SETA DC

Since the end of the Cold War, American-Russian relations have waxed and waned, depending on the administration in Washington, following a pattern of a ‘reset’ and then decline with each successive presidency. Although President Trump sought better relations with Russia, the bilateral relationship has been difficult due to a number of security and geopolitical issues. Strategic competition has been accompanied by assessments and allegations about continued Russian interference in US domestic politics. Nowhere is the continued great power rivalry between the U.S. and Russia more evident than in the Middle Eastern theater, including Syria and Libya.

The SETA Foundation at Washington DC is pleased to host a webinar discussion on the future of US-Russia relations and its impact on the Middle East.

Speakers

Angela Stent, Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Georgetown University

Mark Katz, Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Moderator

Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC

Since its establishment 19 years ago, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has transformed the country’s politics, economy, and culture in many different ways. As a result of its consistent electoral and referenda successes for nearly two decades, the party has become the dominant party in Turkish politics in unprecedented ways. As the party sets out to tackle long-standing ethnic, religious and political challenges in the country, Turkey has emerged as a regional power seeking to assume a critical role in global issues.

The SETA Foundation at Washington DC is pleased to host a webinar discussion on the transformation of Turkey under the AK Party over the last 19 years.

Speakers

Ravza Kavakcı Kan, Member of Parliament from AK Party and President of Interparliamentary Union Group at the Turkish Parliament

Talip Kucukcan, Professor of Sociology at Marmara University and Former Member of Parliament from AK Party

Huseyin Alptekin, Researcher, Strategy Studies, SETA Foundation in Istanbul

Moderator

Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC

Before entering Trump’s personal orbit, John R. Bolton was most famous for his stint as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, where his views contra the multilateral institution, and promoting American unilateralism were espoused in full view of a global audience. Twelve years after his resignation from the position in 2006, he once again caught the eye of a Republican President eager to attack the status quo in foreign policy, Donald Trump. Over the next whirlwind year of 2018, Bolton was made National Security Advisor where he suggested a more hawkish foreign policy, proposing an invasion of Venezuela to oust the leftist government, or further escalation against Iran in the Middle East. By the time Bolton had finally fallen out of Trump’s favor, he had collected a memoir of his experiences which was released in the form a book in late June 2020. Inside his recollections is an incredible firsthand look at how American Foreign Policy during the Presidency of Donald Trump is made.

The SETA Foundation at Washington DC is pleased to host a webinar discussion on what Bolton’s book tells us about US foreign policymaking.

On July 24, Turkish President Erdoğan joined hundreds of fellow worshipers for the first Friday prayers in 86 years inside Hagia Sophia. Built in the 6th century as a Byzantine cathedral, the magnificent structure remained the largest church in the Eastern Roman Empire until the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. After serving as a mosque for centuries under the Ottomans, the Turkish government decided to convert it to a museum in 1934. The restoration of Ayasofya as a mosque came after a Turkish high court’s recent ruling, which annulled the 1934 decision. The decision has been met with much celebration in Turkey and the Muslim world while it has received criticism in the West. What does Ayasofya’s restoration signify for the Turkish people and the Muslim world? What are some of the cultural and historical reasons for this decision?

In 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, launching an economic blockade by land, air and sea. The self-proclaimed 'Anti-Terror Quartet' offered maximalist demands: thirteen 'conditions' recalling Austria-Hungary's 1914 ultimatum to Serbia. They may even have intended military action. Well into its second year, the standoff in the Gulf has no realistic end in sight. With the Bahraini and Emirati criminalisation of expressing support for Qatar, and the Saudi labelling of detainees as 'traitors' for their alleged Qatari links, bitterness has been stoked between deeply interconnected peoples. The adviser to the Saudi crown prince advocating a moat to physically separate Qatar from the Arabian Peninsula illustrates the ongoing intensity―and irrationality―of the crisis. Most reporting and analysis of these developments has focused on questions of regional geopolitics, and framed the standoff in terms of its impact on (largely) Western interests. Lost in this thicket of commentary is consideration of how the Qatari leadership and population have responded to the blockade. As the 2022 FIFA World Cup draws closer, the ongoing Qatar crisis becomes increasingly important to understand. Ulrichsen offers an authoritative study of this international standoff, from both sides.

The trade battle between China and the U.S. didn’t start with Trump and won’t end with him, argue Bob Davis and Lingling Wei. The two countries have a long and fraught political and economic history which has become more contentious over the past three years―an escalation that has negatively impacted both countries' economies and the world at large―and holds the potential for even more uncertainty and disruption.

US-Turkey defense relationship has become more complicated in recent years and served as a source of tension at times. The two NATO allies have long-standing security ties and an overall robust defense partnership, as they make up some of the most capable forces within the alliance. In recent years, Turkey has ramped up its defense capabilities against regional threats and proceeded to acquire missile defense systems from Russia, after failed talks with the US and the EU on procurement of such systems, resulting in frictions within NATO. The US Congress has sought to impose sanctions and remove Turkey’s participation from the F-35 project as a punishment for the procurement of S-400 systems and Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria. The Trump administration sought a middle ground, as Turkey indicated its openness to purchase Patriot systems from the US. Turkey’s nationally produced weapons systems have already demonstrated their effectiveness in the region and the country seeks to cooperate with the US based on common interest. Given this set of dynamics at play, what does the future of US-Turkey defense relations look like? Can the two allies overcome the current difficulties and deepen their security alliance? How can they cooperate better on common defense?

To explore these questions, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC is pleased to host a high-level discussion on US-Turkey defense partnership.

Four years after the July 15 failed coup attempt, Turkey finds itself at a significantly changed geopolitical environment. Since that fateful day, Turkish security and foreign policies have been transformed in unprecedented ways so as to render the country a major player in the region including in Syria, Iraq, Libya among others. As it adopted a new counterterrorism doctrine going after the PKK/YPG as well as ISIS along its borders, Turkey also emerged as a main actor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region. While Turkey’s relationship with the US has gone through a rough patch in recent years, recent developments have shown reassuring signs. The country’s robust handling of the Covid-19 pandemic has also underlined Turkish efforts to help allies deal with this unprecedented challenge. Given that Turkey has been active and decisive in so many fronts, how have the Turkish security and foreign policies since the failed coup attempt of 2016 evolved? What are some of the guiding principles and persistent interests? Can the US and Turkey cooperate in a region with so many different forces pulling in different directions?

To discuss these questions, SETA DC is pleased to host two panel discussions on Turkish security and foreign policy on the fourth anniversary of the July 15 failed coup attempt.

Four years after the July 15 failed coup attempt, Turkey finds itself at a significantly changed geopolitical environment. Since that fateful day, Turkish security and foreign policies have been transformed in unprecedented ways so as to render the country a major player in the region including in Syria, Iraq, Libya among others. As it adopted a new counterterrorism doctrine going after the PKK/YPG as well as ISIS along its borders, Turkey also emerged as a main actor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region. While Turkey’s relationship with the US has gone through a rough patch in recent years, recent developments have shown reassuring signs. The country’s robust handling of the Covid-19 pandemic has also underlined Turkish efforts to help allies deal with this unprecedented challenge. Given that Turkey has been active and decisive in so many fronts, how have the Turkish security and foreign policies since the failed coup attempt of 2016 evolved? What are some of the guiding principles and persistent interests? Can the US and Turkey cooperate in a region with so many different forces pulling in different directions?

To discuss these questions, SETA DC is pleased to host two panel discussions on Turkish security and foreign policy on the fourth anniversary of the July 15 failed coup attempt.

Turkey’s involvement in Libya over the past several months has been decisive in changing the balance of power on the ground. While a potential takeover of the Government of National Accord by Haftar’s forces happened toward the end of 2019, Turkish support to the UN-recognized government in Tripoli dramatically changed the course of the conflict. As a proxy struggle plays out between regional powers including diametrically opposed European positions, Turkey’s Libya policy has been a major subject of discussion. As there appears to be no international consensus on Libya, Turkey seems to be marching forward with deepening its relationship with the North African country. What is the guiding principle of Turkish policy in Libya? What are some of the shared interests between the two countries? What is the Turkish view on how to arrive at a resolution of the conflict in Libya?