SCOTUScast

On June 12, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in POM Wonderful LLC v. The Coca Cola Company. This case involves the Lanham Act, which allows individuals to sue for harms resulting from misleading representations of goods or services in commerce. The question in this case is whether a private party can bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a product label that complies with regulations under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. -- In an unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that competitors may bring Lanham Act claims that challenge food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was reversed. -- To discuss the case, we have Prof. William Kratzke, who is the Cecil C. Humphreys Professor of Law at the University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law.

On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital. The question in this case is whether post-judgment discovery in aid of enforcing a judgment against a foreign state can be ordered with respect to all assets of a foreign state regardless of their location or use, as held by the Second Circuit, or is limited to assets located in the United States that are potentially subject to execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., as held by the Seventh, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. -- In an opinion issued by Justice Scalia, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit by a vote of 7-1 (Justice Sotomayor not participating), holding that no provision in the FSIA immunizes a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from postjudgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial assets. Justice Ginsburg dissented. -- To discuss the case, we have Prof. Michael D. Ramsey, Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law, Director, International & Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego School of Law as well as Professor Thomas Lee, the Leitner Family Professor of International Law, Director Graduate and International Studies, Fordham University School of Law.

On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison. This case presented two questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts: One, does Article III of the Constitution permit bankruptcy courts to exercise the judicial power of the United States on the basis of litigant consent--and if so, can consent be implied by litigant conduct? The second question is whether a bankruptcy judge may submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a “core” proceeding. -- In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that while, under the reasoning of Stern v. Marshall, the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim, the relevant statute nevertheless permits a bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to be reviewed de novo by the district court. Because this determination sufficed to affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit in this particular case, the Supreme Court did not rule on the viability of litigant consent to jurisdiction. -- To discuss the case, we have Thomas Plank, who is the Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law.

On June 9, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio (formerly Mayorkas v. Cuellar de Osorio). This case involved two questions: (1) Whether Section 1153(h)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act– which provides rules for determining whether particular aliens qualify as “children” so that they can obtain visas or adjustments of their immigration status as derivative beneficiaries of sponsored family member immigrants (also known as “primary beneficiaries”) – unambiguously grants relief to all aliens who qualify as “child” derivative beneficiaries at the time a visa petition is filed but age out of qualification by the time the visa becomes available to the primary beneficiary; and (2) whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reasonably interpreted Section 1153(h)(3). -- Although the District Court deferred to the BIA’s determination that only those petitions that can be seamlessly converted from one family preference category to another without the need for a new sponsor are entitled to conversion under §1153(h)(3), the en banc Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the provision unambiguously entitled all aged-out derivative beneficiaries to automatic conversion and priority date retention. --

By a fractured vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Justice Kagan announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Breyer, concluding that the BIA’s textually reasonable construction of §1153(h)(3)’s ambiguous language was entitled to deference. The Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed that the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable, but not because an agency has authority to resolve direct conflicts within a statute. The BIA’s reasonable interpretation of §1153(h)(3) was simply consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, with the established meaning of automatic conversion in immigration law, and with the structure of the family-based immigration system. Justice Alito dissented. Justice Sotomayor dissented joined by Justice Breyer in full and Justice Thomas except as to footnote 3. --

To discuss the case, we have Margaret Stock, who is an attorney with the Anchorage office of Cascadia Cross Border Law.

On June 2, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Bond v. United States. The question in this case was twofold: First, whether the Constitution’s structural limits on federal authority place any constraints on Congress’ ability to enact legislation to implement a valid treaty in circumstances where the implementing law intrudes on traditional state prerogatives. The second question is whether the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act can be interpreted not to reach ordinary poisoning cases, which have traditionally been handled by state and local authorities. The Third Circuit had upheld the Convention’s application to the defendant in this case. --

By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Third Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, specifically ​18 U.S.C. § 229,​ did not encompass Bond’s simple assault. As a result, the Court did not need to reach the issue of Congress’ power in implementing the Convention. --

Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the judgment which Justice Thomas joined and Justice Alito joined as to part I. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment which Justice Scalia joined and Justice Alito joined as to parts I, II, and III. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. The decision of the Third Circuit was reversed. --

To discuss the case, we have Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz who is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center.

On November 5, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burt v. Titlow. This case involves an appeal by the State of Michigan from a federal grant of habeas relief to a state prisoner. The question is whether a federal appellate court, the Sixth Circuit, erred in granting habeas relief to a prisoner on the grounds that she was denied effective assistance of counsel when her attorney allowed her to withdraw a manslaughter plea and maintain a claim of innocence, with the result that she was convicted of second-degree murder, a more serious crime. --

By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit failed to apply the "doubly deferential" standard of review recognized by the Court's case law when it refused to credit a lower state court's reasonable factual finding and assumed that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Alito's opinion. Justice Sotomayor also filed a concurring opinion and Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment only. --

To discuss the case, we have Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Philadelphia District Attorney's Office.

On May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wood v. Moss. This lawsuit against several Secret Service agents presents two questions: one, did the court of appeals err in denying qualified immunity to agents protecting the president by evaluating the respondent’s claim of viewpoint discrimination at a high level of generality, and concluding that pro- and anti-Bush demonstrators should have been positioned an equal distance from the President while he was dining on the outdoor patio and while he was travelling by motorcade? Two, have respondents adequately pleaded viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment when no factual allegations support their claim of discriminatory motive and there was an obvious security-based rationale for moving the nearby anti-Bush group and not the farther-away pro-Bush group? --

In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Secret Service agents are entitled to immunity. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was reversed. --

To discuss the case, we have Patrick Garry, who is a professor of law at the University of South Dakota School of Law.

On May 19, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer. The question in this case, which concerns the copyright for a screenplay on which the movie Raging Bull was based, was whether the defense of “laches”--that is, that the other side delayed too long in bringing its claim--can be asserted to bar a copyright claim for damages falling within the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by Congress. --

In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held by a vote of 6-3 that Laches cannot be invoked as a bar to Petrella’s pursuit of a claim for damages falling within the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period. However, in extraordinary circumstances, laches may, at the very outset of the litigation, curtail the equitable relief available to the plaintiff. In addition, laches may always come into play at the remedial stage when determining appropriate injunctive relief and assessing profits attributable to infringement. --

Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. --

To discuss the case, we have Christina Mulligan, who is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law.

Thomas F. GedeOn May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community. The question in this case is twofold. First, whether a federal court may exercise jurisdiction to prohibit an activity that violates the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), but does not occur on Indian lands; and second, whether tribal sovereign immunity precludes a state from suing a tribe in federal court for violations of IGRA that take place outside of Indian lands. --

By a vote of 5-4, the Court held in an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan that Michigan's suit against Bay Mills is barred by tribal sovereign immunity. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito. Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The opinion of the Sixth Circuit was affirmed and the case was remanded. --

To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, who is a principal in Bingham Consulting and of counsel at Bingham McCutchen. 

On May 27, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Plumhoff v. Rickard. This case presented two questions: (1) Whether the Sixth Circuit wrongly denied qualified immunity to the police officers by analyzing whether the force used was supported by subsequent case decisions rather than prohibited by clearly established law at the time the force was used; and (2) whether the Sixth Circuit further erred in holding the officers’ use of force was not reasonable as a matter of law when the suspect led police officers on a high-speed pursuit that began in Arkansas and ended in Tennessee, weaved through traffic on an interstate at a high rate of speed and made contact with the police vehicles twice, and used his vehicle in a final attempt to escape after he was surrounded by police officers, nearly hitting at least one police officer in the process. --

In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court held that the officer's conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that, even if it had, they would still be entitled to qualified immunity because they had violated no clearly established law. Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined the opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg joined as to the judgment and Parts I, II, and III, and Justice Breyer joined except as to part III-B-2. The decision of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and the case was remanded. --

To discuss the case, we have Joshua Skinner, who is a member of Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin.