Paul Krugman Podcast

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TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Jared Bernstein

(recorded 8/20/26)

Paul Krugman: Hi everyone. Paul Krugman talking with Jared Bernstein, former chief economist, head of the Council of Economic Advisers under Joe Biden. Now a policy fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and at the Center for American Progress, which is in DC.

Jared Bernstein: And I speak to you from Alexandria.

Krugman: Yeah, and the reason I want to talk with you is, you know, there’s a lot of headlines now about debt. Interest rates, particularly at the long end, are way up. You and I have both been Substacking about it. I think we mostly are on the same wavelength, but I’d like to go back and forth, and I want to talk about some work that you’ve done, particularly with Bobby Kogan. But what’s your take right now? I mean, we had all these headlines about forty trillion dollars of debt. This is very different from the way we were talking about debt a few years ago, so what’s your take?

Bernstein: Well, Paul, like you, for many years I was pushing back on those whose hair was on fire about the urgency of the federal debt. I thought that that overheating was overheated, and that as long as the growth rate surpassed the interest rate and we sort of kept our deficits within kind of a normal range, we could service our debt without breaking a sweat. But a few years ago, I began to become more hawkish and less dovish for a couple of reasons. One, the budget math became less favorable; the growth rate looked a lot closer to the interest rate, and that was before this recent bump up in bond yields. But also, you know, I’ve been in government a lot lately, and it looked to me like neither side really cared much at all. The reaction function, as we say these days, seemed to have been kind of dead in a way that I thought was problematic.

Now, this is not a pox on both houses. And by the way, here’s an area where you and I may have slightly different views. The Republicans’ tax cuts—and Bobby and I have done a lot of work on this—are public enemy number one here. Exhibit A, in terms of why we’re in the mess we’re in. But you know, Democrats have largely endorsed those tax cuts and, in my view, have done some irresponsible stuff, too. So that’s kind of my first take.

Krugman: Okay. You’re talking about r-g, but that’s kind of an important point, right? Why do we think about interest and growth and debt? Lots of people are out there saying, “Look, the interest on the debt is now so huge,” but that’s not quite the whole story, but it’s closer to the story. Anyway, your version of it...

Bernstein: Yeah. For me, a lot of this comes from paying attention to Olivier Blanchard‘s work. He has kind of wedged into a lot of our heads this notion that when the growth rate surpasses the rate of interest, it is possible to keep rolling over that debt and not get into a kind of debt spiral because you’re generating enough growth and revenues and incomes to sustain the debt or to roll it over. Meaning, you know, replace some old debt with new debt without worrying about the debt getting on an unsustainable trajectory. As soon as r is bigger than g, that’s when you have the threat of a debt spiral.

That’s not all the math. It depends on the size of your deficits as well. But broadly speaking, for many years we had pretty good growth and pretty low interest rates. We can talk about how that growth was distributed—a lot of it didn’t reach working-class people—but the fact that g, the growth rate, was higher than the interest rate was one reason why I was less wound up about all this.

Krugman: Yeah, one of my favorite things is talking about the question of “How did we pay off the debt from World War II?” And the answer is we didn’t. The debt when John F. Kennedy was elected was about the same as it had been on V-J Day in dollar terms, but it was just vastly smaller as a share of the economy because we outgrew it. As long as debt doesn’t rise relative to GDP, it’s not a problem. That means if the economy is growing and interest rates are not too high, not only don’t you have to pay off the debt, you can actually keep it growing as long as it just doesn’t grow too fast, right?

Bernstein: Exactly. So the problem we face is when our debt grows faster than our economy, when the debt ratio, or the debt-to-GDP, just keeps going up and up and up.

Krugman: Basically for much of the period when everybody was going on and on about debt, the arithmetic there was actually pretty favorable, right?

Bernstein: This is precisely why I kind of did a bit of a flip. I have an Op-ed in the Times—it’s from at least a year ago—where I managed to actually get them to put a graph in, which, you know, they don’t always do in there, which portrays this problem. It shows how the growth rate used to just reliably be well above the interest rate, where the economy grows faster than the debt, and so your debt-to-GDP ratio sort of glides along in a way that’s not particularly worrisome. But it looks like it’s starting to flip and starting to change.

And then if you look at the CBO forecast, they actually have the interest rate on the debt falling below the growth rate numerous years out. And their estimates actually are kind of optimistic in debt terms because they assume a number of things: they assume tariffs continue to generate a bunch of revenue, which doesn’t look to be the case; they assume that some of the Trump tax cuts would fade, but now they’re permanent. So yeah, the budget math has gotten less comfortable.

Krugman: Okay. I want to get to the interest rates in a minute, but the deficit that we’re running right now is just incredibly large. I mean, we used to run deficits to fight wars, and then we started to have big deficits when you had severe recessions. But now we have neither. I mean, there’s a war, but it’s not like World War II, right? It’s a fraction of a percent of GDP.

Bernstein: Right, but it’s not free.

Krugman: Yeah, but it’s not forty percent of GDP. It’s something like six percent of GDP now, right?

Bernstein: Exactly. It’s a little north of six percent of GDP. And according to the kind of numbers that I run on this, with the macroeconomy doing pretty well—and again, I know it’s not reaching a lot of folks; affordability concerns loom large—but you know, GDP is growing around trend, which is about two percent real. The unemployment rate is close to four percent, which is in the neighborhood of full employment. And the stock market’s booming. We should have a deficit that’s closer to three percent than six percent.

And what’s happened here, Paul—and you’ve written about this extensively—is that the constant ratcheting down of tax policy. All those tax cuts introduced by Republicans, too often kind of kept in place by Democrats, have really broken the linkage between solid economic growth and revenue flows to the Treasury. And what Bobby and I show is that if you take the Bush and the Trump tax cuts out of the mix, our fiscal scene would look fine. So, you know, that’s important.

What you can do is simulate what the debt ratio would be—by debt ratio we mean debt-to-GDP—or what the deficit would be (either one), or what the interest payments on the deficit would be. You can simulate those if you take the Bush and the Trump tax cuts out of the system, which means taking them and not just the original cuts, but all the following-on legislation that made those cuts permanent.

You know, when I say Democrats have played a role here: I was in the Obama administration when we essentially made permanent 80% of the Bush tax cuts. That’s not a hundred percent, so I’m glad that we let at least 20% at the top end revert back to what they were. But that’s the exercise we did.

Krugman: The blue line in that chart is the projection for debt on the current trajectory, and up to the point…

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According to an old military maxim, amateurs talk about strategy, professionals talk about logistics. But these days we need a third category: Immature, insecure guys think that war is about acting tough and looking cool.

Hi, Paul Krugman with a podcast update for today. I want to weigh in on the incredible rash of stories about how Trump and company are eviscerating the military. It is truly remarkable. If there’s one thing that we thought that the United States was still kind of number one at, it was that we had the world’s premier military. Now, of course, we managed to rather quickly effectively lose the war with Iran, although current management will never admit it.

But also just a series of stories, some of them related to that war, some of them going beyond and to other areas that just are truly shocking, even for somebody like me, who had no expectation that this administration would be doing any good for the nation.

Just to remember the story: So first we had the big warning that the U.S. military was basically running out of ammunition. That the precision missiles that are so essential to waging war were largely gone, expended unproductively against Iran. And clearly the cost benefit calculus was a disaster because the Iranians were sending cheap drones and we were using multi-million dollar weapons in an attempt to counter them.

After that, we got the story about the horrific conditions on board the USS Lincoln, the aircraft carrier that’s been stationed for a very long time without, it appears, adequate resupply and with toilets flooding. Apparently just horrific conditions, which turn out to be not unique to that ship: Other ships are having problems. There’s the USS Boxer, an amphibious assault ship, which apparently has run out of feminine hygiene products, among other things.

Okay, so we have those horrific stories. And then we have the stories about Trump intervening. Demanding, first, that the Navy construct a whole new class of ships, Trump-class battleships, which are useless and would be sitting ducks. Then demanding that the Navy replace modern catapults with steam catapults, which he thinks are cooler. And then demanding that they relocate the command tower on aircraft carriers because he wants them to look more like the way they looked during World War II.

Is this America? I mean, think about the American way of war. We are not a warrior nation, which is fine. We are a lot of other things.

We were a nation that was supreme in the arts of peace. We were a nation of know-how. America won its wars by doing the arts of peace right, by.building better and more stuff than other countries. By getting our act together in ways that didn’t necessarily involve fighting.

Of course, you always need courageous warriors. You always need people able and willing to risk death in the service of their nation. But what America was supreme at was logistics. If you ask how did America and its allies pull off D-Day, well, a lot of it was being able to deliver supplies to the beaches of Normandy in a way that the Germans never thought was possible.

America was always the place, the country that was really good at logistics. For us to be not feeding our sailors, not able to keep ships that are not, after all, under fire all the time, to keep the plumbing working, that is incredible.

The idea that the president is imposing his personal aesthetic preferences to undo design decisions that were made by military professionals is also basically incredible.

Okay, what is this all about? And what happened? Some of it is specifically military, but mostly it’s not. I think these military failings should be put in the same context as the frantic and disastrous destruction and redesign of Washington, D.C. The demolition of the East Wing. The disastrous attempt to refurbish the reflecting pool to reflect Trump’s aesthetics. Even the gold leaf and gold lettering that is polluting the White House. All of this is really part of the same picture.So what is going on here?

Obviously we have a seriously mentally ill, mentally deficient guy with his finger on the button. The president of the United States is clearly dissociating, I’ve been calling it sundowning because I personally saw sundowning during my father’s awful last year.

Trump is not in full possession of his faculties, and he is obsessing about things that are really just kind of remnant ego trips. I haven’t read the Haberman book yet, but reportedly he spends a large fraction of his time and probably a larger fraction of his mental energy on his redecoration projects, which aside from all being carried out disastrously are also in incredibly bad taste. But this is where he is. He’s actually more interested in his giant, tacky, gilded ballroom than he is in the fate of the nation.

But how does somebody like this end up able to impose his will on these disastrous things? How does he end up able to eviscerate the military?

Well, part of it is that this is a wannabe authoritarian regime. We’re in a peculiar state now where the United States is not yet a police state. It is not yet a place where the secret police will cart you away for expressing the wrong opinion, unless you are not a white U.S. citizen. Maybe the time is coming when that will happen. But in any case, we are not yet East Germany under the Stasi. We are not yet Putin’s Russia.

But the Republican Party, senior politicians, who should be feeling that they have at least some dignity, ability to take a stand, behave as if they were living in an authoritarian state. They’re obviously terrified. They’re afraid to express any dissent. They go along with Bush’s — see, I’m dissociating, living in the past myself. They’re going along with Trump’s wishes.

On top of that, I think it really helps to think of the ruling party in America right now as being a party that behaves as if we were a full-on authoritarian state. And one of the things we learn about in studying how authoritarian regimes behave is, first of all, that the leader actually can be possibly the worst informed person in the nation because nobody dares to tell him bad news. We’re hearing this a lot about Putin, that he doesn’t know how badly his war is going. Well, Trump in many ways probably still doesn’t understand how badly his war is going.

The really striking thing about the munitions shortage and now the horrible conditions on US ships is that to the extent that any action has been taken on either of those issues is it has been only after extensive reporting in the press. So now the Pentagon is talking about a crash program to have defense manufacturers produce more of the missiles that we’ve been running out of. But it’s not clear it’s even started yet, and that call didn’t happen until many months into the war, whereas the munition shortage was obvious to independent observers just a few weeks in — that we were expending munitions that we couldn’t replace. Nothing happened until there was widespread press reporting.

The USS Lincoln has finally been recalled for refit and shore leave. But that didn’t happen until after many press stories about it, all of which were denied, but it’s very obvious just looking at the behavior that the Pentagon and Hegseth and Trump finally reacted saying, oh, I guess something needs to be done. We can’t let this go on. But they didn’t do it until after the press reported.

Now, is this because they’re totally callous? Well, they are. They don’t care at all. The people who yell support the troops most loudly are the people who actually have no interest whatsoever in supporting the troops. But I think it’s probably also the case that they may not have known. That nobody told Trump that we were running out of missiles. He may have read some press stories to that effect, but he said that’s all fake news and nobody within the administration was willing to tell him.

They may not have been willing to tell Hegseth either, who by all accounts flies into a rage and puni…

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. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Vanessa Williamson

(recorded 8/12/26)

Paul Krugman: This week, I’m talking to Vanessa Williamson, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of a fantastic short history of taxation called The Price of Democracy, which is, I’m pretty sure, an allusion to Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “the price of civilization,” but a very different take. And because I’m so interested these days in tax policy, I thought I could talk to Vanessa to get a sense of a lot of these issues where I am very much an amateur and she’s done the homework. So, hi!

Vanessa Williamson: Hi. Thank you so much for having me.

Krugman: So, yeah, let’s talk about the title of the book first, because obviously the famous Oliver Wendell Holmes quote, which I’ve seen in slightly different versions, was basically saying, you know, if you want police and roads and public order, then you need to have taxes to pay for it. But you’re making a much broader point there. Why don’t you explain why you say it’s the price of democracy?

Williamson: Yeah. So I love the Oliver Wendell Holmes quote, that it’s the price of civilization. But as I was writing this book, which was just going to be a history of taxation in America, it struck me that taxation is really more than the price of civilization—it’s the price of democracy. And that’s because democracy isn’t just being able to vote; it’s people having the power to actually make change to their government. And if the government doesn’t have enough money to act, then, even if you can vote, it’s inconsequential.

Historically, this is a very deep story. Taxation and representation really do develop together. This goes back all the way to 1215 with the Magna Carta, when King John had been taxing at a higher level, and the barons demanded that if there were going to be extraordinary taxation, the king had to get the general consent of the realm.

Krugman: Right.

Williamson: And that was a very early iteration—an attempt to create what eventually became Parliament. So the very origins of representation in our historical tradition are really about taxation, because what you find is that when rulers want to tax, they become dependent on the taxpayers. And it builds a connection between the ruler and the ruled, and it gives the taxpayers power.

I think commonly the story you hear in this anti-tax mythology that’s around is you’d imagine the taxpayers use that power to avoid taxation. The opposite is true: when representation develops, taxes go up because, of course, the taxpayers can now have a say in what the government is doing. So taxation and representation developed together historically, and they developed together cross-nationally. The freest countries today are high-tax countries.

Krugman: That would be, above all, the sort of Nordic countries that are very high-tax?

Williamson: Sure, but it’s true across the board. Even highly developed economies that are authoritarian have lower taxes than you would expect given their level of development. And that’s because authoritarians are simply not very good at raising taxes. They much prefer other forms of revenue, whether that’s a gold mine, the spoils of war, or fees and fines that they can apply to their political opponents. There are just other mechanisms that do not make them dependent on the rank-and-file people of their country.

Krugman: Okay. And I want to come back to the high-tax countries in a minute. But one point that you make at several points in the course of the book is that the idea that taxes are okay is very much a challenge to wealthy people saying, “Well, my wealth is mine, and nobody has the right to take some of it.” And there’s a statement of principle that says, “Well, okay, but you too are subject to the laws of the republic and must pay.” Right? That seems to be a pretty big part of the story.

Williamson: Yeah. There’s this long-standing tension, and it’s not all wealthy people or all the elites at any time in our history, but there are often some who are very, very wealthy. Fundamentally, they don’t like to see themselves as citizens, right? They like to see themselves as masters. The first group of people who felt this way, of course, were the slave owners who were desperately opposed to taxation. The anti-tax components of our Constitution were all put there as part of a compromise with slavery, right?

Krugman: That’s a good point.

Williamson: Yeah, the slaveholder class was afraid of mass democracy, even if only of propertied white men. So we get the Three-Fifths Clause. And they were specifically afraid that if every propertied white man could vote, what you would end up with is abolition by taxation—that we would tax slavery out of existence. And so that’s why you see these anti-tax measures in the Constitution.

It happens again in the Gilded Age. You see Rockefeller claiming that high graduated taxation is the most fundamental threat posed by democracy. You see efforts to roll back suffrage rights during that period, even in Northern cities. So it’s a very long-standing fight between the mass public and the kind of things democratic governments usually want to do—roads, schools, and things of that sort—and a fraction of the elite who are willing to accept democracy as long as that democracy is too poor to threaten their power.

Krugman: Wow. Okay. I’ll come back to the history shortly. One thing that I probably don’t talk about enough when writing about these things, but it’s something I certainly always taught when teaching a class on the economics of the welfare state, is that the high-tax, generous welfare state countries don’t have highly progressive tax systems. The state of the US debate always seems to be about, “Shall we raise taxes on the wealthy?”, which is an important concern. But places like Denmark or Sweden or, just in general, European welfare states, have high taxes sort of on everybody.

Williamson: Yeah. That’s exactly right. I mean, that’s also how we pay for Social Security and Medicare. Big social safety net programs are typically funded by broad-based taxes.

Krugman: Right.

Williamson: I think it’s really important to remember all the things that taxes do. We really focus on the redistribution part. And it’s so important, absolutely, especially now with the incredible consolidation of wealth in this country. We focus on the straightforward redistribution part of the top rates, that kind of thing, or whether we should have a wealth tax. That’s important, you’re exactly right. But at the same time, we just need a lot of revenue. Traditionally, and in terms of long-term sustainability, that’s something that we fund by taxing everybody. But that’s part of citizenship.

One of the things that is part of that anti-tax mythos that you hear all the time—people are under the impression that Americans hate paying taxes. It’s just not true. People are quite proud to pay taxes, and they’re very willing to pay taxes for things they think are valuable—things like Social Security and Medicare. So I think the fact that we’ve shied away from asking people to support their government by paying taxes at a federal level has really weakened the civic rhetoric of this country. I think it’s left us in a terrible position. If we can’t convince people that their government is worth paying for, how can we convince them that democracy is valuable?

Krugman: Yeah, indeed. There are several episodes that I actually was ill-informed about. I kind of knew the numbers, but not at all the political history. There was this period, basically under the New Deal and through World War II, when the idea of broad-based taxes—that lots of people pay into social insurance programs, but also a broad-based income tax—really became established. That came as kind of a surprise, that people were willing to accept it, right?

Williamson: Yeah. Before World …

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Link to primer here.

Transcript

If you want to understand how we went so far down the road towards oligarchy, Malta is a good place to look.

Hi, Paul Krugman, doing a video today.

Yesterday, my weekly primer was another episode in the series about the rise of oligarchy and the policies that have led it to where it is. And this time, I focused on the role of a huge shift in taxation that has taken place over the past several decades, away from taxing capital and towards taxing labor. Half of that is a very large decline in the effective rate at which profits are taxed.

Now that decline has taken place partly via a reduction in headline tax rates, but to a large extent, from expanding loopholes — of which one of the most important is the ability of corporations to use accounting tricks to shift their reported profits into low tax jurisdictions, which is where Malta comes in.

On paper, according to the official numbers, Malta plays a remarkable role in the world economy.

It’s a huge investment destination: There are only a bit over 500,000 people on the island. But it has attracted more than $500 billion in foreign direct investment. At the same time, Maltese companies have invested about the same amount overseas. That’s about a million dollars per man, woman, and child in each direction.

Of course, it’s all fake. What we’re actually seeing is a proliferation of shell companies that are used by companies elsewhere as ways to launder, transfer their profits so that they pop up in Malta, which has a basically zero tax rate on corporate profits.

This is a combination of tax avoidance and tax evasion. Avoidance is when it’slegal, although it probably shouldn’t be. Evasion is when it isn’t. There’s some of both going on in Malta. There’s quitea lot of actual money laundering and sheer criminal activity. Famously, an investigative journalist from the island who looked into it was blown up by a car bomb. But mostly it is probably, at least marginally, within the, or arguably within the outer limits of the law.

So Crocs has a two-person office in Malta. And according to its books, basically all of its global profits come from that two-person operation in Malta. The New York Times had a very good report about all of this, which somehow I had not seen before writing the primer.

What is going on here? Well, the mechanics are quite simple. The real question is why this is allowed to persist. Tax avoidance or evasion, but profit shifting to avoid taxation, is a big issue. Estimates for the United States are that we lose probably north of $100 billion a year to companies finding ways to make their profits appear someplace else. If you want a sense of perspective, that’s roughly the entire budget of the food stamp program. It’s roughly the entire amount that Medicaid spends on health care for children.

These are programs that the administration falsely insists are full of fraud, but international profit shifting is fundamentally tax fraud, although it may be legal.

Now, Malta is a sovereign nation, but there really wouldn’t be any problem if the major democratic nations said this must stop. Malta is in fact part of the European Union. The European Union could clearly stop it. It has not.

Now, Europe is not totally hopeless. They actually have to some extent reined in the tax shelter status of Ireland, although it’s still there, but it’s weaker than it was. They have made moves toward a general international agreement that says that corporate tax rates must not be below 15% anywhere. It’s not really in effect, but they’ve moved in that direction. But Europe is characteristically weak in implementation. And let’s face it, there’s a fair bit of corruption there as well.

The United States, well, the United States was part of the project to limit at least extreme tax havens. To impose that minimum 15% corporate tax rate. But Donald Trump has withdrawn from the agreement.

It’s very clear that the United States government, as currently constituted, is not interested in cracking down on tax avoidance and tax evasion. In fact, the President of the United States and his lackeys are very much clearly on the side of tax cheats.

Now, I don’t want to say that Malta is the whole story. It’s obviously just a piece, although it is pretty extraordinary. We’re taking about basically a million dollars of corporate profits being laundered for each inhabitant of this tiny island. But it’s an indication.

It’s also an indication of what I’ve been calling the downward spiral of oligarchy. If we ask why is this outrage, this fundamental tax cheating permitted to continue, the answer is very clearly, it is the power of people with money who want to be able to avoid taxes. And their ability to avoid taxes leads them having even more money,which reinforces that power.

So it’s going to take a really big effort to, you know, we really need to reverse this. And we need to do it, you know, not slowly because this is a cumulativeprocess. We are on a downward spiral here. Malta is slightly exotic, it’s a funny story, but it’s actually very much indicative of what’s going wrong for the United States. And a reminder that although we are definitely the bad guys here, theEuropeans aren’t such great guys either.

But maybe they can be shamed. And maybe if we have a regime change here in the United States, we can finally be part of the effort.

Have a great day.

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. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with G. Elliott Morris

(recorded 8/6/26)

Paul Krugman: I am returning for another of multiple conversations with G. Elliott Morris, whom I find the most informative polling and political data analyst out there. And for a couple of reasons: We just had the primary in Michigan, we have a lot of numbers, and the Strength in Numbers midterm model is up. So we have our first reads on best estimates of what’s going to happen. So there’s a lot I’d like to talk about.

G. Elliott Morris: Hey, Paul. Yeah, let’s get real wonky on the forecasting. Good to be back.

Krugman: Yeah, let’s start with the model. You have a first forecast, which is pretty encouraging for Democrats. But why don’t we talk about what the forecast says and then what might be issues to raise around it?

Morris: Sure. The forecast, which people can find at fiftyplusone.news—which is sort of a sister publication to Strength in Numbers that I run with a couple of friends—is just a team effort, so we kind of have a different play sport than just a solo podcast. That forecast, as of recording (Thursday afternoon), says the Democrats have an 87 out of 100 chance to win control of the House. They need 218 seats; they have 215 right now, so it’s a pretty easy get. I can explain why. And that the Democrats have a 54 out of 100 chance to win control of the Senate. So pure toss-up territory there for the Senate. There, they need to win 51 seats; they currently have 47.

Krugman: Now this is, of course, a map on the House that includes the extreme gerrymandering, all of the attempts to tilt it. And so you’re saying that despite that, the Democrats don’t have a lock, obviously. But I assume that without the gerrymandering, it would be even higher gains on the House.

Morris: Yeah. I mean, without the gerrymandering, I would take close to 95 or 96% odds for them to take it. Our best guess is that the gerrymandering cost Democrats 5 or 6 seats in the House. So that combines a pretty good amount of gerrymandering in Texas—that cost them probably three seats there—and then 3 to 4 seats across the other Southern states. Tennessee is one; Louisiana, 1 or 2; Alabama, probably one there. Florida as well—a pretty big hit in Florida. And then, of course, it takes into account some gerrymandering back in the Democrats’ favor in California, and one lucky seat that they got a lucky break with in Utah with some court-mandated redistricting there. Democrats will take a seat from Utah for sure. So, yeah, I think that they’ll get 231 seats on average today, but that number should be close to 237 without the mid-decade cheating.

Krugman: You’d said that they needed something like a four percentage point advantage in the popular vote.

Morris: Yeah, we’ll be writing more about that. I think the number in the forecast now is close to three and a half. It’s a little more optimistic taking into account stuff like how candidate recruitment was really good for Democrats in some places. Their polling numbers and fundraising are looking really good in those competitive districts. So, you know, if the historical patterns are correct, Democrats gain some ground in the generic ballot, and the predictors are as reliable as they typically are in midterms, then it should be a pretty easy victory for them. We would predict a pretty easy, big House majority for them with 230 seats.

Krugman: But just to talk about the Senate—so that’s a much heavier lift, right? I think I know why, but why don’t you give me your version of what it’s about?

Morris: Yeah, well, in the Senate, Democrats currently control 47 seats. They need 51, so they have to find four seats to flip somewhere. The Democrats are very favored to win the seat in North Carolina. Former Governor Roy Cooper is running—a Democrat. He’s running against current Republican National Committee chair Michael Wheatley. And Roy Cooper is just kind of one of those politicians who has a good connection with his state and kind of can outperform those fundamental indicators in the state. So the typical voting pattern of the state is what I really mean there. So they will very likely win that seat—maybe an 85% chance we gave them.

So they need three more. And Democrats are also defending a seat in Michigan, just for whatever that’s worth. So the other three seats the Democrats could get are Maine, Texas, Alaska, and Ohio. All four of those seats are toss-ups, leaning Democrat in Maine, although we lack a lot of data in Maine with the new nominee, the new Democrat nominee. So that’s really the territory. You could argue maybe Iowa looks potentially competitive based on early data, but it’s kind of thin. Georgia Democrats are looking to upset the incumbent Democrat, Jon Ossoff, but I don’t think they really stand a chance there.

Krugman: Yeah. And the thing about the Senate, there’s two things about it structurally, right? First of all, only a third of the seats are up this year, so Democrats have to win a large percentage of the seats that are actually on the table—where they’re actually holding elections this year.

Morris: Right.

Krugman: And then the Senate gives Wyoming—whose population is basically the equivalent of a neighborhood in Brooklyn—and California the same number of senators. And that kind of works in Republicans’ favor, right?

Morris: I mean, if you count them up, there are 6 or 7 competitive seats from the Republican side that Republicans currently hold. And as I mentioned, Democrats need to win four of those. So you’re looking at two-thirds or so of the competitive seats Democrats have to get to pick up the majority if they defend that seat in Michigan—which is not a certainty. I do think the polls are perhaps undercounting, underestimating the Democrats there, but I wouldn’t put money on that. That’s just kind of a hunch based on the polls and other seats.

Krugman: Okay. But let’s talk about Michigan. So we had this extremely contentious primary. And, you know, Charlie Cook shows up in my feed saying Democratic chances of taking the Senate have just evaporated. And then I read you saying that it really doesn’t make a difference or not much of a difference that El-Sayed won. So let’s talk about this. There are interesting methodological differences.

Morris: I guess the great Charlie Cook would have said that, yeah.

Look, I think there’s a real lack of epistemic humility when it comes to Abdul El-Sayed’s chance of winning Michigan. There is a lot of conventional wisdom out there that, you know, let’s just say it: like a Muslim candidate cannot win the US Senate in Michigan, that Medicare for All and other progressive positions are going to drag him down. And frankly, a lot of this punditry comes from those center-left Democrats who should be in favor of those candidates winning. And so there is a sort of shooting-yourself-in-the-foot dynamic there as well. But if you actually look at the polling—and I wrote about this on Strength in Numbers—if you look at those polls pitting Abdul El-Sayed, the current nominee, against Mike Rogers, the Republican nominee, and then you compare them to how Haley Stevens would have done in those same horse-race matchup polls, the difference between the two Democratic candidates, or potential Democratic candidates, is statistically indistinguishable from zero. It is, on average, zero. Maybe it’s as big as three in either candidate’s direction. But if you’re Charlie Cook saying Democrats’ chances just evaporated, you are leaning heavily on some other priors or other punditry in saying that and not really the data.

Krugman: So, there’s two aspects to this, one of which I take pretty strong statistical evidence from you and one of which is a kind of “don’t know,” but... One of them is saying El-Sayed is too far to the left, and you basically have said that that’s a dimension that exists in the minds of pundits, but not in the rea…

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Contrary to what Trump administration officials say, we are not experiencing explosive economic growth. We are, however, experiencing an explosion in misery — and Donald Trump deserves full credit.

Hi, Paul Krugman here, slightly different location. I want to talk about food stamps and health insurance, two areas where things have gotten dramatically worse just in the past year and are continuing to get worse. There's going to be a lot more hungry people in America, especially hungry children, by the end of this year, and a lot more people without health insurance or with inadequate health insurance. And it all can be tied directly to legislative action or inaction on the part the Trump administration and its allies.

Here's what has happened. So we have what everybody still calls food stamps, though it's officially Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. But we have a situation now where the One Big Beautiful Bill didn't exactly cut the rate of benefits, but what it did was to impose work requirements.

You might say, well,shouldn't people who can work work? Yeah, but that's not really what's happening. What's happening is that people who can work and do work —because among those who can work who are receiving food stamps, the vast majority do in fact work — must show proof of work. And that is, for many such people, a basically impossible burden.

I mean, think of who is likely to be on food stamps. They may well be irregularly employed. They certainly may not have a job where they can call up the HR department and get the necessary forms. They are also presented with a complicated paperwork requirement. We're talking about people who are, to some extent, lacking in formal education. But above all — I've never been poor, thank God — but as everyone who's studied or been poor can tell you, the biggest issue of poverty in some sense is the cognitive burden, the constant struggle to just make ends meet, which is a huge burden on everything else.

So you're imposing a bureaucratic hurdle, really a bureaucratic barricade in front of exactly the people least able to get across it. So of course, we're seeing a lot of people losing nutritional assistance with millions of those people children.

Health insurance is a rather different story. The Affordable Care Act made a huge positive difference to many people's lives — in this case some people I do know quite well, small business people and so on. But the way it was set up, there are subsidies to help you purchase insurance through the exchanges. The subsidies are means tested. I could not get a subsidy for health insurance, nor should I. So they fade out with income. But as originally set up, they faded out too quickly with rising income, and there was a cliff at 400% of the poverty line, no more subsidies, which was clearly bad policy. And they knew that at the time. It was just that trying to scrape together enough votes to get that thing enacted was hard.

So during the Biden years, the subsidy program was improved. It became somewhat more generous, but more important, it no longer had a cliff. It just gradually faded out.

Unfortunately, that was not a permanent change. It wasn't enacted into legislation for forever. There was a cutoff date. Why? Well, two words, Joe Manchin. But in any case, obviously, Trump and Republicans in Congress refuse to even contemplate extending those enhanced benefits. And so a lot of people are now faced with vastly higher costs if they want to retain their health insurance.

Interestingly, these are not the poorest. The poorest are going to be on Medicaid and even people a little bit above that are still going to have the full subsidy. But it's people in the middle class whose income is a little above 400% of the poverty line and suddenly have no subsidy available. That is a hardship for, again, millions of people.

So far we know that enrollment on the exchanges that were set up to buy health insurance has dropped by about three million so far. Probably a lot more to come. And probably that understates the loss because people trying to save money because things are more expensive are in many cases stepping down to less comprehensive plans. So there's an increase in the number of underinsured too. Which means that a large number of Americans who had adequate health insurance no longer do.

How should we think about all of this? The Trump administration has put out a report on the decline in Affordable Care Act enrollment, which is really a blood-boiling document because it portrays the big rise in enrollment that took place during the Biden years as a problem because it was an increase in fraud.

Now, is there fraud? Yes, there's fraud in the Affordable Care Act. Is there fraud in the food stamp program? Yes — there's fraud in every program, public and private sector as well. There's fraud in the endless pasta deal at Olive Garden. There's fraud in frequent flyer schemes. There is no reason to believe that there is significant fraud in the sense that it's a significant, important part of any of these programs.

And one thing that you always want to bear in mind when we're talking about these means-tested programs is how cheap they are. The average food stamp recipient receives $187 a month in nutritional assistance — $187 a month, a little over $2,000 a year. Maybe one way to put that in context is to say that Donald Trump's East Wing Ballroom Project, the one that is so far still just a hole in the ground and hopefully will never be finished, is costing $600 million. So that project alone, that scam, because we know that there's a lot of corruption involved, that is the equivalent of food stamps for 300,000 people for a year.

So the things that we're talking about here are, it's not really about the money. It is one of those “the cruelty is the point” stories. And we could go on about that, but clearly the fact that a lot of people are going to suffer is not an unintended byproduct of these policies. It is kind of, in some ways, the goal.

It's also enormously destructive, not just for people's lives now, but for the future.

One of the best established facts about the benefits of government spending is that nutritional and health assistance to children pays off for society as a whole. That children who received food stamps or Medicaid in their early years grow up to be healthier, more productive adults who pay more in taxes and are less likely to need government assistance. The rates of return on both the food stamp program and Medicaid, the original aid for health care for the poor, are enormous. They're far bigger, far better substantiated than almost anything else you can do.

If you ask, you know, what do we know about the payoff to infrastructure investment? Well, we think it's pretty big, but... that's not based on solid evidence. The evidence on these programs is enormous.

So by cutting back on these programs, by creating this explosion of misery, they're not only making millions of Americans much, much poorer than they were, they're also making the country as a whole substantially poorer in the long run. It's an anti-growth policy. But of course, the cruelty is the point.

And here we are. Many things happen to the economy, many things happen to society that are outside the control of the guy in the White House. Many bad things aren't really the fault of the party in power. This is absolutely, totally Donald Trump's fault.

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Some say the world will end in fire. Some say in ice. Robert Frost wrote that in 1920. With more than a century gone by, we have a verdict. It’s fire for the win.

Hi, I’m Paul Krugman. I thought I’d talk today about a story that should be getting even more play than it is. I mean, there’s so much going on, but, you know, Europe is on fire. There are massive wildfires in France and Spain that have forced the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people, are menacing Bordeaux and not too far from Madrid. This, of course, follows on the enormous Canadian wildfires that for a while gave Toronto the worst air quality on the planet and turned the skies orange and the air foul across a large part of the eastern United States.

And that, in turn, followed on that deadly heat dome in Europe that killed thousands of people.

Okay. It’s pretty awful. It’s also something that was predictable and predicted. If you go back — I’ve been looking at a 2012 report from the UN, their climate project, that very clearly forecast growing incidents of extreme weather, extreme heatwaves, storms, flooding, and by implication, at least, wildfires. This was clearly in the cards.

In fact, the story that somehow has not become standard is that climate scientists pulled off something that was extraordinary in intellectual terms. They got the basic outlines of what was coming and in many ways even the numbers on what was coming right decades in advance. In any kind of rational world we would be hailing them as heroes and very much listening to them about what we should be doing now.

Of course where we are is that climate scientists are reviled. Climate change is almost crowded out of the political discussion and there’s a fair bit of actual personal persecution of people like Michael Mann and so on who are being punished for the sin of being right.

Okay, of course, it’s more than just that. Now, there are sort of multiple levels to the climate story.

At one level, it’s, you know, there are powerful vested interests that don’t want you to take global warming seriously. Fossil fuel interests are dying as an industry, but they’re dying slowly and they’re doing their best to take us all with them. And they have enormous influence in this administration.

That feeds into something else, which is very true of the people now running the federal government, which is they hate science. So this is across the board. There’s almost always some financial interest, but it’s not just follow the money. It’s just a real hatred of the whole scientific enterprise. And so in an obvious sense, the climate denial is of a piece with the determination of RFK Jr’s health department to find a link between vaccines and autism. There have been many studies saying, no, it’s not there, but that’s not the answer they want.

And they just kind of hate the idea of scientists, they hate the idea of objective research of any kind. And so that feeds right into the climate denial.

And then, actually, it’s even broader and deeper than that. I don’t think you can really understand what’s going on in this administration without saying that there’s a kind of hatred of the intellect, not just science, but really any kind of hard thinking. I mean, at some, not very deep level, it’s an obvious correlation between Trump saying that the reason that we had fires in Canada is because the Canadians didn’t rake their forests, — all, by the way, two million square miles of boreal forest in Canada. You know, there’s just this absurdity, this kind of evil absurdity of the whole situation.

And Pete Hegseth, having presided over the humiliation of the U.S. military because we were not ready for 21st century warfare and the Iranians were. So he’s busy suffering casualties and of course trying to hide them, suffering enormous damage and complete failure of war aims in the face of drones and missiles and basically this new world in which the Ukrainians are showing the way.

This is warfare, which still requires some people, still requires enormous personal courage. But the decisive arms of battle are machines, fairly advanced machines, although cheap compared with the expensive hardware we have. And so here you have Pete Hegseth, faced with all of that, and he thinks that what the U.S. military needs is more testosterone. And that’s not a metaphor. Literally, he wants to give testosterone shots.

The truth is that even the ancient Spartans didn’t win battles just by flexing their biceps. Intellect was an important part of war, even in the 5th century B.C. But now, above all, consider the craziness of thinking that it’s all about brawn and muscles and good grooming. Oh my god.

But this is all hatred of basically anything that involves hard thinking. Again, the deep point is it’s not even exactly, I think, that people in this government are lying about climate, that they’re lying about military stuff. I mean, yes, of course there’s a lot of lying, but I’m not sure they even really have the concept that there is objective reality. And they certainly hate anybody who tries to argue that what they’re saying is objectively, empirically not true.

How did we get here? I’ve been writing about oligarchy, and it’s certainly true that the big money — and the big money has never been bigger — that the big money has thrown its weight behind these deeply anti-intellect, anti-science people. This is in the long term, and not very long term, really against their own interests, but the short term lure of tax cuts and a corruptible government — because they’ve got the money to do the corruption — I guess outweighs that.

And also, of course, quite a few of the mega-billionaires are themselves caught up in this. If we all get through this, Elon Musk and the general awfulness of the people who somehow end up with hundreds of billions of dollars is going to be a cautionary tale for generations to come.

Anyway, that’s where we are. What can I say? I’d really like to not talk about depressing stuff, and I will now and then, but boy, we are in quite a state.

And the sky is blue right now, so I guess I should go out and spend some time outdoors while we still can. Take care.

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In my writing about wealth concentration and oligarchy, I steal a lot from lean heavily on the truly work of Gabriel Zucman, who is a hugely important researcher (winner of the 2023 Clark Medal) who is also starting to play a major role in policy. I’ve talked to him before, but this seemed like a good time to bring him back.

. . .

TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Gabriel Zucman

(recorded 7/23/26)

Paul Krugman: So, hi everyone. Paul Krugman here, bringing back Gabriel Zucman, probably the best guy for thinking about inequality, especially wealth issues. And since I’ve been writing about that and stealing a lot of Gabriel’s research, I thought we should talk again. So, hi Gabriel.

Gabriel Zucman: Hi Paul, thanks for having me on.

Krugman: Yeah. So, you have been writing—and now I’ve been, you know, cannibalizing it—a lot about wealth concentration. Why don’t you tell us about your reasons for focusing on wealth.

Zucman: Basically, because there’s a fundamental tension in democratic societies between extreme wealth and the very possibility of a well-functioning democracy. And it’s not a new idea—don’t get me wrong. All the thinkers of democracy have written about this, all the way back to Aristotle, more than two thousand years ago.

Krugman: Right.

Zucman: But there was a period of time after World War II when many people thought that this issue belonged to the past. And it corresponded to a very particular moment in history when extreme wealth had largely disappeared after World War II, after the shocks of the first half of the twentieth century.

But now, of course, it’s making a dramatic comeback. And so we are back to this discussion of: how do we deal with this tension? How do we organize the economy and our society to prevent the forms of capture of the political process, in particular, that are associated with extreme wealth?

Krugman: Now, there’s a question. I mean, I’ve been on the inequality beat for an alarmingly long time—since you were a small child, actually. But in the early nineties, let’s say, it was all income rather than wealth. And a lot of it was top quintile, and maybe top one percent. And now you’re telling us that we need to focus on the wealth rather than the income of the top 0.0002 percent. Why that shift? Why wealth rather than income?

Zucman: Well, it’s for two reasons. Number one is a macroeconomic reason, which is that wealth as a whole has been growing much faster than income. So if you look at the ratio of total household wealth to GDP in the US in 1980, it was around 200–250%, and today we are past 500%. This means that the total wealth of the country is equivalent to more than five years of annual production, five years of annual GDP. The second reason is that wealth itself has become much more concentrated, and the rise of wealth inequality, especially at the top of the distribution—at the very top—has been massive and has been even faster and stronger than the rise of income inequality.

So we all know about the rise of the top one percent; the top one percent’s share of total income has increased from about ten percent of income in the US in 1980 to about 20% today. But at the top of the wealth distribution, the increase has been even much more dramatic than that.

Krugman: At the risk of derailing it slightly, one thing that I myself have gone back and forth on—and certainly I get from comments on things I write—is a question comparing the wealth of the top 0.001%, or whatever: should we be comparing it to total wealth or to total income? And I know you’ve used wealth to GDP, and I have some thoughts, but you’ve done it both ways. Which do you use, and why would you use it? I don’t know which is right, but what are your thoughts?

Zucman: I think both statistics are interesting and capture different aspects of reality. So if you’re interested in wealth inequality, in the concentration of wealth, the most meaningful statistic is to divide the wealth of the super-rich by total wealth in the economy. So, for instance, if you look at billionaires—roughly the top 0.1 percent of the population—they own about seven percent of total US wealth today. In 1980, they used to own about one percent of total US wealth. So it gives you a sense of the rise in wealth concentration. If you look at the super-top, you know, the oligarchs, the twenty wealthiest families—a very, very small fraction of the population—their total wealth is 2.0 to 2.2% of total household wealth in the economy. So I think that if you care about wealth inequality, these are the relevant numbers.

Now, it’s also interesting to compute another statistic, which is the wealth of those top groups, and in particular the oligarchs, relative to total income or total output in the economy, because it gives you a sense of their influence on the economy and also because it gives you a sense of how much revenue there is at stake from taxing their wealth. So let me illustrate. If you get back to the 20 wealthiest people in the country, they have about 2 to 2.2% of total US wealth, and that’s equivalent to about 12–13% of total US GDP.

Okay, so now you’re dividing a stock—their wealth—by a flow. And what it means is that if they spend their wealth—of course, they’re not going to do that in a given year, but imagine that they spent all their wealth in a given year—then they could buy 13% of all the goods and services produced in a given year in the US. So it really gives you a sense of just how big they are relative to the economy as a whole. And also it gives you a sense of what’s at stake with taxing billionaires. Because, of course, the way we think about tax revenue and about government budgets, is often in relation to GDP.

And so here, what you have with billionaire wealth is that there’s a potential tax base; we are not taxing billionaire wealth today, which has been skyrocketing. That’s the flip side of the rise of wealth concentration. The positive aspect in all of that is that now there’s a lot of tax revenue at stake from potentially taxing the wealth of billionaires.

Krugman: Yeah. I mean, my version is, I mean, most people have very little wealth, right? Wealth is highly concentrated, and what most people have is income. But the very top has wealth, and in some sense, the wealth-to-income ratio is telling you how many minions they can buy, how much influence they can buy in the economy and in politics. Is that kind of what you’re saying, or is there something else?

Zucman: No, exactly. When I say that expressing their wealth relative to total income gives a sense of the influence they have, precisely it gives you a sense of how much they can spend on buying media companies, on funding electoral campaigns. Billionaires accounted for nineteen percent of total political spending during the 2024 federal election cycle.

Krugman: Right.

Zucman: They can fund think tanks and foundations, and influence the prevailing ideology like that. So it’s in that sense that it’s really useful, I think, to express their wealth relative to the value of the total income of people in the country.

Krugman: So again, what’s your take on why total wealth has grown faster than income?

Zucman: There are different stories, and I think the one that makes most sense to me and that seems most consistent with the data is that there’s been a number of policy changes since the 1980s that have favored wealth and capital, broadly speaking. So, for instance, you used to have rent controls for housing in many countries; when you lift rent controls, the value of housing wealth tends to go up. Many countries used to have pretty high corporate income tax rates, of almost fifty percent on average at the world level in the 1980s. Well, when the government takes half of the profits of companies, it capitalizes into stock prices; it reduces the market value of companies. But then when governments slash the cor…

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Good news. The second richest man in America might be prevented from taking over CNN. That's the good news. The bad news is, aside from thefact that he probably will manage to pull it off anyway, the bad news is that that would be only a small piece of the ongoing takeover of U.S. media by oligarchs. And in turn, the media takeover is just part of the extraordinary exercise of power by the extraordinarily wealthy small number of men who have been wreaking so much havoc with America as we know it.

Hi, I'm Paul Krugman. Doing a video today, because I didn't feel like doing a usual chart-heavy, analytics-heavy post, but very much on a topic I have been writing about and will continue to write about, which is the rise of oligarchy in America.

Now, I know some people balk at that. But we're not talking about some kind of hidden conspiracy. We're not talking about the Protocols of the Elders of PayPal. We are talking instead about stuff that's largely out in the open, though not fully understood, which is the way that an incredibly wealthy small group of men, mostly men, is able to commandeer a lot of the political life of a country that is still nominally a democracy. And that's a fundamental story for our time, maybe the fundamental story.

How does that takeover work? Well, there is what I think of as the middle level, which is the place where it's most easily quantified, tends to get most of the attention, which is campaign finance. American campaigns are very money intensive and have become more money intensive because we've opened the floodgates with Citizens United. And a lot of that money comes from a very small number of incredibly wealthy people. According to the New York Times analysis, about 20% of all campaign contributions in 2024 came from 300 billionaires and their families.

That's a pretty big impact. A country of more than 300 million people, and 300 billionaires are a fifth of campaign finance, and surely more strategic, more targeted than the average donor. So that's really a very, very large role just in that direct sense of who pays for campaigns.

But that's not the only level. There is a lower level, lower in the sense of morally lower, I guess, which is just plain buying politicians, buying policies, paying for the policies you want with cash or crypto on the barrel.

There has always been some of that in our system, but it was normally discreet, indirect, deniable, the revolving door. It was the case even more than 20 years ago that when the Bush administration pushed through a Medicare bill that was very favorable to pharmaceutical interests, that the then chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who basically engineered and steered the bill through Congress, then promptly retired and became the chief lobbyist for the pharma lobby. So this kind of thing has been going on for a very long time.

But now it's just blatant, out in the open, and the sums are massive. We just have literally billions of dollars thrown at the president and his family. No doubt large sums to other government officials, large sums to at least some members of Congress. So just plain buying the policies you want — and it’s not just that a large share of wealth is held by a small number of people, but that those are the people who are best positioned to really deploy their wealth to corrupt the system.

There's also something, I guess you can call it a higher level, which is what military strategists call shaping the information space, which occurs at a couple of levels. One of them is the promotion of ideas and ideology that serve the interests of the very wealthy.

You see that on many issues. You certainly see it very much on economic policy. If you ask, why do people still go out there saying that tax cuts pay for themselves and that tax cuts on the rich are an enormously powerful tool for stimulating economic growth? That's been tested to destruction, and it just ain't so. But it's a zombie idea. It keeps shambling along, eating people's brains, even though it should be dead. And the reason is, well, there's a lot of money in it.

If you Google something I've written on, more often than not, when I do that, the top sponsored post at the top of the search page is an attack on me sponsored by some right-wing organization. And if you ask who supports those right-wing organizations, well, guess who.

And it’s equally or worse the case in climate science. Scientific journals have been pretty good at not publishing climate disinformation. But when they do publish things that are somehow skeptical, or usually not outright denial, but attempting to sow discord about climate change, what percentage of those studies have received financial backing from fossil fuel interests? The answer is 100. It's all about the money. So this is, again, this is not new. Upton Sinclair: “It's difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends on his not understanding it.” So that has always been the case.

But now we have something which is really, really important and is another level of this, which is the takeover of the media. So, okay. Ellison, or the Ellison family —because nominally this is Ellison's son in charge of Paramount — has already acquired CBS and has hired Bari Weiss to basically corrupt and destroy that network. If the deal for takeover of Warner proceeds, then CNN will get the same treatment. I'm finding CNN a very good news source, just braver at taking on what's really happening than my old employer, the New York Times, which is a great news organization and may be more necessary than ever, but tends to be cautious — and CNN is a little bit less cautious.

But anyway, if he gets away with it, then CNN as we know it will almost disappear. It will almost turn into Fox News. Now, that won't be a profitable venture. There's already a Fox News, and so creating another one is not going to actually produce a lot of profits, if any, but that's not the objective. This is buying influence.

Elon Musk, of course, took over the app formerly known as Twitter. Which was already becoming a more difficult place even before its takeover. I used to have, I guess, I think I had 4 million followers there. But it was impossible. I had to shut off comments because of the cesspool that Twitter had become. But now it is really by design. It is heavily tilted. That can be quantified. The algorithm really tilts it towards right-wing stuff, promotes really rabid racist views.

And unfortunately, the network effects, the centrality that Twitter used to have, still keeps a lot of people on X, where they are influenced: people's views change.

And also something that I don't know how to quantify, but it's very obvious if you follow and pay attention to people's positions, is that people who spend a lot of time on Twitter, elites who spend a lot of time on Twitter, start to think that the views they hear there are representative of where the country is — which they are not. But it does, in fact, tilt policy, tilt understanding to the right.

The third richest man in America is Mark Zuckerberg, who made his billions from Facebook. Facebook is old-fashioned: I don't know anybody who uses Facebook. But I know that lots of people do. And it's still a very important information source and has, again, been tilted.

On most of these media things, it's not as blatant as what Musk is doing at X. But it still has a big influence in changing the tone of the discussion and biasing the discussion towards positions that favor the interests of billionaires as well as favoring their prejudices if they happen to be, like Musk, authoritarian white supremacists.

Okay. And the fourth richest man in America is Jeff Bezos, who purchased the WashingtonPost. I think he purchased the Post initially out of a belief that he was going to enhance his prestige. It certainly looked in his initial tenure as if this was actually more of a vanity…

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