M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
• For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?

Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.

Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptions
• Respondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selection

Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.

Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.

The Fine Print:

• 29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"
• 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:

• National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changes
• Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirements

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement

[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions

[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions

[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement

[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions

[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions

[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement

[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions

[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal

I'll create show notes and five alternative episode title options for this opinion episode.Now I'll create the show notes and title options for the M & K Employee Solutions opinion episode.

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of IAM National Pension Fund | Case No. 23-1209 | Decided May 21, 2026 | Docket Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-1209.html

Overview: ERISA withdrawal liability dispute resolves when pension plan actuaries must select calculation assumptions, affecting billions in retirement obligations across multiemployer pension plans serving unionized workers nationwide.

Question Presented: Whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions underlying withdrawal liability calculations get selected on or before the statutory measurement date.

Posture: D.C. Circuit affirmed district courts allowing post-measurement-date assumption selection, conflicting with Second Circuit precedent.

Main Arguments:

• Employers (Petitioners): (1) Statute's "as of" language freezes all calculation inputs including assumptions on measurement date; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute factual inputs requiring temporal fixation; (3) Broad anti-retroactivity principle prevents post-measurement assumption adoption.
• Pension Fund (Respondent): (1) "As of" language sets reference point for hard data only while tools get selected later; (2) Actuarial assumptions constitute analytical methods not observable facts; (3) "Best estimate" requirement supports using most current available data when selecting assumptions.

Holding: The ERISA provisions governing the calculation of withdrawal liability from an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan do not require that actuarial assumptions underlying the calculation be selected on or before the statutory measurement date.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Affirmed D.C. Circuit.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Section 1391's "as of" language assigns hard data to measurement date but permits calculation performance afterward using tools including assumptions; (2) Section 1393 imposes no deadline for assumption selection and Congress's omission from parallel provisions signals intentional choice; (3) "Best estimate" requirement necessitates access to most current data potentially unavailable before measurement date.

Implications: Pension plans gain flexibility to select actuarial assumptions after measurement dates using current market data and professional judgment. Employers lose timing-based challenges but retain substantive reasonableness challenges through arbitration. Actuaries avoid artificial deadlines while maintaining accountability through reasonableness requirements. Court leaves open whether assumptions must reflect only information available as of measurement date.

The Fine Print:

• 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)(E)(i): Withdrawal liability calculated based on plan's unfunded vested benefits "as of" the last day of plan year preceding employer's withdrawal
• 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): Actuaries must use "actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"

Primary Cases:

• Russello v. United States (1983): Where Congress includes particular language in one statutory section but omits it in another section of same Act, courts presume Congress acts intentionally and purposely in disparate inclusion or exclusion
• Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc. (2020): Courts generally decline reading limitations into statutes that do not appear in their text

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.
• For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.
• For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.

Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.

Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.

Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;
• (2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;
• (3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.
• Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.

Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.

Main Arguments:

• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives

• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principles

Implications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.

The Fine Print:

• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"

• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"

Primary Cases:

• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence

• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.
• United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.
• For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview

[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement

[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions

[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions

[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement

[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions

[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement

[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions

[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions

[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. | Case No. 24-983 | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Decided: 5/21/26 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: Supreme Court preserves Title III liability for entities trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuban Government even when plaintiff's underlying time-limited property interest expired before trafficking occurred.

Question Presented: Whether cruise lines using Havana docks face liability when plaintiff's concession expired before their alleged trafficking.

Posture: District Court granted summary judgment for Havana Docks; Eleventh Circuit reversed applying counterfactual analysis.

Main Arguments:

• Havana Docks (Petitioner):
• (1) Statute's "owns the claim" language focuses on current claim ownership, not hypothetical property ownership in alternate timelines;
• (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock structures Havana Docks built, not just abstract concession rights;
• (3) Congressional purpose requires deterring companies from profiting off stolen property regardless of temporal limitations.
• Cruise Lines (Respondents):
• (1) Property law fundamentals require respecting original temporal limits on property rights;
• (2) Havana Docks' concession excluded passenger services and only covered cargo operations;
• (3) Congress deliberately balanced deterrence against property law principles without providing universal relief.

Holding: Havana Docks is not required to establish that the cruise lines “trafficked” in Havana Dock’s property interest.

Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Justice Sotomayor filed concurring opinion joined by Kavanaugh. Justice Kagan filed dissenting opinion. Vacated and remanded.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Title III imposes liability for trafficking in physical property confiscated by Cuba, not just trafficking in plaintiff's property interest;
• (2) "Using" confiscated property concerns physical things, not property interests—requiring one-to-one correspondence between interest confiscated and interest trafficked reads out obvious trafficking forms;
• (3) Cuba confiscated both Havana Docks' concession and physical dock structures by seizing control, making docks tainted property off-limits to users.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Sotomayor (concurring, joined by Kavanaugh): Flags infinite-recovery problem allowing unlimited repeated recoveries from unlimited defendants for single certified loss; raises due process concerns from government assurances cruises qualified as lawful travel.
• Justice Kagan (dissenting): Majority misconstrues statute to allow recovery for trafficking in property plaintiff never owned; Cuba confiscated only time-limited concession, not physical docks Cuba always owned; temporal property boundaries deserve equal respect to spatial boundaries.

Implications: Companies doing business in Cuba using American-built infrastructure face substantial legal risk even when original American property interests expired decades ago. Decision preserves Title III as powerful deterrent preventing companies from waiting out clock on expired property interests. Lower courts must resolve whether statute allows unlimited repeated recoveries, whether lawful-travel exception shields defendants receiving government licenses, and whether concession limitations preclude passenger-service liability.

The Fine Print:

• 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"
• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(4)(A): "The term 'confiscated' refers to the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property"

Primary Cases:

• Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964): Cuban Government nationalized by forced expropriation property in which American nationals held interests; confiscation can affect both physical property and property interests
• Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002): Property interests defined by both geographic dimensions and temporal aspects; both dimensions must be considered when viewing interest in entirety

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Docket Link: Here | Argument: 3/30/26

Overview: A former hotel security guard lost his arbitration entirely, then argued the federal court he originally chose lacked power to confirm the award — forcing the Court to resolve when federal courts retain post-arbitration jurisdiction.

Question Presented: When a federal court pauses a lawsuit for arbitration, does it keep the power to confirm or throw out the arbitration result — even without independent jurisdictional grounds.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Supreme Court granted cert on the jurisdictional question.

Main Arguments:

• Jules (Petitioner): (1) FAA Section 8 expressly grants "retain jurisdiction" language for maritime cases only — Congress deliberately omitted it from Sections 9 and 10; (2) Badgerow v. Walters (2022) forecloses jurisdiction because the confirm-or-vacate application lacks any independent federal basis on its face; (3) the jurisdictional-anchor theory incentivizes pointless federal lawsuits, directly undermining the FAA's purpose of keeping arbitrable disputes out of court
• Balazs Respondents: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1367's supplemental jurisdiction statute — enacted separately from the FAA — grants courts power over all related claims in the same pending case, no new jurisdictional basis needed; (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding new post-arbitration lawsuits, not pending federal cases already vested with original jurisdiction; (3) Jules's theory forces two simultaneous court tracks — federal appeal of the pre-arbitration order plus state-court post-arbitration proceedings — creating procedural chaos Congress never endorsed

Implications: A Jules victory forces winning arbitration parties to re-file in state court, pay new fees, re-serve defendants, and educate a new court from scratch — benefiting recalcitrant defendants. A respondents' victory preserves the rule in seven circuits: one court, one proceeding, one appeal resolves the entire dispute, giving businesses and employees certainty about where arbitration enforcement lands.

The Fine Print:

• FAA Section 8, 9 U.S.C. § 8: "the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its decree upon the award"
• 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a): "in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III"

Primary Cases:

• Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Federal courts cannot use a "look-through" method to establish jurisdiction over FAA Section 9 and 10 applications — the application itself must reveal an independent jurisdictional basis
• Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co. (2000): The court with power to stay an action under FAA Section 3 holds the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award

Oral Advocates:

• Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.
• Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Timestamps:

[00:01:25] Argument Begins

[00:01:32] Jules Opening Statement

[00:03:03] Jules Free for All Questions

[00:26:40] Jules Round Robin Questions

[00:32:42] Balazs Opening Statement

[00:34:05] Balazs Free for All Questions

[00:51:56] Balazs Round Robin Questions

[00:52:08] Jules Rebuttal

Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties | Case No. 25-83 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether federal courts retain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate arbitration awards when confirmation motions lack independent federal jurisdiction.

Overview: Federal Arbitration Act case resolves circuit split over whether district courts maintaining stayed federal claims during arbitration keep jurisdiction to confirm or vacate resulting arbitral awards.

Posture: District Court confirmed award; Second Circuit affirmed; Fourth Circuit created split reading Badgerow broadly.

Main Arguments:

Jules (Petitioner):

• (1) Badgerow requires independent jurisdictional basis for all Section 9 and Section 10 motions regardless of pre-existing suits;
• (2) FAA created comprehensive jurisdictional scheme demanding textual authorization;
• (3) Service requirements in Sections 9 and 12 establish confirm-or-vacate applications as new federal actions.

Balazs Properties (Respondent):

• (1) Pre-existing federal question jurisdiction over stayed claims extends to confirm-or-vacate motions within same case;
• (2) Badgerow addressed only freestanding applications without prior federal lawsuits;
• (3) Section 3 mandatory stay preserves jurisdiction for FAA's supervisory framework.

Holding: A federal court that previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0 decision affirmed Second Circuit. Justice Sotomayor wrote unanimous opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. No separate opinions.

Majority Reasoning:

• (1) Jurisdiction over cases includes jurisdiction over motions within those cases without requiring look-through approach to controversies outside court;
• (2) Federal question jurisdiction establishing district court authority over original federal claims survived arbitration stay and extended to confirm-or-vacate determinations;
• (3) FAA's supervisory framework requiring mandatory stays rather than dismissals contemplates courts superintending arbitration through final confirmation or vacatur.

Separate Opinions: None.

Implications: Federal courts maintain continuous jurisdiction over federal claims throughout arbitration and its aftermath. Streamlines arbitration by consolidating all proceedings—initial stay through final confirmation—in single federal forum when federal claims launched case. Prevents wasteful dual-track litigation where federal courts handle arbitrability appeals while state courts simultaneously handle confirm-or-vacate proceedings. Reinforces FAA's supervisory framework keeping courts engaged from arbitration commencement through final resolution.

The Fine Print:

• Federal Arbitration Act § 3: "If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement"
• 28 U.S.C. § 1331: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"

Primary Cases:

• Badgerow v. Walters (2022): Freestanding FAA confirm-or-vacate motions cannot use look-through approach to locate federal jurisdiction in underlying disputes not before court absent textual authorization
• Smith v. Spizzirri (2024): Section 3 requires mandatory stays rather than dismissals when sending parties to arbitration, preserving supervisory role for courts assisting arbitration and facilitating award recovery

Oral Advocates:

• Jules (Petitioner): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner and Block.
• Andre Balazs (Respondents): Daniel L. Geyser of Haynes and Boone, LLP

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the FAAAA's safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers who arrange shipments with unsafe motor carriers.

Overview: Truck crash victim challenges federal preemption of state tort claims against transportation brokers, testing whether states retain authority to impose negligent-hiring liability on brokers who select carriers with poor safety records.

Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed district court preemption ruling; circuit split over broker liability.

Interview with Marc Blubaugh: Here

Main Arguments:

Montgomery (Petitioner):

• (1) Negligent-hiring claims concern motor vehicles because they regulate which trucks transport goods on highways;
• (2) Safety exception preserves traditional state tort law policing dangerous conduct;
• (3) Brokers selecting unsafe carriers directly threaten highway safety and public welfare.

C.H. Robinson (Respondent):

• (1) Brokers neither own trucks nor hire drivers, making claims unrelated to motor vehicles;
• (2) Safety exception limited to vehicle-specific regulations like inspections and maintenance standards;
• (3) Subsection (b) excludes brokers from safety regulation, making subsection (c) identical interpretation required.

Holding: The FAAAA does not preempt negligent hiring claims made against transportation brokers because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Alito. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Claims "with respect to motor vehicles" means claims that "concern" vehicles used in transportation, applying ordinary meaning and Dan's City Used Cars precedent; (2) Requiring brokers to exercise reasonable care when selecting carriers concerns the trucks transporting goods most obviously; (3) Safety exception saves only motor-vehicle-safety-related claims, leaving price and route regulations preempted, avoiding swallow-the-rule problem.

Separate Opinions: Kavanaugh concurrence (joined by Alito): Case presents closer questions than majority suggests; contextual considerations point both directions; insurance coverage dichotomy and intrastate-interstate anomaly favor brokers; economic-deregulation structure and federal-regulation absence favor Montgomery; brokers retain defenses through reasonableness standard and proximate cause requirements.

Implications: Transportation brokers face potential state tort liability when selecting motor carriers with poor safety records, affecting 28,000 brokers arranging one-third of domestic freight shipments. Courts must develop standards defining reasonable broker due diligence in carrier selection. Ruling creates enforcement asymmetry permitting state safety regulation for interstate but not intrastate broker arrangements, potentially inviting constitutional challenge to subsection (b) preemption authority.

The Fine Print:

• 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1): "A State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property."
• 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A): The preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."

Primary Cases:

• Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (2013): "With respect to" means "concerns" in FAAAA preemption provision context, establishing ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation of preemption scope.
• Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (2012): State common-law duties and standards of care constitute "potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy" within state regulatory authority over safety matters.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner (Montgomery): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Petitioner Montgomery.
• For Respondents (C.H. Robinson and Caribe Transport): Ted Boutrous of Gibson Dunn.
• For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Caribe): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Case Preview

[00:00:53] Oral Advocates

[00:01:09] Oral Argument Begins

[00:01:17] Montgomery Opening Statement

[00:03:15] Montgomery Free for All Questions

[00:26:20] Montgomery Round Robin Questions

[00:44:00] Caribe and Robinson Opening Statement

[00:46:15] Caribe and Robinson Free for All Questions

[01:04:17] Caribe and Robinson Round Robin Questions

[01:09:37] United States Opening Statement

[01:11:07] United States Free for All Questions

[01:20:35] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:36:19] Montgomery Rebuttal

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Case No. 24-1238 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether the FAAAA's safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers who arrange shipments with unsafe motor carriers.

Overview: Truck crash victim challenges federal preemption of state tort claims against transportation brokers, testing whether states retain authority to impose negligent-hiring liability on brokers who select carriers with poor safety records.

Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed district court preemption ruling; circuit split over broker liability.

Interview with Marc Blubaugh: Here

Main Arguments:

Montgomery (Petitioner):

• (1) Negligent-hiring claims concern motor vehicles because they regulate which trucks transport goods on highways;
• (2) Safety exception preserves traditional state tort law policing dangerous conduct;
• (3) Brokers selecting unsafe carriers directly threaten highway safety and public welfare.

C.H. Robinson (Respondent):

• (1) Brokers neither own trucks nor hire drivers, making claims unrelated to motor vehicles;
• (2) Safety exception limited to vehicle-specific regulations like inspections and maintenance standards;
• (3) Subsection (b) excludes brokers from safety regulation, making subsection (c) identical interpretation required.

Holding: The FAAAA does not preempt negligent hiring claims made against transportation brokers because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Jackson. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion joined by Alito. Reversed and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Claims "with respect to motor vehicles" means claims that "concern" vehicles used in transportation, applying ordinary meaning and Dan's City Used Cars precedent; (2) Requiring brokers to exercise reasonable care when selecting carriers concerns the trucks transporting goods most obviously; (3) Safety exception saves only motor-vehicle-safety-related claims, leaving price and route regulations preempted, avoiding swallow-the-rule problem.

Separate Opinions: Kavanaugh concurrence (joined by Alito): Case presents closer questions than majority suggests; contextual considerations point both directions; insurance coverage dichotomy and intrastate-interstate anomaly favor brokers; economic-deregulation structure and federal-regulation absence favor Montgomery; brokers retain defenses through reasonableness standard and proximate cause requirements.

Implications: Transportation brokers face potential state tort liability when selecting motor carriers with poor safety records, affecting 28,000 brokers arranging one-third of domestic freight shipments. Courts must develop standards defining reasonable broker due diligence in carrier selection. Ruling creates enforcement asymmetry permitting state safety regulation for interstate but not intrastate broker arrangements, potentially inviting constitutional challenge to subsection (b) preemption authority.

The Fine Print:

• 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(1): "A State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier or broker with respect to the transportation of property."
• 49 U.S.C. §14501(c)(2)(A): The preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles."

Primary Cases:

• Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (2013): "With respect to" means "concerns" in FAAAA preemption provision context, establishing ordinary-meaning approach to statutory interpretation of preemption scope.
• Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (2012): State common-law duties and standards of care constitute "potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy" within state regulatory authority over safety matters.

Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Louisiana | Nos. 25A1207, 25A1208 | Decided May 14, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Overview: The Supreme Court blocked the Fifth Circuit's nationwide order reinstating mifepristone's in-person dispensing requirement, preserving mail-order and telehealth distribution while Louisiana's APA challenge to the FDA's 2023 REMS proceeds.

Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit's §705 order suspending the FDA's 2023 mifepristone REMS changes should remain in effect pending appeal.

Posture: District court denied preliminary relief; Fifth Circuit reversed, suspending 2023 REMS nationwide under §705.

Main Arguments:

• Mifepristone Manufacturers (Applicants):

(1) Louisiana lacks Article III standing — the 2023 REMS does not regulate Louisiana, and its sovereign and Medicaid-cost injuries depend on attenuated third-party choices the Court rejected in Alliance and Texas;

(2) The FDA's removal of the in-person requirement rested on 15 studies covering 55,000 patients and consistent adverse-event data showing no safety concerns;

(3) The Fifth Circuit's order upends five years of settled distribution infrastructure, inflicting irreparable harm on manufacturers, patients, providers, and 20 states supporting the current REMS.

• Louisiana (Respondent):

(1) Louisiana holds sovereign standing — approximately 1,000 violations of its abortion laws occur monthly, each constituting an injury to its sovereignty under Stevens, reinforced by $92,000 in Medicaid costs and $17,000 in enforcement outlays;

(2) The FDA itself refuses to defend the 2023 REMS, conceding it reflected "inadequate consideration," and three separate Fifth Circuit panels found the APA challenge likely meritorious;

(3) Neither the public nor the FDA holds any interest in perpetuating an agency action the agency itself admits lacked adequate study, and the manufacturers' desire for higher profits does not constitute irreparable harm.

Ruling: 7–2. The Court issued an unsigned (per curiam) order granting the stay applications, blocking the Fifth Circuit's May 1, 2026 order.

Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion (unjoined). Justice Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion (unjoined). Stay granted pending disposition of the Fifth Circuit appeal and any timely certiorari petition.

Majority Reasoning: (1) The per curiam order provided no reasoning — the Court granted the stay applications without explaining which factors it found satisfied; (2) The order specified only procedural mechanics: what it stayed, conditions for termination, and the timeline; (3) The absence of reasoning left unresolved whether the Court credited the manufacturers' standing arguments, the APA merits defense, or the equities analysis.

Separate Opinions:

(1) Justice Thomas (dissenting): Mifepristone manufacturers derive their claimed injury from profits earned through a "criminal enterprise" violating the Comstock Act (18 U.S.C. §§1461, 1462). No court should protect revenue flowing from federal felonies.

(2) Justice Alito (dissenting): The manufacturers failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. The FDA won't enforce the old rules, the manufacturers devoted only 3 of 80-plus pages to irreparable harm, and lost sales in states banning abortion cannot count as cognizable injury because equity demands surrender of profits from unlawful activity.

Implications: This stay preserves nationwide mail-order and telehealth mifepristone distribution while the Fifth Circuit appeal and potential certiorari proceedings unfold. The unresolved standing question — whether states can challenge federal deregulation through sovereign-injury and downstream-cost theories — carries transformative potential for administrative law far beyond mifepristone.

Thomas's invocation of the Comstock Act signals at least one Justice views existing federal law as criminalizing mail-order mifepristone distribution regardless of FDA approval. The FDA's silence and its admission of "inadequate consideration" leave the agency's ultimate posture uncertain, giving Louisiana potent ammunition on the merits.

The Fine Print:

• 5 U.S.C. §705: "On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court … may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings."
• 18 U.S.C. §1461 (Comstock Act): Bans using "the mails" to ship any "drug … for producing abortion."

Primary Cases:

• FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (2024): Unanimous Court held anti-abortion doctors lacked Article III standing to challenge the mifepristone REMS — the chain of causation from FDA regulation to downstream medical costs stretched too far and too speculatively.
• United States v. Texas (2023): Court rejected states' claims that federal immigration enforcement policies caused cognizable Article III injuries through indirect effects on state revenues and spending — downstream costs from federal policies do not automatically confer standing.

Scott v. McDougle | Virginia Gerrymandering Case | Docket Link: Here

On May 15th, the Supreme Court blocked Virginia's gerrymandered maps from taking effect. This episode breaks down the main issue and airs the Virginia Supreme Court oral arguments.

Case Overview: Virginia Supreme Court struck down partisan gerrymandering amendment because 1.3 million Virginians voted early before legislature's second approval, violating constitutional requirement that valid general election separate two legislative votes.

Question Presented: Whether General Assembly complied with Article XII Section 1's intervening-election requirement when approving constitutional amendment twice before referendum.

Oral Advocates

• Scott (Appellant): Matthew Seligman
• Commonwealth of Virginia (Appellant): Tillman Breckenridge, Virginia's Solicitor General
• McDougle (Appellee): Thomas McCarthy

Posture: Circuit court invalidated referendum. Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.

Main Arguments:

• Petitioner (Scott): (1) "Election" means Election Day only, not early voting period; (2) Legislative authority requires deference to General Assembly's constitutional interpretation; (3) Voter approval through 1.6 million ballots demonstrates democratic legitimacy.
• Respondent (McDougle): (1) "Election" encompasses complete voting process from early voting through Election Day; (2) Strict compliance with amendment procedures protects against legislative overreach; (3) Foster v. Love establishes elections include all voting actions.

Holding: 4-3. Majority opinion by Justice D. Arthur Kelsey affirmed circuit court. Chief Justice Powell dissented, joined by Justices Mann and Fulton. Referendum invalidated despite voter approval.

Majority Reasoning: (1) Article XII Section 1 requires valid intervening general election between two legislative approvals; (2) Early voting beginning September 2025 preceded January 2026 second legislative vote, preventing intervening election; (3) "Election" means combined voting actions from early voting through Election Day, citing Foster v. Love.

Separate Opinions:

• Chief Justice Powell (dissenting, joined by Mann and Fulton): Majority improperly broadened "election" definition beyond traditional Election Day meaning. Legislature complied with constitutional text requiring election between approvals.

Implications: Prevents 10-1 partisan congressional gerrymander, maintains 6-5 nonpartisan court-drawn maps. Establishes that Virginia constitutional amendment process cannot circumvent procedural requirements through narrow interpretations excluding early voting. Reinforces strict compliance standard for constitutional amendments. SCOTUS denied emergency stay May 16, 2026 without noted dissents.

The Fine Print:

• Virginia Constitution Article XII Section 1: "Any amendment...must be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session held after the next general election of members of the House of Delegates, and again agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house."
• Virginia Constitution Article II Section 6-A: "Members of the Senate and of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be elected from electoral districts established by the Virginia Redistricting Commission or by a court of competent jurisdiction."

Primary Cases:

• Foster v. Love (1997): Federal law defining "election" encompasses entire voting process including early voting through Election Day, not merely Election Day itself.
• Coleman v. Pross (1978): Virginia constitutional amendments require strict compliance with all specified prerequisites rather than substantial compliance standard.