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In Urias‑Orellana v. Bondi, the Supreme Court unanimously held that courts of appeals must apply the substantial-evidence standard when reviewing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that a set of facts does not amount to “persecution” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Court explained that although the persecution determination involves applying legal standards to facts—a mixed question—Congress, through 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B), required deferential review of the agency’s conclusion unless the evidence compels a contrary result. In addressing the petitioners’ reliance on Wilkinson v. Garland and Guerrero‑Lasprilla v. Barr, the Court clarified that those cases concerned jurisdiction, holding that mixed questions can qualify as “questions of law” that remain reviewable despite the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions. But the Court emphasized that classifying an issue as a “question of law” for purposes of whether courts may review it at all does not determine how courts must review it once jurisdiction exists; the standard of review is instead governed by §1252(b)(4)(B), which mandates substantial-evidence deference to the agency. Applying that deferential standard, the Court affirmed the First Circuit’s decision upholding the denial of asylum because the record did not compel a finding that the threats and harm described rose to the level of persecution. 

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In 1979, the New Jersey Legislature created the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit) as a “body corporate and politic with corporate
succession” and constituted it as an “instrumentality of the State exercising public and essential governmental functions” but “independent of any supervision or control” by the New Jersey Department of
Transportation. N. J. Stat. §27:25–4(a). The State gave NJ Transit
significant authority, including the power to make bylaws, sue and be
sued, make contracts, acquire property, raise funds, own corporate entities, adopt regulations, and exercise eminent domain powers.
§§27:25–5, 27:25–13. NJ Transit’s organic statute provides that “[n]o
debt or liability of the corporation shall . . . constitute a debt [or] liability of the State,” and that “[a]ll expenses . . . shall be payable from
funds available to the corporation.” §27:25–17. NJ Transit is governed
by a board of directors (Board). §27:25–4(b). The Governor may remove Board members and may veto Board actions; the Legislature
may veto some eminent domain actions. §§27:25–4(b), (f); §27:25–
13(h). NJ Transit is now the third largest provider of bus, rail, and
light rail transit, operating within an area that includes New Jersey,
New York City, and Philadelphia. 

In 2017, Jeffrey Colt was struck by an NJ Transit bus in Midtown
Manhattan; a year later, Cedric Galette was injured when an NJ
Transit bus crashed into a car in which he was a passenger in Philadelphia. Both sued NJ Transit for negligence in their respective home
state courts. NJ Transit moved to dismiss both lawsuits, arguing that
it is an arm of New Jersey entitled to sovereign immunity. The New York Court of Appeals held that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the opposite, concluding NJ
Transit is an arm of New Jersey. This Court consolidated the cases
and granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
Held: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is
not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity. 

Read by Attorney Jake Leahy. 

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It's a ruling about procedure, but they'd like you to know how they believe the Court below should rule. That Free Exercise of Religion should Trump the State of California's right to tell Schools to withold knowledge of a students' decision to transition genders from the parents of that child.

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In a decision affirming the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court held that a trial court may, during an overnight recess that interrupts a defendant’s testimony, prohibit counsel from “managing” or shaping the defendant’s ongoing testimony without violating the Sixth Amendment. Drawing on Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that any restriction during an overnight recess is unconstitutional, explaining that once a defendant takes the stand, he retains his right to counsel but also assumes the burdens of a witness, including limits designed to protect the trial’s truth-seeking function. The Court clarified that the constitutional line is content-based, not purely temporal: while a defendant may consult with counsel about trial strategy, plea negotiations, evidentiary issues, or other matters beyond the substance of his testimony, he has no protected right to discuss “testimony for its own sake” in a way that could shape or adjust it midstream. 

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Petitioner GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondent Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee at the Aurora facility, initiated this class action, alleging GEO’s work policies for detainees violate a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment. GEO responded that the suit must be dismissed under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U. S. 18, which held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the Government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. Id., at 20–21. GEO argued that ICE had authorized and directed it to carry out the challenged labor policies. But the District Court did not read GEO’s contract with the Government to instruct GEO to adopt those policies. The District Court thus concluded that the Yearsley doctrine did not relieve GEO of legal responsibility and a trial would be necessary. GEO immediately filed an appeal, which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying Yearsley protection does not qualify for interlocutory review under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541. Held: Because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential merits defense rather than an immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable. Pp. 3–12. 

Read by Jake Leahy, more here. 

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 Held: Because the District Court’s erroneous dismissal of Whole Foods did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed when this case was removed to federal court, the Fifth Circuit correctly vacated the judg ment in Hain’s favor. 

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The Fed Government retains sovereign immunity under the FTCA for intentional non-delivery of mail.

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No one Authorized President Trump to impose these "Emergency" Tariffs under the IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act).

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The Court Below granted relief when it should have not.

Judge Niemeyer of the 4th Circuit was the lone dissent--contending that the majority had defied AEDPA’s standard of review--the 84 year old Jurist with 36 years service on that court was correct.

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 The Court unanimously held that restitution imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act is a form of criminal punishment, meaning it cannot be applied to conduct that occurred before the statute was enacted without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Although Ellingburg’s offense predated the MVRA, he was sentenced under it and ordered to pay restitution. The Eighth Circuit had treated MVRA restitution as a civil, nonpunitive measure, but the Supreme Court rejected that view. Looking to the statute’s text, structure, and placement within the criminal code, the Court emphasized that restitution is imposed only on convicted defendants, at sentencing, alongside imprisonment and fines, and through procedures governing criminal penalties. Prior precedents likewise treated MVRA restitution as punitive. While restitution also serves compensatory aims, victims cannot control or negotiate it as they could in a civil action, underscoring its criminal nature. The Court therefore reversed and remanded.