In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts John Maurer, George Satterfield, and Vanya Bellinger to talk about the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. They talk about the French revolution as an existential threat to the monarchies of Europe. Next, they speak about the problems Napoleon had with policy strategy match for his aims. The conversation then moves to the how Napoleon influenced Clausewitz in his theories on war. We speak about Napoleon's key strategic problems of being a continental power fighting a maritime power, the Spanish insurgency, and the fateful decision to march on Moscow. Additional other inflection points of times where Napoleon might have made different choices to better his strategic position. We end by talking about key strategic takeaways for the contemporary environment.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts John Maurer, Marc Genest, and Josh Hammond in talking about this ancient conflict. They start with the decision for war that Athens made and whether it is rational or not. Next, they look at the Athenian theory of victory and how they hoped to beat Sparta. They discuss the points in the conflict where opportunities for peace existed and how these off ramps to conflict were not in the Athenian interest since they were winning. These concepts are juxtaposed with the current situation in the Ukraine and how the Ukrainians might not be interested in peace even though pressured by the U.S. to do so. The strategic mistakes of Pericles and Cleon are discussed. Lastly, the conversation turns to the Athenian response to the revolt of Mytilene versus their later response to Melos and how atrocities become more accepted over the course of a protracted war.

In this episode, Jon O’Gorman hosts Kevin McCranie, Timothy Hoyt, and Andrew ‘Dex’ Wilson. They explore questions of strategy by looking at the contemporary example of Russia in the Ukraine. They start by defining the terms of Grand Strategy and Strategy. Next, they explore the concept of geopolitics and what it means for the grand strategy of the United States. Additionally, we compare and contrast the use of Theory for Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and how each could be used to “win.” We also compare the Basil Liddel Hart concept of a better state of peace to the Clausewitzian concept of results in war never being final. We end with discussing why Vladimir Putin got many of these concepts wrong in Ukraine.

Jon O’Gorman hosts David Stone, Timothy Hoyt, and James Holmes to discuss contemporary challenges in the strategic environment. They discuss the challenges of China as a proper pacing threat, what challenges both China and the U.S. have over Taiwan and what our naval theorists, Mahan and Corbett might say about them. The discussion then shifts to Ukraine and Russia as a compare and contrast of strategic problem sets. They also look at Clausewitz’s concept of Value of the Object for both Taiwan and Ukraine for the American People.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts Marc Genest, Heidi Lane, and Burack Kadercan to talk about the Global War on Terror campaign. We discuss why these conflicts were fought in the regions they were and how shifting priority from one theater to another had a negative overall impact. We also discuss how these conflicts gave rise to ISIS and the ramifications. Could anything have been done to prevent this situation? We end by asking if it was the right call to close the theater of Afghanistan.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Michael Dennis, Burack Kadercan, and Anand Toprani. They discuss oil in the Middle East as the driver of this war, why it effects the strategic calculus of the region and our viewpoints towards it from a policy perspective and as an after effect of the Carter doctrine. The conversation then moves to the problems with strategy in the war and why the services could not agree on a strategy due to factors of service parochialism and the failure of the Gold War Nichols Act to truly fix institutionalized service mindsets. They look at technology as a poor substitute for policy and strategy and also discuss Israel and the price the United States pays for having it as its ally in the region. Finally, they come back to the issue of oil as the reason for long term engagement in Iraq and the middle east and what it means for the fight against ISIS.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Timothy Hoyt, John Garofano, and David Stone. They talk about civil-military relations in the Vietnam conflict and why the decision was made to escalate in the war from just an advisory mission. They discuss Red team strategy and Vietnamese nationalism as a motive force. The conversation also covers the problems of wargaming to provide insights to conflicts and dealing with corrupt regimes. Lastly, they flash forward to Afghanistan and why history repeats itself with a seemingly similar conflict ending.

This week Jon O'Gorman hosts John Garofano, Nicholas Sarantakes and Marc Genest as they discuss the larger context of the Korean War. The panel discusses Communist strategy and strategic aims, why a bold aggressive attack vs. a protracted insurgency as in other places in the world in the 1940s-50s, and how President Truman faced domestic and international challenges that inhibited his ability to conduct containment of communist expansion. They also delve into the reasons for the Truman/MacArthur divide and why the U.S. willingly let the General expand the war from a limited conflict to an unlimited one. They end by looking at key takeaways from the conflict.

This week Jon O’Gorman asks James Holmes, Nicholas Sarantakes, and Michael Dennis their opinions on topics ranging from the Japanese decision for war, the role of technology in war, and the choice to use multiple sequential and cumulative campaigns. The discussion shifts towards today's multiple drives in a resource-constrained environment and what this means for U.S. global power against China and Russia.

In this episode, Jon O’Gorman asks James Holmes, George Satterfield and Nicholas Sarantakes about the European theater of the Second World War. The issues they discuss range from how the war starts in its proximate and underlying causes to how the interwar period enabled the start of the war because the peace of the First War was not enforced. They also look at seapower and airpower theory and the ethics of strategic bombing in the context of this war, as well as talk about the theorists Mahan, Corbett and Douhet. Lastly the panel brings the discussion into the contemporary realm and what this war and its beginnings can tell us about the current conflict in the Ukraine.