SCOTUS Oral Arguments

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, No. 22-277

Argued on 2024-02-26.

For petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

Question Presented:

Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so. 2. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-12355

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF HENRY C. WHITAKER

(00:55:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:42:39) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(02:19:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF HENRY C. WHITAKER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, No. 22-555

Argued on 2024-02-26.

For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General,

Question Presented:

Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck , 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston , 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo , 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU , 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton , 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022). The question presented is whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(00:30:39) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(00:40:27) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AARON L. NIELSON

(01:16:54) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, No. 22-1078

Argued on 2024-02-21.

For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N. Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Whether the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), precludes retrospective relief for acts that occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

(00:25:29) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOE WESLEY EARNHARDT

(00:43:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF YAIRA DUBIN

(00:48:47) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Ohio v. EPA, No. 23A349

Argued on 2024-02-21.

For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio. For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D. C. For federal respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For state respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N. Y. VIDED.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATHURA J. SRIDHARAN

(00:23:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CATHERINE E. STETSON

(00:40:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(01:15:44) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JUDITH N. VALE

(01:26:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CATHERINE E. STETSON

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, FRS, No. 22-1008

Argued on 2024-02-20.

For petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va. For respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702- before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule. The question presented is: Does a plaintiffs APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRYAN K. WEIR

(00:31:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN W. SNYDER

(01:07:50) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BRYAN K. WEIR

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, No. 23-51

Argued on 2024-02-20.

For petitioners: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal. For respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N. Y.

Question Presented:

The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry." The question presented is: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JENNIFER D. BENNETT

(00:25:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF TRACI L. LOVITT

(00:55:09) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JENNIFER D. BENNETT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Trump v. Anderson, No. 23-719

Argued on 2024-02-08.

For petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex. For respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo. For respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Question Presented:

The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review. The question presented is: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL

(00:53:39) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JASON C. MURRAY

(01:53:02) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SHANNON W. STEVENSON

(02:05:54) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Relentless, Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce, No. 22-1219

Argued on 2024-01-17.

For petitioners: Roman Martinez, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency. 1. 2. Whether the phrase "necessary and appropriate" in the MSA augments agency power to force domestic fishing vessels to contract with and pay the salaries of federal observers they must carry. 1. This is the question already accepted by the Court in Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al ., No. 22-451, certiorari granted (May 1, 2023) concerning the same statute and regulation. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-1886

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

(01:01:33) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(02:06:46) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ROMAN MARTINEZ

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, Sec. of Comm., No. 22-451

Argued on 2024-01-17.

For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, under a proper application of Chevron , the MSA implicitly grants NMFS the power to force domestic vessels to pay the salaries of the monitors they must carry. 2. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(00:40:25) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR

(01:12:57) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT PAUL D. CLEMENT

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P., No. 22-1165

Argued on 2024-01-16.

For petitioners: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill. For respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D. C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading. Against this backdrop, this case presents the following question: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits- that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise- misleading statement.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LINDA T. COBERLY

(00:22:45) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID C. FREDERICK

(00:44:57) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EPHRAIM McDOWELL

(01:00:33) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LINDA T. COBERLY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y