Bouarfa v. Mayorkas (Decided December 10, 2024)
In Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, the Supreme Court addressed whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the revocation of a previously approved visa petition under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The case involved Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, whose petition for her noncitizen spouse was revoked by USCIS upon suspicion of a prior sham marriage. The agency cited its authority under 8 U.S.C. §1155 to revoke approvals “for good and sufficient cause.”

The Court unanimously held that the Secretary of Homeland Security’s revocation of a visa petition is a discretionary action falling under §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of such agency decisions. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, emphasized that the broad statutory language granting discretion to revoke a visa petition reflects clear congressional intent to shield these decisions from court oversight.

This ruling underscores Congress' authority to limit procedural protections in immigration matters when decisions are entrusted to agency discretion. 

Justice Jackson writing for a unanimous Court. 

Read by RJ Dieken.

Florida and Texas both enacted laws regulating social media companies and other online platforms.  Netchoice alleges a facial challenge to the statutes under the First Amendment.  Held: both judgments (of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits) are vacated, as neither court conducted a proper analysis to the facial challenges under the First Amendment to these two laws.

Read by Jeff Barnum. 

Trump v. United States
A federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity, arguing that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, and that the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. The District Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding that former Presidents do not possess federal criminal immunity for any acts. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. Both the District Court and the D. C. Circuit declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.

Held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined in full, and in which BARRETT, J., joined except as to Part III–C. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Read by RJ Dieken. 

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson

Grants Pass, Oregon, is home to roughly 38,000 people, about 600 of whom are estimated to experience homelessness on a given day. Like many local governments across the Nation, Grants Pass has publiccamping laws that restrict encampments on public property. The Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibits activities such as camping on public property or parking overnight in the city’s parks. See §§5.61.030, 6.46.090(A)–(B). Initial violations can trigger a fine, while multiple violations can result in imprisonment. In a prior decision, Martin v. Boise, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars cities from enforcing public-camping ordinances like these against homeless individuals whenever the number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction exceeds the number of “practically available” shelter beds. 920 F. 3d 584, 617. After Martin, suits against Western cities like Grants Pass proliferated.

Plaintiffs (respondents here) filed a putative class action on behalf of homeless people living in Grants Pass, claiming that the city’s ordinances against public camping violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified the class and entered a Martin injunction prohibiting Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individuals in the city. App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a–183a. Applying Martin’s reasoning, the district court found everyone without shelter in Grants Pass was “involuntarily homeless” because the city’s total homeless population outnumbered its “practically available” shelter beds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a, 216a. The beds at Grants Pass’s charity-run shelter did not qualify as “available” in part because that shelter has rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and to attend religious services. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a–180a. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Martin injunction in relevant part. 72 F. 4th 868, 874–896. Grants Pass filed a petition for certiorari. Many States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Circuit urged the Court to grant review to assess Martin.

Held: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 15–35. 

 GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined. 

Read by RJ Dieken. 

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on January 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered outside the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the building, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal complaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminalizes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. BARRETT, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 

Read by Jeff Barnum. 

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

This is a consolidated opinion of two cases that were argued this term.  Both of them bring into question rules promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Act -- which applies the Adminsitrative Procedures Act.  The only question on appeal is whether Chevron is still good law.  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 6-3 Court, holds that "The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled."

In this very brief Per Curiam decision, RJ Dieken also reads the concurring opinions authored Justice Kagan and Justice Barrett. 

Ohio v. EPA
The Clean Air Act requires both the States and federal government to help develop environmental regulations.  When the EPA creates certain standards regarding air quality, states have to develop their own "State Implementation Plan," which requires States to both set out how to go about applying the federal regulations, and it also requires States to consider its impact on neighboring States (called the Good Neighbor Provision).  The EPA can step in when States won't comply with federal guidelines in creating their plan.  Some State plans were not approved, and 12 States obtained a stay of enforcement of these denials.  This changes the numbers for either State -- becasue part of the benefit of multiple States coming together is the economies of scale of implementation.  Ohio, and some other States, now are trying to obtain a stay of the EPA's decision to implement a federal plan, alleging that implementation is arbitrary or caprcicious, given that so many other States are now out of the plan.  The main issue of the four factors to determine whether to grant a stay, according to the Court, is which side is likely to prevail on the merits.  The Court held that the stay is granted pending review from the D.C. Circuit.  Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined.  Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. 

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma
Purdue Pharma pleaded guilty in 2007 to a federal felony based on its role in misbranding Oxycontin -- which was far more addictive than the company had made it out to be.  Purdue faced seemingly endless lawsuits in the following years based on how addictive the opioid Oxycontin was.  For over a decade that followed, the Sackler family, who owned Purdue, began to pull money out of the company -- they eventually pulled $11 billion out of the company -- 75% of the company's assets.  In 2019 the company filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  As part of the plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court, the Sackler family would contribute $4.2 billion towards settling all opioid related lawsuits, and the Bankruptcy Court would enjoin future claims against the family.  The District Court threw out the plan on review.  The Second Circuit, in a divided panel, reversed, upholding the third-party releases.  The Court reversed, deciding that the Bankruptcy Code's "catch-all" provision, is not so broad so as to allow a discharge of third-party claims against a third-party debtor.  

SEC v. Jarkesy

In the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Congress passed a suite of laws designed to combat securities fraud and increase market transparency. Three such statutes are relevant: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. These Acts respectively govern the registration of securities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment advisers. Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regulators as “the antifraud provisions,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a, 202a— target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing material facts. To enforce these Acts, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. It can file suit in federal court, or it can adjudicate the matter itself. The forum the SEC selects dictates certain aspects of the litigation. In federal court, a jury finds the facts, an Article III judge presides, and the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of discovery govern the litigation. But when the SEC adjudicates the matter in-house, there are no juries. The Commission presides while its Division of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission or its delegee—typically an Administrative Law Judge—also finds facts and decides discovery disputes, and the SEC’s Rules of Practice govern. One remedy for securities violations is civil penalties. Originally, the SEC could only obtain civil penalties from unregistered investment advisers in federal court. Then, in 2010, Congress passed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Act authorized the SEC to impose such penalties through its own in-house proceedings. Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC for alleged violations of the “antifraud provisions” contained in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the matter in-house. As relevant, the final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed securities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 

Held: When the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.