In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts Andrew Stigler, Timothy Shultz, and Phil Haun in a discussion about airpower. They begin by looking at the theorical basis of airpower and the thoughts of Giulio Douhet and John Warden. Next, they move to the other theorists on use of airpower and theory of victory of airpower alone. They question if the U.S Airforce are still believers in the winning from the air alone theory. Then we look at cases studies where airpower was used in various degrees to attempt to achieve victory such as WWII, Vietnam, 1990 Gulf War, and Kosovo in 1999. We end with a contemporary use of technology and airpower in Ukraine, how the Russians have used airpower, and what this might mean for the future.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman talks with Admiral Guillermo Barrera (ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations for the Columbian Navy. Admiral Barrera discusses his time as a naval officer, his time as a former student at the U.S. Naval War College, and his role now as a “CNO Fellow” and senior mentor here. We speak about how his study of strategy as a student aided his role as CNO during the Colombian counterinsurgency against the FARC rebels in the early 2000s. Admiral Barrera has worked in the CNO fellow program for 12 years and is now a U.S. citizen.

In this episode, Jon O’Gorman hosts Vanya Bellinger in discussing the author of "On War." First, we discuss if Clausewitz was a product or a critic of the Prussian military reform movement. We then move to the importantance of studying Clausewitz's experience as an officer and military practitioner to understand his theory. We talk about Clausewitz relationship to mentor Prussian Gen. Scharnhorst. We also speak about the Prussian military reform school that helped beat Napoleon and why the same school failed so spectacularly in the first half of the twentieth century with the Schlieffen Plan. Lastly, we talk about Marie Von Clausewitz and her relationship with her husband and the book On War.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts David Stone, Timothy Hoyt and Nicholas Sarantakes to explore the question, "When does it makes strategic sense to fight in a city?" We begin by discussing our theorist's opinion about the theory behind the issue, in particular why fighting in cites might or might not make sense from a strategic perspective. We then examine some particular examples, including, among others, Ireland in 1916, Manilla in 1944 and Stalingrad in 1942.

In this episode Jon O’Gorman hosts members of the U.S. Naval War College faculty who are subject matter experts on China, Taiwan and U.S policy making; First, from the Strategy and Policy Department, Andrew “Dex” Wilson, second Paul J. Smith from the National Security Affairs Department, lastly, Colin Jackson, Chair of the Strategic and Operational Research Department and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia at the Pentagon. They begin by discussing the U.S. Policy towards Taiwan and the Chinese view of it. Next they debate why the rhetoric on both sides seems to be heating up in the current weeks. Next, they move to discussing the value of the object for both the Chinese and U.S, what the rational calculus is like for both parties views, and their assessments on conflict. Lastly, the guests debate how President Xi can be deterred from overt aggressive action and how the fate of Taiwan may be tied to the fate of Ukraine.

This week Jon O’Gorman and Daniel Post host two outside guests to talk about coercion theory. First, Dr. Reid Pauly, Dean’s Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy, Watson Institute, Brown University, and Assistant Professor of Political Science and Brigadier General Greg Bowen, U.S. Army (Ret), former Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. Strategic Command, and member of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. We begin with laying out the concept of coercion and discussion of the different types of coercion (deterrence and compellence), the differences between them, the challenges and advantages of each, and how this has worked in recent history, particularly during the nuclear era. We look at the stability/instability paradox of nuclear weapons and if this changes the coercion theory. We discuss how states must have the assurances that another state will make good on their threats for the concept to work. We explore this in the context of places like Syria, North Korea, Ukraine, and China. Lastly, we look at how these concepts fit with understanding strategy and grand strategy especially in a nation that can change administrations every four years.

This week we discuss contemporary strategic challenges by looking at the Ukrainian War. Jon O'Gorman brings together David Stone, a Russian historian, Timothy Hoyt, a political scientist; and a member of the National Security Affairs Department and senior State department representative to the U.S. Naval War College: Walter Braunohler. Walter was in the U.S. embassy in Kviv during the lead up to the crisis before being evacuated. We begin by discussing Russia's aims and motivations for the conflict then quickly moving to Vadimir Putin's chosen strategy of trying for a quick decisive victory. Next, we discuss why Russian military performance has been lacking vs. the Ukrainians. We discuss the differences between the Russian action in 2014 vs. 2022 and why the international response has been different as well. Lastly, we discuss the problems with war termination for this conflict and if escalation could lead to nuclear use.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts James Holmes, Kevin McCranie and new this week from the Joint Military Operations Department, Milan Vego. They begin by discussing the perspectives of Mahan and Corbett and what makes them different. They move to commonly held misconceptions on each of their theories. The guests bat around the points of agreement and disagreement between the two, especially concerning the concepts of offense and defense. They provide clarity on what the term fleet in being means and how it can be used. Lasty, we discuss commerce raiding and the key takeaways of naval theory for the contemporary environment in regard to China.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman interviews Dr. Kolby Hanson about his field work interviewing insurgents in South Asia such as the Tamil tigers of Sri Lanka and Nagaland in India. We discuss the concept of the Maoist insurgent playbook and if these groups follow a Maoist model. Additionally, we talk about how governments in the region managed dealing with these groups and why there has been such different methods by different governments depending on the groups' ethno-religious leanings. We then move into talking about how many of the governments have approached war termination or offering a cease-fire with these groups and what happens to the insurgency afterward. We end with Kolby's general observations about the people who join the groups and his time at the U.S. Naval War College.

In this episode Jon O'Gorman hosts Andrew "Dex" Wilson, Timothy Hoyt, James Holmes, and David Stone in talking about the modern challenges for the U.S. in the political and strategic realms. We begin by talking about what there is to think about in strategic culture and concepts to aid us going forward or "retrospect and prospect' as A.T. Mahan called it. We then move into the top topics of the day in talking about what the Chinese weather balloon incident means for both China and what the shoot down signals from the U.S. We next move to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and talk about how difficult war termination will be now that both sides have painted themselves into a corner diplomatically. Lastly, we look at the lessons of the irregular wars of the last 20 years and what lessons we need to keep in mind from them, moving forward, as we move back into an arena of great power competitions.