happens at the level of the European Union. So all of these are problems which straddle the relationship between the two, and are inherently difficult for the EU to deal with.

The U.S. has very often been able to quietly bang heads together and get consensus in the past, but at this moment the U.S. is instead specifically seeking to divide the EU because it doesn’t like the EU, because it views the EU as a threat to, bluntly speaking, “Western civilization”—however the Department of State is defining that today: white folks, fundamentally, and sort of the awesome things that white folks have created. You know, it becomes really hard for the EU to push back against us because it has internal divisions and it has an external protector which is doing everything it possibly can to fan the flames.

And then China also is extremely good at playing the game of, “Well, you want this investment, then do X. But if you take some sort of actions against a Chinese company, we are going to visit hellfire upon your economy in this or that way.”

So, I think you’re absolutely right. Paul. The EU is a phenomenal achievement. I think both Abe and I—or at least I am—cautiously bullish that over the longer term, the EU will get its act together. But we all know what Keynes said about the longer term.

Krugman: Maybe that’s where we end. In the long run, you guys will help save the world with your book and your work. Thanks for talking today.

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Transcript

“Mary had a little lamb, but when she saw it sicken, she sent it off to Packingtown, and now it’s labeled chicken.”

Hi, Paul Krugman here. That’s a little ditty that was circulating, I can’t find any original source, around 1905, when Upton Sinclair published “The Jungle” — about the meatpacking industry, one of the sort of founding documents of the progressive movement.

The topic today is Donald Trump and beef, because here we are back in Upton Sinclair territory.

So you may have seen that last month Trump announced, given that we have high beef prices, that he was going to allow the tariff-free import of 300,000 tons of ground beef.

Rather oddly, he didn’t say from where and wouldn’t say from where for a while. And then eventually said, well, from Argentina, Brazil, and other places.

There has been a substantial uproar over these imports of ground beef because of concerns about safety. You know, if he won’t even say where it’s coming from or whether the countries involved are going to be practicing food safety, that is kind of an issue. And it turns out it’s not just, you know, not just woke liberal types but ranchers, lawmakers and food safety experts who were very concerned about the plan and were not reassured when Trump said the meat is “very clean and very good.”

Okay, little by little details are coming out about how all of this happened. It turns out that the initial plan to allow the beef imports was announced the day after a closed door meeting between Trump and a Brazilian meat packing billionaire who is a major donor to Trump.

And they went right ahead and announced the plan, although again without details. There doesn’t seem to have been much discussion of how this would work, of the concerns. After some initial blowback — even ranchers are concerned that people might become worried about the safety of U.S. beef — Trump announced that he was going to also allow farmers and ranchers to process their own beef rather than having to go through the regular meatpacking companies. But it turned out that the ranchers hate that too, because what they want is for people to believe that beef is safe. They want to be assured that there are quality standards being upheld.

And now that we have at least some information about the origins of the beef, we are even less reassured. In fact, just the other day, the European Union banned beef imports from Brazil because Brazil was not adhering to EU standards on the use of antibiotics. So there are, in fact, real concerns here about safety.

Okay, this is quite a story, and beef is not that trivial a product, but there’s a lot of secondary implications here. The first is that this is a very Trumpian story. It’s got this sort of characteristic combination of raw corruption and raw incompetence. Raw might not have been the best word to use here, but anyway.

The corruption: Obviously, this was a decision made because somebody who has given Trump’s campaign and possibly Trump himself money had a meeting with him and got an immediate policy change. So this certainly looks like undue influence. We don’t know exactly how it happened because it was a closed-door meeting.

Also, shouldn’t somebody have been in the room to or at least passed on this before it was announced to say, you know, is this a good idea? Shouldn’t there have been somebody from the Agriculture Department, somebody from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, but certainly someone from food safety to pass judgment or give some warning?

In a normal administration, any kind of decision like this involves a process in which multiple agencies get a chance to weigh in and in which somebody who knows something gets to say, look, there are real problems with this idea. But obviously that didn’t happen here. And basically it doesn’t happen in this administration.

This is an administration that does not like experts. Does not listen to expertise. That’s not just a result of particular personnel decisions that Trump made. That is just a defining characteristic. At a fundamental level, they’re just hostile to the idea of expertise in any domain, in pretty much every agency where there’s something to know, where there’s technical stuff that you need to know to make good decisions.

The people who actually know things, or the people who are willing to speak up about what they know, have been silenced, purged. That’s across the board. Basically, it’s Hegseths all the way down in this administration.

And so in this case, nobody was there apparently to say, this is really not a very good idea.

And I think it’s really striking that even Trump thought, well, okay, I can fix this. At least I can mend fences with the ranchers by giving them more leeway to be unregulated themselves. But it turns out that the ranchers want regulation. They want customers to know that the beef that they buy is safe. So just raw incompetence on top of the raw corruption.

There’s an even larger issue here. Normally, when we think about, or as we used to think about, left versus right, there is a question about the role of government. How big a role should government play? And ultimately, it’s a values question, normally. It is a question, should it be the government’s business to ensure that citizens are not in dire poverty? Should it be the government’s business to ensure that everyone has access to essential healthcare?

And the question of how far in that direction you want to go is the traditional left-right distinction. Obviously, I’m on one side of that, and I think that morally I’m right. I think even in practical terms I’m right, but that is a debatable point.

But there are certain roles that government must play. The government needs to provide public goods. The government needs to provide things that the private sector cannot do for itself, which is obviously things like national defense, things like public safety, and it turns out also things like ensuring the safety of the food supply, just like ensuring the safety of the water supply.

It turns out that regulation of what goes on in meatpacking plants, regulation of what goes into your food is something that you really want the government to do. Even people in the industries want that unless they are particularly unethical types. The people who are trying to do the business right want those public goods provided because if you don’t have those provided, then people will not trust their products.

And this is not something that you can leave up to the private sector. It’s not something where you can do your own research. It’s a very complicated world out there. And the informational burden of trying to figure out whether the people responsible for your package of hamburger are actually following safe procedures, that’s beyond everybody. It’s actually quite similar in a way to public health measures, including, by the way, of course, vaccination.

Like I said, it’s all the same story here: This retreat from even the most essential roles of government.

So this is not an administration that’s trying to turn the clock back to 1930. It’s not trying to undo the New Deal. It’s an administration that’s trying to turn us back to the 19th century or before. It’s really just trying to undo even the most essential functions of government.

They’re not doing this, I think, out of a philosophical concern. I don’t think they have a theory that says that we really don’t need these things. They just don’t think about it at all. They don’t do expertise. They don’t do thinking, really. And a lot of policy is just based upon who last spoke to Donald Trump and who has given him money.

It turns out that this is a case in which Brazil — and it appears it’s probably Brazil, there may be some Argentine stuff here, but it’s probably Brazil — Brazil is notorious for not practicing internationally accepted standards on the safety of its meat.

And so the last thing you want to do is allow Brazilian ground beef to be admixed. And by the way, none of this would be unique origin. This would be trimmings of beef that get ground up and mixed in with other beef. And basically, if you get a package of hamburger in the United States under this rule, you will have basically no idea where it came from. You’ll have no idea under what conditions the cattle were raised or how the meat was processed. And this is not something that’s in the interest of really anybody except personally this particular Brazilian beef baron who may have a bunch of unsold beef because the Europeans have turned back a shipment.

And of course Donald Trump himself presumably is getting some financial benefit personally out of the whole thing.

So it’s quite a story. It’s in a way captures all in one place everything that is going wrong, how quickly the United States is descending into kind of pre-modern, pre-development status. We’re just giving up all of the things that make an advanced society and advanced economy work.

Okay, that was hard work. And I’m kind of hungry. So I think I’m going to have a piece of hamburger with some iceberg lettuce.

Actually, maybe not.

Take care.

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Transcript

At this point, it’s almost a commonplace to say that under DonaldTrump, America has become a kakistocracy, ruled by the worst. But I don’tthink it’s fully appreciated the extent to which we’ve also become a cheatistocracy, ruled by the most corrupt.

Today’s commentary is a follow-upon yesterday’s primer, which was about the role of tax evasion both in leading to or contributing to our downward spiral into oligarchy and also as a surprisingly large factor in the budget deficit and therefore in America’s debt problem.

Before I get to tax evasion, let me say something about where I’ve been going in my kind of intellectual journey into understanding oligarchy. As an economist, normally my instinct is to think about the invisible hand, to think about market forces, about technology as driving what happens to society. And even now there’s at least some extent to which the rise of kind of garden variety inequality, the rise of the top quintile at the expense of the middle, may be partially explained by the bias of technology towards higher formal skills, although that may be ending now with AI and all of that.

But as I began to focus on oligarchy, on the very small number of people who have enormous wealth, enormous income, but the wealth is an even bigger factor — there are a really handful of people who have come to play such a large role.In our society, in our economy, and above all, of course, in our politics— I was forced more or less by the numbers to say this is not about the invisible hand. This is not about market forces. It isn’t even mostly about technology.

Yeah, some technologies create winner-take-all markets that make people int he right place extremely wealthy. But the really big factor that’s driven us from the relatively equal society that we were 50 years ago — not obviously anywhere close to truly equal, but nothing like the dominance of a tiny elite that we have now — the really important factor is policy and above all tax policy.

We basically stopped imposing progressive taxes that limited the growth of enormous fortunes. And sure enough, as the tax barriers to accumulation of excessive wealth went away, excessive wealth began to concentrate.

This is, in many ways, the fundamental story. We got rid of, we ended the Gilded Age with its dominance by, as FDR said, the power of organized money, largely by taxing a lot of that organized money away. And we got back to something which in many ways is worse than the Gilded Age by taking away those taxes and allowing vast fortunes to snowball and buy themselves enormous political power, which allows them to snowball even further.

One factor in all of that is the rise of simply not paying taxes that you’re supposed to pay. A lot of it is reductionist statutory tax rates. We tax corporate profits at a far lower rate than we did In the 1950s, we tax top incomes at a much, much lower rate than we did in the 1950s. But what’s also true is that we simply allow people to get away with not paying taxes to an enormous extent, to almost surely a much greater extent than used to be the case.

The numbers are big, and in the primer I go through the tax gap. The money owed but not in fact collected is certainly north of $600 billion a year. It is something like 40% or more of the U.S. federal budget deficit. It is a major contributing factor to the accumulation of vast fortunes.

What is striking is that far from really making an effort to rein in that tax gap, for the most part politically our system has moved to let it rip, has basically tried to make America safe for tax cheats.

This is something that overwhelmingly benefits people with high incomes and large wealth because people with really big incomes, people who are extremely wealthy, for one thing, they just have much more complicated income. It’s much, much harder to track down and audit someone who has multiple businesses, some of which are dummy businesses, some of which may be real, but nonetheless are conduits through which money can move. And only the very wealthy can maintain offshore accounts that enable them to hide income and so on.

So tax evasion is something that overwhelmingly benefits people with very high wealth and income. Not all! Not every billionaire is a tax cheat. There are levels and levels. There are some people who just feel that’s not something I want to do.People who feel that it would be wrong. Morality does exist. There are people who feel that their personal losses, should they be caught out cheating heavily on their taxes, would be large. So they care about their reputation.

And then there are those who don’t.

What’s astonishing is that we have, especially since 2010, especially since the hard right Republicans took control of the House of Representatives, we have moved to largely eviscerate any attempt to control that type of tax evasion.

The numbers are really startling, and the IRS has actually put out very useful information. If you are someone with a very high income, the IRS stops counting pretty much at a million or more a year, but presumably it’s even more true further up the scale.

In 2011, before the right-wing Congress was able to do its work, more than 7% of tax returns in that range were audited, which is not unreasonable because there’s obviously a lot of possibility for malfeasance there. It’s not saying that 7% of people with incomes of morethan a million were sent to jail. Obviously nothing like that, but we had widespread auditing, which among other things, encouraged people not to cheat on their taxes.

By 2019, just eight years later, that number had gone from 7.2% to 0.7%. So almost nobody with high incomes was being audited for possible tax fraud.

Now, why was that happening? There had been savage cuts in the funding to the IRS. Very large, at least 25 to 30% adjusting for inflation, something like a 40% reduction in the staff available for enforcement. And as it turns out, auditing the taxes of a very high income person is a lot more expensive than auditing a regular person. An ordinary blue collar worker, middle income, white collar worker who might be failing to declare some income, in many cases, it’s really very hard for them to evade taxes at all. And if they do, it tends to be relatively straightforward to pick apart what’s going on. And so audits of ordinary people are cheap.

Audits of millionaires and billionaires, sounding like Bernie Sanders, are very expensive. And so the IRS, with limited resources and wanting to show that it was in fact auditing people, largely gave up on auditing the extremely wealthy.

And this is a big number. The amount that we lose to tax evasion is something like the entire budget of Medicaid. It’s something like six times what we spend on food stamps. It’s something like 15 times the amount of money that Elon Musk saved by destroying USAID and killing millions of people in Africa. And yet it has been allowed to flourish.

Notice, by the way, that this is all pre-Trump.

Now, under Biden, there was a push to rectify the situation, a push to restore enforcement, increase the resources of the IRS, and increase enforcement actions in an attempt to tilt the agency’s priorities back towards where it should be, which is going after the big money. And that was just getting started. It takes a while to ramp those things up.

And you know what happened. Of course, Trump’s one big beautiful bill did savage cuts in IRS resources for enforcement.Savage cuts in personnel. We’re now back to a situation where things are worse than they were before Biden started to try to fix it. So this is going to continue.

What I find remarkable and interesting — I mean, I wouldn’t say that I’m baffled, but I think it is something that takes some analysis is why exactly.

I mean, it’s one thing to favor the interests of the uber wealthy. Okay, we know that’s what the modern Republican Party is, whatever it may claim to be.

But it’s another thing to systematically favor the least honest. What this policy does is It basically says if you are an honest billionaire — I’m afraid to name somebody because who knows what may come out in some future set of files — but if you are an honest billionaire, you are disadvantaged by the fact that dishonest billionaires are able to get away with cheating on their taxes. You should be opposed to that, but obviously the party that currently controls Congress, the White House, and the Supreme Court, that party actually prefers dishonest men of great wealth. It’s actually a positive preference for cheaters.

I can speculate very loosely. It’s often been observed of Trump, and it’s probably true of some others in his camp, that at a fundamental level, he does not believe that anyone has good motives. And that someone who appears to actually be a decent person who plays by the rules is, by that very token, someone Trump distrusts.

He kind of assumes that they must be even worse than he is. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be faking having good intentions, which people like him never have. Maybe there is something going on, something deeper. But in any case, wehave developed a system where not only do we enormously favor the interests of people who already have vast amounts of money, but we literally favor malefactors of great wealth, to use Teddy Roosevelt’s phrase. We literally favor people who not only have enormous amounts of money, but cheat, who don’t pay their taxes, who break the rules.

This is not America. The general public still very much believes that people should pay the taxes they owe. We are not a country that valorizes, that rewards, or that honors people who cheat.But we have become a society that in practice does reward people who cheat.

What does that do to our social cohesion? What does that do to our sense of ourselves as a nation? I think in some ways the moral decay is worse than the numbers, which is saying a lot.

Take care.

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I’m spending a lot of time thinking about high interest rates, both for obvious reasons and because I’m reconsidering some of my own long-held views. So I thought I’d have a long talk with someone who has really studied these issues and now, I believe, may have been more right than I was. This may be even wonkier than usual, but trust me, it’s important.

. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Ricardo Caballero

(recorded 8/25/26)

Paul Krugman: I’m talking today with a very, very serious economist, Ricardo Caballero, who is one of the most important macroeconomic thinkers of modern times. I was going to say of my generation, but actually, I’m an older generation—but of the currently, still vital creative generation. We’ve had discussions about a lot of events over the past 25 years that have involved some disputes that I hope we can get into in a way that people understand. And recent events, including the rise in long-term interest rates, have really brought all of those issues to the fore. So I thought I’d talk with Ricardo, who is the Ford International Professor of Economics at MIT, a position I once held. But anyway, hi.

Ricardo Caballero: Hi, Paul. So wonderful to see you again. We still miss you at MIT.

Krugman: Well, I miss the days when actually getting at the truth was what mattered, as opposed to dealing with all of the obvious lies. But anyway, I guess there are different stages in one’s life. But so, I will want to get into recent events. But one thing that really struck me is that there’s this long-running discussion basically around interest rates and international movements of capital where there are kind of, as I see it, two rival ways of thinking about it. It could be some of both—but one was about returns to capital and investment opportunities, and one was about people looking for safety and security in assets. And for the most part, I was on one side of that and you were on the other. And I’m starting to think that you were probably right. So, first off, how would you portray this discussion? And maybe we can go back and forth.

Caballero: I don’t know whether they’re really different views because, you know, my view at least was always, when I say “a shortage of a store-of-value,” if you will, investment opportunities create those store-of-value opportunities and so on. So I never saw it as very contradictory. I thought there was an imbalance: lots of needs for savings, in particular in a very specific kind of saving—safe saving. And the productive structure wasn’t able to generate enough assets, especially safe assets. And that’s, I think, what led to the sort of “shortage of safe assets” type of literature, and that naturally depresses safe interest rates. If you look at the return on capital, actually, it was fairly stable. It was all absorbed by the opportunity risk premium, if you will. And so you can see returns both on safe and risky capital sort of declining in tandem since 2000, or earlier than that. And then somewhere around 2000, you can see that the safe interest rate keeps coming down, while the return to capital is sort of paralyzed. And what starts widening is the equity risk premium.

Krugman: So let me just break in here. A kind of crude, simplistic view—probably my view at a certain point—was that there’s capital and then there are returns on capital. And when we start to see interest rates get really low circa 2000, that’s telling you that returns to capital are going down. And if we see a lot of money coming to the United States, it’s because, well, America had faster population growth than other rich countries, and we were leading the technology revolution. But you’re saying there’s a really big difference between buying stock—corporate investment—and buying U.S. government debt, which is safe. And that the United States was sort of better than the rest of the world at supplying these safe assets.

Caballero: Absolutely.

Krugman: And just going way back—the financial crisis, which seems to me like yesterday, but was in fact almost 20 years ago—involved all of these exotic financial instruments, the asset-backed mortgage-backed securities, which you interpreted as a response, to a large extent; not just fraudulent, but a response to a real demand. Right?

Caballero: Absolutely. I thought there was a shortage of ultra-safe assets. So financial engineering got to work and they created sort of “synthetic safe assets.” Now, they were safe assets from the point of view of idiosyncratic shocks, but they weren’t from the point of view of systemic shocks. And to me, that was quite important in generating the financial crisis.

Krugman: Yeah. And so idiosyncratic shocks are like, well, okay: a particular housing development turns out to be a bust, but a collapse of the entire housing bubble is... And so fancy math was used to create assets that were supposedly safe because you were pooling all this stuff. And so, in your view, it wasn’t just that you had evil, fraudulent financial types—though that too—but that they were responding. There basically just weren’t enough Treasury bills and stuff like that out there.

Caballero: I mean, they realized there was a spread to be earned by creating these assets, and then there were regulatory failures that allowed them to hold them on their own balance sheets. And I think that’s when the really toxic mixture was developed, because you had these very low-capital-charge assets which weren’t really safe. But you’re right, it was this spread that sort of created the opportunity and then the regulatory arbitrage, if you will, that brought them into the balance sheets.

Krugman: Okay. I’m going to be self-indulgent and tell you a quick story. Robin and I bought our New York apartment in early 2009, which turns out to have been perfect timing, although that was purely an accident. We had come into a slug of money courtesy of the Swedes. But as we were looking at places and I was looking at the bookshelves of people who were selling their apartments, and a whole lot of them had books on the Gaussian copula and stuff like that, which, as you know, was a technique that was used to justify the claim that these synthetic assets were safe. And so we were clearly getting a preview: there were a lot of apartments on sale from Wall Street quants who’d been fired because everything was about to fall apart.

And so, in some sense, the setting for the financial crisis was that people wanted safe assets, and excessively clever guys on Wall Street invented seemingly safe assets. But then everything went to hell, and we had the financial crisis. And then we had this long period of really, really low interest rates. And your story would be basically, as I understood it, that all of these fake safe assets had been revealed as fake, and now there was a sort of piling into Treasury bills, piling into actually safe assets.

Caballero: Indeed, and also partly the supply of sovereign safe assets—Italian bonds and the like—those also went away. And so we had a massive shortage.

Krugman: Okay. Now, there was an alternative story. And believe it or not, listeners, we are going to get to where we are now as a result. But there was an alternative story that I guess Larry Summers came out with at first, but I actually had been toying with the same thing, which was that what was actually happening was a real lack of investment opportunities. This was the “secular stagnation” view.

Caballero: You know, we were both at that conference. It was IMF, I think, and you may not remember, but that’s when Larry sort of came up with this theory. And you may not remember, but I stood up and I said, “Look, I buy a part of that story. But what you’re missing is that the return on capital hasn’t declined nearly as much as the safe interest rate.” And that’s what I was describing before—the equity risk premium increased enormously. But the return to capital, regardless of whether you measure it with national accounts or return on financial investment, did not decline nearly as much.

Krugman: That’s right. So, national accounts being corporate profits divided by the value of corporate assets. And there really wasn’t a big decline in the profit rate.

Caballero: Of course, in the recession itself, it did. But I’m saying afterwards it recovered.

Krugman: Yeah. By like 2015, the recession is over and basically the interest rate on federal debt is lower than the rate of inflation. And so it’s basically free money for governments to borrow. One interpretation of that is, well, population growth has slowed and technology is maybe not as exciting as we thought it was going to be, and so there weren’t these opportunities. And you were saying that the numbers never supported that.

Caballero: I don’t think so. I mean, elements of these stories are obviously correct, but I mean, there’s like 400 or 500 basis points that really came from widening in the equity risk premium.

Krugman: By the way, the equity risk premium is when stocks historically pay a higher rate of return than bonds—certainly more than government bonds. And it’s always been a little bit of a puzzle why it’s so large.

Caballero: Not for long, though.

Krugman: Yeah.

Caballero: Not so much now.

Krugman: But it was more that people trusted the U.S. government and didn’t quite exactly trust corporate investments. And so that’s why the government was able to borrow so cheaply.

Caballero: I think so. And also the demographic cycle helped on that dimension because, you know, older people tend to demand safer assets. So that’s also changing that composition.

Krugman: Yeah. I wasn’t even thinking about that. So I have to say, I think we were kind of, in some ways, living in a fool’s paradise where governments can borrow essentially for free—certainly the U.S. government could borrow essentially for free.

The case that a lot of us used to justify secular stagnation—and for some reason, the words here are all completely meaningless to a normal human being—but to justify this idea that we just had low returns, a lot of us talked about Japan. Have you spent time on the Japanese story?

Caballero: I wrote a paper on Zombie Lending.

Krugman: Oh, yes you did. Why don’t you tell us about that? Because that’s also an interesting thing that was a consequence.

Caballero: That was a consequence. I mean, essentially, in Argentina, if you have a financial crisis, you just blow up. But in Japan, they had the resources to essentially keep banks alive and the like. And so that led to a process of evergreening loans. And we show that that reduced productivity growth. So it did have a real impact eventually.

But there were other things at play in Japan as well. They had a massive financial crisis which certainly took away their mojo. It took many years, and then they responded. The fiscal policy sort of reacted too soon to the incipient recovery. So they fumbled on multiple occasions.

Krugman: Yeah. And the story that we used was that, you know, the collapse of fertility happened there first. So there was a shortage of Japanese, which should have reduced returns on investment and maybe led to low interest rates, but maybe that wasn’t even the story for Japan.

Caballero: I mean, I think it is part of the story, definitely. I mean, they certainly experienced a very acute demographic cycle. They were not very inclined to allow massive migration. So they had all the ingredients; there is no doubt. But on top of that, you had the financial crisis and this supporting of sort of zombie loans. And so they did terrible things to the productivity environment.

Krugman: Given all of that, you might think that Japan would have fallen way behind on productivity. And they have lower productivity than we do, but not...

Caballero: Well, labor, because they have lots of capital.

Krugman: True. Okay. So this is a vision of kind of the history of the past 25 years as a search for perceived safety, investments where you can’t go wrong, and an abortive attempt to cater to that demand by providing a lot of clever things that looked safe, but weren’t really. And then a collapse of that. And then you enter this long period, because the financial crisis is 2008 and interest rates are still very low, at least as of just three years ago. And now all of a sudden, or so it seems, that’s gone away. So, what do you think happened? We kind of had a glut of safe assets instead of a shortage. What do you think happened there?

Caballero: Well, I think it’s a combination of things. I think that first, there’s the COVID shock for sure, that affected the supply of assets all around the world. So now we have a lot more competition than we used to have as well. That’s one aspect. Second, it brought sort of the inflation monster into play. And that also complicated the life of bonds. And then markets became very bullish. So the equity risk premium we’re talking about essentially went away.

So, to me, a lot of the movement that we have seen is really the equity risk premium up and down. The question is whether it’s structural or temporary. We also saw a compression of the equity risk premiums right before the dot-com bubble. And so the burst of the bubble also led to lower interest rates. So, in struggling with this, the question becomes: How much of this is structural versus how much of this is just some temporary phenomenon or not? So that’s one issue. That’s sort of the financial issue.

And then the second one, which is not unrelated to this issue of the compression in the equity risk premium, is the AI boom. I mean, this is a massive investment and wealth boom, which is very important. So the wealth boom has boosted aggregate demand and that has increased equilibrium interest rates. We talk about the K-shaped economy; I call it financial Dutch disease. We have this enormous amount of wealth creation and therefore the interest rates have to be high. And then anything that is affected by high interest rates is struggling.

Krugman: By the way, people won’t know this, but Dutch disease is a very long ago story, but it stuck. This was when the Netherlands discovered natural gas, and suddenly they were selling lots of natural gas, which made the—I guess they still had the guilder then. They still had their own currency. So this made the guilder strong, which actually was kind of devastating for Dutch manufacturing because they weren’t competitive anymore. And so this is a case where good news is actually bad news for large parts of the economy. And actually, I happen to know, the Dutch stopped pumping out the gas a few years back because the land, which was already below sea level, is subsiding further. But we still use that term.

So you’re saying when people think the second coming of wealth has arrived because of a new technology, they pile into that, and then they’re not so interested in parking their money in safe government bonds.

Caballero: Indeed, yeah. I mean, even without the secondary effect, you still get a boost in aggregate demand that comes from the wealth. Before the productivity of the AI boom arrives, you get the demand. You don’t get the productivity. That requires higher interest rates.

Krugman: That’s right. That was very much the opposite, by the way, of what Kevin Warsh has been trying to argue. He’s been saying, “Well, because of AI, interest rates can come down because it’s anti-inflationary.” But the problem is, if the anti-inflationary stuff arrives, that may yet be some years down the pike. And meanwhile all the spending and the wealth that’s driving the stock market valuation... In a way, you’re saying that a lot of what’s happening should be good news, right? We have this technology, which is pretty impressive.

Caballero: Yeah, it’s extremely impressive. Yeah, I wrote a little paper. It’s called Speculative Growth and the AI “Bubble.” I’m very optimistic about this technology. Now, whether I’m optimistic about the current valuations, that’s another story. But I’m optimistic about the technology. And I think there’s a good future ahead. But the good future, to get there at a reasonable speed, I think we do need a little bit of bubbly markets. And that’s the nature of the story. But it’s a fragile story because, you know, bubbles are fragile.

Krugman: Yeah. And by the way, I don’t know if you saw this, but Stan Druckenmiller, sort of George Soros’s right-hand man and also Scott Bessent’s mentor, published an opinion piece in the Financial Times about how Bessent is all wrong to believe he can bring down long-term interest rates with his little bits of financial engineering, which was an interesting piece and interesting given the source and all that, but it appears, based upon the detectors, to have been entirely written by AI.

Caballero: I see!

Krugman: It seems Druckenmiller knew what he wanted to say, but couldn’t be bothered to actually write it. So he actually told Claude to write it.

Caballero: I’m sure he wanted to blame somebody if it didn’t work well.

Krugman: Now, it’s good news, we think. There’s this technology, which is amazing. It really is. I have to say, I’m using it for pretty nerdy stuff like, “Here’s this published table, but it’s a PDF. Can you please convert it into an Excel spreadsheet for me?” You know, that kind of thing. But it’s amazing how much time that saves.

But it’s actually having this effect, where suddenly interest rates on federal borrowing are way up. Again, this is going to be a lot of nerdy questions because I’m really trying to scope this out, and I can’t think of a better person to talk to about it. It’s also true that a lot of interest rates beyond that and government debt are also up. Right? So does that make sense? If it’s a search for safety, should we be seeing home mortgage rates also going up by the same or similar amounts? Maybe they are.

Caballero: They are in the sense that spreads are being compressed at the moment. So that’s consistent with the fact that there isn’t a lot of concern with risk. And so all the spreads are coming down. That sometimes has to do with “reach for yield” type phenomena. It’s pretty standard. The benchmark rate, which is the Treasury rate, tends to move more than the other ones outside of a financial crisis. But the spreads are being compressed. And mortgage rates are, in fact, rising—not one-to-one, but they are rising.

Krugman: Okay. But it’s not one-to-one.

Caballero: No. I haven’t checked, but I suspect mortgage rates are not rising one-to-one. But corporate spreads are being compressed.

Krugman: Yeah, and that’s actually kind of how you are measuring. Explain to me, because I didn’t quite get it: You have quite a new paper on basically the elimination of the safety premium on U.S. government debt. How did you go about measuring that?

Caballero: It’s a combination of things. I mean, the concept I have in the paper is one of the marginal costs of debt issuance. And that has two components. One is the spread, which we’ll discuss—the spread relative to a safe interest rate; think of it as the front-end monetary policy rate. And another one is the cost of rolling over the old debt at the new higher premium.

So, my estimate is that these costs have increased by about 110 basis points, of which 50 basis points are the result of an increase in the premium—the spread—and 60 basis points is a result of these rollover costs. And the rollover costs come from the fact that now we have so much more debt that every time you get a little bit more of a spread, eventually when you end up rolling over all the old debt, that is going to cost you a lot more from the point of view of the fiscal deficit.

Now, the most commonly understood term is the spread, the premium component. And that has two components. One is the rollover premium, if you will. That one I measured by the Treasury basis trade, essentially. You can probably explain it better than I can.

Krugman: Yeah, I’m not sure I can do that either. But it’s essentially from how much more a Treasury bond pays over a swap that doesn’t use the same amount of balance sheet. And we call that the convenience yield, that Treasury bonds would actually sell at a higher price than the implicit price in a swap of corresponding maturity. And the swap is a swap on corporate debt, right?

Caballero: No, no, no. It’s on safe interest rates. Just think of a futures contract. It’s the fixed rate of a future, of a swap. So think of a futures contract.

Krugman: Okay. But essentially, people were willing to accept a lower interest rate if they were just buying U.S. government debt, rather than doing something more complicated.

Caballero: Yeah, actually it’s not necessarily more complicated. But it happens that the Treasury bonds have a lot of other advantages. You could use them for so many things: collateral and so on. And that was worth a lot. And that’s an interesting angle, actually. It was worth a lot also because the marginal holder was a very different holder from the current one—central banks and so on. For a central bank, like the Bank of Japan, it’s not very useful to have duration through swaps and the like. They like to hold the Treasury bonds.

Now it’s a bit different. The marginal holder may not be the Bank of Japan. It may be some levered agent in the economy, and for that agent, balance sheet and so on is very important. So if you look across all the maturities, that spread was on the order of -18 basis points before COVID, if you will. And now it’s around, I don’t know, zero.

And the other one is the duration component. And if you look across all the maturities, essentially the U.S. didn’t pay much for duration exposure and now it’s paying like 40 basis points for that. So that’s the way you get to 60 basis points.

Krugman: So yeah, people are demanding a higher interest rate basically to tie their stock up in long-term stability.

Caballero: Yeah, I mean, they’re demanding a higher premium because the safe interest rate goes up for the kind of things we were talking about before—wealth and the like. And the question is, what about on top of that?

Krugman: Okay. And so, I should have these numbers in my head, but a few years back, the U.S. Treasury could issue 30-year bonds—so basically lock in financing for the next 30 years—for several hundred basis points, several interest percentage points lower. And it’s now 5-point-something, which is just way, way higher than before. It basically means the federal government was paying hardly more, if anything more, than the inflation rate, and in fact less, and then if you subtract growth in the economy, basically no burden of debt.

Caballero: Yeah. I mean, in real terms, we went from zero or negative for the 30-year bond to plus 2% or 2.5%. So it’s quite significant. And what I’m saying is that perhaps maybe one-third of that is a result of the fact that there is a little bit of a glut of all these assets.

Krugman: And just going back, what happened was that the United States and other countries that also issue stuff that is perceived as safe just sold a lot of bonds, and a lot of that was because of COVID, right?

Caballero: Absolutely. That was a big thing. And nowadays corporates are issuing a lot of bonds as well because we’re in the middle of this investment boom. And so, I think corporates in the U.S. are going to issue on the order of $2 trillion this year. That’s an enormous amount of competition.

Krugman: Yeah. And probably people think of Microsoft bonds as being very nearly as safe as U.S. government debt.

Caballero: For a while, Apple bonds sold at a higher price than Treasury bonds. I think it was a very brief moment, but I think it did happen.

Krugman: I do see where sometimes people say, “I’m going to get you something that’s safer than U.S. government debt.” And I always wonder, what do you think anything is going to be worth if the U.S. government goes bankrupt? Who’s going to enforce the contracts?

Caballero: I assume they are talking about price risk more than the default risk. And by the way, I wrote this paper on a lot of debt, if you will, and what that does to aggregate demand. But I’m not predicting any sort of crisis; I don’t see that. I think there’s nothing that can substitute for U.S. Treasury bonds. I always say, you know, there isn’t enough French real estate you can move to if you want to get out of the U.S. So the paper I wrote says precisely, “No, no, no. Assume that this will remain safe.” I don’t think that this is the issue. The issue is that it becomes more costly to issue this safe debt and that begins to become a big drag on aggregate demand.

Krugman: In some ways you answered the question already. But I’ve been wondering, how much of what we’re seeing is just that there’s a lot of debt out there and you basically have to reward people more to get them to absorb it, and how much of it is an actual loss of faith in the safety of the stuff?

I’m seeing back and forth on this, by the way. I’m reading Robin Brooks, and he’s talking about the debasement trade and people worried about the security of U.S. debt. And I think you are not worried. But the question of whether you are worried and whether somebody out there might be worried are not the same question.

Caballero: Of course.

Krugman: Do you see any signs that people are, in fact, losing faith in the safety of U.S. debt as opposed to just that they don’t really want all that much of it?

Caballero: I think inflation risk is something that is a bigger concern. That’s a debasement risk more than, I think, a default—I would assume. I mean, I don’t know what’s on some people’s minds. But I think there is a much bigger concern out there about inflation, and particularly with the current Fed and, you know, interaction there is not very good. But I suspect it’s that kind of thing.

Having said this, you are seeing a little bit of a change. You remember we talked about corporate bond spreads having shrunk. But not in the hyperscalers. Now, you have seen a little bit of concern there that didn’t exist at all a few months back.

Krugman: Yeah, I have to say, if you go back just a few years and you looked at the big established tech quasi-monopolies, they had this enormous cash flow and these huge business technological moats around their quasi-monopoly positions. And how could they ever be in financial problems? And the answer is, well, if they’re going to spend $3 trillion on a technology that, however great it is, may or may not actually be profitable for the people who spend on it... That could do it. So, yeah.

It’s at least arguable—I mean, you don’t have to get particularly political to say that the U.S. government doesn’t sound the way it used to sound. Maybe you can help me here. I’ve been trying to wrap my mind around what a loss of confidence in U.S. debt would mean. How would that even play out? When people say, “Oh, people are going to dump their U.S. bonds,” I always ask, “And buy what?” And you’re in that same camp?

Caballero: Mostly, yeah. I mean, again, local is different. With a small scare, you can see lost revenue. There was an episode when inflation was a little higher than now and people perceived, for the reasons you just described, equity in this hyperscale assets hypothesis. And I think part of the reason the equity risk premium was so low—and now it’s been increasing a little—it was exactly that. Treasuries were perceived relative to the main shocks that we were experiencing—inflation, if you like—Treasuries were perceived as riskier than some AI-related equities. So you could see for local shocks and so on, depending on the nature of the shock, something going into equities and the like. But otherwise I just think there is nothing that can be done in size, in very significant size.

But we can get a spike. Remember in March of 2020, I think it was, there was a moment in which foreign central banks wanted to sell Treasuries and the Treasury swap spread got unwound because of margin calls, and we did see big spikes in treasuries. And I think the swap lines that were created by the U.S., by the Fed and the like, were mechanisms to try to stabilize episodic things. But I call them episodic. I just don’t see anything that can hang in there for a long time without creating a matching mess.

Krugman: Yeah. One of the marks of really, really effective financial policy is that nobody even notices that you did it.

Caballero: Exactly. Absolutely. That was very well managed.

Krugman: March 2020, for a couple of days, was absolutely terrifying. But they responded effectively. Although, actually, even then, what were people buying?

Caballero: Cash.

Krugman: Ah yes, they were piling into cash. And of course, the thing about that is we can print cash.

Caballero: True, eventually. But first you have to go through a spike and then it happens.

Krugman: Yeah.

Caballero: But effectively that’s what they did. When you create a swap line, it’s just like printing cash.

Krugman: Yeah, that’s right. I’d say I probably get about 15 emails a morning saying, “Here’s how the dollar is going to collapse. It’s the great American financial crisis.” And it usually starts with how irresponsible U.S. policymakers are. All of which is true. But how does this happen? You know, give me the mechanics of the crisis. And I’ve never been able to get an answer on that.

Caballero: Yeah, I don’t see it either, but I do see a drift. I do see a drift. People can be very creative. You give them time. If you tell me now I have to relocate $40 trillion of debt somewhere else, there’s nothing I can do. But, I mean, give them enough time. People start finding certain things that they use, to find sort of safe and appealing, or more appealing [places to put their money]. So I think drift can do a lot more damage than events.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, I’ve been on a kind of related subject: the international role of the dollar in the global payments system. And it’s really, really hard to see anything replacing the dollar, but workarounds that people manage to do—you know, we’re witnessing that in the Persian Gulf as we speak. People can find their way around it.

Financially, what keeps you up at night? I mean, we’ve both lived through and were very attentive during two inconceivable financial crises. Although the one in 2020 got solved very quickly. But I remember 2008. I actually had a relative who was working at the New York Fed and that weekend, the 13th, 14th of September, he wasn’t answering his phone and we said something must be up. And it sure as hell was.

Caballero: That was a long weekend there.

Krugman: Yeah, it was. He had bags under his eyes big enough to pack your luggage in. But anyway, are there scenarios out there that you worry about now?

Caballero: More than a crisis, I worry about the fragility of the current boom. Precisely for the reasons we have been discussing. I think that high valuations are a needed ingredient in the development of this wonderful technology nowadays. But at the same time, we’re quite fragile to that. I mean, the good thing is that we have a lot of space to cut interest rates very, very rapidly if something goes wrong. But I think things are fragile.

I’m exaggerating here but, you know, Venezuela did great under Chavez for a long time because the price of oil was rising a lot. And I feel that a lot of what is happening that is good has to do with AI covering up a lot of stuff. So I’m a little afraid about something that depends on high valuations that could come down very abruptly, and then we don’t do that great.

Krugman: Yeah, I mean, you’re younger than me, but old enough to remember the late ‘90s. And I remember how everything seemed wonderful. Although that was a bubble during which people were happy. We’re now managing to have something different: It may be a bubble, but somehow everybody hates it.

Caballero: A lot of people are very happy with the current bubble.

Krugman: That’s true.

Caballero: But it is also true that there’s a negative side as well. Now, having said that—this may be very optimistic, but I think that the current story is—there’s more alignment between the high valuations and the people that are really involved in generating this revolution. I think the fragility comes from different things. The Chinese may come out with some technologies that wipe out a big part of the competitive advantage we have and things of that kind. Sort of creative destruction-type things can be quite bad for financial wealth temporarily.

Krugman: So, last question: What do you think of Scott Bessent’s attempt to push those top rates down?

Caballero: I suspect they got very nervous, and I think that they wanted to cut a tail. I think he’s smart enough to know that he cannot change fundamentals, but I think precisely because of the fragility—I mean, I think they’re very worried that financial conditions can tighten very abruptly with a spike of that long end and then crash precisely the equity market and the like. And I think to me, this was a sort of “put”-type policy for financial conditions, which is quite important, obviously, for all the developments, political and economic.

Krugman: Interesting times. This discussion will be posted four days after we’re having it, and given the way things are, it may be totally out of date by then. But I’m actually feeling somewhat more relaxed after this discussion, because I was a little bit worried that you were going to tell us that there are no safe assets anymore and the world is doomed.

Caballero: Currently I don’t believe that. We shall see whether that’s naivete or wisdom.

Krugman: Well, thanks so much for talking with me.

Caballero: It was a pleasure.

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Note: After I recorded this it was reported that Trump officials are threatening to demolish the Kennedy Center if it can’t be renovated to Trump’s taste (and presumably with his name added). Matches my argument exactly.

Der Untergang naht.

Pardon my German pronunciation. I’m going to take a break today from wonky economic analysis and talk about, well, Donald Trump, but in a slightly different way from what I think most people are saying. Not positive, obviously.

Just before recording this, I saw that Trump wants to rename Lake Ontario Lake America. Which is silly, would be funny, except that this guy is the President of the United States. And it’s really kind of troublesome that someone in that position is that out of it, that petty, disconnected from reality.

And look, it’s not news to anybody that Trump is ego-driven, disconnected from reality, and at the same time, somehow commands a level of deference and obedience from the entire machinery of the federal government that no president has ever had before. So this is really quite serious.

What I don’t think people are fully aware of is just how bad it can get, given that Trump is so obviously dissociating, decompensating, that he’s not all there.

Obviously, he was already a very problematic personality, which was doing a great deal of damage to the United States. I don’t think even now people fully appreciate the amount of damage that has been done. Even before the Iran War, Trump’s provocations, insults, his trade wars, really destroyed the world’s trust in America.

America became a country that could not be trusted to honor agreements. It was a country that constantly tried to bully other countries. Our word was worth nothing. Our sanity was not to be taken for granted. And then, of course, along comes Iran, where in addition to showing that we’re not to be trusted, that we’re not going to be relied upon., we also showed that we were far weaker than people imagined.

If there’s one thing people thought it was, well, America has a powerful military. It turns out, well, not as powerful and not nearly as competent as people thought. How much of that is the result of Trump and Hegseth degrading it and how much of it was there to begin with is an interesting question. But anyway, at this point, we are not loved, we are not respected, and we aren’t even feared.

And we’re not getting that back. Even if Trump is succeeded by someone decent —God help us if he isn’t— but even if we have a more or less rational, well-intentioned government that follows, the world now knows that we are capable of putting someone like Trump in a position of unprecedented, almost absolute power and that it can happen again.

And the world also knows that we’re just not as fearsome as we seem to be. That we can be defied much more successfully even by smallish countries than anyone really imagined.

And we’re not getting that back. I anxiously wait for the days when we’re no longer a Trump-ruled country, but this is my country, and what will be left of us, what will be left of our role in the world, even once he’s gone?

Okay, the title I gave, the way that I opened this talk was Der Untergang, which is the German title of the movie Downfall, about the last days of Adolf Hitler. I hope that nobody is going to complain about my using the German, right? We’re long past the point where it’s considered unthinkable and incredibly rude to make Nazi parallels. There’s a lot of people in this administration or close to this administration who are effectively Nazis, in some cases explicitly Nazis. America is not yet Germany under Hitler. But the reason we don’t have a functioning Gestapo in this country is not for lack of desire to have one. It’s because these people, at least so far, don’t have the juice. So all of the stuff, all of the parallels seem appropriate.

And the parallels are there. I mean, the parallels are there even in seemingly small things. Hitler was obsessed with building a gigantic gaudy ballroom. So there’s just a lot of parallels in there.

Now the main message of the movie Der Untergang is that it’s about Hitler in his final days who knew that he was losing. He knew that defeat was looming. He knew that his power was collapsing. And his reaction was, among other things, to take it out on his own country.

Hitler never accepted that he had failed Germany. He felt that Germany had failed him. And so he had a plan, often called the Nero Decree, which was to destroy as much as possible of Germany’s infrastructure. Supposedly to deny it to the victorious allies, but in large part to punish Germany.

Well, Trump knows. He may deny it, he may have his moments when he actually believes that the polls are all fake and all of that, but in many ways he is behaving like somebody who knows that his days of supreme power are about to end. He, of course, is not going to accept that it’s his fault. It’s the fault, obviously, of the Democrats, who are all communists. It’s the fault of the Republicans, who didn’t live up to his leadership. The fault of everybody but him.

What does he do in the position of losing? Probably not committing suicide in the Fuhrerbunker, but still in the position of losing all of his power. Well, what you do in that position, if you are somebody like Trump, who is an empty vessel: there’s nothing in there, the only pleasure he appears to take in life comes from dominating other people.

Well, one thing you do is you try to stick your name everywhere, or leave your imprint everywhere. So Trump, according to reporting by Swan and Haberman, spends most of his time thinking about his construction projects and trying to leave his mark on everything in Washington.

What I don’t think we’re fully appreciating even about those projects is that there isn’t a whole lot of actual construction. There’s a lot of starting of stuff, but so far it’s been mostly destruction, mostly tearing stuff down. We don’t have a triumphal arch, but we have a hole where the ballroom is supposed to be. We have just a lot of damage having been done to our nation’s capital and to the iconic structures that were supposed to define, symbolize who we are as a country. The scale of the destruction is really quite amazing.

So I’m not going to try fancy video editing here. I’m just going to show you a picture of what the environs of the White House look like right now. There you go. That bare area is the South Lawn, ripped up because of Trump’s cage match. You can see in the corner there the hole in the ground, which is where the east wing of the White House used to be. Basically, Trump has left, so far, wreckage in his wake.

Even the things which have not involved tearing stuff down, the gilding of statues, the horrific redecoration of the White House, is surpassingly ugly. That’s partly because Trump has terrible taste, but it’s also, I think, a clear sign of aggression. He’s saying, oh yeah, you’re going to give me a 33% approval rating? Well, I’m going to make the nation’s capital as ugly as I can in this little time as I possibly can.

Now, this is all superficial. This is stuff that can and will be repaired. It’ll cost a lot of money, but OK. So we’ll rebuild the White House. We’ll reseed the South Lawn. We’ll strip the gilding off the statues. We’ll make the White House a dignified place again.

But how much more will be coming? When we talk about Hitler’s last days, as I said, one of his last attempted acts was what’s called the Nero Decree, which was an attempt to destroy as much of Germany’s infrastructure as possible, supposedly to deny it to the victorious allies. But clearly, and even there’s some evidence that he actually he clearly thought this as a way of punishing the German people for failing him.

Now, historiography is a little more complicated than that, as it usually is, but that’s clearly the gist of it. That Hitler’s final acts were to basically try to bring everyone else down with him.

Do you really want to say that that’s not what’s going to happen with Trump? Assuming that he loses much, if not all, of his power to shape events this November, and of course we’re all worried about how he may try to disrupt or overturn the election, but assuming he doesn’t manage to do that, he will find himself much diminished. How much damage will he do basically taking revenge on America?

Because always you want to bear in mind that Trump hates America. He hates the values on which America was built. He hates democracy. He hates rule of law. He hates all of the things that are what we’re supposed to be about as a nation.

But increasingly it looks as if he just plain hates this country because it doesn’t love him. How much damage will he do? How much damage can he do? I don’t want to make a specific prediction, but I’m worried.

And don’t say that he won’t do that or he can’t do that. Those have been famous last words again and again over the past decade. So this is going to be even worse, even uglier, I think than most people imagine.

Have a great rest of your day.

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Better transcript!

. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Jared Bernstein

(recorded 8/20/26)

Paul Krugman: Hi everyone. Paul Krugman talking with Jared Bernstein, former chief economist, head of the Council of Economic Advisers under Joe Biden. Now a policy fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and at the Center for American Progress, which is in DC.

Jared Bernstein: And I speak to you from Alexandria.

Krugman: Yeah, and the reason I want to talk with you is, you know, there’s a lot of headlines now about debt. Interest rates, particularly at the long end, are way up. You and I have both been Substacking about it. I think we mostly are on the same wavelength, but I’d like to go back and forth, and I want to talk about some work that you’ve done, particularly with Bobby Kogan. But what’s your take right now? I mean, we had all these headlines about forty trillion dollars of debt. This is very different from the way we were talking about debt a few years ago, so what’s your take?

Bernstein: Well, Paul, like you, for many years I was pushing back on those whose hair was on fire about the urgency of the federal debt. I thought that that overheating was overheated, and that as long as the growth rate surpassed the interest rate and we sort of kept our deficits within kind of a normal range, we could service our debt without breaking a sweat. But a few years ago, I began to become more hawkish and less dovish for a couple of reasons. One, the budget math became less favorable; the growth rate looked a lot closer to the interest rate, and that was before this recent bump up in bond yields. But also, you know, I’ve been in government a lot lately, and it looked to me like neither side really cared much at all. The reaction function, as we say these days, seemed to have been kind of dead in a way that I thought was problematic.

Now, this is not a pox on both houses. And by the way, here’s an area where you and I may have slightly different views. The Republicans’ tax cuts—and Bobby and I have done a lot of work on this—are public enemy number one here. Exhibit A, in terms of why we’re in the mess we’re in. But you know, Democrats have largely endorsed those tax cuts and, in my view, have done some irresponsible stuff, too. So that’s kind of my first take.

Krugman: Okay. You’re talking about r-g, but that’s kind of an important point, right? Why do we think about interest and growth and debt? Lots of people are out there saying, “Look, the interest on the debt is now so huge,” but that’s not quite the whole story, but it’s closer to the story. Anyway, your version of it...

Bernstein: Yeah. For me, a lot of this comes from paying attention to Olivier Blanchard‘s work. He has kind of wedged into a lot of our heads this notion that when the growth rate surpasses the rate of interest, it is possible to keep rolling over that debt and not get into a kind of debt spiral because you’re generating enough growth and revenues and incomes to sustain the debt or to roll it over. Meaning, you know, replace some old debt with new debt without worrying about the debt getting on an unsustainable trajectory. As soon as r is bigger than g, that’s when you have the threat of a debt spiral.

That’s not all the math. It depends on the size of your deficits as well. But broadly speaking, for many years we had pretty good growth and pretty low interest rates. We can talk about how that growth was distributed—a lot of it didn’t reach working-class people—but the fact that g, the growth rate, was higher than the interest rate was one reason why I was less wound up about all this.

Krugman: Yeah, one of my favorite things is talking about the question of “How did we pay off the debt from World War II?” And the answer is we didn’t. The debt when John F. Kennedy was elected was about the same as it had been on V-J Day in dollar terms, but it was just vastly smaller as a share of the economy because we outgrew it. As long as debt doesn’t rise relative to GDP, it’s not a problem. That means if the economy is growing and interest rates are not too high, not only don’t you have to pay off the debt, you can actually keep it growing as long as it just doesn’t grow too fast, right?

Bernstein: Exactly. So the problem we face is when our debt grows faster than our economy, when the debt ratio, or the debt-to-GDP, just keeps going up and up and up.

Krugman: Basically for much of the period when everybody was going on and on about debt, the arithmetic there was actually pretty favorable, right?

Bernstein: This is precisely why I kind of did a bit of a flip. I have an Op-ed in the Times—it’s from at least a year ago—where I managed to actually get them to put a graph in, which, you know, they don’t always do in there, which portrays this problem. It shows how the growth rate used to just reliably be well above the interest rate, where the economy grows faster than the debt, and so your debt-to-GDP ratio sort of glides along in a way that’s not particularly worrisome. But it looks like it’s starting to flip and starting to change.

And then if you look at the CBO forecast, they actually have the interest rate on the debt falling below the growth rate numerous years out. And their estimates actually are kind of optimistic in debt terms because they assume a number of things: they assume tariffs continue to generate a bunch of revenue, which doesn’t look to be the case; they assume that some of the Trump tax cuts would fade, but now they’re permanent. So yeah, the budget math has gotten less comfortable.

Krugman: Okay. I want to get to the interest rates in a minute, but the deficit that we’re running right now is just incredibly large. I mean, we used to run deficits to fight wars, and then we started to have big deficits when you had severe recessions. But now we have neither. I mean, there’s a war, but it’s not like World War II, right? It’s a fraction of a percent of GDP.

Bernstein: Right, but it’s not free.

Krugman: Yeah, but it’s not forty percent of GDP. It’s something like six percent of GDP now, right?

Bernstein: Exactly. It’s a little north of six percent of GDP. And according to the kind of numbers that I run on this, with the macroeconomy doing pretty well—and again, I know it’s not reaching a lot of folks; affordability concerns loom large—but you know, GDP is growing around trend, which is about two percent real. The unemployment rate is close to four percent, which is in the neighborhood of full employment. And the stock market’s booming. We should have a deficit that’s closer to three percent than six percent.

And what’s happened here, Paul—and you’ve written about this extensively—is that the constant ratcheting down of tax policy. All those tax cuts introduced by Republicans, too often kind of kept in place by Democrats, have really broken the linkage between solid economic growth and revenue flows to the Treasury. And what Bobby and I show is that if you take the Bush and the Trump tax cuts out of the mix, our fiscal scene would look fine. So, you know, that’s important.

What you can do is simulate what the debt ratio would be—by debt ratio we mean debt-to-GDP—or what the deficit would be (either one), or what the interest payments on the deficit would be. You can simulate those if you take the Bush and the Trump tax cuts out of the system, which means taking them and not just the original cuts, but all the following-on legislation that made those cuts permanent.

You know, when I say Democrats have played a role here: I was in the Obama administration when we essentially made permanent 80% of the Bush tax cuts. That’s not a hundred percent, so I’m glad that we let at least 20% at the top end revert back to what they were. But that’s the exercise we did.

Krugman: The blue line in that chart is the projection for debt on the current trajectory, and up to the point where it gets dotted, it’s the actual debt-to-GDP. And it’s really three rounds, right? It’s Bush, which were very much tax cuts for the one percent; then Trump 1, more tax cuts for the one percent; and then Trump 2, even more tax cuts, not entirely for the one percent. Where we are now is not at all where we would be if we hadn’t had all of these tax cuts.

Bernstein: Yeah, and let me say something about this. First of all, I know you do a lot of economic history, which is just really great work in my opinion, and I just don’t want our viewers to not note that that graph started back in, I think, the late 1700s. So that’s some pretty good economic history there.

Remember, those figures, including the one that showed a much lower, much more sustainable debt path, include all the spending that is in the system. The only change we’re making is the tax cuts didn’t happen. And so this is important, because there are always going to be people who say, “You know, it’s all spending,” and “It’s all taxes,” and that’s a common fight. But that figure keeps the spending precisely where CBO says it is. So that’s not a judgment on whether we have the optimal amount of spending—we can argue about things that should be cut or expanded—but those are the numbers; those are the facts.

Krugman: One of the things that strikes me about this is that often if we’re trying to understand what it would take to be able to pay for even what we have, that we would have to have something like European levels of taxation or something radically different. And actually, all we really need for that is Clinton-era levels of taxation.

Bernstein: Precisely right. Yeah, in fact, under the Clinton regime was the last time we had an annual surplus, so the debt-to-GDP was starting to come down, which is what happens when you have a surplus. Now, a lot of that had to do with a big bump in capital gains, and that led to more revenue flows. But that’s precisely the channel that I think we’ve shut down with this endless ratcheting down of tax policy.

Krugman: Yeah, it’s an amazing thing. And you and I both remember the nineties, and I didn’t feel that we were living in a regime of oppressive taxation that was stifling entrepreneurship. Those were the roaring nineties.

Bernstein: No question. The extent to which the political class, particularly Republicans, has convinced so many people and so many media writers that taxes are always bad and must always be cut is one of the reasons we’re in this mess.

Krugman: Okay. Now, clearly the deficit is so big because of, again, another round of tax cuts and the legacy of the past tax cuts. But also, the arithmetic of debt used to basically kind of melt away relative to GDP because of growth exceeding the interest rate, and that’s not the case anymore. Although the gap is not that large even now, right? It’s sort of like a four percent average interest rate on federal debt and maybe three percent nominal growth, three to three and a half. But still, it’s very different now. But the thing that is really striking is that interest rates are way higher than they were not very long ago, especially, of course, at the long end. So I’m actually not fully sure myself what I think is happening, but why do you think interest rates have gone up so much?

Bernstein: You know that old movie—I think it’s called Murder on the Orient Express—where it turned out, spoiler alert, that they were looking for one perp, but there were like 17 perps?

Krugman: Yeah.

Bernstein: I think there’s a bunch of reasons. To me, it seems credible and plausible, so I don’t feel particularly confused about what I’m seeing, though I may be missing something, but I would put at the top of the list that there are two very large demanders of credit right now in both the US and other economies as well. Those are the AI build-out and all the picks and shovels therein. Those folks are now leveraged, meaning they’re borrowing somewhere between six, seven hundred billion and a trillion this year.

Krugman: Right.

Bernstein: I’ve seen plausible estimates that they’re going to borrow a trillion dollars. By the way, a lot of those AI companies used to invest using cash flow. They weren’t leveraging; now they’re borrowing. And they’re borrowing hand over fist. A lot of investors are confident about those returns. I personally think it’s kind of bubbly, but they’re confident about those returns, so they’re certainly buying that debt.

The other big competitor is the US government, and I just mentioned maybe the AI bros will borrow a trillion this year. Well, we know that the US government’s gonna borrow twice that, a little bit north of two trillion. That’s thing one.

Cause number two, is the Trump-induced inflation concerns. So look, if you think that inflation is going to be high and sticky and you’re about to lock up some of your money for a while in a bond, you might want an inflation premium. You might want a little bit more compensation on that interest rate to account for the fact that this is all a nominal deal, and so you want to be compensated for higher expected inflation.

Then there’s the fact that Kevin Warsh has gotten off to a bit of a shaky start, and I think that’s spooking markets a bit, and that kind of uncertainty also calls for a higher risk or term premium.

And then there’s the fact that the country’s being run by an orange maniac. I think that is kind of a long-term risk premium that any investor is concerned about. Some foreign investors, who have often bought a lot of our debt, are saying, “Huh, maybe not so fast given the way this country is governed right now.” So if you put those all together, to me they tell a pretty compelling story.

Krugman: Okay. I think I mostly agree with that, except I have a couple of questions. One is that this is global, right? Interest rates are up all around the advanced world. They’re more or less moving on parallel tracks in Germany, with their famous, slightly insane fiscal discipline, and in Japan, where we used to say nothing ever seemed to matter. I mean, the AI boom is mostly here, and the orange maniac is only here. He would like to be elsewhere, but he’s only here right now. So—

Bernstein: I think he spills over into some other places, but yes.

Krugman: Yeah. So, is there kind of a common story?

Bernstein: I mean, it’s a great question, and I should have said: I don’t think anybody can explain 100% of this variance, but my R2 gets up there pretty good, I guess. I think the problem is that the fiscal accounts of other countries are looking a little bit more like ours than they used to, and that they also seem to be facing a borrowing crunch.

Japan, as you just mentioned, would make our debt-to-GDP ratio look very, very tame, because of course they’ve been north of 200%. And for years, nobody really thought that was too big a problem. But I guess because of some of the global risks—you know, we have geopolitical dynamics; when energy is stuck in the Strait of Hormuz, that is a much bigger deal for Europe, for Japan, for China than it is for us. And so I would argue that the combination of geopolitical tensions and unbalanced fiscal accounts is probably pushing up long rates in other countries as well. But there’s probably more to it.

Krugman: We have a couple of financial indicators that are supposed to capture some of these risks. There’s breakevens, right?

Bernstein: Yeah.

Krugman: The US government sells bonds that are supposedly protected against inflation, and the spread between those and regular bonds should give you an indication of what Mr. Market thinks is going to happen to inflation. And that really isn’t showing anything, right?

Bernstein: Right.

Krugman: And then there are credit default swaps; insurance that will pay out if a company defaults. And there are credit default swaps on the United States government, although I always wonder a little bit what good any contract is if the US government goes into default. But anyway, those are just not flashing red at all.

Bernstein: Yeah, I can speak to that. There’s a couple of points here, one of which I think is very important that you made in your post this morning, and I’ve been trying to stress as well. I really want to make sure we get into it, which I will here.

The first point is that a second ago I said there’s an inflation premium in some of these bonds, meaning that credit investors want to have a slightly higher return because they’re worried about expected inflation. I think that’s a pretty small part of the puzzle; I think it’s more on short-term than on long-term loans. And this is clear if you look at where you really see the increase—for example, the 30-year bond is in the inflation-protected version, and that tells you that it’s not just inflation; it’s making the breakeven point a different way. And that tells you that there’s some nervousness about the long-term prospects of the US project.

The important thing that I wanted to nail here is that I think of this as much more of a slow burn than something that’s going to explode this week or next week. I don’t think the US is going to have a Liz Truss moment. I’m referring to the case in the UK where creditors engaged in what’s called a sudden stop: they looked at her fiscal plan and said, “That’s it, we’re out. We’re not going to invest in that country anymore.” I don’t think that happens here, for a variety of reasons that you and I can tick through.

But that doesn’t mean that everything’s fine and happy-dappy or we’re out of the woods. It’s more of a slow burn, this upward pressure on rates, which folds into affordability—mortgage, auto, credit card loans, and so on—that is a problem for American households and consumers. And that is less of a “what’s inflation going to be next week” story and more of a “higher for longer” problem, where rates look to me and to many others like they’re going to stay up for a while because these problems are structural.

Krugman: Yeah. There’s a lot of crisis talk, as there was, by the way, back in 2010 when there was really no problem at all. And my problem with that has always been: explain to me how that happens. You say people will go on a buyers’ strike and try to sell all of their US government debt, and my question is always, “And buy what?” I mean, it’s not like there’s an obvious place. Even for Britain, the Liz Truss moment was much more limited than people claim. And for the US as a whole, it’s not like Greece, where people were demanding euros and the Greeks couldn’t print euros. As someone said, it’s that we should be thinking about termites, not a tornado.

Bernstein: Yeah, and here’s why I think this is so important, and you and I have both been circling around this point: It’s very important for human welfare—not just American, but for human welfare—that the current thugs running the government be banished and held accountable. I’m sorry if that sounds partisan, but I don’t think it is.

And for that to happen, I don’t think candidates can run on—I remember the John Kasich platform, which is, “Vote for me and I’ll lower the debt and the deficit. We’ll all eat our spinach.” And I think that’s a mistake. I think it’s a mistake politically, and I think it’s a mistake economically. As you wrote this morning, don’t panic. I agree with that. This is a structural problem that’s not going away anytime soon, but we can chip away at it by reversing some of the high-end tax cuts, which I think would be both progressive and send a signal to markets and investors that we’re actually back in the business of having a reaction function to our unsustainable path.

But first and foremost, we have to meet the very basic, urgent needs of households that have been left behind for too long: health care, child care, housing, energy costs. That, to me, is the first demand on fiscal policy. And so I think the fact that neither you nor I see a pending sudden stop or credit crisis—we could be wrong about that, in which case we’ll have to reconfigure—but based on history, I think we still have time to get this right, and we should do both. We should walk and chew gum.

Krugman: Okay. At the risk of delaying a moment until we get to what to do, there’s one thing that kinda bothers me intellectually: during the era of low interest rates, we had a really good story—secular stagnation—basically that largely because of low birth rates and a stagnant working-age population, there was just going to be lots of savings and not enough places to spend it on. And that’s kind of what we thought had happened to Japan. And now here we are.

Just six years ago, I would have been a full-on secular stagnation guy, and now we have, whatever it is, 5.3% interest rates on the 30-year. Were we all wrong about that, or did something really radically change?

Bernstein: I think that we were over-torquing or over-indexing a bit on a period where interest rates were uniquely low, and we built a big story about secular stagnation that I sort of believed at the time. But I look back now and I think that perhaps that wasn’t as believable as we thought.

I think what might have been happening instead was we just had what Ben Bernanke called a global savings glut. We had excess savings, and there are a lot of reasons for that; it doesn’t have to be a lack of investment opportunities. A lot of it had to do with international imbalances, which you’ve written a lot about. And so these excess savings found their ways into U.S. Treasuries because it was the safest debt you could buy, and the U.S. looked like a going concern, so a lot of those resources flowed here. And that glut of savings, often coming out of Asian trade surpluses, led to rates that were really quite depressed for a long time. But as those dynamics changed, I think the savings glut is in the rearview mirror and the dynamics are more like those we’re talking about today.

Krugman: Yeah. If I can say, one intellectual trap that I fall into far more often than I should is the lure of a beautiful model that seems to fit the facts for a while. The secular stagnation model was lovely, and it all fit together, and there were the low interest rates. And then all of a sudden, it wasn’t really that solidly grounded. But the fact that a model seems to work for a while doesn’t necessarily mean—

Bernstein: Well, it may have been the right model for the time. And look, you’ve made a career and won a Nobel Prize for beautiful models, so I wouldn’t—I don’t want to wave you off of that.

But I think there’s another dynamic to this—see if this resonates with you. One of the foundational principles behind secular stagnation is the idea that there’s more savings than there are credible investments, or places to put it; there’s just an absence of investment.

Krugman: Right.

Bernstein: And by the way, when Larry Summers raised this issue of secular stagnation, Ben Bernanke stood up at the IMF conference and said, “Wait a second, there’s lots of places to invest.” I’m not sure that was exactly right at the time, but it sure is not the case now, right? And that’s the AI boom.

There’s this tremendous investment opportunity going on now. Again, I think those guys are over their skis because there’s so much more investment than there is profitability right now that I have bubble worries, and Ryan Cummings and I have written numerous pieces on this. But secular stagnation, or the absence of investment to absorb the excess savings, may have been a fact for a few years there, but as this new technology came along, as is often the case, you now have an investment absorption mechanism.

Krugman: Right. And it’s probably worth saying, just going back, that it’s not just that the hyperscalers are borrowing money when they used to not have to, but also presumably before, all of these huge profits being generated off our social media addiction were effectively being parked in places where they could then be lent out. And now, instead of pouring water into that pool, they’re drawing water out of it, and that adds to this pressure.

Okay, big question: hopefully January 20th, 2029, President—name your favorite—with majorities in both houses comes in. And aside from needing to go after all of the legacy of corruption and all of that, they’re going to come in during what looks like it’s going to be a less forgiving financial environment than we might have hoped. What do you do? What’s your agenda for how we address all this?

Bernstein: Well, first of all, from your lips to God’s ears, as we used to say. If we find ourselves in that situation, I will be partying in the streets and not worrying about the interest rate, at least for a few days.

I’m sure you’re right, and it’s an important question and an important framing of the question. I think there’s a path forward, though. First of all, we should definitely hold the Trumpies accountable and in a big way. I’ve written about that, and I think we have to Trump-proof our government because other authoritarians will come along. But if that’s all we do, we’re falling short. We really have to attack with the affordability agenda. And there, I think we should look at not just Mamdani and some of the others on the left who are making delivering the absolute key plank of their political project, but so is Abigail Spanberger and Mikie Sherrill from the center. So it’s not just a left-center thing; it’s just about rejecting the status quo and delivering to American households who’ve been not just abandoned, but abused for so long, especially under this administration.

And in terms of the context of what we’re talking about now, how do you do that if you’re in a high-rate environment and you have this budget outlook? Well, we have to reverse the high-end tax cuts. We have to close investment loopholes. We have to close the tax gap. We have to fund the IRS enforcement mechanism, because for every dollar you invest in IRS enforcement, you collect something like nine or ten dollars in taxes that are currently being evaded almost exclusively from the top of the scale. Closing the tax gap is a project that could yield five, six, seven hundred billion per year.

Krugman: Let me, by the way, explain again for listeners: “the tax gap” is a term of art. It’s not just hand-waving; it’s speaking specifically about money that people owe that we’re not collecting because the IRS doesn’t have the resources, and it’s overwhelmingly very high-income people. So you’re saying that’s like two percent of GDP.

Bernstein: I recently heard Natasha Sarin talk about this and she used, I think, that exact figure. I’m colorblind, so I’m not sure what color it was, but the chart that Bobby Kogan and I used—I think it was green—that could get us closer back to that debt-to-GDP line that’s much more sustainable. And they rest largely on applying taxes to where income and wealth have exploded at the top of the scale, so they neither hurt middle-income people nor compromise the affordability agenda.

I don’t want to be too Pollyannaish about this: a dollar spent on childcare is a dollar that’s not available for debt reduction. But what I really don’t think we should do is say we have to come in here and clean up the Republicans’ debt mess as our first priority. Anything we do that stops digging us into a deeper fiscal hole—even if we’re digging more slowly, or even better yet, stop digging, not necessarily filling—would be, I think, not only good fiscal policy, but probably welcomed by the markets as a sign that the congressional reaction function to the fiscal outlook isn’t dead.

Krugman: I regret to inform you that the good debt scenario, if we hadn’t had all of these irresponsible tax cuts, the line is orange, which is kind of an unfortunate choice given where we are in America right now.

Bernstein: Whoops.

Krugman: But anyway, I think you may have partially answered my question. When I look at that “if we hadn’t had those tax cuts” line, that would be great. If that was where we were, then I certainly wouldn’t be worrying at all about debt. But although those tax cuts were very heavily tilted to the top, with something like thirty to forty percent going to the one percent, reversing all of them would hit a number of people who at least think of themselves as middle class. And so the question is: what is within the realm of the politically possible that we can actually do?

Bernstein: Great question. And I definitely have argued and tried to stress that the right place to start and to linger is at the top of the scale. I don’t think we should raise taxes on middle-class or middle-class-adjacent people; they’re having a hard enough time already and don’t need an extra tax burden.

But the extent to which income and wealth have accumulated at the top of the scale—I’m sure you’ve seen the factor share data showing that the labor share of national income is kind of uniquely low and the profit share is uniquely high. And so I think we have to be pretty aggressive in that regard, but we can do so without dinging the middle class.

If you listen to some budget hawks, they say we have to get back to that orange line. To be clear, I’m not saying that. I don’t think we do have to get back to the orange line. By the way, Danny Yagan has some nice papers on this, saying that we can be really gradual about getting back to some version of fiscal responsibility, but we have to move in that direction. We sort of have to change the sign, even if the magnitude is tiny.

Krugman: Yeah, I think the post-World War II story is actually kind of helpful here because people talked for a long time about, “How are we going to pay the national debt? How are we gonna pay off the war debts?” And we never did. In fact, by sometime in the sixties the debt was higher in dollar terms than it had been, but the trajectory of all of the ratios was down, and we probably don’t even have to do that steep a descent, right?

Bernstein: Yeah. Some people want to say that AI is gonna save our bacon because it’s gonna generate so much growth. In the piece with Bobby, we have a section on it, and my view is kind of like: hope for the best, plan for the worst.

Krugman: Yeah.

Bernstein: I’m kind of stuck on the fact that the internet really did eventually have a strong productivity impact, and then it went away.

Krugman: Yeah, things can go into reverse, but there was only about ten years of good growth.

Bernstein: Yeah, exactly, and then we kind of got back to where we were. So a lot of the AI productivity discussion assumes that not only will AI boost the level of productivity, but it’ll just keep getting better and better and better so that it improves the growth rate. And you know, I hope that’s true, but I certainly wouldn’t bet on it.

Krugman: So, what are you hoping for in the spring of 2029 as our hypothetical virtuous government comes along?

Bernstein: I am hoping for the following: I spend a fair amount of time scratching my aging noggin with the question of how much of the damage done by the Trump regime is temporary and can be quickly repaired, or is long-term and will be with us for a while.

If a good Democrat takes over and we have some legislative power, can we restore good relationships with Canada and Europe? Or are they gonna be like, “Screw you, we’ve seen what you guys do. You’re okay, but we don’t know who the next guy’s gonna be. We might be looking at President Vance around the corner.”

So I guess what I’m hoping for and looking for is that the damage can be reversed in my lifetime, which isn’t the longest span of years. And that’s an open question.

What about you? You answer that question.

Krugman: Well, okay. When you ask me about the economics—can we restore, can we even significantly reverse the drift to oligarchy—I’m actually fairly optimistic that it’s within the realm of the doable. When it comes to our international relations, when it comes to our military credibility, I don’t know. I think we’re talking about a generations-long project, and that really upsets me quite a lot.

At some level, you know, I talk about Iran or something like that and I say, “Okay, this is Trump’s failure and we should wrap it around his neck.” But in the end, it’s my country, too. And my God, we are not the country we were in the eyes of the world, and I don’t know when we ever will be again.

Bernstein: I agree with you, Paul, and I share that worry. I’ll only say the following: it may be a generational project, but if it is, it’s a great generational project, and generations should be anxious to undertake it.

Krugman: Well, on that happy note, thanks so much for talking to me.

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