SCOTUScast

On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Quinn. The central question in this case concerned whether a state can, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, compel in-home care providers paid for through Medicare, also known as “personal assistants” or “PAs,” to financially support a union to be their exclusive representative with respect to employment-related collective bargaining. -- In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held by a vote of 5-4 that the First Amendment prohibits the collection of an agency fee from PAs who do not want to join or support the union. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. The decision of the Seventh Circuit was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. -- To discuss the case, we have Andrew Grossman who is an Associate at Baker & Hostetler LLP and Adjunct Scholar at the Cato Institute.

On June 12, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Clark v. Rameker. The question in this case is whether an individual retirement account that a debtor has inherited is exempt from the debtor's bankruptcy estate under Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts "retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation" under certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. -- Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that funds contained in an inherited IRA do not qualify as "retirement funds" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code exemption. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was affirmed. -- To discuss the case, we have Jennifer Spreng, an associate professor of law at the Arizona Summit Law School.

On June 19, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lane v. Franks. The question in this case is twofold: First, whether the government is categorically free under the First Amendment to retaliate against a public employee for truthful sworn testimony that was compelled by subpoena and was not a part of the employee’s ordinary job responsibilities; and second, whether qualified immunity precludes a claim for damages in such an action. -- Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that Lane's truthful sworn testimony at a state representative's criminal trials was speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and therefore protected. Even though the testimony was protected, however, Lane's claim against his superior Franks in Franks' individual capacity must be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity. The claims against Franks in his official capacity were remanded for further proceedings. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito. The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit was affirmed in part and reversed in part. -- To discuss the case, we have Josh Blackman, who is an Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law.

On June 19, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Clarke. The question in this case is whether an unsupported allegation that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a summons for an improper purpose entitles an opponent of the summons to an evidentiary hearing to question IRS officials about their reasons for issuing the summons. -- Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that an allegation of improper purpose does not entitle a taxpayer to examine IRS officials. Rather, the taxpayer may do so when he can point to “specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an inference of bad faith." The contrary decision of the Eleventh Circuit was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. -- To discuss the case, we have Kristin Gutting, an associate professor of law at the Charleston School of Law.

On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Loughrin v. United States. The question in this case is whether the government must prove that a defendant intended to defraud a bank and expose it to risk of loss in every prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, or whether the government need only prove that a defendant knowingly attempted to defraud someone “to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” -- Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the government does not need to prove that a defendant charged with violating 18 U. S. C.§1344(2) intended to defraud a bank. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit was affirmed. Justice Kagan's opinion was joined in full by the Chief and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined as to Parts I and II, Part III–A except the last paragraph, and the last footnote of Part III–B. In addition, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in part and in the judgment. Justice Alito filed a separate concurrence in part and in the judgment. -- To discuss the case, we have Todd Braunstein, who is counsel at the law firm WilmerHale.

On May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hall v. Florida. The question in the case is whether the Florida scheme for identifying intellectually disabled defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the relevant Florida law, under which all further exploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed if a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70,­ creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia and Thomas, joined. The decision of the Supreme Court of Florida was reversed and the case remanded. To discuss the case, we have Mr. Kent Scheidegger, who is the Legal Director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.

On June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCullen v. Coakley. This case involved the constitutionality of Massachusetts’s law regarding speech within 35 feet of an abortion clinic. The law makes it a crime for speakers other than clinic employees to “enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within thirty-five feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of an abortion clinic.” The questions are first whether the law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to petitioners; and second, whether, if Hill v. Colorado permits enforcement of this law, Hill should be limited or overruled. -- The Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that the Massachusetts law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that the law was content neutral but not narrowly tailored to further the government’s legitimate interests. While Massachusetts has a legitimate interest in protecting public safety, patient access to healthcare, and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and streets, the law burdened more speech than necessary to achieve these interests. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. The decision of the First Circuit was reversed. -- To discuss the case, we have Mr. Erik S. Jaffe, Law Office of Erik S. Jaffe, P.C. and Prof. Richard W. Garnett, IV, Professor of Law & Concurrent Professor of Political Science, Founding Director, Program on Church, State & Society, University of Notre Dame Law School.

On June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning. This case presented three questions arising from President Obama’s attempt to make three recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board or NLRB. First, it asked whether the President can exercise the recess appointment power during a temporary recess that occurs while the Senate is still in session, or is instead limited to recesses between enumerated sessions. Second, the case asked whether the President may exercise the recess appointment power to fill any vacancy that exists during a recess--including vacancies that arose before the recess occurred--or whether that power is limited to vacancies that arise during the recess. Finally, the case asked whether the Senate is in continuous recess if, though effectively out of town, it continues to convene every three days in brief pro forma sessions. -- In a 9-0 decision, the Court found President Obama’s attempted recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board invalid. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer ruled that the Recess Appointments Clause empowers the President to fill any existing vacancy during any recess, whether it be intra-session or intersession, of sufficient length. He also held that the phrase 'vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate,' applies both to vacancies that first arise during a recess and to vacancies that arise before a recess but continue to exist during the recess. Finally, he concluded that because the Senate was in session during its pro forma sessions, the recess during which the President made the appointments was only 3 days, and therefore too short to trigger the President’s recess appointment authority. The appointments were therefore invalid. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, which the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Alito joined. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit, which held that the recess appointments fell outside the scope of the Clause, was affirmed. -- To discuss the case, we have Noel J. Francisco, Partner, Jones Day; Prof. Kristin E. Hickman, Harlan Albert Rogers Professor in Law; Associate Director, Corporate Institute, University of Minnesota Law School; and Prof. Michael B. Rappaport, Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law, and Director, Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, University of San Diego School of Law.

On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell. Both cases involve a challenge by small, closely held corporations to a regulation issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, often called the “contraceptives mandate,” under which companies are required to provide their employees with health insurance that covers a broad array of contraceptives, including some that may function as abortifacients. The corporations and their owners assert religious objections to this mandate, and the principal question before the Court is whether the mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which requires that the government not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest. -- In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that, as applied to closely held corporations, the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ​ (RFRA)​. Per Justice Alito, ​RFRA protects closely held for-profit corporations like Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mandel, and HHS’s contraceptive mandate substantially burdens the exercise ​of ​their ​religion​. Assuming for the sake of argument that ​the government has a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to health care, the mandate is not the least restrictive means for the government to achieve this goal. Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion which Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan joined. Justices Kagan and Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion. The decision of the Tenth Circuit (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores) was affirmed; The decision of the Third Circuit (Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Burwell), was reversed and remanded. -- To discuss the case, we have Prof. Michael P. Moreland, Vice Dean & Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law as well as Prof. Richard W. Garnett, IV, Professor of Law & Concurrent Professor of Political Science, Founding Director, Program on Church, State & Society, University of Notre Dame Law School.

On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.This case presented two questions. The first is whether the Supreme Court should overrule or modify its decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the “fraud-on-the market theory,” which posits that a company’s material misrepresentation regarding a security traded in the open market that affects the price of the security is presumed to have been relied on by a plaintiff who purchased the security and suffered a loss; and second whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock. -- In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court noted that under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC’s rule 10(b)(5), investors can recover damages in a private securities fraud action only if they prove that they relied on the defendant's misrepresentation in deciding to buy or sell a company's stock. In Basic, the Court held that investors could satisfy this reliance requirement by invoking a presumption that the price of stock traded in an efficient market reflects all public, material information-including material misstatements. Given that Congress can change the law, Halliburton failed to provide the “special justification” necessary for the Court to overrule its prior decision in a statutory case. For the same reason, class action plaintiffs may rely on the Basic presumption to avoid having to directly prove in the first instance that the misrepresentation affected the stock price at the class certification stage. But nothing in Basic or any other Supreme Court decision prevents defendants from defeating this presumption at the class certification stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in fact affect the stock price, and courts should give them the opportunity to do so. The Court vacated and remanded the decision of the Fifth Circuit. -- To discuss the case, we have Adam Pritchard, who is the Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law at the University of Michigan School of Law.