SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, No. 141-Orig

Argued on 2024-03-20.

For United States: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For Texas: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For New Mexico: Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Santa Fe, N. M.

Question Presented:

EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master ’ s recommendation that the States ’ joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Intervener United States's Exceptions and Opening Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Reply Brief to Exceptions of Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado (Yellow Br.)

• Sur-Reply Brief of Intervener United States (Tan Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

(00:32:30) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LANORA C. PETTIT

(00:56:03) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY J. WECHSLER

(01:04:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Gonzalez v. Trevino, No. 22-1025

Argued on 2024-03-20.

For petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va. For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

In Nieves v. Bartlett , this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford , 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker , 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued respondents but no arresting officer. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened. 2. Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANYA A. BIDWELL

(00:56:40) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(01:23:15) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ANYA A. BIDWELL

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. Inc., No. 22-1079

Argued on 2024-03-19.

For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For debtor respondents: C. Kevin Marshall, Washington, D. C. For claimant respondents: David C. Frederick, Washington,

Question Presented:

Asbestos claims in state court have been plagued by rampant fraud, with claimants seeking inflated recoveries against some asbestos defendants by suppressing evidence of claims against other asbestos defendants. For nearly a decade, bankruptcy courts have sought to protect debtors and their insurers by requiring fraud-prevention measures-like ensuring access to claims information-before channeling the asbestos claims against the debtor to a trust. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). In this case, a Chapter 11 debtor colluded with representatives for asbestos claimants to propose and confirm a plan that includes these fraud-prevention measures only for uninsured asbestos claims-not insured asbestos claims. Petitioner is the insurer who bears the financial burden of those 14,000 insured claims. The Bankruptcy Code's plain text empowers any "party in interest" to "raise" and "be heard on any issue" in a Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). But the court of appeals refused to adjudicate petitioner's objections to the fraud and collusion, relying on judge-made limitations engrafted onto the Code. The question presented is: Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a "party in interest" that may object to a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALLYSON N. HO

(00:20:24) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANTHONY A. YANG

(00:33:48) ORAL ARGUMENT OF C. KEVIN MARSHALL

(00:52:07) ORAL ARGUMENT DAVID C. FREDERICK

(01:10:38) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ALLYSON N. HO

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Diaz v. United States, No. 23-14

Argued on 2024-03-19.

For petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). The question is: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER

(00:41:57) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW GUARNIERI

(01:20:43) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Murthy, Surgeon Gen. v. Missouri, No. 23-411

Argued on 2024-03-18.

For petitioners: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.

Question Presented:

in the application. The stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court . CERT. GRANTED 10/20/2023 QUESTION PRESENTED: . . . the government respectfully suggests the following questions presented: (1) Whether respondents have Article III standing; (2) Whether the government ’ s challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies ’ content-moderation decisions into state action and violated respondents ’ First Amendment rights; and (3) Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

(00:48:37) ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

(01:37:51) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

NRA v. Vullo, No. 22-842

Argued on 2024-03-18.

For petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id . at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30. Accordingly, the questions presented are: 1. Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy? 2. Does such coercion violate a clearly established First Amendment right?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID D. COLE

(00:35:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EPHRAIM McDOWELL

(00:47:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NEAL K. KATYAL

(01:11:03) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID D. COLE

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, No. 23-3

Argued on 2024-02-28.

For petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D. C. For respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.

Question Presented:

Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

(00:25:57) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID J. HARRIS, JR.

(00:40:35) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JESSICA L. ELLSWORTH

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Garland, Att'y Gen. v. Cargill, No. 22-976

Argued on 2024-02-28.

For petitioners: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Question Presented:

Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq ., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks. The question presented is as follows: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot * * * by a single function of the trigger."

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

(00:35:46) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL

(01:26:08) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN H. FLETCHER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 22-529

Argued on 2024-02-27.

For petitioners: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D. C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3). The question presented is: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

(00:36:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(01:01:46) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(01:44:36) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN E. TAYLOR

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

McIntosh v. United States, No. 22-7386

Argued on 2024-02-27.

For petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y. For respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

1.Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.? The appellate courts are divided on this issue. The Court of Appeals below rejected petitioner's argument that the district court's forfeiture order was invalid where the government failed to submit a preliminary order of forfeiture until more than two- and-half years after sentencing, and the government also failed to comply with the district court's direction that it provide a formal order of forfeiture within one week of sentencing, Compare United States v. Maddux , 37 F.4th 1170 (6th Cir. 2022) (rejecting the decision below and concluding that Rule 32.2 was a mandatory claim processing rule preventing forfeiture in that case); and United States v. Shakur , 691 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 201l)(Rule 32.2's mandates are jurisdictional, and a court lacks the "power to enter" forfeiture once Rule 32.2's deadlines have passed); and United States v. Martin , 662 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that Rule 32.2's deadlines are simply "time-related directive[s]"). 2.Is the theft of cash from an individual sufficient to satisfy the "interstate commerce" element of 18 U.S.C. §1951 a necessary predicate for federal jurisdiction of what is otherwise local criminal conduct that should be prosecuted by the individual states? The Solicitor General candidly admitted in a prior case before this Court that: when there's a robbery of an individual, the links [to Commerce] are much more attenuated and there's a longer chain of causation to get to commerce. And so in those contexts, even within the depletion of assets theory that my brother espouses before the Court, the courts have said, as a normal matter, robberies of individuals just don't fall within the Commerce Clause. Taylor v. United States , 14- 6166 (Transcript of Oral Argument, Feb, 23, 2016) at 23-24. Despite this concession, the Second Circuit upheld petitioner's conviction under the depletion of assets theory, a theory that when applied to an individual effectively eviscerates the "interstate commerce" element and raises serious Federalism concerns.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:08) ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEVEN Y. YUROWITZ

(00:23:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW GUARNIERI

(00:44:01) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF STEVEN Y. YUROWITZ

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y